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ABSTRACT
"Halfway Between Nobody Knows Where and Somebody's
Starting Point": A History of the West End
of Montrose County, Colorado
by
John A. Hardcastle, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 1998
Major Professor: Dr. F. Ross Peterson
Department: History
The thesis contains interesting and rel evant
information concerning the impact of the mining and milling
industry on communities located within a geographically,
socially, politically, and economically defined area in
southwestern Colorado.

This area supplied a tremendous

amount of radium, vanadium, and uranlum In succeSSlve eras.
The author focuses primarily on Uravan, and examines the
town's role in the uranium procurement program during World
War II.

The study of Uravan also provides information on

the social structure of a company-owned community.

Also

examined are the ways in which government policies affected
these small communities, and the impacts of the mining and
milling industry upon the environment and human health.
(424 pages)
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FOREWORD
"No man fit to be called a historian ever finished his
work without feel i ng the inadequacy of his own powers, or of
any conce ivable human means,

to reproduce the little

fragment of history which he has chosen. II I
This thought comes to mind upon the completion of the
present work, a history of the West End of Montrose County,
Colorado.

It is by no means complete or thorough, simply a

reproduction of a little fragment of the West End's
fascinating history.

The history of even a very small place

seems impossible to tell; one searches through the records
and finds all manner of subtle or pronounced influences that
are worthy of examination, but whi ch must be excluded for
the sake of brevity and in favor of the theme one has
c hosen.

But the attempt to portray a place, to make it come

alive , and to describe what it was really like and how the
people reacted t o events and made their decisions -- that
e ffort may produce the feeling of II inadequacy" described In
the previous paragraph.
I have attempted to explain how the presence of certain
metals in West End mineral deposits has shaped the
development of the area.

I have attempted to demonstrate

the ways in which West End history has been shaped by
people, companies, and government agencies whose sole
lWilliam Roscoe Thayer IIHistory- -Quick or Dead? II
Atlantic Monthly 122 (November 1918): 642.
I

Vl

interest In the West End lay in the region ' s mineral
deposits .

And I have tried to interpret the ways In which

the West End responded to the events and decisions that
impacted its development .
During the course of my research I conducted fortyseven intervie ws with varying degrees of formality .
However, sixty-four people actually sat for interviews; In
many cases a husband and wife both shared their time and
experiences with me.

In such cases each gave his and her

responses to my questions .
questions.

I asked each a different set of

They sometimes corrected one another and they

often elaborated upon the other ' s statements.

Thus , I

received t wo interviews in one sitting , and I have chosen to
cite them in the footnotes as separate interviews.

My

interpretations have also been informed by numerous informal
conver sations with various individuals.
With certain exce ptions, most of those I interviewed
kept anonymous,

simply for the sake of privacy.

I

When the

source of my information is obvious , or when the interviewee
gave information of a specific , technical n ature,

I have

cited h i m by name in the footnotes .
I have relied heavily on newspaper ar ti cles.
such information can sometimes be misleading,

While

incomplete , or

inaccu r ate , it i s also insightful; and in this case , it was
often the only source of information on certain topics.

The

newspaper articles are not listed In the bibliography; thus,

Vll

In the footnotes I use the complete citation for newspaper
articles each time they appear in the footnotes.
The West End's only newspaper has been published
continuously since 1953.

It began as the Nucla Forum, was

changed to the Forum in 1954, and again to the San Miguel
Basin Forum in 1971.

The reader will notice this change of

names in the footnotes.
I have also used documents found in the storage
building of Umetco Minerals Corporation of Grand Junction,
Colorado.

Umetco Minerals is the latest name for a

subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation; its former names
were the United States Vanadium Corporation , and Union
Carbide Nuclear Company.

Umetco's records contain documents

from each of these three companles.

I have faithfully cited

these documents by file, drawer, and room number; however,
Umetco Minerals lS in the process of reorganlzlng its old
records , so the designations I used in the footnotes may no
longer be accurate.

I have not included in the bibliography

company documents cited in the footnotes.
While this is a history of the West End of Montrose
County,

I have given special emphasis to the development and

community structure of Uravan.

I considered certain aspects

of Uravan's history--its function during World War II,

its

unusual status as a company town, and the presence in Uravan
of the West End's most influential company--to be worthy of
closer examination within the context of the entire area.

Vl l l
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CHAPTER 1
"THE GREAT UNDEVELOPED WESTERN
MONTROSE COUNTY" 1
In 1981 historians of Colorado's Western Slope dubbed
t he region "A Land Alone."

The area's history is

distinctive enough to merit recognition as a reglon separate
:rom the rest of Colorado.

Indeed,

it has been suggested

that the Western Slope deserves to be studied as one of the
major geographic entities of the United States. 2
Vastness and isolation distinguish this part of
Colorado.

The Western Slope is bound by the mountains of

the Continental Divide on the eastern side, while remote,
sparsely populated desert characterizes the far western
side .

During the early development of weste rn Colo rado,

this unusual geography prohibited easy travel int o and out
of the area.

Even today most of this region is isolated;

communities are,

for the most part, small, and th e distances

between them great.

Winter weather often makes travel

difficult, both within the Western Slope and to points
beyond.

lC. E. Jordan, "The Great Undeveloped Western Montrose
County," Montrose (CO) Daily Press, 12 October 1911, p. 13.
2Duane Vandenbusche and Duane A. Smith, A Land Alone:
Colorado's Western Slope (Boulder, CO: Pruett Publishing,
1981); David Lavender, foreword to A Land Al one : Colorado 's
Western Slope, by Duane Vandenbusche and Duan e A. Smith
(Boulder, CO: Pruett Publishing, 1981), vi.

2

"Geography h as always been the key to the history and
development of the West ern Slope.,, 3

Nature endowed this

reg ion with an array of mineral res o u rces , wide fertile
va lleys, and plenty of o p e n graze land.

Into this land

a l o ne white settlers flocked during the last quarter o f the
nineteenth century.
silver,

Miners sought primarily gold and

"Colorado's original creators"; but soon other

minerals would become equally prized. 4
t h e miners came farmers,

ranchers,

Simultane ou s with

and town builders .

During the 187 0 s and 1880s, numerous t o wns, not to mention
ml nlng camps, arose on the West ern Slope.
Climate extreme s further characterize western Colorado .
The high mountain regions receive tremendous amounts of
snowfall; the winter temp eratures are low and the summers
are short.

Meanwhile, the canyon lands and high plateaus

near the Utah border are known fo r hot summers and an arid
cl imate.

Acro ss the West ern slope the terrain is rugged ,

not ea sily accessible, and of te n unyielding.

"The

forbidding mountain ranges, bitter cold , inhospitable
canyons and plateaus , and the paradox of heavy snow and
little wat er have forced people to conform t o the lay of the
land and nature." 5

3Vandenbusche and Smith, A Land Alone, 2 .
4Lavender,

foreword to A Land Alone, vii.

5Vandenbusche and Smith, A Land Al one , 2 .

3

To the extent possible, people also conformed the land
to their needs.

For example, the valleys proved fertile ;

farmers found that they could grow all manner of vegetables ,
gralns, and many types of fruit trees.

But the arid

climate--much of the Western Slope receives less than ten
inches of rain per year--made irrigation a necessity.

The

irrigation systems proved complicated and costly, and the
rivers simply do not supply as much water as people once
supposed. 6
Miners also needed water for their operations, and like
the farmers,

they went to great lengths to get it.

serious problem for the miner, however,
boom and bust nature of the industry.

A more

resulted from the
The mining f o rtunes

of western Colorado have al ways depended on o uts ide markets.
Moreover, the industry relied upon outside capital to
finance its operations .
area , noted the irony:

David Lavender, a native of t he
"Thus though the Wes tern Slope speaks

proudly of 'its' riches,

it actually finds its elf in
The result

economic thralldom to Denver and points beyond.

lS a prickly defensiveness among many Slopers and , o ften,

a

deep ambivalen ce about which way to jump next.,, 7
The people of this region have forged an iden tity , pa rt
mythical and part real, as "Western Slopers.

II

This identity

6Ibid., 147-153, 184-192.
7Ibid., 183-184; Lavender,
Vll.

foreword to A Land Al one ,

4

was shaped by the land itself, which is beautiful and full
of promise, yet rugged and demanding.

As they grew up with

the country, as it were, Western Slopers became part of it.
Part o f the identity is a certain defensive political
posture, an "us versus them" mentality that resulted from
the region's isolation , small population, and its wealth of
natural resources, not the least valuable of which is water.
The Western Slope has traditionally felt underrepresented in
state politics; the area lacked the political influence to
advance its own interests, for example, and felt powerless
when the eastern slope population centers appropriated
western Colorado 's water.

The exploitation of the Western

Slope's mineral resources has traditionally generated some
resentment, as well.

Quite often the money used to finance

mining operations came from banks and capitalists from the
eastern part of Colorado.

The people of the West ern Slope

"watched as profits of their labor went right into Denver
banks and Denver-based mining companies."

Meanwhile, within

the Western Slope members of various interest groups find
themselves at odds with one another.

Farmers and ranchers ,

environmentalists , and developers all have fought t o
preserve , promote, or exploit that which seems most valuable
to them. 8

These struggles are the legacy of the Western

8Jon Klusmire, "Regi onal Rivalries: Western Slope vs.
Front Range vs. 'South' Slope," Colorado Business 20 (August
1993): 42; Vandenbusche and Smith, A Land Alone, 1-3, 205206, 301, 303, 306.

5

Slope, and its history lS the interaction between the people
and the land.
Within this vast reglon,

one small part serves as a

microcosm--the West End of Montrose County.

The West End,

too, has earned its own identity, although the fact may not
be widely known.

One begins each word with a capital

letter, and by adding the suffix "er," one forms the name by
which residents of the area are known, West Enders.
West End is home to unusual geographic formations,

The
as well

as several artificial monuments to human endeavor.
The land lured the white settlers to this far western
part of Colorado, and they,
conformed to the land.

like Western Slopers in general,

Miners, ranchers,

farmers,

and town

builders faced the same challenges that confronted others In
western Colorado.
a dry,

They had to find ways to make a living In

isolated , environment.

The West Enders, those who

stayed and made the history of the place, demonstrated a
r esourcefulness and hardiness that earned them a special
i dentity.
The West End lS geographically separated from the east
end, and from the county seat, Montrose, by the Uncompahgre
Plateau.

This plateau, with elevations of up to ten

thousand feet,

traverses the oddly shaped county roughly In

a diagonal direction,

from northwest to southeast.

neatly bisects the county.

It

6

On the eastern side of this divide lies the broad ,
level Uncompahgre Valley, drained by the Uncompahgre River.
The valley encompasses approximately 175 , 000 acres of arable
land , and the city of Montrose, at 5 , 800 feet elevation ,
sits in the middle of this valley.

The communit y was

founded in 1882, at approximately the same time that
settlers began hopefully tilling the soil.

Montrose

benefitted from the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, whi ch
built a depot in town, and by its proximity to other
communities , including the mining town of Ouray.

It served

as a market and "distribution point for nearby farms,
ranches, and orchards. ,, 9
Originally , sagebrush and native grasses grew In the
alkaline soil of the Uncompahgre Valley.

Almost desert-

like, the valley receives approximately ten inches of raln
per year.

Nevertheless , homesteaders poured int o the valley

and dug irrigation ditches from the nearby Gunnison and
Uncompahgre Rivers.

The valley , which stretches north into

Delta County, achieved a certain renown for fruit and
vegetable crops, but many growers struggled for lack of
water.

10

9Vandenbusche and Smith, A Land Alone, 147; Paul M.
O'Rourke , Frontier in Transition: A History of Southwestern
Colorado , Bureau of Land Management Cultural Resource Series
Number 10 (Denver: Colorado State Office , Bureau of Land
Management, 1980; reprint, 1992), 83.
lOVandenbusche and Smith, A Land Alone, 147-148.

7

The answer to this problem came in the form of the
remarkable "Gunnison River Diversion."

Approximately five

hundred workers built a 6 .2 -mile tunnel from the Black
Canyon of the Gu nnison River t o the Uncompahgre Valley ,
through the mesa that separates the two .

The United States

Reclamation Serv ice undertook the pro jec t at a cost of $10.5
million.

The constructi o n lasted from 1905 to 1909, and has

prove d one o f the more successful irrigation projects on the
Wes t e rn Slope. ll
The West End of Montrose County , In contrast with the
ea st end,

is c haracterized by sagebrush and ce d ar-cove r e d

mesas, deep canyon s, and unusual sandstone f ormations .
Eleva ti ons range fro m fiv e thousand to six thousand feet .
This area, we st of the Uncompahgre Plateau , is drained by
the Dolores and San Miguel Rivers.

The Dolores and San

Miguel Rivers join in wes tern Montrose County, after wh ich
point the river is named Dolores.

The West End ' s most

unusual and dominant geologic feature is the Paradox Valley ,
so named because the Dolores River flows acros s the valley ,
In a transverse manner, rather than l engthwis e along the
middle of the valley fl oor .

The foll o wing d escription

c aptures not on ly the pe cu liar beauty of the Paradox Valley,
but also glves one a good impress ion of much of the We st End
landscape.
ll Ibid., 185-187; O'Ro urke, Frontier in Transiti on ,
144.
O'Rourke reported that the Gunnison Tunnel , as it lS
known , cost $ 6 .7 million.

8

The valley is about 25 miles long, extending in a
northwest - southeast direction, and varying in
width from two to five miles.
On all sides,
except the southwest, abrupt and often sheer walls
of naked rock rise to a height of from fifteen
hundred to two thousand feet from the valley
floor.
These walls, fantastically eroded in
banded red and gray sandstone, present strange and
unearthly aspects in the changing lights.
The
Dolores River enters the valley through a narrow
canyon in its south wall and after meandering
across the valley floor makes its exit through an
equally narrow canyon to the north. 12
One finds similar scenery along the San Miguel and Dolores
Rivers, which have cut into the sandstone.

Brilliantly

colored mesas and cliffs overlook these rivers and the
roadway that leads north to Grand Junction.
Just east of the San Miguel River the land rlses
several hundred feet in elevation, the gentle beginning of
the Uncompahgre Plateau.

Several creeks flow from the

higher elevations of the plateau toward the San Miguel.
Along this margin of the Uncompahgre Plateau lie a series of
"parks," broad expanses of grass and sage covered land.
The first white settlers of the West End came to the
Paradox Valley in the late 1870s and early 1880s to raise
cattle, and by 1879 the settlement of Paradox had been
established.

During the succeeding decades a number of

homesteaders came to the valley, intent on ralslng crops or
livestock on the exceedingly arid land.

"With mystic and

12G. Woodbury and E. Woodbury, "The Archaeological
Survey of Paradox Valley and Adjacent Country in Western
Montrose County, Colorado, 1931," Colorado Magazine 9
(January 1932): 3.

9

det e rmined hope," one observer wrote,

these fam ilies "yearl y

wait for the completion of the irrigation proje ct t hat is t o
convert this desert into a paradise." l3
During th e late nineteenth century the West End
attracted a number of ranchers and cattle compani es .
these,

One o f

the San Miguel Cattle Company, o perat e d i ts Cl u b

Ranch in the San Miguel Canyon , approximately one mil e fr o m
the future sit e of Uravan.

The ranch headquarters,

"splendidly lo c ated in a c ountry all its own, II e n compassed
110 acres, and ranchers had access to summer graz e l and on
the Uncompahgre Plateau.

By 1906 the propert y ha d passed

into individual ownership, and cattle o n the ran c h numbered
3 , 500 . 14
In the ea r ly 1880s h o mesteaders arr ive d a t the Sa n
Migu e l River ; t h ey would c all thei r s ettle ment Naturita ,
suppo sedly the Span i sh diminutive f o rm o f the word "na ture . II
(The name is prono unced as Iinatta - rita. II )

By 1 894 Na t u r ita

b o asted of a s c h o ol, and by 1905 e n o ugh famili e s live d in
the surrounding area to send twenty - fi ve children to t h e
l3Wilson Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country (Denver : Sage
Books, 1965), 122-123; Thomas F. V. Curran, " Carnotite in
Paradox Valley, Colo. ," Engineering and Mining J o urnal 9 2
( 3 0 De c e mb e r 1 9 11 ) : 12 8 7 .
14 Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 15 0 -153; quot ati on
from "Consummation of the Deal on the Big Club Ran c h, II
Montrose Daily Press , 10 December 1912, p. 1.
Dav id
Lavender worked the Club Ranch for a time, and h e reco unted
his experiences in One Man's West (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1943 ; 3rd edition, 1964; reprint , Lin co ln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1977), 273-290.
Lave nder's
book provides details of the cowboy life in the West End.

10

school.

Naturita became a "stopping -off place for freight

wagons" that ran between the Paradox Valley and Placerville ,
the c l osest rail head. 15
The town of Nucla owes its existence to a group of
hardy communalists.

Nine men and one woman formed the

Colorado Cooperative Company in 1893 in Denver.

The group

sold stock at one hundred dollars per share , and it limited
members to one share each.
End the following year.

The company moved to the West

The colonists lived in Pinon and

o ther camps near Naturita for several years while they
construc ted a wooden flume and ditch to bring water
seventeen miles from the San Miguel River to Tabeguache
Park, a mesa five hundred feet above Naturita.

Included In

this remarkable and successful effort was a wooden trestle
built over Cottonwood Creek.

The trestle measur ed 108 feet

high and 840 feet long, reportedly the biggest such
structure in the world at that time. 16
By the turn of the century Pinon had fifty buildings;
the 1900 census listed its population at 150, making it the
biggest settlement in the West End.

The company published a

newspaper, the Altrurian, that promoted its communal mission

15Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 147-150.
16Ibid., 166-174; O'Rourke, Frontier in Transition, 87.
For an interesting account of Nucla's beginnings, see Ellen
Z. Peterson, The Spell of the Tabeguache (Denver: Sage
Books, 1957 ).
Tabeguache is pronounced tab-e-wash.

11
~nd

attracted new members from around Co lorado and fr o m

:::>ther states , as well. 17
The col o nists completed the water diversion i n 1 9 04,
and began moving their town , to be named Nucla,
Tabeguache Park the next year.
~he

to

The town took its name from

field of atomic science, but not, as many have assumed ,

because of the radioactive elements found in West End
mineral deposits.

Nucla ' s founders envisioned the co lony as

t he center (nucleus ) of an expanding s oc ialist u topia .

The

colony maintained its founding principles for many years,
although the lure of private property and capitalisti c
ventures tempered the socialistic spirit.

Despit e the

gradual privatization of the colony , Nucla stand s a s t he
"only true agricultural colony to survive on the We st e rn
Slope . ,, 18
West Enders witnessed their first mlnlng b oom in 18 9 9.
A c o mpany fr o m Mi c higan open e d the Ca s hin c o pp e r mine on the
s o uthwest side o f Parado x Va l le y , o n La Sal Creek .
company also operated a smelter nearby.

The

To supp ly coke t o

the smelter, ovens for that purpose were erected n e ar some

17Suzanne Schulze , comp., A Century of the Co l o rado
Censu s (Greeley: University of Northern Colorado, 1977), 86;
Peterson, Spell of the Tabeguache, 7, 49; Duane D . Mercer,
"The Colorado Co-operative Company, 1 894-1904, " Colorado
Magazine 44 (Fall 1967): 294.
18 Peterson, Spell of the Tabeguache, 154; Ro c kwell ,
Uncompahgr e Country, 174; Mercer, " Colorado Co-operative
Company, " 305-306; Vandenbusche and Smith , A Land Alone,
152.

12

coal dep os its at the southeast end of Paradox Val ley , about
four mi l es west of Natu rita .
1899 to 1908,

The min e produced copper fr om

although on several occasions after 1908

varlous interests tried to r e open it.

A camp, called

Cashin, sprang up in the vic i nity of the mlne, and f o ur
miles west of there the town of Bedrock was built, In
response to the increased ac t ivity in the area.

19

The mlnlng operation st i mulated the West End economy.
Local farmers and ranchers s o ld produ ce and o the r staples to
the mining companies; the mining company hired freighters to
haul their ore; ranchers sol d grain to the freight ers ;
freighters,

In turn , brought in supplies from points beyond

the Wes t End.

According to o ne source the town of Bedrock

ballooned to five hundred residents , but this is probably
quite an overestimation .

Na t urita benefitted economically

from its location on the freight route between the Paradox
Valley and the shipping point for the ore at Placerville. 20
Gold prospectors also vis ited the Wes t End.

The San

Miguel River had "f or untold centuries " washed gralns of
gold out of the San Juan mountains.

This gold may be found

in the river bed and in the adjacent gravel benche s.

From

19Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 133-135.
2° rbid., 135, 149. According to the 1900 census,
Cashin had a population of fifty, and Bedrock, thirty-five.
In 1910, the census listed neither; instead, the cens us
consolidated all of Paradox Valley into the precinct of
Paradox, which had 235 residents in 1910.
Schulze, A
Century of the Colorado Census, 86, 203.

13

the beginning of West End settlement people have tried to
reclaim that gold, never with very much success.

One such

attempt, described by David Lavender as "a staggering plece
of hopefulness," left spectacular evidence of the
irresistible lure of gold and the lengths that people will
go to obtain it . 21
In 1889 the Montrose Placer Mining Company began
working some claims on the Dolores River,
its confluence with the San Miguel.

four miles below

A group of St. Louis

businessmen financed the operations of this company.

The

operators believed that if they could obtain enough water
for hydraulic placer mining, the claims would yield a
fortune.

The idea they struck upon, and carried out, was to

build a flume to carry water from the San Miguel River,
twelve miles above the claims they wished to min e .
eight miles of this distance,

For

the flume had to be attached

to the walls of the canyon that rises above the San Miguel
and Dolores Rivers.
be seen.
feet wide.

There, supports for the flume may still

The wooden ditch measured four feet deep and SlX
Workers fastened it to the canyon walls "100 to

150 feet above the river and from 250 to 500 feet below the

summit of the gorge."

The flume ran above the San Miguel

River for a mile and a half, and above the Dolores River for

21 Lavender, One Man's West,

274-275.
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SlX

and one - hal f miles. 22

(To visualize this, one must

remember that the San Miguel River joins the Dolores.)
The cost of this operation came to approximately
$100,000,

and the construction took two years.

By all

accoun ts the flume successfully delivered the proper amount
of water.

The un foreseen problem that ruined this fantastic

scheme was that the gold grains were too fine to be
recovered.

Soon after its completion the company abandoned

the flume. 23
Neither go l d nor copper would bring the West End
prosperity.

Montrose County produced gold worth $47,155

bet ween the years 1886 and 1923.

The county produced

$93 , 899 worth of copper during the same years .

Both figures

constituted minute fractions of the total worth of those
minerals produced by the entire state. 24

Indeed, the West

End 's fortunes lay in an element the properties of which
scientists began to realize only at the turn of the century .
Carnotite occurs throughout the sedimentary f o rmati on s
of southwestern Colorado and southeastern Utah .

It is the

most important of several uranium-bearing minerals located
on this part of the Colorado Plateau.

Geologists have f ound

22 Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 160-162.
23 Ibid., 163 -165; Ellen Z. Peterson, "The Hanging Flume
of Dolores Canyon," Colorado Magazine 40 (Ap r i 1 1 963) : 128131.

24Charles W. Henderson, Mining in Colorado: A History
of Discovery, Development and Production (Washingt on , DC:
Government Printing Office, 1926), 86-87, 181-182.
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carnotite dep os its around the globe; it may b e said ,
however,

that the mineral was "dis covered, " or received its

"type locati on ," from a sample that originated in western
Montrose County. 25
Imbedded in the sandstone walls of the Paradox Valley
are some of richest deposits of carnotite on the Colorado
Plateau .

Although the valley would become the center of

mining activity, many other locations in southwest ern
Colorado hold extensive deposits.

It became evident to

geologists that the carnotite deposits, when mapped , formed
a pattern.

Within this belt-shaped pattern the deposits

were more likely to be found than in other areas.

This lS

now known as the "Uravan Mineral Belt," defined as "a
narrow, elongate area In which the carnotite deposits
generally have closer spaclng,

larger size, and higher grade

than those in the adjoining areas and the region as a
whole. ,, 26
The unnamed (at that time) mineral had intrigued
prospectors since 1881, when the first sampl e o f ca rnotite

25Wi lliam L. Chenoweth, "Historical Review of Carnotite
Mining and Processing in Southwestern Colorado ," paper
written for the Grand Junction Office of the Bureau of Land
Management, December 1993, 1-5; personal communication with
William L. Chenoweth; Edward R. Landa, "Buri ed Treasure to
Buried Waste: The Rise and Fall of the Radium Industry,"
Colorado School of Mines Quarterly 82 (S umme r 1987): 7.
26R. P. Fischer and L. S. Hilpert, Geology of the
Uravan Mineral Belt , United States Department of the
Interior, Geological Survey Bulletin 988-A (Wa shington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1952), 3.
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was assayed.
unsuccessful.

Several attempts to identify the mineral were
Although assayers found traces of gold and

silver in carnotite, those metals did not exist in
quantities sufficient enough to encourage mlners to dig the
ore.

Because of the mineral's yellow color, and lacking a

proper name for the mineral, miners called it

11

chrome-

copper. ,, 27
Not until 1898 did mineralogists determine that
carnotite contains the radioactive element uranium.

In that

year Charles Poulot, a French chemist and ore buyer,
received a sample of carnotite ore from western Montrose
County.

He determined that the ore contained uranium, but

he forwarded the sample to associates in France for further
analysis.

They named the mineral after Adolphe Carnot,

"a

prominent French mineral analyst of the time. ,, 28
Two men laid claim to the distinction of procuring the
sample of carnotite ore that led to the naming of the
mineral.

Gordon Kimball wrote that he mined the o re fr o m

his claim on Roc Creek in 1898.

He then sent the sample t o

Poulot, who forwarded it to France.

T. M. McKee reported

that he obtained a sample of the ore from the same mlne on
Roc Creek sometime before 1898.

According to this story,

27R. C. Coffin, Radium, Uranium , and Vanadium Deposits
of Southwestern Cclorado.
Colorado Geological Survey,
Bulletin 16 (Denver: Colorado Geological Survey, 1921), 151152.

28 Landa,

"Bur i ed Treasure," 7.
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McKee met Poulot ln Paradox Valley, where the latter was
working for a "Michigan syndicate"
Cas hin mine) .

(the operators of the

McKee went on to say that he was "dumbfounded

and very much disappointed, because it had not been named in
honor of Colorado or Montrose County."

McKee would have had

. he mineral named "Montrosei te . ,, 29
The identification of carnotite, and the realization
t hat it contained uranium and vanadium, prompted small-scale
mining of the mineral.
for uranium.

There already existed a small market

Manufacturers of glass and ceramics used the

element to tint or color their products, and it was also
used as a pigment in dyes and inks.

Steel companies

experi mented with uranlum and vanadium, and found that both
elements improved the strength of steel.

And scientists

required a certain amount of uranium for varlOUS
exp e rimental purposes.

Although the element uranium had

been known since 1789, the phenomenon of radioactivity was
not discovered until 1896, so it was still a new field of
research for scientists.
only a few years.

But this small-scale mining lasted

Treating carnotite ore to remove uranium

29Gordon Kimball, "Discovery of Carnotite," Engineering
and Mining Journal 77 (16 June 1904): 956i T. M. McKee,
"Early Discovery of Uranium Ore in Colorado," Colorado
Magazine 32 (July 1955): 191-203.
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and vanadium proved difficult,

and buyers for those elements

found less expensive, more readily available sources. 30
Also in 1898 Ma rie and Pierre Curie discover ed the
element radium .

Radium lS a decay product of uranium.

Therefore, all minerals that contain uranium also contain
radium; the ratio between the two elements wil l always be
the same, because uranlum decalTs at a fixed rate.

The

Curies ' discovery sparked considerable scientific interest,
and as the radioactive properties of radium began to be
studied,

"new medical and commercial applications began to

spring forth ." 31
The medical community took the most active role In
research, centered primarily around the treatment of cancer
with radium.

The history of the medical community's use of

radium is fascinating.

Physicians , and others, treated an

astonishing array of human ailments with radium.

While some

of these treatments wer e misguided, at best, the use of
radium in the treatment of cancer was legitimate and
successful, to a degree.

"The basic principles and

30Gary Lee Shumway, "A History of the Uranium Industry
on the Colorado Plateau" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Southern California, 1970), 3-8; Landa, "Buried Treasure,"
7-9.
On the use of uranium in glass , Thomas F. V. Curran
wrote that some glass contained enough uranium to make up
25% of the weight of the glass.
"Naturally, such glass is
highly radioactive ." Thomas F. V. Curran, "Carnotite--II ,"
Engineering and Mining Journal 9 6 (27 December 1913): 1223.
31 Chenoweth , "Historical Re v iew," 5; Landa,
Treasure," 30.

"Buried
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practices deve lope d during the early period form the
f oundation of c u rr ent radiation therapy. ,, 32
Despite the r ealization that carnotite contained
radium, no great demand materialized.

European scien ti sts

and physicians engaged far more heavily in radium research
than did Americans, and the Europeans had available to them
other sources of radium .

Several attempts were made to

isolate the radium from carnotite ore during the period 1900
to 1909, but none proved successful. 33
Beginning in 1909 the outlook for the carnotite mlnlng
industry improved.

In that year the General Vanadium

Company, the Baltimore subsidiary of an English firm,
ac quir e d claims i n Parado x Vall e y, mining carno tite o re f o r
i ts vanadium content.

The company shipped its ores to

Liverpool, England, for treatment.

Between 1910 and 1914

this and other companies attempted to profit from the
vanadium content of carnotite; but isolating the element
pro ved "troublesome," and those in the market for vanadium
found cheaper outlets. 34
32 Landa,

"Buried Treasure," 30-47, quotation on 30.

33 Shumway, "History of the Uranium Industry," 14 - 15;
Frank L. Hess, "Uranium and Vanadium," in Mineral Resources
of the United States: Calendar Year 1912, part 1, Metals
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), 1012.
34Thomas F. V. Curran, "Carnoti te - - I," Engineer ing and
Mining Journal 96 (20 December 1913), 1165; Frank L. Hess,
"Vanadium, Titanium, Molybdenum, Uranium, and Tantalum," in
Mineral Resources of the United States, Calendar Year 1910,
part 1, Metals (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office ,
1911), 759-760; Frank L. Hess, "Radium, Uranium, and

20

Although mlnlng carnotite for its vanadium content did
not hold much promise at this time, the demand for radium
began to increase significantly after 1910.

European buyers

had begun to purchase the ore--for both its vanadium and its
radium content--in quantities greater than before. 35

At

about the same time Americans became much more interested
In, and aware of, the potential benefits of radium.
In 1910 the United States Bureau of Mines was created.
The federal agency became interested in the carnotite
deposits on the Colorado Plateau; officials believed that
this region contained "almost all of the world's supply of
radium."

Bureau of Mines officials were concerned, however,

that because of inefficient mining methods much of the ore
was being wasted.

In addition, Europeans had begun to

purchase much of the ore.

The Bureau of Mines hoped to

boost the American rare metals industry by encouraging the
production of radium in America for use In America.

The

Bureau of Mines considered it "almost a patriotic duty to
develop an industry that will retain the radium in America."
Toward this end Bureau of Mines officials worked to arouse
public interest and to find a sponsor.

The bureau hoped to

Vanadium," in Mineral Resources of the United States, 1914,
part 1, Metals (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1916),

943.

35 Curran, "Carnotite--I," 1165; Shumway , "History of
the Uranium Industry," 15.
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find someone or some institution willing to finance the
mining of carnotite ore, and the extraction of radium. 36
The reas o n the Bureau of Mines felt so strongly about
the protection o f America's radium resources had to do in
large measure with the price of the element.

In the years

of radium production in the United States, the cost
fluctuated between $40,000 and $160,000 per gram; most
often, the cost is cited as $120,000 per gram.

This amount

reflected the scarcity of the element and the high cost of
production.

With carnotite ore producers needed at least

two hundred to three hundred tons of high grade ore

(uranium

content of two percent or better) to produce one gram of
radium.

The treatment process required tremendous amounts

of chemicals, the quantities of which ranged up to four
times the weight of the ore that was treated.

Companies

that isolated radium hired teams of chemists and
metallurgists, to develop and improve extraction methods.
In addition, the high cost of finding, mining, and
transporting ore from the remote regions of the Colorado
Plateau to the extraction plants affected the cost o f the
finished product.

Radium represented,

literally , "the most

expensive substance known to man." 37

36 Shumway, "History of the Uranium Industry,
quoted in Landa, "Buried Treasure," 54.

II

15-22;

37 Kathleen Bruyn, Uranium Country (Boulder , co:
University of Colorado Press, 1955), 42-43; Chenoweth,
"Historical Review," 5 ; Landa, "Buried Treasure," 18 -19, 2.
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The Bureau of Mines found its sponsors in two men
intensely interested In the potential of radium therapy.
Howard A. Kelly, o ne of the few American physi cians who had
used radium,

foresaw great possibiliti es .

James Douglas wa s

a philanthropic mining engineer who regularly contributed to
a cancer treatment center in New York.

Kelly and Douglas

each supplied $75,000 for the establishment of the National
Radium Institute.

The Bureau of Mines agreed to provide the

facilities and technical staff needed to produce the radium.
In return for their investment, Kelly and Douglas would
receive radium, which they would donate to the h ospital s
wi th whi ch each associated. 38
The Nati onal Radium Institute le ased mlnlng claims and
established a camp at Long Park, on the southeast rim of the
Paradox Valley,

In 1913.

By the foll o wing year it had

erected an experimental extrac ti on plant in Denver.

The

extraction process proved successful, and in 1915 the
Institute built a second plant to increase production .

The

National Radium Institute met its three year goal by 1916;
it had produced 8.5 grams of radium, more than anticipated.
James Douglas donated his share of radium to the New York
hospital that later became known as the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center.

Kelly 's share went to the hospital

at The Johns Hopkins University.

38 Landa,

In achieving its mission,

"Buried Treasure," 54.
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the National Radium Institute "represented an early and very
s ucce ssful example of public-private sector cooperation . 11 39
During the radium boom in western Colorado several
companles attempted to profit by mining and processing
carnotite ore.

Companie s such as the Standard Chemical

Company, the Radium Company of Colorado, and the Radium
Luminous Material Corporation controlled most of the
productive carnotite deposits.

The high cost of mlnlng

carnotite ore discouraged many independent mlners.

Often,

the companies leased or bought claims that independent
miners found unprofitable.

Nevertheless, some prospectors

found a way to make a living on their own.

Carnotite buyers

purchased ore from those miners who managed to operate
alongside the big, well-financed companles, and those
companles themselves also bought ore. 40

The greatest part

o f this mining activity occurred In southwestern Colorado ,
with most of it centered in the West End.
Joseph M. Flannery, from Pittsburgh , gave the carnotite
industry its greatest boost, and in the process made
Montrose County the center of the industry.

Flannery had

gained experience in the mining industry when he formed the
American Vanadium Company, which sold vanadium extracted
39 Ibid.,

53-56.

4°Chenoweth, "Historical Review," 7-8; Blair Burwell,
"Carnotite Mining in Southwestern Colorado," Engineering and
Mining Journal 110 (16 October 1920): 758; Shumway, "History
of the Uranium Industry," 7 3 -74; Landa, "Buried Treasure,
II

23.
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from ores mined in Peru.

In 1909 tragedy struck his family;

Flannery's sister died of cancer.

Flannery felt that radium

treatments may have cured his sister, but the treatments
were not widely available in the United States.

Looking

into the matter, Flannery believed that a great demand for
radium in the United States would soon develop.

He also

anticipated an overseas market ; by 1910 Europeans sought new
sources of radium.

Flannery sold his mining interests in

Peru and formed the Standard Chemical Company, with the
intention of mining and processing carnotite ore for the
radi urn content. 41
The Standard Chemical Company would become, by far,

the

largest radium producer in the United States; the company
produced seventy-five percent of the ore shipped out of
western Colorado.

By 1921, which year marks the end of the

radium boom, the company had produced seventy-four grams of
radium, nearly half of all radium isolated in the United
States.

To sell his product Flannery created the Radium

Chemical Company, designed to investigate the therapeutic
uses of the element and to stimulate the interest of
American physicians.

The Radium Chemical Company published

the journal Radium, designed to disseminate information
about the clinical applications of radium.

41 Shumway,

Flannery even

"History of the Uranium Industry," 3 0, 31.
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hired a group o f physicians to experiment with radium on
laboratory animals. 42
Due partly to the efforts of the Standard Chemical
Company and the National Radium Institute, the medical use
of radium in cancer treatments became accepted and widespread in the United States.

Simultaneously, the use of

radioactive medicines for other maladies proliferated.

By

1913 the public's interest in radium "had been whipped

almost to fever pitch."

There arose a concern that America

was not producing enough radium. 43
The concern over the precious resource, radium, grew t o
such a degree that President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of
the Interior, Franklin K. Lane, proposed massive involvement
by the federal government in the production of radium.

The

idea was to ensure "an adequate supply of reasonably priced
radium for the American medical community. "

However, Lane's

suggestions struck fear in the hearts of capitalists like
Joseph Flannery.

He and others argued that private

enterprise could accomplish the goal.

Early in 1914 both

houses of Congress held hearings on a bill, suggested by
Lane , that would have directed the federal government to buy
all radium ores, and to isolate the radium "at governmentoperated radium concentration and extraction plants."

Under

an earlier version of the bill the government wou ld have
42Landa,

"Buried Treasure," 2 2 .

43 Shumway,

"H istory of the Uranium Industry," 22 .
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wi thdrawn land o n the Colorado Plateau for the purpose of
a l locating, or otherwis e regulating, the supply of radium.
Both bills failed to pass. 44
"The Standard," as Joseph Flannery's company became
known in the West End, arrived there in 1910.

The company

established its headquarters at the old coke ovens, at the
southeast end of Paradox Valley,
Naturita.

four miles west of

The headquarters consisted of houses, offices, an

ore buying station, a commissary, and a laboratory; it was
fully modern, complete with telephone connections.

The

company immediately began staking, leasing, and purchasing
claims.

According to Flannery, his company arrived at a

time when West End claim holders had abandoned hope.

He

recalled the situation:
We had a place out there in this isolated
territory where everybody would come in for a
meal.
It was a sort of halfway house between
nobody kno ws where and somebody's starting point.
They would come in and say, "will you buy our
claims?
I am broke, and I want to get out of this
country." He would say, "Do you want to buy a
burro?" The burros would starve if we did not buy
them, and the man would have to stay there if he
didn't get the money.
. We would pay him his
cash right there, and he got his money and drove
off and was satisfied. 45

44 Landa, "Buried Treasure," 63.
For details on the
political debate that raged during this time, see Shumway,
"Hist ory of the Uranium Industry," 11-61.
45U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Mines and Mining,
Radium: Hearings on H. J. Resolution 185 and 186, 63rd
Congress, 2nd session, 19-28 January 1914, p. 61.
Likely,
Flannery's "halfway house" was a boarding house at the
company's headquarters at the Coke Ovens.
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The Standard acquired some of the richest carnotite
deposits in both southeastern Utah and southwestern
Colorado.

The company immediately began "mining and

development work," and by 1911 it employed perhaps eighty
people.

In that year the company began shipping ore from

the West End to its experimental plant in Canonsburg,
Pennsylvania.

By 1913 Standard's chemists had developed the

necessary extraction methods, and began full-scale
production of radium.

In subsequent years Standard Chemical

continually expanded its holdings in southwestern Colorado
and southeastern Utah.

For example,

in 1916 the company

purchased the c laims held by the General Vanadium Company,
which had mined ore for its vanadium content from 1910 to
about 1914. 46
Naturally, the residents of Montrose County took notice
of developments In the radium industry.

Newspapers in

Montrose and Nucla carried stories about the wonders of
radium , and described the latest discoveries of carnotite
deposits.

County boosters saw possibilities of great

wealth, and they looked forward to a time when Montrose
County would be the center of a great mining industry.

Many

of these boosters came from the city of Montrose, where they
contemplated ways to bring some of the riches of the West

46Curran, II Carnot i te in Paradox Valley, II 1287; Landa,
II Buried
Treasure, 11 19 - 20; 11 Standard Company Purchases Claims
of the General Company," Montrose Daily Press, 28 March
1916, p.

1.
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End to Montros e .

Meanwhile, some In the West End began to

consider what lit t le Montrose had done for them.

Some West

Enders did not necessarily look to the county seat for help
In exploiting the area's resources.
Mineral resources were not the only commodity from the
West End.

Simultaneous with great developments In the

carnotite industry came progress in agriculture and
ranching.

Homesteaders gradually settled the fertile

"parks," the lands on the lower margins of the Uncompahgre
Plateau.

By 1911 Second Park had enough residents to

necessitate the building of a schoolhouse. 47

A Nucla

correspondent believed that if the Nucla Chamber of Commerce
would promote the West End,

"it will be a very short time

until the land in this valley will be all settled up."
promotion succeeded.

Such

Among the homesteaders attracted to

western Montrose County were a group of 150 Hungarian
immigrants who came to settle in the Paradox Valley. 48
Of the soil in the West End, a reporter wrote that
"when truth excels fancies and wild imaginings we hesitate
to write the record. "

The record indicated "marvelous "

yields of potatoes, three cuttings of alfalfa per season,
47 "West End News," Montrose Daily Press, 29 January
1912, p. 3; "Natu rita Valley Notes," Montrose Daily Press, 4
October 1911, p. 2.
The news from the West End appeared
frequently but irregularly in the Montrose Daily Press.
Often the correspondent remained unnamed, as in these two
examples.
48 "Nucla News," Montrose Daily Press, 8 May 1912, p. 2;
"Paradox," Montrose Daily Press, 28 September 1917, p. 4.
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and fifty to sixty bushels of corn per acre, among o ther
The corres pondent believed that " fortunes will be

crops .

made on onlons,

tomatoes, cauliflowers and cabbage " ; and In

the West End orchards needed no "spraying or smudging.

II

Growers had recently planted several orchards that, they
hoped , would make the West End into a commercial fruit
In 1912 the crops were so abundant in the West End

center.

that a local challenged the farmers in Montrose:
in the Unc o mpahgr e Valley if you can .

"Beat that

Ranching, too,

II

appeared to have a bright future In western Montro se County .
In 1913 the owner of the Club Ranch shipped an entire
trainload--twenty-eight cars--of cattle to Denver. 49
West End homesteaders succeeded only with the
irrigation demanded by the arid climate.
Hartman brothers of Montrose completed

II

In 1911 the
the largest

transaction of land ever" in that county; they bought four
thousand acres In the Paradox Valley and planned a massive
irrigati on s ystem that included a proposed reservoir,
canals, and ditches.

To accomplish their goal the brothers

formed the Paradox Valley Irrigation Land and Development

49C. E. Jordan , " The Great Undeveloped Wes t ern Montrose
County , Montrose Daily Press, 12 Oc t ober 1911 , p. 13;
"Na turi ta News,
Montrose Dai l y Press , 7 September 1912, p.
4; " Nu cIa and Nat uri t a,
Mo n t ro seD ail y Pre s s, 5 Nove mbe r
II

II

II

1913,

p.

2.
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Company, capitalized at $200,000. 50

Several other, smaller

companies formed to irrigate West End farms. 51
The second decade of the twentieth century brought hope
to the hardy pioneers of the West End.

After years of labor

to make the land produce, it seemed as if the time for
prosperity had c o me .

Summing up the potential we al t h of

western Montrose County, the Nucla Chamber of Commerce
proclaimed:
The future of this section is indeed bright.
We
are developing one of the richest sections o f the
state.
We know it, and we want many more to know
it, for upon the thousands of acres of our fertile
lands there should be thousands of happy homes. 52

50Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 136; "Deal Being
Concluded Involving 250,000.00," Montrose Daily Pr e ss, 12
October 1911, p. 1; "New Paradox Valley Company Formed with
Capital of $600,000," Montrose Daily Press, 3 0 Jul y 1912, p.
1.
The Hartman brothers, according to this arti c l e , planned
to sell six thousand shares of stock at $100 per share.
Rockwell reported that "$200,000 in outside capital was
invested."
51 "Farmers under Naturita Canal Will Get Water for
Present Irrigation," Montrose Daily Press, 5 May 1913, p. 1;
C. E. Jordan, "The Great Undeveloped Western Montrose
County," Montrose Daily Press, 12 October 1911, p. 13.
52 "Real Reasons for Residing in Western Montro se
County," Nucla (CO) Independent, 17 April 1913, p. 8.
This
promotion ran in several editions of the paper.
This weekly
was published from 1913 until 1929, although copies of many
editions have been lost.
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CHAPTER 2
II

NO PLACE FOR THE LOVERS
OF EASE AND LUXURy" l

The West End experienced considerable growth between
1910 and 1920,

boom.

ten years that encompass most of the radium

The three towns of Nucla, Paradox, and Naturita grew

from a combined total of 832 residents in 1910 to 1,393 in
1920.

By 1920 a new community appeared on the census: Fords

Camp, which owed its existence to the carnotite industry,
had 119 residents in 1920. 2

Much of this growth was tied

directly to the mining industry, and there is evidence of
the economic impact that the radium boom had on the West
End.
When the Standard Chemical Company set up operations In
the West End,

it created jobs for some West Enders, business

opportunities for others, and injected into the small, rural
economy a large sum of outside capital.

The radium boom

undoubtedly helped to boost the West End's population.
it also stirred people's imaginations.

And

Residents of western

Montrose County noted proudly that within their sandstone
cliffs and mesas lay the world's supply of radium.

They

imagined a prosperous future for their part of the county.

lBarton W. Marsh, "A Paradox," Montrose Daily Press,
January 1914, sec. 4, p. 8 .
2Sc hulze, A Century of the Colorado Census, 203, 363.

9
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The most obvious impact the radium boom had on the West
End was the number of people the industry employed.
Standard Chemical alone employed eighty.

In 1911

By 1914 the total

number of people employed in the West End carnotite industry
had grown to 350, a figure that probably includes freighters
and others who worked peripheral businesses.

In 1918 the

general manager of the Standard, John I. Mullen, estimated
that 295 men worked for four companies operating In the West
End.

Of those,

the Standard employed two hundred. 3

The mlnlng companies experienced no difficulties In
attracting labor.

As reports of the mining activities In

the West End spread, the carnotite fields became
"overcrowded with men seeking employment. "

For each job,

four to five men applied; many of those applicants had
arrived in the West End with no means, and found themselves
"broke, " and unable to "get out of the country."

Standard

Chemical sought to discourage hopeful job seekers. 4
In addition to hiring miners, the Standard and other
companies contracted the services of freighters to haul ore

3Barton W. Marsh, "A Paradox," Montrose Daily Press, 9
January 1914, sec. 4, p. 8; Frank L. Hess, "Radium, Uranium ,
and Vanadium,
in Mineral Resources of the United States (
1918, part 1, Metals (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1921 ) , 812 .
II

4"No More Men Needed over In the Paradox ," Montrose
Daily Press, 27 May 1914, p. 1.
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to the railhea d a t Placerville for shipment.

5

Some

observers preferred to use the number of horses used by
freighters as a way to gauge the level of mining activity.
In one edition of a Montrose newspaper, readers learned that
" 60 four- and six-horse teams are hauling this ore.

they read further,

II

If

in another article, they learned that

"twenty - five six-horse teams" h auled ore out of the West
The definitive estimate, perhaps, came from a Parado x

End.

Valley resident.

He reported

hat "2 0 B head of heavy

freight horses" hauled ore for shipment.

In addition, one

hundred burros were used to pack ore from the mines to the
freight stations. 6
The mining camps that sprang up around the West End
created a certain amount of peripheral employment, as well.
The larger camps usually had a boarding house, where miners
lodged and ate, and near the larger groups of mines were
located "c o untry st o res,
s upplies and mai l .

II

wher e miners procured their

The mi ners c reated a demand fo r loc al

farm pro ducts, and the freighters relied on local farms f o r
hay to feed to their horses and burros.

In addition to

No ti ce , II Nucla Independent, 10 April 1913, p. 4, and
31 July 1913, p. B.
The Standard requested sealed bids for
ore hauling, and specified the exact procedures the
freighters would be expected to follow.
5

11

6"$6,273,740.00 Crop Production in 1913,'1 Montrose
Daily Press, 9 January 1914, sec. I, p. 1; " Center of the

Radium Mining of the World, II Montrose Daily Press, 9 January
1 914, sec. 3, p. 6; Barton W. Marsh, "A Paradox, II Montrose
Daily Press, 9 January 1914, sec. 4, p. B.
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hauling ore out o f the West En d, freighters brought into the
country goods that had to be purchased from larger
commer c ial centers . 7
By its o wn estimate Standard Chemical had spent
$135,000 on its mining operations in the West End by 1914.

This figure included the purchase price of the company's
mlne s, the co s t o f constructing mining camps and company
headquarters at the Coke Ovens,

investments in road and

tr ail building, and wages paid to employees.

s

Altho ugh

nothing substantial remains of the Coke Ovens today , at one
t ime it was referred to as "a modern little city."

The

company also ushered In the automotive age in the West End.
By 1917 trucks motored alongside freight wagons hauling ore ,
and as part of its daily op erations , the company kept " two
Ford cars traveling most of th e time between the different
camps a nd over the count ry ."

The comp any replaced its cars

once each year, and built a garage "with a concrete floor
and .

e le ctric lights" to house its vehicles. 9

7T. V. R. Quinn, "Radium," Nucla Inde pendent, 16
Octobe r 1 913 , p. 1; "Nucla New s ," Mont rose Daily Press , 19
February 1912, p. 3.
SU. S. Congress, Radium, 80.
9"Local News Items," Nucla Independent, 24 July 1919,
p. 1.
Trucks never entirely replaced horse-drawn wagons
during this period.
The poor condition of the roads in the
West End often precluded any advantage trucks may have had
over wagons.
Hess, "Radium, Uranium, and Vanadium," in
Mineral Resources, 1918, 813 .
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As noted, to extract one gram of radium from carnotite
ore , the Standard had to ship at least two hundred tons of
high grade ore to its plant in Pennsylvania.

To improve the

efficiency of its operations, the company built a
concentrating mill "to upgrade the lower grade ore. ,, 10
separating the radium-bearing ore from the waste,
increased the radium content of lower grade ores.

By

the mill
This

greatly reduced the amount of ore to be shipped, first by
freight wagon to Placerville, then by train to Canonsburg,
Pennsylvania.

The company located its new mill in a canyon

on the San Miguel River, fifteen miles down river from
Naturita and bordering the Club Ranch.

The company chose

that site probably because of its proximity to important
mines and because the river supplied the means to produce
electricity .

Standard contracted with the Westinghouse

Electric Company, also of Pittsburgh , to build the reduction
plant in 1914. 11
One year earlier,

In 1913, the company had constructed

a camp at this location. 12

West Enders knew the site as

laThe phrase is William L. Chenoweth 's, communicated
informally to the author.
11Landa, "Buried Treasure," 23n; Burwell, " Carnotite
Mining," 757; "Nucla and Naturita," Montrose Daily Press,
June 1914, p. 2.

16

12"Nucla News," Montrose Daily Press, 15 July 1913, p.
2.
The Nucla correspondent wrote: "The Standard Chemical
company are to start a new camp near the Club ranch and wil l
likely put in a phone at that place, which will be a new
line 18 miles in length." 1912 has long been accepted as
the year during which the camp's boarding house, which still
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the Ford, probably because ranchers had used that spot to
ford the rlver.

Soon after construction of the mill the

camp was renamed Joe Junior,
son.

in honor of Joseph Flannery's

Some locals referred to the camp as Ford, while others

adopted the company's new name for the place.

In addition

to the mill, the camp included a boarding house, tent
houses, a "mines laboratory," commlssary, and a hydroelectric plant.
per week,

II

The mill ran "three shifts per day, 7 days

and the company charged one dollar a day for food

and board . 13
Companies In the West End paid employees from three to
seven dollars per day, depending on the skill level of a
particular job.

For example, the Radium Luminous Material

Corporation offered miners "$3.25 per day to start," and
"advancement to men who make good."

Blair Burwell, a young

mining engineer with Standard Chemical, reported that
"miners and muckers are paid $4 . 50, ore sorters $5.50, and
drill runners $7 per shift, with board at $1 per day."
Labor in the West End benefitted from the competition among
the various companies operating there, and from the eastern
capital that financed the operations.

By contrast, the

stands, was built.
The foregoing note lS the only written
reference known to the author.
13Arthur L. Miller, "Personal Reminiscences of the
Early History of the Radium Extraction Industry in the
U.S.A.," Argonne National Laboratory Report (ANL) Report
7461, July 1968, 94-95; Kenneth C. Nicholson, "Early
Carnotite Mining in Colorado," Engineering and Mining
Journal 159 (June 1958 ) : 101.
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carnotite mlners on Calamity Mesa,

In southwestern Mesa

County, received only one dollar per day, although they did
not have to pay board. 14
For a time the Joe Junior camp was probably populated
by single men, as were other camps in the area.

A former

resident of the Joe Junior camp recalled that "a man's pay
accumulated until it began to burn a hole in his pocket.

II

He then would leave for Telluride, on the pretext of
visiting a dentist.

Later,

II

he would return to camp, often

without having his teeth fixed and generally without any
money. 11 15

Local law prohibi ted the sale of alcohol in

Montrose County, but no such law existed in neighboring San
Miguel County, and its county seat, Telluride.
If during the years before 1917 bachelors constituted
the majority of the Joe Junior camp's population, by that
year enough families had moved into the camp that the need
for a school arose.
John Mullen,

At the urging of Standard Chemical's

the county provided a teacher and opened a

school at the Joe Junior camp.

In 1917 six to ten students

enrolled in classes held in a tent schoolhouse.

The school

operated for five years; after 1921 the population of the

14 "Wanted- -Miners at L. M. C. Camp , Long Park," Nucla
Inde pendent, 18 October 1917 , p. 6 ; Burwell, " Carnotite
Mining,
758; Lisa Pi tcher Godfrey , "Mining the Colorado
Plateau: The Story of Calamity Mesa, 1910-1970" (Master 's
thesis, Utah State University , 1991 ) , 15.
II

15Nicholson,

"Early Carno tite Mining,

II

101.
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Joe Junior camp dw indled to a point that obviated the need
for a school. 16
Until 1915 the West End had no high school.

Parents

wishing to further their children's educations arranged f o r
them to stay with families in Montrose for the entire school
year.

Margaret Galley, a West End pioneer, remembers about

fifteen students, including herself, who journeyed to
Montrose to attend school.

A student could come home f or

Christmas if her parents had eight dollars to send her.

It

cost about that much to take the train from Montrose to
Placerville, and the mail wagon from Placerville to
Naturita, a trip that included overnight lodging In
Placervi lIe. 17
Later Margaret Galley taught school In Nucla.

She

rode, on horseback, seven miles from h er home to school.
For an extra five dollars per month, she perf ormed
janitorial work at the school.

On most days,

she left home

before the sun r ose and returned home well after
darkness. 18

l6 C. E. Adams, "150 Men Employed by Standard--My First
Glimpse of Lilylands," Montrose Daily Press, 2 November
1917, p. 4; Estalee Silver, "History of the Uravan Grade
School to 1961," undated manuscript, Estalee Silver
Collection, Museum of Western Colorado, Grand Junction,
Colorado.
17Margaret Galley, interview by author, 16 July 1993,
Nucla, Colorado, tape recording, private collection.
18 Ibid.
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In 1915 the county school board arranged to h o ld high
school classes in Nucla's Congregational Church.
development certainly represented progress.

That

After 1915

Nucla adolescents attended high school in their home town;
students from other parts of the West End lodged with
families in Nucla for the entire school year . 19
Standard diversions for West Enders included baseball
games and dances,
of West End life.

forms of recreation that became hallmarks
The towns of the area formed baseball

teams that played against one another, and various mining
camps also fielded teams.

The games attracted enough

spectators that Naturita citizens built a grand stand
designed to accommodate two hundred at the town's ball park.
And dances were held on a regular basis, often as a way to
raise funds for community projects.

Standard Chemical

showed its generosity by sponsoring a dance in the Nucla
Town Hall; the company invited everyone to IIcome out and
enj oy the hospi tal i ty of the Coke Ovens boys. 11 20
Signs of ec o n o mic growth accompanied the in cre as e I n
population.

Nucla became a hub of traffic into and out of

the region.

Hotels and restaurants sprang up in the

19 "School History of West End of Montrose County , State
of Colorado, II undated manuscript, Rimrock Historical
Society, Naturita, Colorado; "Homes for Students Wanted, II
Nucla Independent, 9 August 1917, p. 1.
2°"Naturita Valley Record," Montrose Daily Press, 1
June 1912, p. 6; IIAn Invitation, II Nucla Independent, 26
April 1917, p. 8.
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village, and with the comlng of the motor age, several
entrepreneurs opened garages and began selling, and
repairing, motor vehicles.

Merchants offered hardware and

mining supplies, while blacksmiths and liverymen advertised
their services.

Nucla enjoyed frequent visits from

officials of the various mining companles, ore buyers,
assayers, and others associated with the carnotite industry.
In 1914 a new bank opened in Nucla.

Nucla also endured a

negative, but common, aspect of growth.
the newspaper reported in 1919,
of good houses in our town."

"For some time,"

"there has been a shortage

While there were no carnotite

mines in the direct vicinity of Nucla, a number o f miners
and their families called the town home.

In the era before

a daily commute was possible, mlners stayed for long periods
of time at the mining camps in which they found
e mpl oyment . 21
If Naturita lagged somewhat behind Nucla In both
population and economi c growth, it too became "a busy little
place."

Naturita's trade greatly increased after 1916, when

a county road crew carved a road along the San Miguel River

210ne may track the growth in the variety and number of
Nucla's businesses by browsing the advertisements in the
Nucla Independent from its inception, in 1913, to the height
of the radium boom, in about 1918.
"Nucla will Have New
Bank Soon," Montrose Daily Press, 3 December 1913, p. 1;
"Nucla Needs More Houses," and "Local News Items," Nucla
Independent, 24 July 1 919, p. 1.
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from Naturita to the Joe Junior camp. 22
completion of this road,

Until the

freighters and travelers from the

Joe Junior camp generally followed a trail that led them up
Tabeguache Creek and across the parks to Nucla.
completion of the San Miguel River road,

With the

freighters went

directly to Naturita, bypassing Nucla.
As West Enders realized the economic benefits made
possible by the radium boom, many dreamed of ways to
capitalize further.

They believed the area would inevitably

become a commercial entity able to stand on its own, built
on the seemingly unlimited potential of agriculture and
mlnlng.

Certain of their country's future growth, some

talked of dividing Montrose county, of forming a separate
county from the communities in the western half.

Many West

Enders harbored resentment towards the county seat, which,
they believed, did not invest enough in the development of
the western half of the county.

Proponents of county

secession, however, decided to postpone the matter.

The

Nucla Chamber of Commerce realized that "taxes are high
enough now, without dividing the county to make them
more. ,, 23

22 C. E. Adams, "Nucla Branch of High School Gets into
New and Commodious Rooms , " Montrose Daily Press, 30 October
1917,

p.

1.

23 "Nucla Wants San Miguel River Purified and the
Division of the County--Other News," Montrose Daily Press,
17 December 1912, p. 1; Trixell Sly, "Nucla and Naturita,"
Montrose Daily Press , 28 January 1913, p. 4.
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Though s o me i n the West End felt neglected, citizens of
Montrose took grea t
the west.

interest in the mineral-rich lands to

After all, as early as 1913 carnotite ores

accounted for an e stimated thirty percent of the total value
of all goods in Mo ntrose County. 24

Throughout the 1910s

Montrose boosters encouraged support for the West End
carnotite industry.

One correspondent lamented the apathy

he perceived on the part of his fellow citizens:
Montrose coun ty has the bUlk of the world's supply
[of radium] and here we are still trying to get a
reputation on onions and potatoes.
If we knew
what was good for us, we would exploit the radium
this county has and it would make all the gold in
the San Juan look like pewter platters in
comparison. 25
Yet, however diligently the promoters persuaded, Montrose
found it difficult to capitalize on the West End's fortunes.
Of major concern was the fact that the Standard and
ot her ra dium producers shipped their ore out of state, or
eve n out of the country , for processing.

Many hop e d for a

day when radium could be mined, isolated, and sold fr o m
Montrose County , thereby keeping the profits "at home."
Stated one interested citizen: "Montrose should bend every
energy possible to get a mill and reduction plant.

It

would mean the greatest era of building and prosperity to

24 "$ 6 , 273,740.00 Crop Production In 1913," Montrose
Daily Press, 9 January 1914, sec. 1, p. 1.
25 "Radium Soars to Fabulous Prices ; Montrose County Has
Bulk of World Supply," Montrose Daily Press, 9 April 1918,
p.

1 .
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our city and count ry."

Another believed that "one hundred

me n with $100 ea c h or ten men with $1000 e a c h can have a
mill f o r extracting radium in Montrose in sixty days. ,, 26
At least one att e mpt was made to form a company that would
produce radium in Montrose County, but nothing substantial
resulted.

Likely, the company's founders underest i mated

both the financial resources and the complicated processes
required to isolate radium.
a "specialized plant,
and operating work force,

The extraction process demanded
access to a skilled construction

large quantities of fuel and

water, and industrial, chemical, and scientific equipment
and supplies."

On ly with a tremendous financial investment

could such a plant have been constructed in Montrose in
1913 . 27
As an obstacle to West End prosperity, the condition of
the county ' s roads presented the most pressing problem .

The

p oo r state of the roads made the shipment of goods from the
West End more expenslve than ne cessary .

And because there

was no good road connecting the eastern half o f the county
with the weste rn half, Mo ntrose mer c hants felt tha t

they

wer e denied the lucrative trade with their western
26Montrose Supply [sic] World with Radium from
Carnotite Beds We Are Developing," Montrose Daily Press, 1
May 1913, p. 1; J. Q. Allen, "By Pushing We Can Land The
Radium Mill," Montrose Daily Press, n. d., n. p.
27 "May Reduce Radium Here," Montrose Daily Press, 10
March 1913, p. 1; "Radium Company is Sure Success," Montrose
Daily Press, 20 May 1913, p. 1; Landa, "Buried Treasure,"
19.
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neighbors.

West Enders found it eaSler to travel to

Telluride or Placerville to do their business. 28

The topi c

of road construction and improvement dominated the county
ne wspape rs throughout the radium period.
Placerville, the nearest rail o utlet for West End
goods, lay approximately forty-two miles from Naturita, and
nearly two thousand feet higher than Naturita.

During the

winter and sprlng months snow and rain rendered the dirt
ro ad impassable.

Between Placerville and the Wes t End lies

the infamous, steep grade of Norwood hill.

That section of

ro ad presents a danger to dri v ers of today; but to see
Norwood hill in the early days, one "would hardly believe
that anyone could drive a four - horse team and wagon up
and down it."

The trip from Naturita to Placervill e and

back again by freight wago n took at least five da ys , with
good conditi ons ; this included the stops n eces sa ry to pick
up and deliver freight. 29
The people of the Wes t End were not satisfied in
sending their goods to Placerville for shipment.

The

narrow, dangerous road to Placerville constantly needed
upgrading; they wanted a broad, smooth road over which
freight wagons could run all year.

Moreover, there was

growlng sentiment among West Enders that they should have
28 "Center of the Radium Mining of the World," Montrose
Daily Press , 9 January 1914 , sec. 3, p. 6.
29 Flora Cooper Locke, "Recollections of Naturita,"
Journal of the Western Slope 1 (Autumn 1986 ) : 34 -35.
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access to a large r commercial center.

The cities of Grand

Junction and Montrose provided the alternatives.

There was

no direct route to Grand Junction, approximately one hundred
miles distant by today's road.

The distance to Montrose

from the West End was considerably shorter, about sixty road
miles; but the only direct road to Montrose was hardly
worthy of the name .

Known as the "colony road , " because it

ran between the Nucla colony and Montrose, this route was
more of a trail, used by ranchers to drive cattle to the
railroad at Montrose.

The colony road led travelers

directly over the Uncompahgre Plateau; the snow on the tenthousand-foot high plateau prevented travel over this route
for much of the year.

Even today this road remains closed

during the winter . 30
As the commercial value of resources In the West End
became more apparent, Montrose boosters sought to bring
attention to the need for a good county road .

One

frustrated observer noted that "Montrose is evidently asleep
and wi ll not wak e up to the opportunity of getting the
Paradox and west end business until it is too late. "

The

president of the Montrose Chamber of Commerce admitted that
the road proposal "means more to Montrose than the most of
30 In 1913 a motorist drove from Nucla to Montrose over
the colony road.
He covered the fifty-five miles in six
hours and forty-five minutes "without a mishap." The Ford
car "climbed over rocks and stumps" on a road marked often
by steep grades.
"Lincoln Vestal Drives Auto over Old State
Road from Nucla Here," Montrose Daily Press, 21 August 191 3 ,
p . 1.
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us had the slightest idea of."

Promoters pointed out that

not only could Montrose become a shipping point for West End
goods, but with a good road,

the citizens of the West End

would come more frequently to Montrose to recreate, purchase
supplies, pay taxes, and otherwise spend money. 31
In August of 1912 the Montrose Chamber of Commerce held
"one of the most important meetings" ever, to discuss the
construction of a road to the Paradox Valley.

Promoters had

to raise a large sum of money, probably in the range of
$20,000.

The chamber planned to raise enough money, through

subscriptions from businesses, partially to construct the
road.

Then, road promoters hoped, the State Road Commission

would see the need for the byway and would appropriate
additional money to the project.

By September of 1912 the

county had sent out a surveyor to map the best route.

The

Montrose Daily Press reported these events with optimism ,
and it seemed only a matter of time until a passable road
connected Montrose and the West End. 32
West End promoters, however, had some different ideas
on the matter.

They had "clamored for a good road for

31 " Paradox People Are Working on the Wagon Road,"
Montrose Daily Press, 21 December 1911, p. 1; "What it Would
Mean To Have Road into Paradox from Here," Montrose Daily
Press, 27 July 1912, p. 1.
32 " Two Plans for Paradox Road to be Submi t ted, "
Montrose Daily Press, 11 May 1912, p. 3; "Road Matters of
Great Importance," Montrose Daily Press, 27 August 1912, p.
1; "Two Viewers Make Good Report on Paradox Wagon Road,"
Montrose Daily Press, 24 September 1912, p. 6.
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years," trying "every conceivable method" to get one.

They

greeted every road proposal wit h a great deal of enthusiasm,
only to see their hopes frustrated.

The State Road

Commission, alleged the Nucla Independent, allotted just
enough money to "repair a few ruts," using funds to repalr
poor roads instead of building good ones.

West Enders had

heard enough proposals that they could almost "hear the
tooting of the automobiles" motoring into their country.
City boosters not only from Montrose, but also fr om Grand
Junction, had shown interest in a West End road, but the
plans never materialized. 33
In fact, West Enders probably preferred a road to Grand
Junction rather than Montrose.

B. W. Marsh, a spokesman for

the Paradox Valley, believed it impractical to construct a
road over the Uncompahgre Plateau and its ten-thousand-foot
elevation.

Marsh advocated a byway to Grand Junction, the

highest point of which would be seven thousand feet.
Moreover,

the road bed on such a route would be superior to

that of the Uncompahgre Plateau.

Marsh wrote letters to

Grand Junction businessmen, trying to convince them of the
trade opportunities available to them.

Because of his

overtures to Grand Junction, the Montrose Daily Press
accused Marsh of "playing one community against the other In

33"What It Would Mean to Have Road into Paradox from
Here," Montrose Daily Press, 27 July 1912, p. 1; Nucla
Independent, 17 April 1913, p. 5; "Good Roads Our Need,"
Nucla Independent , 14 August 1913, p. 1 .
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order to get the road."
accurate.

No doubt this observation was

" If we cannot get the desired response fr o m the

cit=i zens of Grand Junction, " wrot e Marsh,

"we wi ll by mere

necessity be compelled to look else where for an outlet. ,, 34
Although effort=s to secure a good road to the outside
world never flagged, during the radium boom the West End
never realized its dream.

The cost of such a road, likely ,

proved too much for the city of Montrose, and the
geographical barriers discouraged all but the most hopeful.
The most direct, well-maintained route from the West End to
it s county seat still runs through Placerville and San
Miguel County.
Ult imate ly , Grand Jun ction gathered the funding to tap
the "vast re s o urces" o f the Paradox Valley.

The Grand

J un ct i o n Chamber of Commerc e aggressively pushed the road ,
primar i ly by soliciting businesses.
subscriptions totaled $5,000.

By March o f 1922

Two months later, mlnlng

compan ies had dona ted an additional $12,000, and farmers had
pledged horse power and feed.

Eventually, the chamber of

commerce may have raised as much as $ 30 ,000.

Convict labor

constituted at l ea st a part o f the construction work force.

34 1lMontrose Promoters to Survey the Paradox Wagon Road
in 10 Days," Montrose Daily Press, 1 June 1912, p. 1.
In
this article the editor reprinted Marsh's letter to the
Grand Junction business community.
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By the summer of 1923,

"road gangs" had completed the much

anticipated highway. 35
Ironically, the road came too late to benefit the West
End during the radium boom.
activity took place.

By 1923 only limited mining

Nevertheless, by investing in the road

the business leaders of Grand Junction demonstrated that
they were not "blind" to the future, which held "much in
store for the radium fields."

That future,

farther down the road than most anticipated.

however,

lay

It would be

thirteen years before carnotite mining of any significance
occurred in the West End.
1923 were

For their part West Enders by

"glad to realize the fact that they have found a

community which gives the west end of the county at least
more than its moral support." 36

.
.
It is one of the enduring lronles of West End life that
the distance from Naturita to Grand Junction is
approximately sixty miles.

But because of geographic

obstacle s, the road travels through one hundred miles of
landscape.

35 "Funds Needed to Continue Paradox Road, " Daily
Sentinel, 24 March 1922, p. 4; "San Miguel Road to be Built
to Paradox Valley," Daily Sentinel, 25 May 1922, p. 4; John
I. Mullen, "The G. J . -Paradox Road," Nucla Independent , 1
February 1923, p. 1.
It seems possible that Standard
Chemical contributed to the construction of the road . But
there were also mining companies in Grand Junction
interested In the road project.
36 John I. Mullen, "The G. J.-Paradox Road," Nucla
Independent, 1 February 1923, p. 1.
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The dreams o f road-building went far beyond the
For many years talk circulated of a Paradox

feasible.

Valley ra i lroad .

These rumors followed the same line, and

took place at the same time, as those concerning a
conventional wagon and automobile road.

In 1912 Montrose

boosters met and discussed ways to persuade railroad
officials to build a line from Montrose to the West End.
Two weeks later the people of the West End had become
"greatly agitated over the prospects of a railroad."
Meanwhile, Grand Junction promoters gained the lead in the
railroad rumors: they claimed that the Denver and Rio Grande
Railroad favored Grand Junction over Montrose as an outlet
from the Paradox Valley, and that "a ctual cons tru ction work
may start on such a road. ,, 37
Four years later the West End still did not have its
railroad, and the lo cal citizenry, while still hopeful, had
become disaffected:
In the past ten years we have had numerous
railroads built into this country; two or three
have been built down the [San] Miguel from
Placerville. At least two have been launched from
Montrose.
Probably not less than one half dozen
broad gauge railroads have been built from Canada
to the Gulf and each road has come through our
prosperous section. We have railroads to burn, In
our minds.
Pipe dream railroads. 38
37 "All Together for Paradox Railroad," Montrose Daily
Press, 3 January 1912, p. 1; "Naturita News," Montrose Daily
Press, 18 January 1912, p. 2; "Claim That Andrews Favors the
Junction," Montrose Daily Press, 19 October 1911, p. 3.
38 "Where is Our Railroad?" Nucla Independent, 13 July
1916, p.

6.
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Although interest In a railroad continued for several years,
the dream never materialized .
Some road-building dreams went beyond the reasonable
into the realm of the fantastic.

As early as 1911 those who

wished to "open up the west end" discussed the possibility
of constructing an electric line from Montrose to the
Paradox Valley.

Not to be outdone, Grand Junction boosters

also entertained the notion.

The newspaper articles of the

day reveal nothing concerning the means by which the
electric line would be built, maintained, or operated.

One

reporter merely assured readers that "such a line would not
be expensive to construct and operate," and that "eastern
financiers are willing to furnish capital ."

In 1916 a gro up

of men from Grand Junction set out for the Paradox Valley to
survey business opportunities.

Ever optimistic, the Nu cla

Independent reported that "if the proposition for business
looks good we will no doubt see electric cars running in
this country in the next year. ,, 39
Such reports repeated.

When it became obvious that no

investors would come forth t o finance the scheme, those

39 "Will Discuss an Electric to West," Montrose Daily
Press, 21 October 1911, p. 3; "Electric Line from Grand
Junction to Paradox Proposed," Montrose Daily Press, 3 April
1916, p. 1; "Electric Road from Grand Junction," Nucla
Independent, 6 April 1916, p. 1.
The idea of electricpowered transportation took hold in the Nucla colony very
early. One of the pioneer settlers envisioned "the town as
a nucleus from which electric cars ran to all points"
surrounding the colony.
Peterson, Spell of the Tabeguache,
21.
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still interested In the electr i c line turned to the company
with the deepest pockets and biggest investment in the Wes t
End: the Standard Chemical Company.
superintendent of the Standard,

John I. Mullen,

responded angrily to the

suggestion that his company woul d finance an electric line.
He pointed out that Standard Chemical had spent $300,000
during the prevlous seven years in transporting its ore from
the Paradox Valley to Placerville.
remained "open for suggestions."

Therefore, the company
But Mullen summarily

dismissed the suggestion that freighting ore through the
rugged country in southwestern Colorado could be
accomplished by electric cars.

"The electric line would

require an investment that would make the proposition a
laughing stock."

Mullen also took to task those who assumed

that the Standard stood ready to absorb the cost of an
electric line.

The very idea struck Mullen as "ridi culous

and laughable. ,, 40
This episode characterizes the economlC quandary faced
by West Enders and Montrose County leaders .

They relied a

great deal upon the investments of the Standard Chemical
Company and other outside capital.

They resented their own

lack of control; at the same time, however, they came to
expect more from their benefactors.

4°John I. Mullen, "No Elect ric Line Says John I.
Mullen," Nucla Independent, 24 July 1919, p. 1; "Electric
Line to Paradox Mine Absurd, Says Official," Rocky Mountain
News (Denver), 27 July 1919, se c . 1, p. 7.
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Two arti c les from the Nucla Independent illustrat e the
paradox in which West Enders found themselves.
first,

In the

a Montrose optician, T. V. R. Quinn, pointed out the

wonderful benefits provided by Standard Chemical.

It formed

"the backbone o f the uranium business" in the West End.

It

paid fair pri ce s f o r ore, and bought its ore directly fr o m
the miners, or "producers."

Thus, the prices were not

affected by independent buyers or middlemen.

Moreover, the

Standard at least kept its ore and profits in the United
States, instead of shipping it to Europe for processing.
Best of all,

"the Standard Chemical Company is putting a

bridge across the San Miguel rlver, some 60 feet in length."
If n o thing else, this writer implied, citizens should be
grateful for this new bridge.

"The Standard is A- I in th e

c arn o tite business."
Quinn ackno wledged that the "pro ducers" work e d at the
mer c y o f the rich men in the radium business, and that local
min e rs did not see a fair share o f the radium pro fits.

But

he laid blame on the buyers for European concerns, not on
the Standard Chemical Company.

At any rate, the problem

would be solved once a radium extraction plant were
established in Grand Junction or Denver, as anticipated.
Then,

"we' 11 keep our rock at ho me, and our radium t o o." 41

41 T. V. R. Quinn, "Radium--The Poor Man's Proposition,
The Rich Man's Perquisite," Nucla Independent, 15 January
1914,

p. 1.
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The writer of the second article, J. H. Burfeind, took
a harsher view of the radium buyers,
included Standard Chemical.

in which group he

Burfeind detailed a typi cal ore

transaction, showing the prices paid to miners for their
ore, and the profits supposedly realized by the radium
buyers and brokers.

This profit allowed the elite of the

industry to "ride In automobiles, make trips to Europe,
[and] have plenty of money to buy claims and ores."
Meanwhile, the West End producers drove "broken down teams";
they scarcely profited from their work because they bore the
costs of "mining,

[ore] sorting, wagon -hauls, railroad

freight , sampling charges, etc ."
Burfeind expected Standard Chemical to remedy this
discrepancy by competing more aggressively with the other
buyers in the field.

He noted one instance in whi ch a buyer

for a European firm paid eighty dollars per ton for a
certain grade of ore.

The Standard offered only sixty-four

dollars per ton for the same grade.

"Had the Standard been

thoroly [sic] patriotic it would have bid $81.00, or even
$101.00 . ,, 42

Some in the West End expected more from the

Standard than new bridges.
But the Standard was not willing to play the ro l e of
benefactor, and the company spent its money only when
absolutely necessary.

In 1914 officials from the Standard

42 J. H. Burfeind, "Radium- -Why the Radium-Producer
Wal ks and the Buyer Rides in His Auto," Nucla Independent,
15 January 1914, p. 1.
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met with the commlSSloners of Montrose County to discuss a
proposed $9,000 road from Naturita to the Joe Junior camp,
running along the San Miguel River.

Standard Chemical

wanted Montrose County to finance the road; because the
company had invested some $45,000 in its West End operations
during the month of July alone, officials felt "the county
should be able to give them some assistance."

But the

commissioners refused, claiming the county had only $668.00
to spend per year in that district.

The county would have

gladly assisted, but the law forbade the expenditure.

The

county's refusal to fund this road seems disingenuous,
considering the sentiments of county boosters, who wished to
support the radium industry in every way possible.

On the

ot h er hand, Standard's refusal to build the road seems
almost trivial; the company stood to profit from the road,
which would significantly decrease the time, expense, and
difficulty of hauling ore to and fr om its Joe Junior mill.
Montrose County officials could justifiably view the road as
a business expense to be borne by Standard Chemical.
Nevertheless, the company held out, and two years later, In
1916,

the county found the means to construct the road. 43

43 "County Can Not Help Build Road," Montrose Daily
Press, 30 July 1914, p. 1; "Tragic Ending of Nick Krohn,"
Montrose Daily Press, 16 September 1916, p. 1.
Krohn, the
supervisor of the road crew, was killed in an accident near
the completion of the building project.
The article
contains information regarding the construction of the road.
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Standa rd Chem ical and Montrose County officials also
wrangl ed over the amount of taxes owed the county by the
company.

In 1926 the Standard hired a Denver law firm and

sued the county fo r the recovery of tax revenues, claiming
an excessive evaluation of company property.

This was not

the first such lawsuit--the company had already "won a
number of suits against the county," and company o fficials
had "no reason to doubt" a victory in this case , as well. 44
The Standard Chemical Company and other radium
producers invested great sums in the business of producing
radium.

The manager of the Radium Company of Col ora d o

estimated that, during the radium boom, the ten companies
working in the West End had invested $1 0 million in the
industry.

This corresponds with a statement made by John I.

Mullen in 1923:

"There has been about a million dollars

(Eastern money) a year spent in the Paradox during the past
eight years. ,, 45

These figures likely include the co s t of

refining radium, money spent outside the West End.
Nevertheless, the radium companles must have spent quite a
lot of money in the West End.

But within the boom period

44 " Standard Pays Tax- -To Sue for Recovery," Nucla
Independent, 21 January 1926, p. 1.
The Standard paid
approximately $15,000 in taxes to Montrose County for the
year 1924.
45Lee Emerson Deets, "Paradox Valley- -An Historical
Interpretation of Its Structure and Changes," Colorado
Ma g a z in e 11 ( S e pte mbe r 1 9 3 4): 1 9 5 ; John I. Mu 11 en, " The G.
J. - Paradox Road," Nucla Independent, 1 February 1923, p. 1.
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forces beyond the West End's control limited the area's
prosperity.
First of all, the chronically poor road system within
the reglon forced mining operations to halt for at least
The wet winter weather made for

three months of the year.
"impassable roads. ,, 46

Of course, when the mines closed,

freighting and other cottage industries had no business,
either.
Secondly, the market for radium fluctuated a great
deal.

The market affected independent miners the most.

But

after the outbreak of the First World War in the summer of
1914,

the entire radium industry came almost to a halt.

Germany, which had purchased nearly two million dollars
worth of carnotite ore per year, diverted its resources t o
the war and stopped buying radium and radium ore altogether.
Even the well-financed Standard Chemical Company stopped
production for a time; it, too, depended on the European
market for the sale of its finished product. 47
The bust in the radium industry lasted approximately
three years,

from 1914 until 1917.

Unfortunately, almost n o

record exists regarding the impact this temporary bust had
on the West End communities.

46 Burwell,

(Coincidentally, few issues o f

"Carnoti te Mining," 7 58 .

47 Shumway, "History of the Uranium Industry," 68; "War
Stops the Radium Industry,
Montrose Daily Press 6 August
1914, p. 1; "Standard Chemical Company Is Forced to Shut
Down,11 Montrose Daily Press, 18 August 1914, p. 1.
II
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the Nucla Independent fro m 1914 t o 1917 remain . )

The mln ers

and prospectors at tra cted to the c arnotite regions have been
described as a "restless cre w,
communi ty. "

with no interest in the

Such persons would have drifted out o f the Wes t

End as easily as they arrived. 48

Others who lost out on

business opportunities spent more time on their farms and
ranches.

Some may have found other occupations , but in the

West End, there were not many alternatives to agriculture
and mlnlng.
For a time all carnotite mining ce ased.
of ore left Placerville in September of 1914.

The last load
Standard

Chemical shut down its operations, but probably not for very
long.

The company had invested heavily in the West End, and

it had the resources to weather a slump.

The Standard

resumed production, albeit on a limited basis: in 19 14 the
company produced 9.6 grams of radium; in 1915, 1.7 grams ; In
1916,

five grams; and in 1 9 17, se ven grams. 49

As noted ,

the talk of highways and railroads in the West End
circulated vigorously in 1916 ; this indicates that the
Standard did not cease mining for long, and that few
expected the radium slump to last long.

48 Deets ,

"Paradox Valley," 196.

49" Colorado Carnot i te Company Shipped 4 Cars Ore to N.
Y. ," Montrose Daily Press, 19 September 1914, p. 1;
"Standard Chemical Company Is Forced to Shut Down," Montros e
Daily Press, 18 August 1 9 14, p. 1; Landa, "Buried Treasur e ,
II

25.
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While the First World War put a hold on the use of
radium in medical research,
renewed the radium boom.

it created another market that

Several companies had been

experimenting with radium in the production of luminous
paint, which was applied to watch faces and instrument
panels.

The soft light emitted by the paint allowed one to

read the instrument in the dark.

By 1913 watches with

luminous dials had become relatively popular in the United
States.

Soon thereafter the military started using the

paint on compasses, watches, gunsights, and the instrument
panels of ships and planes.

This market greatly boosted the

radium industry; In 1918 radium production in the United
States peaked at 21.7 grams
13 . 6 grams) .

(Standard Chemical accounted for

Of this, approximately ninety-five percent

went for the production of luminous paint. 50
Despite the great demand for radium during this period,
some would question the prosperity enjoyed by West Enders.
According to one oplnlon the economic impact was minimal.
The sponsors of the boom came from outside the reglon;
therefore, the profits left the region without benefit to
West Enders.
While farmers and ranchers profited indirectly
from the influx of money brought on by the booms,
their mode of living continued on fundamentally
the same as if there had been no uranium or
vanadium ore in the region.
Likewise , the towns
of the area received only temporary and
superficial benefits from the migration of
50 Landa,

"Buried Treasure," 4 3 - 4 5 .
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prospectors a nd miners and the freighting of ore
through the country. 51
Another opinion holds that the Paradox Valley, and,
presumably, other parts of the West End, rode "the crest of
a wave of prosperity" during the radium years; money
"poured" into the local economy. 52
Certainly, some locals must have capitalized to an
appreciable degree.

However , when the boom subsided West

Enders could point to only a few tangible, lasting benefi ts :
a bank and a high school in Nucla, and some road
improvements, but no permanent, thriving industry.

The

hotels and other business enterprises established in the
West End could not prosper without the capital provided by
the radium industry.
The recollections of a West End ploneer testify to the
difficulty of making a living during boom and bust.

Wal ter

and Myrtl e Cooper moved to Naturita in 1899, intending t o
ralse cattle.

Finding that endeavor "unprofitab le ," Walt er

and a partner became freighters, when the Cashin copper mine
was operated.

For unspecified reasons "Walter didn't stay

with ore hauling very long."

Presumably, that occupation

proved just as risky as ranching.

But the famil y stayed In

the area, and for several years the Coopers operated
Naturita's post office; later, they relinquished the post

51Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 195.
52 Deets,

"Paradox Valley I" 195.
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master's job and opened their house to boarders.

During the

radium boom they had plenty of business but "the profit
didn't amount to very much," especially when compared with
the amount of work involved in running a boarding house.
Through it all the Coopers maintained their farm,
the land was the one sure thing they had.
recollection,

because

As noted in this

"people on these small farms often tried ways

of adding to their small income."

The radium boom afforded

the Coopers such an opportunity, but it certainly did not
make them weal thy. 53
The radium boom exercised the greatest impact, perhaps,
on the collective imagination of Montrose County residents.
For years news from the radium fields dominated talk in the
county.

Newspaper correspondents enthusiastically reported

each new discovery of high grade ore, printed the latest
news from the carnotite industry, and repeated the claim
that the whole world looked to the West End to supply the
valuable element, radium.

Radium so enthralled the West End

that the reglon took radium as part of its identity.

Some

referred to the reglon as "the radium belt," and when
Nucla's first movie house opened, its proprietor adopted the
name "Radium Theatre"
Radium Theatre") .

53 Locke,

(and the slogan,

"Meet Me At The

Other merchants tried to capitalize on

"Recollections of Naturita," 34-42.
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the element; a Nucla creamery produced "Radium Brand
But ter. 11 54
The county's newspapers treated readers to stories of
miraculous cures accomplished by radium therapy, and to the
newest applications for radium, such as "the rejuvenation of
frozen fruit trees,
California.

II

a technique developed by a scientist In

In Montrose consumers had available to them the

latest, practical use for radium--a switchplate coated with
luminescent paint made with radium.

At the cost of one

dollar each, one could "radiumize" his home by purchasing
"everlasting guide lights for finding wall electric push
but tons in the night time." 55
Since the general public did not understand the
phenomenon of radioactivity--the most significant
characteristic of radium--a knowledgeable Montrose man
sought to inform the less enlightened.

In a remarkable,

sometimes eschatological treatise, the author anno unced that
"radium is the nearest approach to God of any known metali c

54 "The Gospel In the Radium Belt,
Nucla Independent,
20 April 1916, p. 3; "Radium Theatre" (advertisement), Nucla
Independent, 25 December 1913, p. 8; "Then and Now: The
Nucla Creamery,
San Miguel Basin Forum (Nucla, CO), 29
February 1996, p. 15.
II

II

55 "Rich Men Will Aid the Sick if Colorado Radium is
Available,
Montrose Daily Press, 30 January 1914, p. 1;
"Radium Cured Denver Man of Cancer on Tongue,
Montrose
Daily Press, 6 April 1914, p. 1; "Colorado Woman Believes
Radium Will Cure Her," Montrose Daily Press, 4 March 1914,
p. 1; "New Use for Radium,
Nucla Independent, 2 May 1913,
p. 1; "Radiumize" (advertisement), Montrose Daily Press, 11
April 1918, p. 1.
II

II

II
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[sic]

substance."

He warned that chemists "are getting

closer to Causation every day.

But, Obey the Sign: Thus

Far, and No Fa rthe r Shalt Thou Go!

'God Lives Next Door.'"

Used unwisely, he suggested, radium could "set the world
afire."
After this startling introduction, the author retreated
slightly, allowing that "God is Good": never would God have
given to humans the element radium if it were not intended
for some good, and if the dangers of radium were not
"printed in bold-faced type on the label."

In fact,

scientists were beginning to realize that radium "is Life giving."

Not only had s cie nce developed radium cures, but

those who merely lived n ear radium deposits reaped healthful
benefits:
The d oc tor practising [sic] In the western
mountainous portions of the United States, from
Colorado to northern Alaska, has to depend mostly
on births, o ld age, accidents and sick visitors
from the east for a revenue.
And it is being
noticed that this part of Colorado is phenomenally
healthy.
Radium, like many other subtle
activities, may be the silent factor lighting each
spark of vital force in life. 56
With such an endorsement West Enders could not help but take
pride in their radium fields.
The most enduring evidence of the West End's
fascination with radium survives to the present day In a bit
of folklore.

Quite early people began to believe that Marie

56 T. V. R. Quinn,
October 1913, p. 1.

"Radi urn," Nucla Independent, 16
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Curie performed her experimental work with radium from
Colorado carnotite.
1911,

As recorded In a mining journal In

"agents of Doctor and Madame Curie operated" a mlne

and a "small factory" in the West End.

Forty years later,

one could read that near Naturita "the famous Madame Curie
had a working mill and several mines supplying ore to the
plant."

More likely, however, the scientists' slim budget

prevented them . from hiring agents and building factories.
In all but a few cases, the Curies received their samples
from a pitchblende mine and mill in Austria. 57
Equally persistent, and interrelated, lS the notion
that Curie, the most famous name associated with radium,
toured the West End or some other part of the Colorado
Plateau.

These rumors may have been fueled,

actual visit to the United States In 1921.

in part, by her
In that year

Curie received as a gift from the "women of America" one
gram of radium,

"the most celebrated gram of radium

produced" by the Standard Chemical Company.

The itinerary

for her visit reportedly included a stop in Colorado, to
observe carnotite mining operations.

According to the same

accounts, she later decided to bypass Colorado. 58

57 Curran, "Carnotite in Paradox Valley," 1288; Pete
Maness and Lois Jacobs, Uranium Crazy (n. p., n. d.), 43;
Landa, "Buried Treasure," 7.
58 Landa, "Buried Treasure," 20; "Madame Curie to Make
Visit to Colorado Mines," Rocky Mountain News (Denver), 12
May 1921, p. 1; "Mme. Curie Cannot Come to Colorado," Rocky
Mountain News, 13 May 1921, p. 7.
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Over the years varlOUS observers recorded Mari e Curie's
supposed sojourn in the West End.

If all of the stories

were true, she would have traversed the Colorado Plateau
from Moab, Utah, to the Paradox Valley and on to Naturita.
A researcher in the 1950s established 1908 as the year of
the earlies t Curie sighting.

One account holds that Curie

came to southwestern Colorado in 1899 and named the mineral
carnotite.

A West End resident claimed to have met Curie

when she visited the superintendent of the Standard Chemical
Company; she reportedly left with three sacks o f radioactive
ore.

But the final word on the subject belongs to David

Lavender:

"Mme. Curie, incidentally , never visited the

Colorado Plateau, though some promoters will show you the
very chair she sat in." 59
The year Marie Curie visited the United States, 1921,
also marked the decline of America's radium industry .

In

that year a Belgian company received from the Belgian Congo
the first shipments of pitchblende, a mineral with very high
concentrations of uranium and radium.

The Belgian company

had developed the necessary process t o extract radium from
the pitchblende; and because the ore contained so much
radium, the company needed only ten tons to produce three or
four grams of radium each month.

The American radium

59Bruyn, Uranium Country, 62-64 ; Richard E. Westwo od,
"Howard W. Balsley, Dean of Uranium Miners and Civic Leader
of Moab," Utah Historical Quarterly 59 (Fall 1 991): 399-400;
"Meet 'Clear Water Lou,'" Forum (Nucla, CO), 13 February
1964, p. 8; Lavender, One Man's West, 304n.
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companles realized immediately that they could not compete
with the Belgian company.

Instead, Standard Chemical and

other companies cooperated by providing technical assistance
and by helping the Belgians market their radium. 60
By the second half of 1922 the American companies had
virtually halted radium production.

Standard Chemical

maintained its presence in the West End until 1928; the
company continued to prospect for new carnotite claims, and
in 1926 the Standard even expended five thousand dollars to
build a road into Bull Canyon.

Apparently, the company

hoped that the pitchblende reserves in the Belgian Congo
would play out, and that Colorado carnotite would again
supply the world's radium.

The company even branched out t o

another extractive industry: the Standard attempted to
locate oil reserves in the West End. 61
capa ci ty, howeve r,

In its limited

the Standard employed only a fracti on o f

the men that it had previously.
Carnotite mlnlng in the West End continued, but only o n
a small scale.

A few buyers purchased ore from those miners

diligent enough to maintain their claims.

Some refining

companies still marketed radium for use In luminescent
paint, and uranium for use in glass and ceramlC ware.
6°Landa,

"Buried Treasure," 2 6 .

61Nucla Independent, 22 April 1926, p. 1; Shumway,
"History of the Uranium Industry," 77-78; "May Drill in
Paradox Soon," Nucla Independent, 14 August 1924, p. 1; "To
Prospect for Oil in West End of County," Montrose Daily
Press, 10 April 1924, p. 1.
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Producers of "radioactive water,

salves, tonics and other

nostrums" continued to market their products well into the
1930s; some miners sold ore to those producers.

But after

1922 carnotite traded only sporadically. 62
For several years those in the West End held hope that
carnotite mining would return to its former glory, that
"carnotite will come back. ,, 63

In 1925 and in 1926 enough

carnotite ore sold to make observers hope "for a boom In the
local mlnlng game."

At one point the Nucla newspaper

repeated a rumor about a boom town that would sprlng up In
the Paradox Valley near some oil wells. 64

But no such boom

occurred, and carnotite mining did not return.

In 1927

Standard Chemical sold its holdings in Colorado to Union
Carbide and Carbon Corporation.

This sale may have brought

hope to the West End, for Union Carbide planned to mine
carnotite for its vanadium content.

However, the company

could begin operations only "when the demand arises"; at the
time, no such demand existed. 65

62 Shumway,
63 Deets,

"History of the Uranium Industry," 80-82.

"Paradox Valley," 195.

64Nucla Independent, 5 February 1925 p. 1; "Moving Ore
from Long Park Mines," Nucla Independent, 21 January 1926,
p. 1; Nucla Independent, 7 May 1925, p. 1.
I

65 J. B. Huffard, "Corporation Acquires Additional
Vanadium Property in Colorado," Carbidea 5 (February 192 9)
5. The Carbidea, apparently, was a pUblication of Union
Carbide and Carbon Corporation.
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Coincident with the radium bust came the realization
that agriculture could not deliver growth and prosperity to
the West End.

The Hartmann brothers, who had purchased fou r

thousand acres and formed the Paradox Valley Land and
Development Company, went broke in their attempts to
establish an effective irrigation system.

The failure of

this company ruined many homesteaders in the Paradox Valle y .
The group of 150 Hungarian settlers, who arrived at the
Paradox Valley in 1917, departed one year later, broke and
disappointed .

Many other homesteaders relinquished their

property and left the area .

By 1923 farmers in the Parado x

Valley cultivated only thirty-one percent of the total
amount of the available, arable land. 66

In 1921 a

geologist summarized the problems faced by those who would
irrigate the West End:
In conside ring [irrigati o n] p rop o sals it sho u l d be
remembered that the rocks in which the canals and
ditches would be bui l t are porous and the ground
water table is low.
Evaporation is rapid and
becomes a serious factor when the long distances
through which the water would have to come are
considered.
The cost of initial construction and
the high cost of ditch maintenance , because of
silting, breaks, etc., are other extremely
unfavorable factors which should be carefully
considered before any irrigation scheme is
adopted.
. A great deal of land in the area
. would be immensely productive if it could be
watered.
However, the high cost and the

66 Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 139; Deets,
Valley, " 196 - 97.
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uncertainty connected with such enterprises will
probably limi t their promotion. 67
If , ten years earlier, enthusiastic West End promoters could
have read this report,

it probably would not have deterred

them in their attempts to deliver water to West End farms.
The early successes of ranching In the West End also
proved ephemeral.

Ranchers competed intensely for graze

land and access to the few existing springs.

This led to

the practice of fencing off the land, and battles between
ranchers and "squatters," or homesteaders.

The "sin of the

stockman," overgrazing, ruined much of what once seemed
inexhaustible.

Due to these factors the costs of stock

raising increased dramatically, and only those with the most
favorably located ranches and the most economical modes of
operation profited.

The Club Ranch, perhaps the most

successful in the West End, was "among the last of the
ranches of this region having anything like adequate range
area for any considerable herd." 68
To be sure, the pastoral pursuits of the West End were
not all failures.

Nucla, with its successful ditch company,

provided the area a certain economic stability.

The town of

67 p. G. Worcester, "Geography," in Radium, Uranium, and
Vanadium Deposits of Southwestern Colorado, by R. C. Coffin,
Colorado Geological Survey, Bulletin 16 (Denver: Colorado
Geological Survey, 1921), 24.
68 Lavender, "One Man's West," 144-145; Rockwell,
Uncompahgre Country, 140; "Consummation of the Deal on the
Big Club Ranch," Montrose Daily Press, 10 December 1912, p.
1.
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Paradox assumed an "agricultural life," although many could
only " eke out a bare existence from their water-starved
properties. ,, 69

While these communities survived,

it had

become evident that the West End was not destined to be an
agricultural empire.

69Rockwe 11 , Uncompahgre Count ry , 139.
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CHAPTER 3
URAVAN:

"THE NEWEST BIG LITTLE

TOWN IN THE UNITED STATES" l
In 1931 a correspondent from Parado x rec o rded a
poignant description of the Depression-era West End:
It's rather heart breaking these days, to the
farmers of the valley to have to turn away so many
men who come here, hiking the long, weary miles
across the desert for work.
Some come offering to
work for board.
Some have hiked so many miles
their feet are almost too sore to permit further
travel.
And then when there is no work for them
and they must either tramp back across the desert
or take the steep rocky road for Utah, it must
indeed be discouraging. 2
Very little money circulated In the West End.

Most

families lived on small farms, or cultivated their own
vegetable gardens and thus had produce available.
people shot game, both in and out of season.
remembered,

And many

As one

"we lived on buckskin and beans , you might say."

With so little money available, a barter system took hold in
the local economy.

Farmers traded produce for o the r goods

and serVlces, and others sold their labor skills for food.
The operators of a local coal mine exchanged coal for
staples, and paid their employees in the same fashion. 3
l "Mining Town," Montrose Daily Press, 24 August 1939,
Uravan, CO. Clippings File, Western History Collection,
Denve r Public Library (hereaf ter cited as DPL) .
2Mrs. C. B. Warner,
June 1931, p. 2.

"Paradox," Montrose Daily Press, 11

3Alva Hiett, interview by author, 30 July 1993,
Naturita, Colorado, tap e recording, private collection .
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But eve n in hard times people oft en find ways to afford
t heir diversions.

A West End resident of the time recalled,

with a touch of wry humor, one o f the consequences of the
money shortage:
Back in the Depression days they had a little
poker game going on at the pool hall up here at
Nu c la.
And in this game, there's only about ten
dollars.
Maybe one time one guy would take two or
three dollars home.
But always between the five
or six, sometimes four guys, they would always
have money enough to start their poker game.
Well , one time there was a traveling salesman that
come in.
They let him get in the game.
He won
ten dollars, and there wasn't a game for three
weeks.
That's how tough it was. 4
Montrose County exhibited o ther signs of the times, and
some people turned to illegal means to survive the
Depression.

The coun ty sheriff arrested a man for opera ting

a still, located "in the isolated and impenetrable vastness
o f canyon and cliffs of the west end."

A Montrose newspaper

warne d residents of strangers who perpetrated various con
games upon the unsuspe cti ng.

And In a show of optimism

during hard times, a Montrose merchant held a "Back to
Normalcy" sale. 5
Normal cy lay yet a few years d o wn the road for the West
End.

The collapse of carnoti te mining, and the difficulties

5"Notorious Still in West End Taken by Sheriff
Wednesday," Montrose Daily Press, 4 June 1931, p. 7; "All
Kinds of Sucker Games Are Worked Here by Transients,"
Montrose Daily Press, 17 June 1931, p. 1; "Back to Normal cy
Sale" (advertisement), Montrose Daily Press, 2 January 19 3 1,
p.

4.
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experienced by farmers and ranchers, took a toll on the
population of the West End.

By 1930 the combined population

of Nucla, Paradox, and Naturita had fallen to 813; that
figure represents a forty-two percent decrease from 1920,
and fewer residents than 1910. 6

Nucla boasted the most

residents, and remained the most prosperous West End
community .

In Paradox most people "marked time and talked

about the day when mining would again come into its own.,, 7
Naturita, described during the radium boom as "a brawny camp
abustle with radium mlners and ore wagons," had decayed into
virtual rUln.

That village had been the most reliant on the

carnotite trade.

Down river from Naturita, near the Club

Ranch, the Joe Junior mill and campsite lay desolate.

The

boarding house remained, along with the machinery of the
mill,

" a shattered red hulk leaning against the canyon

wall." S
As always, mlners refused to glve up hope.

The fine

particles of gold deposited in the gravel benches along the
San Miguel River still intrigued West Enders.

In 1931, amid

reports that indicated a revival of the gold market, several

6In 1930 census take rs counted 398 people in the Nucla
precinct, 221 of whom lived in "Nucla town."
Paradox
counted 221 residents, and Naturita 199.
Nucla was the only
West End community divided into precinct and township for
purposes of the census . Schulze, A Century of the Colorado
Census , 203, 363 , 163.
7Rockwell, Uncompahgre Country, 140.
SLavender, One Man's West, 273, 277.
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prospectors set up placer operations along the San Miguel
River.

The process of placer mining provided a diversion

for lo cals , many of whom visited the sites "to watch the
gold being washed out of the gravel."

An outfit calling

itself San Miguel Exploration undertook the most ambitious
of these enterprises.

The company hauled a 96,OOO-pound

drag line to the West End to dredge gold from the San
Miguel.

The dredging apparatus was so heavy that a bridge

collapsed under its weight.

9

The success of various

attempts--by individuals and companies--to retrieve gold
from the West End rivers was limited.

Likely, more than one

company met the same fate as the "San Miguel River Gold
Placer syndicate," which operated near Naturita.

Early In

193 6 that operation faced bankruptcy, and sold its equipment
at auction.

1o

A revival of the carnotite industry seemed more likely.
Sporadic mining of that mineral took place, and occasionally
West Enders received encouraging news.

In 1931 the Rare

Metals Corporation built a mill near Naturita, the mill
designed to extract vanadium from carnotite ore .

The plant

employed approximately thirty men, and in the early summer

Start Campaign to Revive Gold Mining in Colorado as
Conditions Seem To Be Good," Montrose Daily Press, 16 June
1931, p. 1; Mrs. W. W. Williams, "Naturita," Montrose Daily
Press, 27 August 1931, p. 6; Nellie Rodgers, "Nucla,"
Montrose Daily Press, 25 September 1931, p. 6.
9"

lO"Gold Placer Outfit Sold at Sheriff's Sale Here
Wednesday," Montrose Daily Press, 22 January 1936, p. 1.
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of 1931 mlners on Long Park, on the northeast rlm of the
Paradox Valley, beg an digging ore for the mill. ll

By the

end of the summer, however, the mines closed, and Rare
Metals sold its mill at public auction.
authori ty,

According to an

"the demand for radium, uranium, and vanadium ,

like that f or most o ther substances, was small du ring
1931 .

,, 12

It would be several years before demand would

pick up, but it would do so in a spectacular manner.
In 1924 the United States Vanadium Company (USVC ) was
formed.

The company mined and milled roscoelite ore in the

vicinity of Rifle, Colorado.

From that ore the company

extracted vanadium to sell to the steel industry.
is one of severa l metals used to strengthen steel.

Vanadi um
In 1926

Uni on Carbide and Carbon Corporation purchased USVC, whi ch
continued its operat i ons at Rifle.

USVC , now a subsidiary

of Uni on Carbide , bought the Colorado properties of the
Standard Chemical Company in 1 927. 13

With its pu rchase of

llMrs. J. R. Cuthbert, "Naturita," Montrose Daily
Press , 9 April 1931, p. 3; Mrs. J. R. Cuthbert, "Naturita , "
Montrose Daily Press, 27 May 1931, p. 3.
'
,
Mrs. W. W. Wl' 11 lams,
"Naturlta,"
Montrose Dal, 1 y
Press , 23 July 1931, p. 3; Frank L . Hess, "Vanadium,
Uranium, and Radium," in Mineral Resources of the United
States , 1931, part 1, Metals (Washingt o n, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1934), 185.
12

13W. L. Dare, Uranium-Mining Practices and Costs at Ten
Salt Wash Lease Operations of Union Carbide Nuclear Co.,
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines
Information Circular 7922 (Washington, DC: Government
Pr inting Office, 1959), 1-3; Huffard, "Corporation Acquires
Additional Vanadium Property," 5.
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the Standard's property, USVC appeared poised to expand i ts
operations; the company owned the most favorable mine sites
in southwestern Colorado and southeastern Utah.

However,

the Depression- e ra economy prevented the company's plans t o
develop its new properties.
to make steel
companles .

a~loys

usvc

The slim market for metals used

was already tightly controlled by othe r

saw its production and sales of vanadium

from its Rifle operations decrease yearly from 1927 to
1932 . 14
In the mid - 1930s a revitalization of the steel industry
gave hope to me t als producers such as USVC.

The demand f o r

metals used to produce alloys--such as molybdenum and
vanadium--increased , a development reflected in the growth
of the Climax Molybdenum Company .

That company, owner of

Colorado ' s largest company town (Climax), expanded its
operations In late 1935, and doubled its molybdenum
production In 1936.

Meanwhile, USVC gre w concerned about

the depleted state of its vanadium reserves at the Rifle
mlne.

With this in mind, and anxious to take advantage o f a

more favorable metals market,

the company planned

improvements to its property in Montrose County. 15

14 Shumway,

If

History of the Uranium Industry," 95-100.

15 "Cli max Co. Plans Large Improvement," Daily Sentinel,
26 August 1935, p. 8; "Molybdenum Mill Running at Capacity,"
Daily Sentinel, 29 October 1935, p. 8; "Climax Company to
Spend $2,500,000," Daily Sentinel, 15 May 1936, p. 1 ;
Shumway, "H istory of the Uranium Industry," 101.
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On 1 October 1935 USVC brought a "small force of men"
to the site of the old Joe Junior camp and mill on the San
Miguel River.

The men began the preliminary work of

building a mill- - designed to extract vanadium from carnotit e
ore--and of building a town to house the mill workers.
Blair Burwell, USVC ' s general manager , promised
"considerable activity in the west end carnotite, radium,
uranium and vanadium fields after a considerable period of
inact i vi ty.

,, 16

Thus began the vanadium era in the West

End.
The company decided upon the unromantic, somewhat
awkward, but altogether modern and appropriate name of
Uravan for its new town.

The appellation incorporates the

first three letters of "uranium" and "vanadium "
consecutively.

It seems fortunate that the company chose

not to include the first three letters of the third
important constituent of carnotite, radium.
It is said that a company engineer named Benner
originated the name; by the early spring of 1936 newspapers
referred to the town as Uravan.

At that time, U. S.

Vanadium employed about sixty men in construction of the
various mill buildings.

By the summer of 1936 workers had

completed the main mill structure, but housing for the work
force, estimated at ISO, had become "a serlOUS problem . "

"U. S. Vanadium Co. Resumes Work in West End of
County," Montrose Daily Press, 2 November 1935, p . 6.
16

At
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that point only a few houses had been erected, with several
more in the planning stage. 17
their families,

Many of the workers, and

lived in tents and tar-paper shacks, not

unfamiliar accommodations in the West End mining districts.
In fact,

a veritable "tent town" sprang up in the Uravan

vicinity; residents referred ironically to the collection of
canvas dwellings and shacks as "Navaru," Uravan spelled
backwards.
imagine.

These tents were sturdier than one might
Residents stretched the canvas over wooden frames,

and often installed wooden floors.

Some people put two

tents together, doubling their living space, and most
installed stoves.
By 1937 or 1938 most of Uravan's original houses had
been completed.

The company named each residential block by

letter, alphabetically.

Thus, as originally constructed,

the town consisted of blocks A through F, perhaps eighty
units. 18

Single men found housing at the boarding house,

which stood on the property since the Standard Chemical

17 "Vanadium Corp. Building Town Called Uravan,"
Telluride (CO) Journal, 28 March 1936, Uravan Clippings
File, DPL; "Vanadium Company Plant and City to House Its
Workmen Is Taking Form," Daily Sentinel, 21 June 1936, p.
13.

18 There is no accurate record of the construction dates
of Uravan's original houses.
The following documents give
some clues: "Residential Property Appraisal Record, Paradox,
Redvale, Uravan, Olathe, Alamo Heights," Tax Assessor's
Office, Montrose County Court House, Montrose, Colorado; T.
F. Roberts, "Uravan Housing Review," 14 January 1964,
Housing 1964 file, Uravan Purchasing drawer, room 126,
Umetco Records.
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days.

Commercial and community buildings included a

drugstore and gas station , recreation hall, commissary , post
office , and clinic.

Several of these buildings were moved

by the company to Uravan from Civilian Conservation Corps
camps.

The company relocated one such building to serve as

the town ' s school house; In the fall of 1936 some fiftythree children, aged six to twenty-one, enrolled. 19
The company needed massive amounts of salt for the
roasting process, one of the preliminary stages of vanadium
extraction.

Brine, conveniently deposited by the Dolores

River in the central portion of Paradox Valley, provided the
source.

The company dug wells to pump out the brine, which

settled into ponds on the surface.
leaving thick salt beds for harvest.

The water evaporated,
To heat the mill ' s

roasters , USVC dug coal from a mine near Nucla.
also installed water-

The company

(from the San Miguel River) and

diesel-powered generators to supply electricity to the mill
and town. 20
By the summer of 1936, USVC spent a reported $60,000
per month on supplies needed to maintain the mill and town.
As noted previously , the business leaders of Grand Junction
expended considerable effort and money in 1923 to construct
a road to the West End.

That effort paid "handsomely,"

19Si l ver , "History of the Uravan Grade School."
2° "Mining Town," Montrose Dai l y Press , 24 August 1939,
Uravan Cl ippings Fil e , DPL.
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because USVC chose Grand Junction as the location for its
offices.

The company purchased materials from businesses In

Grand Junction, or had materials shipped through the city In
route to Uravan.

For their foresight and accomplishment,

business leaders of Grand Junction congratulated themselves
and their predecessors, although some echoed the dire
warnings heard two decades previously in the city of
Montrose:

"If the people of western Colorado could only

realize the potentialities of vanadium .

they would show

a great deal more interest In this industry. ,, 21
In 1936 the condition of the road, known variously as
the Gateway Road, Dolores River Road, or Highway 141, was
scarcely better than it was in 1923.

In some stretches, the

road resembled "a mere shelf running along the hillside well
above the Dolores river."

But USVC had the clout and the

resources to improve the situation considerably.

And with

two o r three tru c ks rumbling over the road each night

(t o

avoid o ther traffic ) , the situation demanded improvement.
The company assumed some of the task, providing machinery
and powder for the necessary blasting.

Reportedly, the

company itself rebuilt approximately forty miles of highway.
Montrose County contributed finances toward improvement of
21 "Vanadium Company Plant and City to House Its Workmen
Is Taking Form," Daily Sentinel, 21 June 1936, p. 13; "Small
Army of Men Employed at New Town of Uravan in Building Huge
Mill, Homes for Workmen," Montrose Daily Press, 23 June
1936, p. 6; "Leading Grand Junction Businessmen Comment on
Need of Uravan Highway," Daily Sentinel, 20 July 1939,
Uravan Clippings File, DPL.
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that part of the road that lay within county boundaries,
and, during the next several years, Mesa County found the
means, through federal and local sources, to finance several
projects on its share of the road.

22

The residents of the West End took In stride the
developments of 1935 and 1936.

Certainly, there must have

been considerable excitement at the prospect of a new town,
and more importantly, of a company that would provide jobs
and an economic base for the area.

But in contrast to the

boom days of the 1910s, the news reports of the mid-1930s
reveal no evidence of great expectations.

West Enders,

weary of economic depression and wary of potential busts
that seemed to follow each boom, may have adopted a waitand - see attitude.
observer noted,

The town of Uravan, as more than one

"bl ossomed almost overnight"; people may not

have known what to expect. 23

Although cautious , residents

could not help feeling optimistic, a mood reflected in this
statement by a Paradox woman:

"It begins to seem like old

times around here--so much mining talk, and everyone who has
22 "Vanadium Company Plant and City to House Its Workmen
Is Taking Form," Daily Sentinel, 21 June 1936, p. 13;
"M ining Town," Montrose Daily Press, 24 August 1 939 , Uravan
Clippings File, DPL ; "Equipment for Road to Uravan," Daily
Sentinel, 20 September 1939, Uravan Clippings File, DPL.
23 "Town of Uravan Ne eds Mail Route to Serve 700
Inhabitants Dependent upon Accommodation of Truck Line,"
Montrose Daily Press, 16 December 1937, Uravan Clippings
File, DPL.
David Lavender also used a botanical analogy to
describe Uravan.
"Overnight almost it sprouted," he wrote,
"and the incomprehensibility of it will not leave me."
Lavender, One Man's West, 277.
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a claim out digging out a few tons of ore, as they can sell
it now." 24
Indeed, the arrival of the United States Vanadium
Corporation signaled an era of new opportunity.

In the

years subsequent to the founding of Uravan, the carnotite
industry prospered anew.

In addition to purchasing ore from

independent mlners of the area, USVC contracted with
independent companles to operate claims that USVC owned.
The company built miles of "drill roads," designed to open
up the country to exploration, throughout the West End, and
In other remote regions of the Colorado Plateau.

Many of

the miners arrived from established mining centers like
Ouray, Colorado.

Such miners possessed the equipment and

experience to exploit the carnotite fields.

A statistic

from the Minerals Yearbook reflects the tremendous increase
in mining activity in western Colorado and southeastern
Utah.

Vanadium production increased from 52,000 pounds In

1936 to 980 ,000 pounds in 1937.

The "famous and important"

mines in the Paradox Valley and its vicinity provided much
of the carnotite ore processed at Uravan. 25
In addition to USVC, other companies milled carnotite
for its vanadium content.

24Mrs. John B. Colombo,
Press, 25 July 1936, p. 4.

In 1936 the Utah Vanadium

"Paradox," Montrose Daily

25 Robert H. Ridgway and H. W. Davis, "Molybdenum,
Tungsten, and Vanad ium," in Minerals Yearbook, 1938
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938) , 576.
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Corporation constructed a mill at Cedar, In San Miguel
County, Colorado.

In the same year a group of investors

financed the construction of a small mill near Blanding,
Utah.

North Continent Mines,

Inc. operated a mill at Slick

Rock, Colorado, beginning in 1939.
Alloys,

Also in 1939, Gateway

Inc. opened a mill at Gateway.

The ore capacity of

these small mills ranged from fifteen to twenty-five tons
per day.

By way of contrast, the USVC designed its Uravan

mill to treat 125 tons of ore per day, and it was later
upgraded to treat 24 a tons. 26
In 1938 it became apparent that the vanadium market
would continue to thrive.

USVC's strongest competitor, the

Vanadium Corporation of America, refurbished the old Rare
Metals mill near Naturita.

VCA also constructed a town near

the mill, and named the town Vancoram, a contraction of
Vanadium Corporation of America.

(In subsequent years, the

town appeared on maps as "Vancorum.")

The mill opened in

1939 and processed ore at a rate of one hundred tons per
day.

VCA competed with USVC for the control of mlnlng

claims, but USVC always held the upper hand, and the VCA
mill never challenged the dominance of USVC and its Uravan
mill. 27

Similarly, the town of Vancorum never attained the

26 Chenoweth,

"Historical Review," 13 -14 .

27 Ibid.; Shumway,
108.

"History of the Uranium Industry,"
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slze o r stature o f Uravan.

Actually, Vancorum was more of a

housing extension of Naturita.
In the West End Uravan quickly came to dominate, In
Men came

terms of both population and economic importance.

to Uravan from all parts of southwestern Colorado to apply
for jobs.

Within a few years of Uravan's construction,

approx i mately 250 workers lived in the town, or its
vicinity, and the company's payroll ranged between fifty and
sixty thousand dollars each month. 28

Apparently, the

company met its goal of beginning operations by 1 October
1936.

By the 26th of that month, the mill operated twenty -

four hours per day,

in three eight-hour shifts. 29

By 1938 Uravan had an estimated seven hundred
residents, and the 1940 census shows a population of 862.
The c ompany town became the largest population center in the
West End, but othe r communities experienced a good deal of
growth tied directly to the carnotite industry.

Naturita,

described by itinerant writers in the late 1930s as "a
scattered village of small false-front buildings," saw its

28 "Mining Town," Montrose Daily Press, 24 August 1939,
Uravan Clippings File, DPL.
Uravan was always a mill town,
despite the title of this article.
However, at various
times in its history, the town housed some miners, as well
as mill workers.
29 Imogene Oberding, "Uravan News," Montrose Daily
Press, 26 October 1936, p. 6.
Oberding, from Nucla, served
as one of Uravan's first two school teachers.
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population climb from 199 In 1930 to 302 In 1940. 30

As

indicated by news reports, several Naturitans, newly
employed, moved to Uravan in 1936.

(A few of Naturita's

residents packed up and moved to California during the
Depression.)

However, the town's population swelled because

of migrants, who arrived not only from relatively near parts
of southwestern Colorado, but also from places such as
Lawton, Oklahoma, and Jicarilla, New Mexico.
day," wrote a Naturitan,

"Nearly every

"we see someone trying to rent a

house in town, but there are few unoccupied houses." 31
Nucla,

"a compact town of neat frame bungalows," was

less touched by the latest surge In the carnotite industry.
There , "in the small grassy park shaded by poplars, school
children eat their lunches and townsfolk pasture their
cows . ,, 32

Increasingly, however, the West End's population

became more mobile.

Now a person could live in Nucla and

commute daily to Uravan, or to work in the mines.

Nucla

retained an agricultural atmosphere, but many of its
residents labored in various jobs associated with the
carnotite industry.
30Workers of the Writers' Program of the Works Projects
Administration in the State of Colorado, Colorado: A Guide
to the Highest State, American Guide Series (New York:
Colorado State Planning Commission, 1941; 5th printing,
1948), 422; Schulze, A Century of the Colorado Census, 167.
31Mrs. F. L. Wilson, "Natur i ta," Montrose Daily Press,
17 September 1936, p. 6;
Mrs. F. L. Wilson, "Naturita,"
Montrose Daily Press, 9 October 1936, p. 5.
32Wo rkers of the Writers' Program, Colorado, 421.
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With the arrival of USVC the West End "opened up."
Just a few years previously the fifteen mile trip from
Uravan to Naturita demanded at least two hours.

Road

improvements reduced the time requirement to a length more
comparable to the fifteen minutes one needs today.

county

road crews made obsolete an old catt le trail that connected
Uravan (and the Club Ranch)

and the Paradox Valley by

constructing a road along the Dolores River.

This

facilitated travel to the mines of the Paradox Valley, and
provided access to USVC's salt works in the central part of
the valley. 33

And, to complete the West End's entry into

the twentieth century, distances to the outside world
rapidly decreased.

A reporter proclaimed that "famous

'Norwood hill' has at last been conquered by a splendid
state highway down its precipitous [canyon] wall."
corres pondent noted that Mesa County,

The same

"anxi o us to keep

runnlng the ore trucks from Uravan," maintained Highway 141
in good repair. 34

To be sure, motorists in the 1940s faced

rough, dusty roads; and flash floods occasionally tore d own
bridges and washed away entire stretches of highway.

West

Enders would not have the pleasure of driving on pavement

33Mrs. John B. Colombo, "Paradox," Montrose Daily
Press, 22 October 1936, p. 5; Lavender, One Man's West, 273274, 300.
34 " Travel ing wi th the Edi tor to Uravan and Back Last
Sunday," Gunnison (CO) News Champion, 4 September 1941,
Uravan Clippings File, DPL.

87

for many years to come.

Nevertheless, they started to lose

a bit of their isolation.
During USVC's first five years of operation In the West
End t he company enjoyed a considerable amount of growth due
to increases in domestic and foreign steel production.

The

coming of World War II brought the company even more
business.

Because the manufacturers of armaments needed

vanadium-strengthened steel, production of vanadium
increased as the United States armed itself and its allies.
Concomitantly, the federal government involved itself
heavily in the production and distribution of various
resources necessary for industrialization, resources often
referred to as "strategi c and critical materials."

The

federal agencies that decided such matters chose not to
classify vanadium as "strategic" or "critical"; but the War
Production Board exercised control over vanadium deliveries,
giving priority to defense orders. 35
In June of 1 9 40, Congress passed legislation that
created the Metals Reserve Company.

Metals Reserve was

designed to facilitate America's industrialization by
procuring and stockpiling, from both foreign and domestic
sources, those materials deemed necessary for the war
35 Shumway, "History for the Uranium Industry," 114;
Robert H. Ridgway and H. W. Davis, "Molybdenum, Tungsten,
and Vanadium," in Minerals Yearbook: Review of 1940, ed. H.
D. Keiser (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1941), 625-626; Frederick Betz, Jr. and Alice P. van Siclen,
"Vanadium," in Minerals Yearbook, 1942, ed. C. E. Needham
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 666.
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effort. 36

In May o f 1942 USVC contracted with Metals

Reserve to serve as its agent in the production of vanadium.
Metals Reserve financed the construction of additional
facilities to mill vanadium, and the company purchased all
vanadium produced .

Under this program, USVC converted an

old lead smelter at Durango, Colorado, to a vanadium
processing plant; Metals Reserve owned the plant, but USVC
operated it.

VCA operated its mill at Naturita for Metals

Reserve, and VCA also built a new mill at Monticello, Utah.
In addition, North Continent Mines and Gateway Alloys
operated small mills at Slick Rock and Gateway,
respectively, under contracts with the Metals Reserve
Company.

With USVC as its agent,

the federal government's

Metals Reserve Company bought ore and stockpiled it for
distribution to the various mills. 37
The procurement of vanadium proved successful by any
measure.

Vanadium production rose to its highest point in

1943; USVC accounted for the bulk of this production,

with

most of the carnotite ore coming from the Paradox Valley and

36Gerald D. Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping
the Economy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990),
19; R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization,
United States Army in World War II Series (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, United States Army, 1959;
reprint, 1991), 603-604.
37 Chenoweth, "Historical Review," 13-14; W. P. Huleatt,
Scott W. Hazen, Jr., and William M. Traver, Jr., Exploration
of Vanadium Region of Western Colorado and Eastern Utah,
United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
Report of Investigations 3930, September 1946 , 2-4.
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other mlnes In the West End.

In less than two years Metals

Reserve had enough vanadium stockpiled to insure any futur e
needs.

On 29 February 1944 the Metals Reserve Company

canceled its contracts with USVC and other vanadium
producers. 38

At the end of the war officials estimated

that "approximately 60 per cent of the world's supply of
vanadium, and 90 per cent of the entire domestic vanadium
supply" originated in the carnotite fields of the Colorado
Plateau. 39
The end of vanadium production during the war spelled
an end to carnotite mining for a time.
the mill--two mills,
carried on as before.

At Uravan, however,

in fact--continued to run, and workers
Since 1910, the nominal beginning of

the mining industry in the West End, the third important
element found in carnotite, uranium, had been passed over .
Now, In the middle of the war, the federal government want ed
uranlum, as much as the mills could supply.

Had it not been

for that nearly forgotten radioactive element, Uravan might
prematurely have become a ghost town.
Since the Uravan mill opened, In 1936, it had extracted
vanadium from carnotite oreSi the waste material from its
operations, the tailings, contained unwanted uranium.

For

years, these tailings had accumulated, not only at the
38 Chenoweth, "Historical Review," 14, 1 7 i Shumway,
"History of the Uranium Industry," 130.
39 "Blair Burwell Makes Statement on Uranium Taken from
This Region," Daily Sentinel, 8 August 1945, p. 1.
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Uravan mill, but at other mills on the Colorado Plateau, as
well.
In June of 19 42 the United States Army Corps of
Engineers assumed control of America's fledgling atomic
energy program.

In August of that year the Corps created a

new district, the Manhattan Engineer District (MED).

From

this designation the entire effort to build an atomic bomb
came to be known a s the Manhattan Project.

Very simply put,

the MED's mission consisted of building and operating plants
designed to produce fissionable material. 40

Requisite to

this charge was the acquisition of the required radioactive
feed materials--namely, uranium.
For its supply of uranium, MED used three maJor
sources: the Shinkolobwe Mine in the Belgian Congo (Zaire)
the Eldorado Mine in Canada's Northwest Territories; and the
tailings piles l ocated at various points on the Colorado
Plateau.

(The Shinkolobwe, with its rich pitchblende

deposits, was the same mine that put the Standard Chemical
Company out of business in the early 1920s.)

The MED looked

primarily to the African and Canadian mines because those
ores contained relatively high percentages of uranium;
American officials also wanted to insure access to the

4°Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomi c
Bomb, United States Army in World War II Series (Washington,
DC: Center of Mil i tary History, United States Army, 1985),
40, 43-44; Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story
of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper and Row, 1962 ) ,
11.
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world's richest deposits, to keep such resources out of
hostile, or potentially hostile, hands.

The exploitation of

Colorado Plateau resources occurred almost as an
afterthought, considering the time and energy that the MED
expended to obtain Canadian and African ores .

At the time

many authorities were not certain that carno tit e ores would
yield appreciable amounts of uranlum.

But the stockpiled

tailings at Uravan were more accessible than any other
source.

Moreover, the MED held to a policy of procuring

uranlum from all possible sources, not only for the
Manhattan Project, but also for anticipated future needs. 41
In December of 1942 MED procurement officers visited
southwestern Colorado to assess the area's potential to
supply uranium.

Soon thereafter, MED officials negotiated a

contract with USVC representatives.

Under the agreement,

the government purchased USVC's stockpiled tailings.

USVC

constructed a new mill to process the tailings, located
across the San Miguel River from the original mill, with
financing provided by the government.
the mill, but USVC operated it.

The government owned

When Uravan's original mill

halted the production of vanadium, in February of 1944, the

41Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 33-37, 178-17 9 ; Richard
G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the
United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. 1, The New
World, 1939-1946 (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1962), 291-292; Jones, Manhattan, 292-306,
310-312.
Uravan's role in the Manhattan Project occurred
almost as an afterthought to those who chronicled the
project.
Uravan received only brief mention in these books.
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company reequipped the plant to process uranlum.

The

government reimbursed USVC for all costs the company
incurred in this project, including the salaries and wages
of its employees.

In addition to absorbing all costs, the

government paid its contractor a fixed fee.

USVC did,

however, pay for the operation of its own mill at Uravan.
The MED purchased the output from USVC's original mill "on a
unit prlce basis. ,, 42
Under the same contract USVC constructed a smaller mill
In Durango, Colorado, at the vanadium plant belonging to the
Metals Reserve Company.

Feed for this mill came from

tailings accumulated from the Metals Reserve vanadium
procurement project.

USVC designed the Uravan and Durango

mills to produce a "uranium-vanadium sludge."

To further

process this product, also known as "green sludge," USVC
built a refinery at Grand Junction.

At that plant, workers

separated the vanadium and the uranium, producing from the
latter "yellowcake."

This uranium concentrate, about sixt y

percent pure, was then shipped to Linde Air Products
Company, of Tonawanda, New York.

Linde, also a subsidiary

of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, further refined the

42 Phillip L. Merritt, "Resume of Production of Uranium
Products for Manhattan District in the Colorado Plateau
Area," New York, War Department, Uni ted States Engin,e er
Office, Madison Square Area, 26 January 1945, RMO-979, 3-4.
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yellowcake to black oxide, a more concentrated form of
uranium. 43
To summarize, USVC operated two mills at Uravan; one
was company owned and operated, and the other was government
owned and company operated.
owned mill at Durango.

USVC operated a government

Output from each of these plants was

transported to Grand Junction for further processing.

In

addition, the government procured a uranium-bearing sludge
product from VCA's Naturita plant, and from a Metals Reserve
plant in Monticello, Utah.

The sludge from these two plants

was further refined by the Vitro Manufacturing Company in
Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.

From the Vitro Manufacturing

Company of Moab, Utah, the MED acquired high grade carnotite
ores; these ores were refined in Grand Junction.

Also, the

MED purchased old vanadium tailings from small mills in
Blanding, Utah, and in Gateway, Lorna, and Slick Rock,
Colorado.

These tailings were shipped to Uravan for

processing. 44
By at least three years USVC anticipated the
government's need for uranium.

Late in 1939, apparently on

its own initiative, the company constructed an experimental
plant for the recovery of uranium.

The company invested

$100,000 in the pilot plant, which was incorporated into the
43 Ibid.; William L. Chenoweth, "Raw Materials
Activities of the Manhattan Project on the Colorado
Plateau," Nonrenewable Resources 6 (March 1997): 35-38.
44 Chenoweth,

"Raw Material s Act i vi ties,"

36- 37

.
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existing facilities and designed to treat fifty tons of
tailings per day. 45

Naturall y,

this small plant allowed

USVC to experiment with and improve its refining process.
USVC held the advantage over competitors,
government called in 1942.

In fact,

like VCA, when th e

output from Uravan's

pilot plant was first used by MED late in 1942, before
USVC's negotiations with the government took place. 46

By

all accounts USVC's Blair Burwell originated the plan to
build the small, experimental uranium circuit.
The pilot plant at Uravan was no secret.
the MED censored the press,

And, until

"there was considerable

speculation in the open literature

. regarding the

military possibilities of nuclear fission. ,, 47
discussed such theories in this case.

But no one

A news reporter In

1939 implied that USVC's uranlum would be used,
vanadium ,

like

"in the manufacture of high grade steel. ,, 48

In March of 1943 Second Lieutenant Philip C. Leahy o f
the Army Corps of Engineers arrived in Grand Juncti o n with
45 "Colorado," Engineering and Mining Journal 140
( De c e mbe r 1 9 3 9): 7 9; " Color a do," Eng i nee r i n g and Min i n g
Journal 141 (May 1940): 76.
Under the title "Colorado"
appeared a series of paragraphs that summarized various
developments in the field.
Neither of these unnamed authors
speculated on the proposed use of uranium.
46Merri t t,
47Landa,

"Resume of Production," 1.

"Buried Treasure," 2 8 .

48 "Uranium Mill May be Built at Uravan,
Is Already Great Property," Daily Sentinel,
1939, Uravan Clippings File, DPL; "Vanadium
Co l orado, " Denver Post, 31 December 1940, p.

Adding to What
3 September
Production In
4A.

95

his orders in a sealed envelope.

As per instructions Leahy

rented a hotel room and opened the envelope.

Succinctly,

the orders instructed Leahy to contact Blair Burwell, USVC's
general superintendent.
he needed to know.

Burwell would tell Leahy everything

Included with Leahy ' s orders was a

letter signed by Major General Leslie R. Groves, the Officer
in Charge of the Manhattan Project.

The letter read,

"To

whom it may concern: if this officer should ask for help,
please assist."

Leahy carried the letter with him

throughout the war, but needed to use it only once. 49
As the general contractor for the project, USVC was
responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance
of all necessary facilities.

Because the MED reimbursed the

company for all costs, Leahy and his staff had the
responsibility of advancing the necessary money to the
company, auditing the company's expenses, and overseeing its
operations.

But because of the nature and urgen cy of the

project, and because of the government's interest in seeing
it completed, Leahy also served as a procurement officer; In
several instances he provided the means and manpower to
insure the completion of the project.

Of the project, Leahy

knew only that it had to be done in the shortest possible
time.

He was there to make sure that the plants were built

49 Philip C. Leahy, address presented to the Grand
Junction Projects Office of the Department of Energy, Grand
Junction, Colorado, 23 January 1993.
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and that the uranlum was delivered. 5o

Toward this end,

Leahy and his staff proved efficient and helpful.

This

resulted in more of a partnership between the company and
the government than might originally have been designed.
For example, the project's brain trust, USVC officials
and Leahy, realized that

usvc

did not own enough trucks to

haul materials between Grand Junction and the plants at
Uravan and Durango.
army delivered.

Leahy ordered sixty trucks, which the

However, the trucks had been designed for

use In the desert; the transmissions and rear axles were
geared for serVlce much different than what Leahy needed.
Also, the trucks had no beds or cabs.

Undaunted, Leahy

arranged to have the trucks properly equipped, and he put
them to use.

Leahy also procured a snow plow, and Manhattan

District engineers helped to keep open Red Mountain Pass
during the winter.

Truckers negotiated the pass when

driving between Grand Junction and Durango. 51
Leahy also procured technical expertise for the
project.

When the company began processing tailings, it

recovered approximately sixty percent of the uranium.
felt that the recovery rate could be improved.

Leahy

He managed

to hire chemists from private firms around the country "to
look at the problem."

As a result of their work, the

50 rbid.; Philip C. Leahy to author, 3 March 1994 .
51 Leahy, address.
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project achieved an eighty-seven percent uranlum recovery
rate. 52
As work on the project progressed, off icials realized
that they needed skilled manpower at the plants,
specifically mechanics, electricians, instrument repalr
people, and laboratory technicians.

Because of the war, so

many men served in the armed forces that labor shortages
became a serlOUS problem.

Often the company hired men whose

expertise lay in areas other than milling,
farmers,

sheep-herders, and what have you."

"ranchers,
To mitigate

this problem Leahy sent word through his chain of command
that he needed individuals with certain skills.

MED

complied, and, during the course of the war, assigned
thirty-one enlisted men to the Colorado Area Engineers
Office in Grand Junction.

Of these, twenty-eight served at

Uravan, and three at Grand Junction. 53
In October of 1943 Cliff Hiett arrived In Grand
Junction, one of the first soldiers assigned to Uravan's
mill.

Unlike Philip Leahy, who came to Grand Junction

without really knowing where he was, Hiett was familiar with
the area.

Hiett grew up in the West End, graduated from

52 Ibid.
53 Leahy to author, 3 March 1994; Leahy, address.
These
soldiers probably belonged to either the Special Engineer
Detachment or the Enlisted Reserve Corps, two military
organizations designed by the District Engineer to provide
technical expertise and manpower to the various Manhattan
Project facilities.
See Jones, Manhattan, 358-359.
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Nucla High School, and worked for two years at Uravan's
vanadium mill.

In May of 1942 the Army drafted him.

After

stops in five d ifferent states, Hiett received the orders
that sent him to Colorado.

In Grand Junction Hiett reported

to Leahy, his commanding officer.
leave for a couple of days,

Leahy was just about to

so he asked Hiett if there we re

anything he wa nted to do until Leahy returned.

Hiett

responded that he wanted to go to Nucla, to see his parents.
Leahy, previously unaware that Hiett was from the West End,
said that would be fine; in fact, after spending a couple of
days in Nucla, he could go down the road to Uravan, where he
would be stationed. 54

After fifteen months of duty, Hiett

returned to the same job he left.

In his absence Uravan had

grown considerably.
As USVC officials contemplated wa r-t ime expanSlon,
h ousing undoubtedly constituted one of their maJor concerns.
Part of the remedy came from a federally sponsored program
designed to alleviate housing shortages in certain mlnlng
centers.

Early in 1943 a Montrose contractor won the

federal contract to build sixty-eight apartment units In
Uravan.

The one, two, and three-bedroom apartments were

constructed with flat,

tar-covered roofs.

(The contractor

54 Cliff Hiett, interview by Estalee Silver, 20 May
1976, Uravan, Colorado, tape recording, private collection.
Of the twenty-eight soldiers who served in Uravan, perhaps
five or six had worked previously for the company.
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built similar apartments in Vancorum.) 55

Because of this

design, the people of Uravan always referred to the
dwellings as the "government flat tops," or the "flat tops."
Also in the spring of 1943 construction of the
government owned uranium mill began.

In accordance with

terms of its contract, USVC engaged a subcontractor for this
work, the Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company of Denver.
The influx of workers for this project strained the housing
capacity of Uravan .

In response to a request from Stearns-

Roger, USVC moved to Uravan buildings from a Paradox Valley
Civilian Conservation Corps camp.

The company converted

these buildings into dormitories and mess halls. 56

In

addition, USVC appropriated various Civilian Conservation
Corps buildings for use in Uravan as office and shop
facili ties. 57
Stearns-Roger finished construction of the new mill
sometime near the target date of 15 July.

On 23 July 1943

USVC put the "sludge plant at Uravan" into operation,
a thru-put of 300 tons of sand per day."

"with

The new plant at

55 "R. E. Wear Construction Company Is Awarded Contract
to Build Housing Projects at Naturita and Uravan," Montrose
Daily Press, 11 January 1943, Uravan Clippings File, DPL.
56 C. S. Beech, Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co. to U. S.
Vanadium Corporation, 28 April 1943; L. K. Norton, USVC to
Lieutenant P. C. Leahy, 28 April 1943; both letters from
Area Engineer Correspondence March to October 1943 file,
drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
57Leahy to author, 3 March 1994; Work Order, 28 June
1944; Work Order W7P-5, 28 June 1944; both documents from
Work Orders file, drawer 78 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records.
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Durango began operation at a rate of one hundred tons of
tailings per day on 10 July.

And on 25 August the refining

plant at Grand Junction was put into serVlce.

Nearly one

month later, on 22 September, the Grand Junction refinery
met the goal of processing four hundred tons of sludge per
day, with a refined product that met terms of the contract.
USVC pointed out this achievement to MED officials because,
under terms of the contract, the company would not recelve
its fixed fee payment until its product met the "required
specifications. ,, 58
From the beginning of the project, USVC officials
struggled with "an acute labor shortage at Uravan."
company had two plants to run,
vanadium mill.

The

including Uravan's original

Each plant employed seventy to ninety men

during the war years.

The company's Industrial Relations

Department worked through the United States Employment
Service to attract labor to Uravan, but as of 16 August
1943,

"only about fifty percent of the men sent to Uravan

have remained more that two or three days."

The employees

that remained worked "twelve to sixteen hours daily" to meet
the company's required output. 59
58 Blair Burwell, USVC to Lieutenant P. C. Leahy, 7
September 1943; J. R. Van Fleet, USVC to U. S. Engineer
Office, Madison Square District, 2 October 1943; both
documents from GJWE 11, box #5 file, drawer 260 Ub, room
114, Umetco Records.
59W. E. Haldane, USVC, to P. C. Leahy, 16 August 1943,
Area Engineer Correspondence March to October 1943 file,
drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
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Uravan's isolation proved one of the maJor detriments
to attractino steady workers.

Stearns-Roger realized this

problem durirg construction of the government-owned uranium
Some c f its employees left the project each Saturday

mill.

evening "to attend to personal business," or, perhaps, to
find entertainment unavailable at Uravan.

Those employees

then found it difficult to return to Uravan for a day or
two.

To alleviate this problem, Stearns-Roger changed its

work week from seven eight-hour days to six nine-hour days,
thereby allowing workers one day off. 60
Ultimately, however, the factor most responsible for
the labor shortage was the demands placed on manpower by the
war.

The young, skilled, constant workers needed by

companles across America streamed steadily into the armed
forces,

either through voluntary enlistment or conscription.

This prompted a USVC official to state:

"The type of labor

applying for work through the United States Employment
Service in these days is generally [of]
class. ,, 61

the drifting

Thus, the company experienced high turnover and

absentee rates among its hourly workforce.

This problem

affected all of the plants under government contract.
60 p. C. Leahy to U. S. Vanadium Corporation, 2 June
1943; P. C. Leahy to U. S. Vanadium Corporation , 24 June
1943; both letters from Area Engineer Correspondence--March
to October 1943 file, drawer 260 Ub, room 1 1 4, Umetco
Records.
61W. E. Haldane, USVC, to P. C. Lea hy, 16 August 1943,
Area Engineer Correspondence March to October 1943 file,
drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
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Between 1 July 1 9 42 and 30 JUlIe 1945, USVC hired,

for all of

its construction projects and mill operations, 1,874 people.
During the same time period,

the company terminated 1,390.

At Uravan,

during the six-month period from 1 January to 30

June 1945,

the company hired l23 workers for both mills.

In

the same period, USVC terminated 138. 62
USVC officials worked constantly to solve this problem.
First,

they addressed workers

facilities.
single men,

Apparently,

ll

complaints about the housing

the company employed a number of

and to them the company offered the option of

renting rooms in the newly built apartment units.

This was

basically dormitory style housing, with two beds for each
room,

including the living room.

three-bedroom apartment. 63

Thus, eight men lived in a

That this arrangement

represented improvement speaks to the crowded living
conditions that existed, and to the prior state of housing
In Uravan.

The company also allowed workers with families

to rent space in the flat top apartments, or other available
houses.

Undoubtedly,

families found the flat tops better

than tents or shacks, and it precluded the necessity of
commuting from another West End community.
62 G. N. Hamm to A. Q. Lundquist, 13 August 1945,
Personnel Force Reports, Industrial Relations file, drawer
118 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records; Summary Sheet--Personnel
Force Reports, 1945, Industrial Relations file, drawer 116
Uf, room 125, Umetco Records.
63W. E. Haldane, USVC, to P. C. Leahy, 16 August 1943,
Area Engineer Correspondence March to October 1943 file,
drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
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In its quest for a stable workforce, USVC permitted
boys as young as sixteen years of age to work at the mills.
Furthermore, officials employed men beyond the national
retirement age, established at sixty-five years.

However,

USVC never hired women to work in the mill, a practic e
common in American industry during World War II.
elaboration, a company official wrote:

Without

"Work in the mills

lS

not such that they can be used to any appreciable
extent. ,, 64
The company advertised the employment opportunities at
Uravan in eighteen different Colorado newspapers, and it
also bought radio air time.

Interested workers from other

states also heard about Uravan through the United States
Employment Service.

USVC received applications for

employment from such distant places as Seattle and Hanford ,
Washington, Ogden, Utah, Palo Alt o , California, Sidney ,
Nebraska, and also from towns around Colorado. 65
To keep the men it valued, the company applied to those
individuals' draft boards for deferment from the draft.

64 80b Ausmus, "When Uravan Went to War," unpublished
manuscript dated 23 October 1991, Estalee Silver Collection,
Museum of Western Colorado, Grand Junction, Colorado; R. M.
Mahoney to A. F. Boyd, 13 October 1944; Recommendation for
Continuation in Active Employment beyond Normal Retirement
Date; both documents from Employees beyond Normal Retirement
Age file, drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records; J. L.
Robison to P. C. Leahy, 21 April 1945, Labor Relations file,
drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records.
65Advertising, Applications for Employment, and Labor
Recruiting file, drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records.

1 04
Because of the difficulty in obtaining deferments, USVC
The Industrial Relations Department

exercised discretion.

requested deferments for men "in key positions only,
whose loss we feel, would be detrimental to our effort In
the production of our materials for the War Effort."
Company officials did not let themselves be swayed by
"sympathy or personal feeling." 66
It proved "almost impossible" to secure deferments for
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two.
other ages,

For men o f

the Selective Service System provided for an

appeals process In case a draft board denied deferment.
company appealed to Lieutenant Leahy,
Engineer,

The

the Colorado Area

"requesting him to glve any aid in his power In

securing" deferments.

67

USVC als o had the option of

sending a deferment through the Manhattan District Engine er s
Office.

It is not known how often USVC sent a deferment

request to the district engineer's office.

But two such

requests never made it past the Colorado Area Engineers
Office.

"After careful review of these applications," wro t e

the Assistant Colorado Area Engineer,

"this office has

concluded that they do not warrant certification to the
C. Muckenthaler to A. Q. Lundquist, 12 April 1 94 4 ,
Correspondence, Inter-Office file, drawer 117 Uf, room 125,
Umetco Records.
66 G.

C. Muckenthaler to F. B. Hynes, 23 February 1944,
Muckenthaler File (file ) , drawer 170 Uf, room 126, Umetco
Records; G. C. Muckenthaler to A. Q. Lundquist, 12 April
1944, Correspondence, Inter-Office file, drawer 117 Uf, room
125, Umetco Records.
6 7 G.
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District Engineer for his indorsement."

Despite this

exception, the deferment process likely benefitted USVC and
Uravan's contribution to the war effort. 68
High turnover plagued USVC until the end of the
project.

However, the company succeeded in securing a core

of dedicated, constant, hard-working individuals.

In March

of 1945, Leahy congratulated USVC for accomplishments In all
areas of production, and for the "steady increase in the
rate" of production.

Leahy especially admired "the spirit

of friendly enthusiastic rivalry" that existed between the
various mill departments.

This "cooperative attitude"

resulted in a "team that has a common purpose of doing the
best job possible and yet at the same time endeavoring to do
still better. ,, 69

Leahy wrote specifically of the

government-owned, contractor-operated mill.

At company-

owned, company-operated plant (Uravan's original mill)
different conditions obtained.
Ironically, at the very time Leahy issued his encomlum
to the superintendent of the government mill, teamwork and

68 James C. Deal, Jr. to U. S. Vanadium Corporation, 26
March 1945, Correspondence, Inter-Office file, drawer 117
Uf, room 125, Umetco Records.
The Manhattan District
Engineer, first James C. Marshall, then Kenneth D. Nichols,
was in charge of construction work for the entire Manhattan
Project.
The Manhattan District Engineer provided a great
deal of support to all MED contractors in this matter, as
did the various area englneers.
Jones, Manhattan, 366-369.
69 p. C. Leahy to Fred Hynes, 13 March 1945, Area
Engineer Correspondence--June 1944 to March 1945 file,
drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
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cooperation showed slgns of deterioration at USVC's original
Three months later, on 26 May 1945, employees at the

mill.

USVC mill went on strike.
grlevances,

A union official cited eight

"including unauthorized reductions in employees'

paychecks and failure to settle grievances over the last
three-month period."

Union members also complained of the

company's seniority system.
climaxed when,

The accumulated frustrations

"without provocation," a foreman struck an

hourly employee. 70
The union requested that the company transfer the
foreman.

Initially, USVC refused.

Instead, the company's

employment manager issued notices to the strikers' draft
boards.

The company claimed that the worke rs ' absence was

"unexcused,

. arising out of an unauthorized strike.

11 71

Presumably, the workers' unexcused absences qualified them
for the draft.

On 2 June the workers "terminated" the

strike, although the parties negotiated the matter until 22
June.

On that date, an arbitrator recommended that the

company transfer the offending foreman. 72
7° "Mine Workers Leader Makes Statement on Rifle, Uravan
Strikes," Daily Sentinel, 30 May 1945, p. 3.
71Notifications to Selective Service Boards file,
drawer 117 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records.
The company sent
notices to draft boards in Colorado, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Kansas, and Arkansas.
72A. Q. Lundquist to L. A. West, State Manpower
Director, 9 June 1945, Manpower Commission file, drawer 118
Uf, room 125, Umetco Records; Arbitration Report, 11 July
1945, Area Engineer Correspondence--May 1945 to December
1945 file, drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
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It may seem that USVC officials spent much of their
time trying to attract and retain a steady work force.
perception would not be unwarranted.

The

The company also had a

town to maintain, but it did so with the expressed purpose
of maintaining a stable workf orce.
addressed six specific problems.

Toward this end, USVC
Residents complained of

"dusty roads in and about town"; sand storms created by wind
blowing over the tailings piles; "poor and slow laundry
serVlce from Grand Junction"; the war-time rations on
gasoline and tires, a situation that inhibited residents'
ability to travel to larger towns; insufficient goods at the
commissary; and, a lack of recreational facilities In the
town.

Leahy wrote that his office stood ready "to glve you

assistance in solving or overcoming any of the
aforementioned problems or others that may arlse from time
to time .

,, 73

The company remedied some of these problems, but found
others beyond its control.
spray water on the roads,
down.

USVC purchased a tank truck to
in an effort to keep the dust

Similarly, the company arranged to spray some of the

tailings piles with oil, to keep to a minimum the blowing
sand; however, officials saw no effective, economical way to
spray the untreated tailings.

The residents' concerns about

gasoline rations, slow laundry service, and a lack of goods
C. Leahy to U. S. Vanadium Corporation, 28 July
1944, Area Engineer Correspondence--June 1944 to March 1945
file, drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
73 p .
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at the commlssary could not be entirely solved.

These

problems had more to do with the general war-time lack of
abundance than with any want of effort on the part of the
company.

For example, the poor laundry service resulted

from a "lack of manpower in the laundries."

And, Uravan's

store may have been better stocked than people realized at
the time.

Some years previously USVC had purchased the Club

Ranch; the company raised cattle to supply meat to its town.
Fruit and vegetables, however, were sometimes hard to come
by during the war. 74
Considering the limited facilities and relative
isolation of Uravan, residents had ample opportunity for
recreation.

Uravan had a SWlmmlng pool, which the company

maintained during the war years.

Residents used the

community building for all sorts of activities, from church
services to dances.

Baseball teams formed, and competed

with those from other West End communities.

Lieutenant

Leahy and his staff contributed to Uravan's social
activities with the purchase and operation of motion picture
equipment; movies were shown in the recreation hall. 75
The company also reconditioned and expanded the Uravan
school house, another of the town's buildings that began as
a CCC building.

In 1944, the year of peak attendance, 190

74 J. L. Robison to Captain P. C. Leahy, 1 August 1944,
Area Engineer Correspondence--June 1944 to March 1945 file,
drawer 260 Ub, room 114, Umetco Records.
75 Ibid.
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students enrolled in grades one through eight.
students rode a bus to Nucla for high school.

Older
During the

war West End school officials experienced difficulties in
hiring teachers,

just as USVC had trouble attracting labor.

"It was an acute problem of getting teachers to come to such
an isolated area. ,, 76
The company could do very little for those who found
Uravan lacking.
atmosphere.

USVC could not change the basic, small town

Those who adapted, or were accustomed, to small

town living found it a pleasant place to live.
individuals created "a bustling, happy,

Those

friendly,

comfortable community, which was obviously busy In operating
the

usvc

corporate mill and the MED mill."

adult individual had an lncome;

Every family or

"there were no jobless,

homeless, or even hungry people in Uravan."

And, concerning

Uravan's isolation, one resident believed it an advantage-those in isolated communities tend to work harder, and to be
more creative, In their pursuit of dive rsions. 77
However, not all small towns had two uranium-pr o ducing
mills, not to mention a cadre of soldiers living amongst the
population.

And people must have thought it extraordinary

76Work Order Number HW-36, USVC Contract Account, 5
January 1945 , Work Orders--HW Account--Superintendent's File
(file) , drawer 78 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records; Silver,
"History of the Uravan Grade School."
77 Leahy to author, 3 March 1994; Ausmus, "When Uravan
Went to War"; Cliff Hiett, interview by author, 30 September
1994, Delta, Colorado, tape recording, private collection.
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when the company erected chain-link fences around the mill
areas, and installed guard houses at the mill entrances and
exits .
As an MED contractor, USVC maintained certain security
precautions.

The company screened potential employees, and

those whom it did hire pledged to uphold the Constitution,
swearing that they were not members "of any political party
or organization which advocates the overthrow of our
constitutional form of Government."

USVC even kept a list,

sent to the company by the Army, of people whom the company
should not hire.

Employees received colored badges, which

allowed them access to specific sites.

And, the guards at

Uravan were instructed, at least for a time, to carry loaded
weapons when on duty.

78

But government regulations fell to small town
familiarity.

For a couple of months, the guards dutifully

checked the identification passes of those entering and
leaving the mills.

Thereafter,

"the gates remained open,

and the guards waved any and every body through."

The

soldiers who worked at the mill behaved no differently than
the civilians.

They performed the same work and reported to

the same bosses as everyone else, and received no special

78 Certification to Uphold the Constitution file, drawer
118 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records; Muckenthaler File (file ),
drawer 170 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records; G. C. Muckenthaler
to Guard Personnel, 16 March 1944, and G. C. Muckenthaler to
All Guards, no date; both letters from Master Copies file,
drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records .
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treatment.
them.

Some of the soldiers brought their families with

In fact,

for a time the soldiers wor e civilian

clothes because the Army wanted to attract as little
attention to them as possible. 79
A sense of urgency pervaded the operations at Uravan,
an urgency fostered by the secret nature of the pro ject .
The company taught employees the importance of and
implementation of security measures. 80

Officials used

codes for certain words, like uranium, In their
correspondence.

The Army kept secret all statistics, bills,

orders, and anything else relating to the project.

And, the

press refrained from reporting on any of the milling
activities in southwestern Colorado. 81
If individuals in Uravan did not sense the urgency of
the project, they learne d of it first-hand in the mills.
The mills ran every day , twenty-four hours per day.

The

shifts rotated, s o t ha t a person worked about one week on
each of the three shif ts.

This is the nature of this type

of mill work; the plan t could not be shut down and restarted
every day without cons iderable inefficiency.

The

unaccustomed routine for those in Uravan was working for
79Ausmus,

"When Uravan Went to War,"

1;

Leahy, address.

80G. C. Muckenthaler to All Employees, no date,
Authorized Overtime fi le, drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco
Records.
81 Leahy, addre ss ; "Blair Burwell Makes Statement on
Uranium Taken from Th i s Region," Daily Sentinel, 8 August
1945, p.
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treatment.
them.

Some of the soldiers brought their families with

In fact,

for a time the soldiers wore civilian

clothes because the Army wanted to attract as little
attention to them as possible. 79
A sense of urgency pervaded the operations at Uravan,
an urgency fostered by the secret nature of the project.
The company taught employees the importance of and
implementation of security measures. 80

Officials used

codes for certain words, like uranium, In their
correspondence.

The Army kept secret all statistics, bills,

orders, and anything else relating to the project.

And, the

press refrained from reporting on any of the milling
activities in southwestern Colorado. 81
If individuals in Uravan did not sense the urgency of
the project, they learned of it first-hand in the mills.
The mills ran every day, twenty-four hours per day.

The

shifts rotated, so that a person worked about one week on
each of the three shifts.

This is the nature of this type

of mill work; the plant could not be shut down and restarted
every day without considerable inefficiency.

The

unaccustomed routine for those in Uravan was working for
79Ausmus,

"When Uravan Went to War,"

1;

Leahy, address.

80G. C. Muckenthaler to All Employees, no date,
Authorized Overtime file, drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco
Records.
81Leahy, address; "Blair Burwell Makes Statement on
Uranium Taken from This Region," Daily Sentinel, 8 August
1945, p.

1.
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months on end wi thout a day of rest.
working eleven straight months,

Cliff Hiett remembered

seven days per week .

Hiett

served in the Army, but civilians worked as hard as he did.
Employees earned overtime pay for hours worked in excess of
forty per week,

and for working on holidays. 82

The MED project waited neither for traditional
holidays--such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, and the Fourth of
JUly--nor for an occasioned celebration.
company offic ial,

Advised one

"all work on the Contract Account will

continue without interruption on VE-Day."

Later in the

year , anticipating VJ-Day , the same man requested
"p rotective measures where necessary to insure that no
damage to Government property occurs through riotous
celebration by either Contract personnel or the pUblic. ,, 83
Everyone in Uravan,

the West End, and probably in all

of southwestern Colorado kne w that the government wanted
uranium ; there would have been no other reason t o process
the tailings.

However, no one cou l d have predict ed the

even tual us e for the uranlum.
general feeling:

Cliff Hi ett summarized the

"We kn e w something was going on , but we

didn't know what form it was going to take .

I t was just

82 Cliff Hiett, interview by author; A. Q. Lundquist t o
J. L. Robison, 2 July 1945, Wo rk Schedules fil e, drawer 118
Uf, room 125, Umetco Records.
83A. Q. Lundquist to J. L. Robison, 24 April 1945; A .
Q. Lundquist to J. L. Robison, 14 August 1945; b o th letters
from Wo rk Schedules file, drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco
Records.
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logical that it would be a bomb.
energy locked up in it. " 84

People knew there was

It has been said that one

citizen of Uravan occasionally informed his acquaintances
that "the war is going to be won right here at Uravan."
Leahy was not informed of the details of the MED
project, either.

He knew only that the Army wa nted uranium,

and as quickly as possible.

After the successful test of

the atomic weapon at Al amogordo, New Mexico, Leahy and USVC
officials received a telegram from General Groves ' s office,
informing them that the "MED mission had been accomplished."
The company provided a copy of the telegram to all of its
employees, but, still, no one knew the nature of the
accomplishment.

Just like everyone else in the nation, the

people of southwestern Colorado learned of the atomic bomb,
through press reports, after the deployment of the bomb on 6
Au gu s t 1 94 5 . 85
The civilians who worked for USVC during the war
received a certificate from the War Department and the
Manhattan District of the Army Corps of Engineers.

The

document stated that the recipient had "participated in work
essential to the production of the Atomic Bomb, thereby
contributing to the successful conclusion of World War II.
This certificate

lS

awarded in appreciation of effective

service."
84 Cliff Hiett,

interview by author.

85 Leahy to author, 3 March 1994.
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The question that inevitably arlses concerns whether
MED scientists used Colorado Plateau uranium in the first
atomic bombs.

The statistics indicate that they had very

little to use.

The MED acquired 18,938,000 pounds of

uranium oxide for the Manhattan Project.

The African source

of uranium, the Shinkolobwe Mine, provided the MED with
approximately seventy-three percent of its total.

The

remaining twenty-seven percent arrived from Canada and the
Colorado Plateau.

About fourteen percent of the MED's

uranium originated from various sources on the Colorado
Plateau; USVC, from operations in Durango and Uravan,
supplied sixty-six percent of the total amount of the
domestic uranium. 86
The MED contracted with three companles to produce
uranium concentrates, a later step In the feed materials
refining process: the Eldorado Mining and Refining Company,
at Port Hope, Ontario; the Vitro Manufacturing Company, at
Canonsburg , Pennsylvania; and the Linde Air Products
Company, at Tonawanda, New York.

Each of these plants

produced concentrates from different sources (Canadian,
African, and American), but only Linde Air Products
processed the uranium from USVC.

From these plants,

Eldorado, Vitro, and Linde, the concentrates went to other

86 Chenoweth,

"Raw Materials Activities," 38.
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locations for further refining. 87

Thus, to trace the

source of the uranlum used in the first atomic bombs would
be a difficult process; if anyone has determined the source,
that information is not readily available.
Nevertheless,

in southwestern Colorado the general

impression exists that Colorado Plateau uranium constituted
the primary source of feed materials for the Manhattan
Project.

That assumption logically extended from the fact

that the Army spent considerable time and effort to procure
Colorado Plateau uranium.

The extent of the MED's other

procurement activities would not become public knowledge for
many years.

Blair Burwell, USVC's superintendent, may also

have succumbed t o a bit of reg i onal pride in this matter.
The man known as "Mr. Uranium" maintaine d that "not a pound
of the uranium ore that went int o those bombs came fr om the
Belgian Congo or Canada."

Reportedly, however, Burwell

later claimed that he never made such a statement. 88

The

anonymous author or authors of a book about Canada's uranlum
industry wrote the following sentence, striking for its
similarity to Burwell's remark:

"There lS no evidence that a

single gram of Canadian-produced uranium was actually used
in the two atomic bombs detonated in 1945, although it had
87Hewlett and Anderson, New World, 292 ; Jones,
Manhattan, 314.
88Al Look, U- Boom: Uranium on the Colorado Plateau
(Denver: Bell Press, 1956), 13; Raymond W. Taylor and Samuel
W. Taylor, Uranium Fever: Or, No Talk under $1 Million (Ne w
York: Macmillan, 1970), 128.
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been employed In varlOUS ways throughout the research
program. ,, 89
Soon after the war ended, the government's need for the
facilities at Uravan also ended.

For about two months after

the end of the war, mill crews at Uravan worked to "complete
the project."

Then,

in October of 1945, USVC began to lay

off employees; by the end of that month, the company had
only forty-five hourly employees on its payroll.

The few

workers that remained dismantled the government-owned mill
at Uravan and removed from USVC's mill the government-owned
equipment that the company chose not to purchase.

The

government allowed much of the equipment to be sold "on
site. ,, 90

Charles Beech, the Stearns-Roger engineer who

supervised the construction of the government's uranium
mill,

took advantage of the opportunity.

It was later

c laimed that he paid only six t o ten percent of the original
co s t of the equipment he pur chased.

91

89 Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited, Uranium in
Canada (Ottawa: Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited,
[1964J), 35.
90 Payroll Analysis and Personnel Report, Industrial
Relations file, drawer 118 Uf, room 125, Umetco Records;
Work Order Number HP-6, 27 October 1945, and Work Order
Number HR-5, 27 October 1945; both documents from Approved
Work Orders, WSP Plant--Uravan file, drawer 225 Ub, room
125, Umetco Records.
91Robert H. Hansen, "Tight Securi ty Curtain Shrouds
Story of Three Razed Uranium Mills," Denver Post, 22 October
1952, p. 49.
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The gradual migration of workers from Uravan reduced
the place almost to a ghost town.

Some workers quit

voluntarily, and returned to neglected farms and ranches.
When possible, the company moved employees to different
locations.

The soldiers transferred outi many of them

received their discharge after the war, but Uravan held no
promise of work for them.

For the next three years only a

few families lived In Uravani they served as caretakers for
the dormant town.

In 1946 and 1947 a total of five students

enrolled in the grade school, and in the following year,
that number increased to eight. 92
USVC never intended to abandon its town.

Having

supplied vanadium for America's wartime needs, company
officials gauged a future, peacetime demand for the same.
And while they could not have known exactly what the future
held for uranlum, they probably expected some sort of market
for that element, as well.

While some geologists and mlnlng

engineers continued to question the potential of carnotite,
those familiar with the Colorado Plateau believed that the
mineral would be an important source of uranium. 93

92 Sil ver,

"History of the Uravan Grade School," 2.

93 "Marked Lull in Production of Vanadium," pain
Sentinel, 11 November 1945, p. 14i "Uranium Ore of Region
One of Most Valuable Assets on Continent, Burwell Tells
Rotary," Daily Sentinel, 9 June 1949, p. 2.
Blair Burwell
left USVC in 1948 and started his own mining development
firm, the Minerals Engineering Company.
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Uravan' s firs t ten years marked a significant period o f
d evelopment for the West End o f Montrose County.

Between

1936 and 1945 the area lost some of its isolation, and the
character of the West End changed dramatically.

With the

construction of a new town and mill, USVC had demonstrated
just how quickly the for tunes and economy of a small region
could be transformed .

With the impetus of a big company

behind it, the West End abandoned its singular focus on
agriculture.

USVC's presence sparked a variety of wage-

paying jobs, a luxu ry to many In the West End.

Of course,

West Enders had witnessed change during the radium boom of
the 1910s, but not on the same scale, and not with su c h
lasting e ff ect.
The fate of the Club Ranch illustrates the point .
During the radium boom the Standard Chemical Company built
its mill and small camp o n the border of the ranch proper ty ,
and each enterprise functioned without drastic int erference
to the other.

Sometime after USVC began operat i ons in the

West End, the company bought out the owner of the ranch.

As

noted, the company operated the ranch for a time, but that
would not last.

Eventually all traces of the Club Ranch,

"that famous old propert y ," disappeared.

"It could be said

with some degree of finality that the era of the Club Ranch
had finally come to a close" . 94
94 Howard E. Greager, In the Company of Cowboys (New
York: Vantage Press, 1 990) , 195; for similar observations,
see the final chapter of Lavender, One Man's West, 29 9-3 1 6 .
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CHAPTER 4
"THE NEW URANI UM INDUSTRY

. BRINGING

PROSPER ITY TO THE PLATEAU" 1
In 1914 Secretary o f the Interior Franklin K. Lane
suggested that the federal government assume control of
America's radium industry.

Under his proposal, the

government would have pu rchased carnotite ore from miners on
the Colorado Plateau, proce ssed the ore at federally o wned
treatment plants, and distributed radium to American
physicians.

Radium showed promise as a cure for cancer, and

some legislators believed it the role of government to
provide the nation's hospitals with radium.

The bill that

came from Lane's proposal enjoyed a great deal of support,
but it also generated intense opposition.

After lengthy

debate in both houses o f Congress, the bill never came to a
vote.

Traditional fr

enterprise won the day , and one can

on l y speculat e on the course of events had elected
representatives voted for federal control of the radium
industry.
Two years prlor to America's entry into the Second
World War,

President Franklin Roosevelt set In motion the

process of building an atomic bomb, still only a theoretical
possibility at the time.

Nearly six years later, scientists

working for and sponsored by the government succeeded in
lUnion Carbide Corporation, Mesa Miracle (n.p., 1952;
reprint, 1957), 5 -6.
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IIharnessing the power o f the atom," at a cost of roughly two
billion dollars.

The su ccess of this program set the stage

for government control o f the nuclear industry, an industry
that encompassed miners on the Colorado Plateau, scientists
engaged in resear c h, and specialized manufacturing firms
working under government contract. 2

The government created

an industry that profoundly affected even tiny communities
on the Colorado Plateau.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) assumed control of
America's nascent nuclear program on 1 January 1947.
tasks laid before the Commission were enormous.

The

Unlike the

Manhattan Engineer District, which pursued a single goal ,
the AEC simultane o usly developed a variety of programs ,
including weapons production, research in a number of
fields, and the construction of different types of reactors.
Scientists and government officials anticipated great
peaceful applications of nuclear fission. 3

For these

programs the AEC required tremendous amounts of the raw
material, uranium.
The AEC negotiated with Canada and Belgium to purchase
uranium from what the Commission believed were still the
2This
radium era
period was
Industry,"

contrast between government inaction during the
and government invo lvement during the uranium
drawn by Shumway, IIHistory of the Uranium
150-156.

3Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, A History of
the United States Atomic Energy Commission, volume 2, Atomic
Shield, 1947-1952 (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1969 ), 602.
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best sources avail abl e.

However, at the famous Shinkolobwe

mlne In the Belgian Congo , ore reserves neared exhaustion,
and the Canadian mines were difficult to exploit.

Other

countries, like South Africa , seemed likely sources of
uranium, but there was considerable uncertainty about
uranium deposits around the world.

Because of this

uncertainty, and to insure a supply independent of
international politics, the AEC wanted to develop a domestic
source of uranium. 4
In 1947 the AEC estimated uranlum ore reserves on the
Colorado Plateau at one million tons, not nearly enough to
satisfy the Commission's needs.

Within a few years one

state--Colorado--would produce more than one million tons of
ore within a single year.

By 1959 estimates of ore reserves

had grown to 89 million tons.

The experts' low estimate in

1947 points to the vastness of the Colorado Plateauj by the
late 1940s relatively l ittle of the 100,000 square mile area
had been prospected.
To locate additional ore reserves, and to create a
supply of uranlum,

the AEC initiated various programs to

stimulate uranium production.

To administer the procurement

program the Commission opened the Colorado Raw Materials
Office in Grand Junction.

In 1952 the office became known

as the Grand Junction Operations Office.

4Ibid., 147-14 9 ,172-174.
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To acqulre uranlum ( "in the interest of the c o mmon
defense and se c u rit y " ) , t he AEC i ssued a series of
"circulars."

These public de crees established parameters

for the types and gr a d e s o f ore that the AEC would buy and
the incentives towa r d wh ic h mlners would work.
circulars were issued bet ween 1948 and 1957.

Nine
The most

important, Circular 5, Re v ised, guaranteed prices for ore
based upon the ore's ura nium content; established a prlce
paid for the ore's vanadium content; and allowed payment to
producers for the cost of hauling ore to mills and ore
buying stations.

Also enticing was the sixth promulgation,

which promised the payment o f bonuses to producers who
developed newly dis covere d d e posits.

The mine owne r

collected the bonus, up t o $35,000 for certain grade s of
ore, on the first ten thousand pounds of uranium from
properties that fit certa i n criteria.

Circular 5, Revised

and Circular 6 were iss ued in the summer o f 1951. 5
Because uranium p ro d uc ers were reluctant to pro spect
for new deposits, the AEC, assisted by the United States
Geological Survey (USGS),

initiated an exploration program.

5This summary of the AEC's uranium procurement program
has been culled from two sources.
Neilsen B. O'Rear,
Summary and Chronology of the Domestic Uranium Program
(Grand Junction, co: United States Atomic Energy Commissi o n,
Grand Junction Office, May 1966), TM-187; Holger Albrethsen,
Jr. and Frank E. McGinley, Summary History of Domestic
Uranium Procurement under U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Contracts: Final Report (Grand Junction, CO: U. S.
Department of Energy, Grand Junction Area Office and Bendix
Field Engineering Corporation, September 1982), GJBX-220
( 82) .
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On several separate occaSlons the AEC withdrew from the
public domain tracts of land deemed worthy of examination;
altogether, about seven hundred square miles were withdrawn.
Within these areas the AEC and the USGS conducted geologic
investigations, geophysical research, and airborne surveys.
The reports generated by these studies were eventually made
available to the public.
However, the land withdrawn was not immediately
available to the pUblic.

The AEC contracted with private

drilling companies to take core samples from the withdrawn
land.

If the analyzed core samples showed uranium deposits,

the AEC leased the land to mining companies willing to
extract the ore.
the government.

In return, the producers paid a royalty to
Between 1949 and 1954 the AEC let fifty

such lease agreements.

The Commission returned to the

public domain land on whi c h it failed to find deposits.
drilling program commenced in 1949.

The

Each year thereafter

exploration financed by private concerns increased and the
Commission's drilling activities decreased; in the mid-1950s
the government ceased its exploration and drilling.
The primitive state of roads on the Colorado Plateau
caused the AEC some consternation, and the Commission "felt
obligated to help rectify this situation. ,, 6

Road

improvement was needed to facilitate travel to mills and

60'Rear, Summary and Chronology, 12.
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mlne sites.

The Bureau of Public Roads allocated the funds,

in most cases, to state and county agenclesi however, the
government requi red a small financial offering from the
state or county in whi ch the road was being built.

Between

1951 and 1958 the AEC co ntributed some $14 million to build
or improve 1,253 miles of roadway in six western states,
while the states' share came to about $3 million.

Ninety

different projects were completed, including both dirt roads
hewn by bulldozers and smooth blacktop byways.
Of course, the uranium producers needed outlets to sell
their ore.

In the late 1940s the AEC anticipated the

construction of several privately owned mills that would
process uranlum ore.

However, the Commission also planned

for a number of buying stations to handle the influx of ore
in areas not served by a mill.

Typically, the AEC would

build a station in a regio n that needed a market .

If the

supply of ore were great enough, the Commission contracted
with a private company to build a mill near that location.
Then, the AEC would sell to the mill the stockpiled ore that
had accumulated, and the mill would become the outlet for
the producers.

During the 1950s the AEC established eleven

ore-buying stations In Arizona, New Mexico, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming.
AEC officials formulated the entire uranlum procurement
program during the Commission's first few years of
existence.

Most of the programs and incentives remained In
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effect for app roximat el y ten years.

Periodically the AEC

abandoned or modif ied ce rtain programs, depending upon the
efficacy of a particular program.
The AEC devised the se incentives with the ultimate goal
of acqulrlng uranlum concentrate, the product of the milling
process commonly c all ed yellowcake.

The concentrate

consists of approximat el y 85 percent uranium oxide (U 3 0 S )
To obtain this concentrate the AEC contracted with private
milling companies.

These mills procured ore, either from

independents or from the companies' own mines, and extracted
the uranium for sale to the AEC.

When negotiating milling

contracts, the AEC took into account the incentives that it
offered to the producers (miners).

Thus, the miners still

received the guaranteed price for ore, and haulage costs,
when they sold their ore to a mill.

By 1954 nine mills

operated , and by 1961 twenty-seven mills in ten western
states produced uranium c oncentrate.

These mills varied

tremendously In both output and length of service.

Most

were located In Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
The carnotite ores of southwestern Colorado and
southeastern Utah also contained vanadium,

in amounts that

averaged five times more than the contained uranium.

The

AEC not only paid miners for the vanadium content of their
ore,

it also bought from the mi l ls in that particular area

of the Colorado Plateau any vanadium not sold on the market.
This prevented the vanadium market from affecting the output
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of uranlum; it was als o an added bonus for those uranlum
mil ls.

The Grand Juncti o n Office of the AEC purchased and

stockpil ed vanadium frorn 1949 to 1959; in 1960 1.5 million
pounds of tha t product was sold to the highest bidder.

(The

AEC maintaine d a poli cy of "getting the most for the
taxpayers dollar, whil e insuring the miller a fair
return.,, ) 7
Until 1958 the mills were allowed to sell uranlum
concentrate only to the government.

In 1958 it became legal

to sell yellowcake to private concerns, but no such sales
were consummated until 1966.

The AEC con tinued to purchase

U3 0 S through 1970, but after that year utility companies
purchased all of the concentra te produced.

Between 1948 and

1970 the government purchased from domestic sources nearly
350 million pounds of uranium oxide in concentrate,

cost of nearly three billion dollars.

at a

The government

acquired another 280 mil lion pounds of uranium oxide from
foreign sources.

By the time it halted procurement, having

purchased one hundred million pounds more than needed, the
Commission sought a method of disposal for surplus
uranium.

S

7"Bids Asked on Vanadium Pentoxide," Forum (Nucla , CO),
28 April 1960, p. 2; O'Rear, Summary and Chronology, 14.
sJonathan E. Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores: The
Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943-1954 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1986 ) , 226.

1 27
But AE C offi cials c ould not foresee this success when
they b e gan the Domestic Uranium Procurement Program in 1947.
They f a ced a n uncertai n supply and an urgent demand, so
these o fficia ls created an economlC atmosphere conducive to
the pro ducti o n o f uranium.

The AEC wanted a boom, and it

set off the biggest r us h for minerals in American history,
the only "government prompted , government subsidized,
government sponsored, and government financed mineral hunt"
In American history. 9
Naturally enough, the activity started slowly.

In 1948

the AEC took delivery of nearly 232,000 pounds of uranium
oxide in con c entrate.
decreased,

In 1949 pr o ducti o n actually

though only slightly.

In 1951 the AEC issued

Circular 5, Revised, which gave mine operators a more
favorable return on their investment; coincidentally,
uranium production nearly doubled over the total from 1950.
Produ c ti o n increased yearly from 1950 to 1961, in which year
the AE C bought more than thirty-five million pounds of
uranlum oxide.

For several years uranium production was

concentrated in southwestern Colorado and southeastern Utah,
but by the late 1950s the mills with the largest production
were In New Mexico and Wyoming.
At the height of the boom, In the mid to late 1950s,
uranlum procurement had grown to an industry with yearly
expenditures of $100 million, by "even the most conservative
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estimates.

II

Perhaps te n thousand people worked in varlOUS

phas es of the industry t hroughout the Colorado Plateau.
Twelve hundred peop le worked for the AEC and the USGS,
government agencies that established offices ln Grand
Junction.

That town bec ame the "hub of uranium operations

in the Plateau .

II

Als o ce ntered in Grand Junction were

mining, exploration, truck ing, supply, and construction
companles, all of whi ch f ound ample business o pportunities
during the boom . lo

Other, smaller towns across the area

grew ln respon se to the government's uranium pro curement
program.
The uranlum boo m focused national attention on the
Colorado Plateau.

It attracted not only well financed

companles and corporations, but also weekend prospectors
hoping to get rich.

For several years, stocks in uranlum

companles traded wildly in Salt Lake City.

Money and people

poured into isolated areas of the Colorado Plateau. ll
In 1947 the most likely place to find uranl um was ln
those areas o f Colorado and Utah that had alr e ady been mined
fairly extensively.

The famous and important mines of the

lOUnion Carbide Corporation, Mesa Miracle, 6-7.
llA number of authors have chronicled the uranium boom.
See, for example, Look, U-Boom; Taylor and Taylor, Uranium
Fever; Raye C. Ringholz, Uranium Frenzy: Boom and Bust on
the Colorado Plateau (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989; reprint,
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1991 ) ; Micha el
B. Husband, "'Histo ry ' s Gre atest Metal Hunt': The Uranium
Boom on the Colorado Plat e au,
Journal o f the West 21
(Oc tober 1982 ) : 17-23.
II
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Paradox Valle y, and ad jace nt areas of the Uravan Mineral
Belt, held most of the k nown ore reserves.

Theref ore , the

AEC negotiated the fi rst milling contract with the Vanadium
Corporation of America , for production from VCA's Naturita
That contract bec ame effective in May of 1 947 .

mill.

In

October of that year, US VC agreed to produce uranium at its
In 1949 the AEC opened an ore-buying station at

Rifle mill.

Monticello, Utah; an AEC owned mill soon followed at that
location.

Also in 1949 VCA and USVC signed contracts for

mills at Durango and Uravan, respectively. 12

Of the first

five uranium mills built after the war, two were located in
the West End.
Mo ntrose County became, by far,
producing county in Colorado.

the lead ing uranlum-

In 1957, for example , the

county claimed fifty-seven percent of the state's output.
The worth of this uranium was estimated at nine milli o n
dollars, and the pro du ct ion came from 245 separate mining
operations.

In the same year , Colorado 's se cond leading

county, Mesa, pro duced uranium worth nearly three million
dollars from 10 9 mlnlng o perations.

And, San Miguel County

produced uranium valued at nearly two million dollars fr om
119 operations in 1957. 13

12

0' Rear,

"Summary and Chronology," 1- 2 .

13Alfred L. Ransome and others, "The Mineral Industry
of Colorado," in Minerals Yearbook, 1957, volume 3, Area
Reports (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959 ) ,
271.
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The long -term f igu r es are equally impressive.
bough t uran i u m concentra te from 1947 through 1970.

The AEC
During

those years mi ners dug f rom Montrose County 6.2 million tons
of ore, which c o nta ined thirty - one million pounds of uranium
oxide.

The uranium oxi de from Mesa County and San Miguel

County ores, combined, approximated twenty-three million
pounds.

Thus, the County of Montrose accounted for fifty-

seven percent of the uranium from Colorado's three leading
uranium-producing counties. 14

(No other county in the

state produced uranium in such impressive quantities. )
As one would expect, many companies attempted to
capitalize on the government's uranium purchase program by
mining and milling uranium.

By 1961 twenty-seven mills

operated in the American West.

Some of these ventures

lasted only a few years, while others sold uranium to the
AEC for ten years or more.

One of the major players in this

industry was Union Carbide Nuclear Company, once known as
the United States Vanadium Corporation.

USVC be c ame Un ion

Carbide Nuclear Company in 1955, and the company remained a
subsidiary of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation.
Union Carbide's mills at Rifle and Uravan produced
uranium during the entire course of the AEC procurement
program.

These were the only two mills that could claim

such a record of longevity.

In addition, Union Carbide

owned a mill at Gas Hills, Wyoming, which processed uranium
14 Chenoweth,

"Historical Review," 26.
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from 1960 until 1970, and one at Maybell, Colorado, which
operated from 1957 to 1964 .

Each of these plants

accumulated an impre ssi v e reco rd of production.

However , In

terms of the amount of ore processed and the amount of
uranium extracted from that ore, the Uravan mill stood as
the most important.

From 1947 to 1970 the Uravan mill

produced more uranium than all but four other mills in the
United States.

Some other mills in other states extracted

uranium at a higher per day rate ; but Uravan's mill ran at a
relatively consistent level for a period of time that
exceeded other mills. 15
While the company claimed a healthy share of America's
uranium industry, Union Carbide did not dominate; however,
it certainly maintained a dominant status in southwestern
Colorado.

From mills in Uravan and Rifle, Union Carbide

produced fifty-eight percent of the uranlum concentrate sold
to the AEC from the state of Colorado.

The Uravan mill

alone produced thirty-five percent of Colorado 's uranium
during the AEC procurement program. 16
The production of vanadium was also important to Uni o n
Carbide's operations.

Seven mills,

five in Colorado, one In

New Mexico, and one In Utah, extracted vanadium in addition
to uranium.

During the 1950s the milling companies sold

this product to the AEC.

Eventually, the AEC purchased more

15Albrethsen and McGin ley, Summary History, B-7, B-8.
16 I b'l d . , B-7.
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than twenty-eight mi llion pounds of vanadium concentrate,
and Union Carbide ' s Uravan plant accounted for one-third o f
this total.

l7

Union Carbide and other companles s ol d

vanadium on the open market after the 1950s.
Naturally, this meant a great deal to the people of the
West End.

Many people credit "Carbide ," as the company was

known familiarly,

for bringing jobs to a cash-starve d area.

The company became the largest employer and most dominant
economic force in the area , and its influence extended to
all areas of the uranium production c hain . 18
The company's original contract with the AEC required
the Uravan mill to treat approximately five hundred tons of
ore per day.

VCA's mill at Naturita, in contrast, processed

one hundred tons per day.

By the mid - 1950s both plants had

been upgraded, Uni on Carbide's to one thousand t ons per day ,
and VCA's t o 325 tons per day.

Carbide e mpl oyed about 250

at its Uravan mill, while o nly about o ne - half as many people
wo rked for VCA.
Union Carbide initiated an aggresslve exploration
program.

The company staffed geologists and mining

engineers, but for much of its exploration and assessment
work the company hired independent drilling companies.
17

I b l' d

.,

In

B-5.

18USVC became Union Carbide Nucl ea r Company in 1955.
Although many people remember the former name of the
company, everyone refers to it as "Union Carbide , " o r simply
"Carbide." To avoid confusion, the latter two terms will be
used here.
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addition, the comp any engaged drillers to perform the
development wo rk n ec essary to maintain a claim.

By law,

claim owners had t o perform a certain amount of development
work on their claims each year .
When Union Carbide decided to mlne a claim , the company
hired independent mlnlng contractors to do the work.

During

the 1950s Carbide operated all of its mines with this
arrangement.

(Later, In the 1960s, the company mined some

of its own ore but still contracted with small mlnlng
companies. )

All ore from a Carbide-owned mlne was shipped

to the company's mill at Uravan.

But the company also

bought ore from independent miners and companies that worked
mlnes not affiliated with Union Carbide.

Of course, both

Union Carbide and its mining contractors engaged truck
drivers to haul ore from the mines to the mill, and to haul
yellowcake from the mill to the AEC sampling plant at Grand
Junct ion. 19
Thus, it seemed that nearly everyone In the We st End
either worked for Carbide , or worked for someone who
contracted with Carbide.

It was even said that Union

Carbide ' s "wage rates have tended to set the pattern for
employers In the Uranium Basin," simply because Carbide
employed the most people in the area.

The company "was the

hub of the uranium business" in the West End.

The Vanadium

19Bill Hosokawa, "It's Uranium, and the Bleak Colorado
Plateau Is the Nation's Chief Source," Empire (Sunday
supplement to the Denver Post) , 16 November 1952, 7.
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Corporation of Amer ica, on the other hand, employe d far
fewer people than d id Union Carbide, and VCA hardly b o the red
to expand or ln cre ase its holdings. 20
The Uravan contract, effective 1 July 1949, specified
that production would begin on 1 January 1950.

However, the

Uravan mill required extensive reconstruction before it
could be placed into operation.

Anticipating the AEC

contract, the company began hiring late in 1948; in December
the town housed about thirty employees.

All through the

following year more workmen arrived, and by December o f
1949, just prior t o the commencement of mill operati o ns,
Uravan's populati o n stood at seven hundred.

The town

bl o ssomed , it must have seemed, almost overnight.
Uravan continued to grow.

By 1952, 215 people worked

for the USVC mill, and Uravan had about one thousand
residents.

In the mid - 1950s the company employed 250, and

the town housed, by various estimates, 1,2 00 to 1,500.

But

it is difficult to establish a firm number, because people
ere c ted cabins, tents, and shacks at vari o us pla c es along
the San Miguel River near Uravan.

A small transient

community formed at Atkinson Creek, about one mile from
Uravan, complete with a boarding house.

A local reporter

referred to these ramshackle villages as Uravan's "sprawling
suburbs along the San Miguel canyon and on the adjacent
20 "USV Bargaining Under Way," Nucla Forum, 19 February
1954, p. 4; Interview #42; Chenoweth, "Historical Review,"
19.
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mesa."

He des cribe d Uravan as "the boomingest big little

town In Colorado." 21
A relatively ne w facet of twentieth century living
arrived In the West End: trailers and mobile h o mes.

A 1954

picture of Uravan s hows about twenty - five small, mobile
dwellings placed along the river o pposite the mil l.

This

row of trailers lay adjacent t o Highway 141, the West End's
narrow, dirt -c overed highway.

Outside of several trailers

hung clothes from the day's wash.

One can imagine the

reaction of those residents to the dust raised by a passing
car or truck. 22
Union Carbide reserved the housing In Uravan f or those
who worke d at the company mill.

But as the company 's

employees began to o utnumber its houses,

some workers made

due with s o me type of temporary housing on the outskirts of
Uravan.

Others who lived in Uravan's "subu rbs " were mi ners ,

who also established several small camps f or themselves and
their families farthe r from Uravan , near the larger mine
sites.

Some of the larger camps had electric power, but the

cabins and trailers had no phones and no runnlng water;
resi dents hauled water from Uravan or other towns.

The

21 "East End Groups Impressed by Nucla H.S. Needs ,"
Nu c la Forum, 11 December 1953, p. 1.
The Wes t End' s o nly
newspaper, the Nucla Forum, commenced publication in June of
1953.
One year later, the edi to rs changed the name of the
we ek ly to the Forum.
This name remained until the ear l y
1970s, when it became the San Miguel Basin Forum.
22 Robert D. Nininger, "Hunting Uranium around the
Wor ld," National Geographic 106 (October 1954): 556 - 557 .
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roads leading to these outposts were rough , steep, and
occasionally impassable.

Buses delivered the children from

the various mlnlng camps to Uravan's school.

One camp ,

called Long Park and located on the northeast rlm of the
Paradox Valley, had its own school house during the 1950s.
Some remote camps had no bus service, and high school
students from those areas boarded with Nucla families during
the school year. 23
Many families In the West End lived in housing that we
might consider primitive.

For example, some Uravan families

moved into houses built without bathrooms, and used a
community bath facility.

One family lived in a trailer that

measured sixteen by eight feet; they later built a twelve by
eight addition, nearly doubling their living space.

A woman

remembers moving to Nucla in 1954 and finding nothing to
rent.

An old dentist's office finally became available--it

had no bath, no kitchen, no source of heat and n o
insulation, but it did have "a single basin with one faucet
(cold water ) . ,, 24
In 1954 Nucla's official population stood at eight
hundred and Naturita's at 1,200.

Both towns struggled to

23 Bill Brenneman, "On Civilization Rim [sic]," Rocky
Moun tain News, 27 September 1954, Mineral and Mining
Resources Clippings File, DPL; "Needed: Homes for Students,"
Forum, 26 August 1955, p. 1; "Housing Appeal Answered,"
Forum, 9 September 1955, p. 16 .
24 Interview #7; Interview #11; Teresa Sales, "Those
Happy Days," San Miguel Basin Forum, 9 October 1974, p. 8 .
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house incoming residents.

The Nucla Forum reported that

"several thousand people in the region live in trailers,
'temporary' government housing or substandard rentals."
Because of a lack of "l ong term financing for housing,"
relief was slow in coming.

Apparently, speculators and

lenders were initially hesitant to invest in the West End.
At the time, trailers cost ninety dollars per month to
rent. 25
Meanwhile, at company-owned Uravan, residents paid rent
In the amount of fifteen to thirty-five dollars per month.
Between 1954 and 1956 Union Carbide completed about seventy
new houses in Uravan, and the company gradually expanded or
improved many of its older houses.
Providing public services burdened the residents of
Nucla and Naturita in a similar manner.

New water systems

in those towns cost about $55,000, and the citizens debated
painful tax increases to pay for such improvements.
Uravanites also received a new water system,

in 1953, but

they did not feel the cost; they relied solely upon the
company to provide ci ty services. 26
25 "Uranium Basin Grows," Nucla Forum, 12 Mar ch 1 95 4, p.
1; Carl [sic] Queal, "Nucla Struggles with Growing Pains, II
Denver Post, 18 November 1954, p. 80; Cal [sic] Queal ,
"Uranium Industry Boosts Naturita Population from 30 to
1,200,
Denver Post, 16 November 1954, p. 40.
Ii

26 Ibid; "Naturita Ups Mill Levy," Forum, 22 October
1954, p. 1; IICool, Clear Water," USV Photo News 10 (AugustSeptember 1953): 4.
USV Photo News, published by the United
States Vanadium Corporation, provided company information
for its employees in Uravan, Grand Junction, and Rifle.
In
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West End school populations also boomed.

Nucla's high

school, the only on e in the area , doubled in size between
1947 to 1953, from an enrollment of seventy-eight to 157.
The elementary schools in Naturita and Uravan, combined In
one district, grew from a total of 344 students in 1953 to
607 in 1956

(see Tab l e 1, following page). 27

County tax

revenues generated by the uranium industry financed the
construction of new schools for the area.

The assessed

valuation of West End properties increased by fifty percent
from 1953 to 1954.

Most of this increase resulted from

mining assessments and the expansion and increased
production of the mills in Uravan and Naturita.

This

increase also meant that the West End accounted for about
one-third of the county's assessed valuation. 28
The West End became a busy place during the 1950s, and
o ne can imagine the myriad activities and the assortment of
people who came to take advantage of the opportunities:
miners, mill worker s, drillers, equipment operators,
construction workers , truck drivers , geologists, and other

1955, when the company changed its name to Union Carbide
Nuclear Company, it p u blished UCN Photonews.
27 "Uranium Basin Grows , " Nucla Foru m, 12 March 1954 , p.
1; "East End Groups Impressed by Nucla H. S . Needs, " Nucla
Forum, p. 1; "Annual Report of the Superintendent of School
District No. 25 for t he Year 1 958-1959," compiled by Eugene
Miller, p. 20; from School District RE-2 file, Contracts and
Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 1 25 , Umetco Records.
28 "West End Valuation Up 50% , " Forum , 27 August 1954,
p. 1.
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Tabl e 1. -- School Enro llment by Grade In Uravan and Naturita,
1953-1958
Naturita
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958

K

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

16

9

33

31
28
32

18
26
28
48
45
37

17
31
27
29
38

49
14
22
25
25
28

12
22
14
32
24
28

13
13
18
19
29
22

14
18
18
26
21
26

12
21
21
26
24
18

29
38
36
34

Total
143
164
181
272
261
263

Uravan
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958

K

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

33

22

45
35
49
51
47

33

49
36
38

29
43
40
49
58
56

31
22
34
40
45

21
36
17
36
33

33

38

22
19
29
21
29
33

23
24
20
34
15
22

20
21
20
18
28
13

37
39
47
50

Total
201
243
232
335
342
330

Enrollment figures available only for School District 25 ,
whi ch consisted of the Naturita and Uravan elementary
schools.
In 1961 the people of the West End elected to
organlze all West End schools into one district.
Source: Annual Report of the Superintendent of School
District No. 25 , for the Year 1958-1959, compiled by Eugene
Mill er , 1 July 1959.
School District RE-2 file, Contracts
and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
professionals engaged In the uranlum business.

With all of

this type of activity came certain other business
opportunities,

su ch as mining supply stores,

bars , gas stations,
businesses.

restaurants,

and several other service-oriented

Some people took advantage of the boom in
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mobile housing by o penlng trail er courts, and at least one
entrepreneur began selling new trailers. 29
The West End bo omed, and an appropriate question
concerns whether these towns took on the negative
character ist ics sometimes implied by the term "boom town":
drunkenness, gambling, p ro stituti on , violence , and a general
la ck of law and orde r.

Such a ct i vi t y i s an often observed

aspect of boom towns , and is generally attributed to an
influx of newcomers who feel no sense of responsi bility for
the community in which they find themselves. 30

There is no

question that the West End during the 1950s attracted
colorful and occasionally unsavory characters.

The bars of

the West End did a booming business; those o utlet s attracted
a decidedly rough and rowdy segment, people who,

it seemed,

spent most of their f ree time drinking and fighting.

The

West End also experienced an unprecedented level of crime.
During the height of the boom, the local newspaper described
"a rash of robberies recently reported in this part of
Colorado ."

During lulls in the cri me spree, police stayed

busy arresting people for driving while intoxicated,
fighting,

and "drunk disturbance. ,, 31

29 "Surge o f New Businesses In Nucla-Naturita," Forum,
2 5 May 1956, p. 13.
30Ronald L. Li t tIe, "Some Social Consequences of Boom
Towns," North Dakota Law Review 53 (1977): 414.
31 "Pharma cy Robbed Again," Forum, 2 September 1955, p.
12; "47 Driving Violations," Forum, 6 July 1 956, p. 12;
"Lots o f Lo cal Police Activity," Forum, 10 January 1958.
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It was during this time, perhaps, that Naturita
acquired its unwanted reputation of having few attractions
besides the bars.

"Nast y-rita," some have called it, a

suggestive and pejorative pun on the pronunciation of the
name:

"natta-rita."

Described during the 1950s as a "cit y

of trailers," the town lay on the crossroads of the West
End, and it served as the most convenient gathering spot. 32
Nucla and Uravan had bars, and those towns experience d
certain boom town problems.

But to many people's

recollection, Naturita attracted the more notorious
characters.

It may well be that Union Carbide's cont rol of

Uravan induced Carbide employees to stay out of tro uble.
Nucla, geographically speaking, was more removed from the
activity, and less touched by the mining boom.

In addition,

Nucla had a more stable population that predated the uranium
boom.
Another negative trait of boom towns

lS

the absence of

positive social interactions, recreational opportunities ,
cultural attracti on s, and a general lack of what o ne might
c all community spirit.

Boom towns, generall y sp eaki ng,

spring up in isolated areas with harsh climates and few
services for the increasing population.
towns offer,
arduous.

The work that boom

in this case mining and milling,

is physically

Such demands, along with the frustrati ons of "life

32wilson Rockwell,
April 1965, p. 1.

"The West End Story," Forum, 22
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cooped-up in a trailer" with few of the comforts, or even
necessities, of modern life, may lead to "alcoholism, drug
abuse, child abuse, and depression."

This "s ocial malaise"

may extend to young people, who respond with poor
performance in school, delinquent behavior, and other
transgressions of societal rules. 33
Towns in the West End fit the pattern of this
"syndrome," and there is some evidence that the towns
succumbed. 34
the

II

Reportedly, many marriages dissolved under

stress" of the times.

.

People who lived through the era

remember not only bar fights, but domestic violence,
murders, and suicide, as well.

In 1956 the local newspaper

printed a depressing list of the social problems that
plagued the West End:

"adolescent drunkenness, truancy,

unmarried mothers with no one to turn to for advice,

[and]

occasional families who are utter failures at rearing each
successive child."

This writer opined that "the San Miguel

Basin may not have more of a juvenile problem than other
areas in Colorado, but it would be hard to find a community
that has less facilities for dealing with such problems. ,, 35
33Little, "Social Consequences," 408-409i V. Edward
Bates, "The Impact of Energy Boom-Town Growth on Rural
Areas," Social Casework 59 (February 1978): 76i quotations
in Robert W. Righter, The Making of a Town: Wright, Wyoming
(Bou lder, co: Roberts Rinehart, 1985), 4.
34Righter, Making of a Town, 4.
35Teresa Sales,

"Those Happy Days," Forum, 6 November

1974, p. 7i "Naturita Knifing Shocks Area," Nucla Forum,
August 1 953 , p. 1i "Doc Gilliatt Murdered," Forum, 23

6
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One must acknowledge that social problems of this sort
existed, but the incidents cited above constitute only part
of the picture.

Moreover, these social blights plague most

communities, not just those in which the populat ion and
economy grow at a highly accelerated rate.

The evidence

suggests more strongly that West Enders succeeded in
building relatively healthy communities and responded
creatively to the challenges posed by the uranium boom.
Some residents participated in town beautification and held
various events to raise money for community projects.
People often donated their time and energy to helping those
who found themselves In trouble.

West Enders formed groups

and associations of all kinds and there was a great deal of
involvement in the youth organizations like the Cub Scouts
and Girl Scouts.

People organized athletic teams for

youngsters and adults.

Parents devoted considerable time to

solving the problems in the expanding school system, and the
parent-teacher conferences always drew large audiences.

In

response to the aforementioned juvenile delinquency,
citizens met and planned an extended recreational program
for youths.

They even invited an expert from the state

Department of Welfare to address the problem. 36

December 1955, p. 1; "Attempts Suicide," Forum, 15 April
1955, p. 7i "Bell Case Shocks Area," Forum, 7 October 1955,
p. 1 i "A Challenge," Forum, 2 March 1956, p. 3.
36This information is available from almost every lssue
of the Forum during the 1950s.
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Union Carbide played a roll In several community
projects.

For examp le, when the Lion's Club of Uravan built

a baseball field near that town, Carbide donated the lights
and the local San Miguel Power Association furnish ed the
poles and wiring for the project.

Uravan's swimming pool

was unique in the West End, and anyone could come to Uravan
to swim for very small fees.
support Uravan's hospital

And, Union Carbide helped to

(later, a clinic), which was open

to everyone In the West End.
Many West Enders rejected what they saw as pernlclous
influences that threatened their communities; they
vigilantly encouraged the preservation of a traditional,
principled, and conservative wa y of life.

New churches

arose almost as often as bars or liquor stores, and one
dispute pitted supplicants of the former against patrons to
the latter.

The details of the following incident

illustrate not only the amount of interest that West Enders
showed in their communities, but also the level of open and
honest debate that existed.
Pete Peters operated Uravan's general store, the San
Miguel Trading Center; Union Carbide owned the land and
building, but Peters ran the store on a contract with the
company.

Peters also ran the drugstore, and in 1954 he

decided to add the sale of packaged liquor to that business.
He obtained the approval of Carbide's plant superintendent ,
who considered it "desirable for Uravan to have all the
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servlces or fa c i li tie s that would be available In any other
town of comparable size."

Peters claimed to have number o f

customers who want ed him to carry packaged liquor. 37
Uravan's physician led the considerable opposition to
this proposal.

The Home Builders, a Uravan church-related

group, also disapproved, and they gathered three hundred
signatures on a petition that explained their opposition to
the liquor store.

The doctor also conducted a survey that

revealed that eighty-five percent of Uravan's hous e holds
opposed the I iquor store . 38
Peters' request initiated intense debate in the West
The Montrose County commissioners convened a meeting

End.

in Uravan to discuss Peters' application for a liquor
license.

The opposition lined up, and Peters found himself

virtually alone.

In another public forum,

Peters again cut a lonely figure.

the newspaper,

In a number of l e tte rs

residents voiced concern that liquor sales in Uravan would
only increase the incidence of alcoholism, drunk en driving,
and family disintegration.

Uravan's doctor believed that

the sale of liquor would "demoralize the youth and parents
of this area."

A correspondent from Naturita congratulated

Uravanites for "keeping their town clean" by opposing liquor
sales.

A Uravan resident suggested that citizens had a duty

37 "Liquor Hearing Held," Forum, 10 December 1954, p. 1.
38 Ibid.;
1954, p. 1.

"Liquor Request Challenged," Forum,

3

December
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to prevent others from obtaining alcohol.

The lssue even

drew a response from California, from a couple who were
gratified "that so many of the citizens of the West End were
fighting the 1 icensing of 1 iquor. ,, 39
Only one wrote in support of the sale of packaged
liquor in Uravan.

In an open letter to the town physician,

a Uravan man urged the West End not to revisit the "Noble
Experiment Days."
physician and.

While he admired the doctor's "skill as a
. sinceri ty as a preacher," the wri ter

suggested that alcohol sales were not the doctor's concern.
He made the democratic appeal for the right to chose:
Many have used alcohol profitably and wisely.
The
discreet and temperate use is to be condoned
rather than prohibited.
Let's let Pete worry about the liquor store, you
worry about your hospital and church, and me worry
about my next drink. 40
The county commlSSloners, perhaps swayed by public
oplnlon, denied Peters his license.

On this matte r , one c an

not know for certain that a majority of Uravan residents
really opposed the liquor license; perhaps they simply were
not loud and insistent enough.

Just a few years later, the

county commissioners approved Peters' second application for

39 Pete Peters, interview by author, 13 January 1994,
Grand Junction, Colorado, tape recording, private
collection; "Forum's Forum," Forum, 3 December 1954, p. 2,
and 24 December 1954, p. 2.
4° "Forum's Forum," Forum, 10 December 1954, p. 2.
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a liquor license. 41

However, the actions of those opposed

to liquor sales demonstrate the degree to which many in the
West End involved themselves in their communities.

In this,

and in many other matters, citizens took active roles in
shaping their towns.
Problems facing those In the West End grew in relative
proportion to its economic and population growth.
reglon lived the proof of the adage that states,
things change, the more things stay the same."

The
"The more

During the

1950s, as during an earlier time, roads occupied a prlme
position on the list of West End priorities.
For much of the uranlum boom of the 1950s West Enders
negotiated roads layered with dirt or gravel.

A trip to

Grand Junction could easily turn treacherous--the rough
surface caused numerous flat tires, and sometimes a flash
flood washed away portions of "Highway" 141.

Other times

motorists found thems elves stranded , unable t o proceed
because of water rushing over the roadway.
Too often accident s on the narrow, twisting roads left
motorists seriously or fatally injured.

A reporter counted

eleven accidents in eighteen months on state road 97, which
connected Nucla and Naturita.

Another well-known stretch of

roadway, Norwood Hill, claimed its share of accidents.
Automobile wrecks constituted a somber fact of life for

41 "License Denied T.e., " Forum, 17 December 1954, p. 5;
Peters interview.
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those in the West End , and the high volume of heavy truck
traffic compounded t he problem.

To be sure, accidents were

often the fault of the drivers involved; police officers
cited "excessive speed" or a failure to use caution in bad
weather as the cause of several.

Nevertheless, it was clear

that road improvement needed to be addressed. 42
The road problems also stood as the major obstacle to
continued economic growth.

West End promoters envisioned

such growth, of which the uranium boom was only the
beginning.

They believed that the West End was the "missing

link" in a transcontinental highway that would connect
Denver with southern California.
State Highway 80

This link would be old

(present-day Highway 141), which ran from

Naturita in a southwesterly direction to Slick Rock,
Miguel County, and on to Dove Creek,

In San

in Dolores County.

From there, the transcontinental highway would extend
through southern Utah and on to California.

Promoters of an

improved Highway 80 point ed ou t that the mills in the West
End received more than one quar ter of their ore from trucks
traveling by that route.

The highway also served the lumber

mills that operated near Norwood,

in San Miguel County, and

ranches throughout the San Miguel Basin.
represented something much bi gger:

But, the highway

"transcontinental

Correct ion: Not 7, But 11 over 97 in 18 Months,"
Forum, 1 July 1955, p. 2; "Li fe Lost off Norwood Hill,"
Forum, 21 September 195 6, p. 1; "Naturita Area Accidents
Injure 5," Forum, 5 October 1956, p. 13; "Accidents
Increase," Forum, 21 Dec ember 1956, p. 6.
42 "
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trucking, commercial travelers and tourists."

It "would do

more to build our economy than mining and logging have done
together. ,, 43
One editorialist encouraged Montrose County officials
to take the lead in this effort.

He believed that if the

county improved the road, more people would use it.

Once

the traffic reached a certain level, the state would see the
need to take over maintenance. 44

The only problem with

this plan was that the vast majority of Highway 80 lay In
San Miguel County.

In fact,

the entire effort to promote

Highway 80 suffered from an ambiguity: no one explained how
the highway would be routed from the West End to Denver,
through the mountains of the continental divide.
This grand vision for Highway 80 captivated some In the
West End, but other roads concerned them, as well.
141 was the vital link to Grand Junction,

Highway

and Highway 90

covered the distance from Naturita to Paradox and on to the
Utah state line, serving some of the more important mines in
the West End.

The AEC expressed willingness to contribute a

considerable chunk of money toward the improvement of these
roads, but state and local governments kept a tight lid on
the respective treasuries.

The Forum newspaper alleged that

the State Highway Department had allotted only $22,000 for
43"The Forum Fotogravure, " undated, special issue of
Nucla's Forum devoted entirely to highway 80; untitled
editorial, Forum, 20 April 1956, p. 3.
44 Untitled editorial, Forum, 20 April 1956, p. 3.
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roads in the "Urani um Basin," out of a total budget of $35
million . 45

Montrose County officials seemed content to

wait out the situation, hoping that someone else would come
through with the money.
In 1954 the AEC proposed a $1.5 million project for
Highways 141 and 90.

The AEC's plan depended upon a

$50 0,000 contribution from the local and state government.

In response, the State Highway Commissioner commented "that
Montrose County might be able to furnish the half million
In turn, a Montrose County Commissioner blithely

dollars."

suggested that Union Carbide would come up with the money,
once the roads got bad enough.

This exchange earned the

"Laugh of the Week" in the Forum newspaper. 46
The dispute between the county and state governments
resulted,

In part,

from the designation of West End roads.

For example, parts of Highway 141 were in the stat e road
system, while other parts of it remained in county c ontrol.
Not until the summer of 1956 did the state take all of 141
into its road system.

Highway 80 became a part of the state

system in October of 1957.

The state administrators refused

to appropriate money for non-state roadsi and, they

45 "Clash Seen over Uranium Roads," Forum, 20 August
1954, p.

1.

46 "Laugh of the Week," Forum, 20 August 1954, p. 2.
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continually postponed glvlng roads In the West End a state
designati on. 47
Meanwhile, West Enders fumed,
irony of the situation.

and they pointed out the

The uranium industry generated

millions of d ol lars in revenue, and played a key role in t he
nati o nal defense; yet, those engaged in the business faced
unnecessary challenges.
this way:

A long time Nucla resident put it

"We hauled $43 million worth of uranlum ore over

these roads last year.

In the process we wre cked $1 million

worth of new trucks on those rough roads. ,, 48

West End

promoters vented anger at Montrose County officials because
of the perceived lack of support from the county seat.
Increasingly, however, they realized that the county could
not or would not deliver the needed money , and they begin to
apply more pressure to state p olitic ians.

It especially

irked the West End that the AEC offered up t o nin ety percent
of the necessary funds, but the state still stalled.
Accordi ng to the local newspaper editor,

" Colorado's share

of AEC access road money had been cut by hundred s of
thousands of dollars because of the two-year delays that are
common here
months)."

(Utah has been utilizing such money in 8 to 12
Even the editor of Uranium magazine weighed in on

47 "State Takes 141 Back int o Highway System," Forum, 27
July 1956, p. 4; "Betty Pellet Looks into 80 Backg round ,"
Forum, 17 October 1958, p. 4; "It's Up to the Gov Now, "
Forum, 2 7 May 1955, p. 2.
48Bill Brenneman , "Slope Outlines Multi-Million-Dollar
Road Program," Forum, 30 September 1955, p. 14.
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the subject, writing that Colorado failed "to hold up its
end of the concerte d drive to step up production of uranium
on the Colorado Plateau. ,, 49
The West End appealed to the state through county
officials , elected representatives, uranium industry
spokesmen, and concerned citizens, who attended numerous
meetings on the topic of road improvement.

Another helpful

influence came f rom Club 20, a Colorado political
organization formed to re present the interests of those
counties located west of the continental divide.

This gro up

lobbied hard for good roads on the Western Slope, and placed
the uranium basin high on its priority list. 5o
Through the eve ntual cooperation between the state and
the AEC, West End roads gradually improved.
came slowly,

In yearly projects that improved s everal miles

of roadway at a time.
until 1964. 51

The progress

Highway 141 was n ot comp l etely paved

And, the route for a transcontinental

highway bypassed Montrose Coun t y altogether; it was built
from Denver th rough Grand Junction .

49Editorial (no title ) , Forum, 28 September 1956, p. 4;
Henry Hough, "The Editor's Post Scr ipt," Uranium Magazine 1
( S e pte mbe r 1 9 54): 4 8 .
50 "At Hearing Despite Storm," Forum, 3 December 1 9 54,
p.1; "Hope Stems from Road Meet," Forum, 1 July 1 955 , p . 14;
Bill Brenneman, "Slope Outlines Multi-Million-Dollar Road
Program," Forum, 30 September 1955, p. 14.
51 "Five More Miles to be Paved on 141," Forum, 7 March
1 963 , p. 1; "Bid Opening is June 9 on 141 Project," Forum,
28 May 1964, p. 18.
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Other amenities arrived on a pace roughly equal to that
of paved roads.

Not until 1958 did the West End gear up for

the advent of dial telephones, and not until 196 0 did most
residents in Uravan have telephone service at all.

Until

that year the people of Uravan used a phone at the town
drugstore; and they used a nearby bulletin board to post
phone messages for one another.

Unfortunately, the upgraded

service in the West End eliminated the jobs of telephone
operators, one of the few instances of a layoff during the
uranium boom. 52
Television sets were an uncommon luxury; many p eople
have only a vague recollection of getting a televisi on in
the late 50s or early 60s, and their c h o ice of programming
was limited t o one station.

That wa s accomplished in 1957

by the locall y formed TV Associati on , which raised money
from interested citizens t o buy several signal repeaters for
the West End.

Local chronicler Betty Zatterstrom points out

that such modernization cannot be attributed solely to the
uranium boom.

"Boom or not,

I

suppose televisio n wou ld also

have 'snuck - in' somehow," she wrote. 53

52 "$279,000 R.E.A. Loan Approved for Nucla - Na turita
Telephone Co.," Forum,S September 1958, p. 1; "New Phones
in by September 27," Forum, 9 July 1959, p. 1; "Nu c laNaturita Telephone Co. to Build Dial System In Uravan, "
Forum, 28 July 1960, p. 1.
53 "A Brief History of Television Reception in the San
Miguel Basin," Forum, 27 October 1960, p. 1; Betty
Zatterstrom, "'The Times--They were a changin' '--The Mid50's," San Miguel Basin Forum, 14 January 1993, p. 6.
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"Boom or not," the West End consisted of small,
isolated communities that lacked the conveniences of larger
towns.

For example, the area suffered for want of a

hospital, according to local physicians.

One estimated that

the West End averaged one child birth per day.

Expectant

women either delivered without hospital facilities, or drove
to Montrose or Grand Junction for obstetric care.

For a

short time during the early 1950s, Doctor Akers ran a
hospital at Uravan, but the endeavor failed.

Thereafter,

the West End had doctors, but no facilities to care for
child births and emergencles.

Residents relied on an

ambulance service funded by subscription, five dollars per
year for each family, and run by volunteer drivers. 54
The Nucla-Naturita ambulance service proved its worth
on a number of occasions .

Once, a Uravan woman needed

medical attention in Montrose.

Her husband considered

delivering her in his own car, but the n decided t o ca ll the
ambulance because of icy roads.

With his wife sa fe l y in the

ambulance, the man followed in his car.

At some point

during the trip he lost control of his car, which careened
over the edge of Norwood Hill.

He emerged from his

automobile, unharmed, and probably thankful that his wife

54 "Doctors' Plea: Give Us a Hospital," Forum, 26
December 1958, p. 8; Erma Dougherty, "A Hospital is Born,"
Nucla Forum, 27 November 1953, p. 1; "Ambulance Busier Than
Ever, " Forum, 10 October 1958, p. 1.
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traveled in the ambulance.

His car remalns where he left it

that day. 55
The story offers a loose analogy to the condition of
the West End.

The people of the area proceeded down an

uncertain path, close to a preclplce.

The area had grown

tremendously since 1950, and the boom provided West Enders
with an unprecedented standard of living.

But the road t hey

traveled was not of their own making, and they had no
control over the future path of that road.

For example, In

1954 the AEC announced that a uranlum mill would be erected

in the Paradox Valley, near Bedrock.

In 1956 the federal

agency signed a contract with the company that would invest
2.5 million dollars in the project,

and some speculated that

Bedrock would grow to a community of five hundred. 56

But

these plans were never realized; no new mill was built.
This was no great disappointment to the West End, but it
illustrates the West End's level of dependen ce upon the AEC,
companies like Union Carbide, and, by extension, uranium.
All o f the West End's growth and prosperity rested on the
uranium industry, and the future of that industry lay with
institutions and businesses far removed from the We st End.

55 " A Narrow Escape," Forum, 1 7 January 1958, p. 1.
newspaper reported inaccurately some details of this
adventure.
The author thanks the man's family for
contributing additional information.

The

56 " 'Mill for Bedrock Ore': AEC," Forum, 6 August 1 95 4,
p. 1; "Paradox Valley to Get Uranium Mill," Uranium Magazine
3 ( July 1956): 2.

1 56
This lS not to say that people lived In constant f e ar
of losing their jobs because of a bust in the uranium
market.
risky.

But they acknowledged that the business could be
Men who joined the Uravan mill in the early 1950s

knew that the company agreed to relatively short term
contracts with the AEC; some did not anticipate a future
beyond the length of the contract.

And, there wer e many at

the time who had lived through an earlier boom and bust
period.

While not anxious, West Enders abided a seldom

spoken realization that "some day the uranium bubble may
break when the government stops its inflated monopo ly
buying. ,, 57
One cannot 19nore the value to the West End of its
agricultural enterprises, referred to as "the year-in and
year-out backbone of the Uranium Basin's economy."

But

thes e mostly small, family run, of t en "marginal" operations
formed a quiescent economy , unable to attract the jobs and
money lured by uranium.

In fact, many men went t o work in

the mines or mills to bring home the money needed f or the
family ranch or farm.

Some farmers worked mlnlng claims

that they had held since before the uranium boom.
Paradox Valley , one claimed,
a little from uranium."

In the

"nearly every farmer

A man who worked in Uravan and

helped on his father's ranch drew a clear distinction
57Bill Brenneman, "Drama of 1950' s Building Legend,"
Rocky Mountain News, 1 October 1954, Mining and Mineral
Resources Clippings File, DPL.

made
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between the two ende avors: uranlum was the best thing that
could have happ ened to the West End.

One who has not lived

through it cannot imagine what the boom did for people.
Vividly, he recalled that for the first time a man cou ld put
his hand In his pockets and not find them emptYi he actually
had some money to spend.

58

It comes as no surprise, then, that uranlum captured
the loyalty of those it served.

The unstable element also

captivated their fancYi uranlum became a sign of the times,
and the multifaceted uranium industry represented a meal
ticket In more ways than one.

For example, hungry West

Enders enjoyed meals at a Nucla cafe with the evocative name
of the "Pick N' Shovel."

In Naturita, shoppers took

advantage of "Uranium Values" at one department store, or
drove to Nucla to browse the racks at the "At o mi c Apparel
Shop. "

For evening entertainment some imbibed at a bar

called "Atomic Recreation" in Nucla--bar owners in Naturita
als o gave their establishments names inspired by uranium
mlnlng.

At the time there was even a brand of whiske y

marketed with the name "Uranium Whiskey."

Others opted for

"Uranium Basin Grows," Nucla Forum, 12 March 1954, p.
Ii John Marshall, "'Can We Change with the Economy?'- Marshall," Forum, 26 December 1958, p. 7i Bill Brenneman,
"Valley Called Paradox," Rocky Mountain News, 30 September
1954, Mining and Mineral Resources Clippings File, DPLi
Interview #41.
John Marshall, the county agricultural
agent, noted that "the family type farm is on the way out."
To stay profitable, farmers and ranchers needed larger
investments in equipment and more land, both of which
necessitated debt.
58
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a movle at the "Uranium Drive-In," located on the hill
between Nucla and Naturita.

The proprietor of a shuttle

service, which transported travelers from the West End to
Montrose, named his business the "Uranium Express," and held
a contest to choose a "Uranium Queen."

In 1955 the town of

Delta hosted the "Uranium Bowl" college football game.
(Delta had no obvious connection with the uranium industry,
but the high school football stadium was probably bigger
than Nucla's, and more accessible to fans.)

Uranium

achieved its most prominent place as part of the Nucla town
seal; the emblem featured the words hunting, fishing, and
uranium inscribed in a circle around the town name. 59
The uranium rush drew considerable national attention,
and the interest of thousands of prospectors.

Newspapers

and magazines supplied the public with stories of
prospectors discovering rich deposits o f uranium o r e .
Cottage industries--stores selling geiger counters and other
necessities for prospecting--mushroomed in towns around the

59This information was gleaned from several editions of
the Forum newspaper of the 1950s.
The fascination with the
atomic age occurred throughout America, and manifested
itself in "songs, movies, place names, and advertisements."
Naturally, the excitement generated by atomic power grew
stronger in those places more closely associated with
certain aspects of it.
Business people in Las Vegas,
Nevada, near the AEC's nuclear test site, employed various
"atomic themes" in promotions, advertisements, and to
attract visitors.
Residents could see the atomic tests from
Las Vegas, and tourists came to witness the blasts.
A.
Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and
American Politics (Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press,
1986), 86-100.
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Colorado Plateau.

Anxi ous prospectors inundated the c lerks

at county court houses with mining claims . 60
Most prospecting occurred in southeastern Utah, on
relatively unexpl o red, unclaimed land; in the Uravan area
much of the land was already claimed by the bigger mining
companles.

But even in the Uravan Mineral Belt there was

still room for the independent prospectors.

One Nucla man

"scratc hed for years" before staking a claim that would
become the "fabulous Opera Box mine."

Another local

"parlayed a $1200 grubstake into six figures."
course,

Others , of

"went broke" in their search for uranlum.

A West

End rancher spent so much time and mone y in a futil e search
for uranlum that his ranch failed of neglect. 61
The West End also witnessed one authentic land rush,
whi c h attracted uranium hunters fr o m as far a way as Texas
and Wyoming.

In 1954 the AEC opened for claiming e ight een

thousand acres of land on Atkinson Mesa, near Ura van.

At

the appointed hour on 1 2 November, an est imated one thousand
prospectors poured into the area.

A reporter observed that

the mesa "looked like a crowded golf course on the Fourth of
July."

Many people staked their claims early, and others

6°Ringholz, Uranium Frenzy,
Greatest Metal Hunt, '" 21-22.

76 - 77; Husband,

'" History's

61Bill Brenneman, "Drama of 1950' s Building Legend,"
Rocky Mountain News, 1 October 1954, Mining and Mineral
Resources Clippings File, DPL; "Uranium and Katherine Kadie
. She Was Here Through Boom and Bust," San Miguel Basin
Forum, 27 July 1978, p. 9.
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"paid little attention to evidence of prlor staking or
ownership."

In the attendant confusion, there appeared to

be enough transgressions "to keep every lawyer west of the
Mississippi busy for years on title suits."

Later, the

Montrose County Clerk's office recorded approximately two
thousand claims.

Union Carbide officials , who knew

intimately the Atkinson Mesa geology,

laid no claims. 62

The uranium boom profited West Enders,
part.

for the most

Many owned mines that they worked or leased, and

others started mining, drilling, or trucking companies that
contracted with the bigger companies like Union Carbide.
Many more earned a good living from work in the mlnes or
mills.

The owners of bars, restaurants, hotels, and service

stations probably earned as much in the West End as they
could have anywhere else.

However, the West End historian

Wils on Rockwell believed that the boom of the 1950s had an
impa ct similar to the radium boom o f the 191 0s:

"The big

money was made by independent operators and corporations on
the outside , most of whom pulled ou t when the boom finally
came to an end. 11 63

62 II Prospectors Rush Restored Land, II Forum, 19 November
1954, p. 1; "Land Rush for Uranium Turns int o Comic Opera ,"
Rocky Mountain News, 13 November 1954, Mining and Mineral
Resources Clippings File, DPLi IIAtkins on Me sa Stampede,"
Uranium Magazine 1 (December 1954 ): 46.
63 Bill Brenneman, IIDrama of 1950' s Building Legend, "
Rocky Mountain News, 1 October 1954, Mining and Mineral
Resources Clippings File, DPLi Rockwell, Uncompahgre
Country, 205.
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Most West Enders would probably agree with this
assessment.

Many of those with the experience to profit In

the uranium industry had come into the West End from other
areas.

And they did not stay after they had made their

money.

The West End benefitted from school construction,

upgraded roads, and the improvement of some public services.
But the residue of wealth did not last, and the benefits
existed only as long as uranium remained profitable.
The year 1958 is often given as the end of the uranlum
boom.

For the West End it began early in the year, when the

Vanadium Corporation of America announced that it would
close its Naturita mill.

VCA could not come to terms with

the AEC on a new contract, probably because of the condition
of the plant.

It was the oldest uranium mill In America,

and its facilities were outdated by standards of the day.
Thus, it operated with much less efficiency than other,
competing mills.

West Enders suspected as much: one man

regarded the VCA operation as "a bailing wire outfit," a
reference to the method by which the company effected
repalrs.

Another man, using similar terminology and the

same impassive delivery, described VCA as a "fly-by-night
outfit."

One hundred twenty-five men lost their jobs as a

result of the VCA closure.

The local newspaper editor

estimated that figure at only five percent of the mlnlng and

16 2

milling jobs In the entire uranlum basin, an area that
included San Miguel County.

He saw "no need for panic. ,, 64

However, in 1958 something much bigger was in the
works.

The AEC's procurement program had succeeded beyo nd

expectations, and the agency realized that "it was no longer
In the interest of the Government to expand the production
of uranlum concentrate."

For years the AEC had predicted

that demand for uranium would arlse in the private sector,
from utility companies that operated nuclear power plants.
Then, as the AEC's needs for uranium decreased, commercial
demand would lncrease.

But the technology for tho se power

plants lagged behind expectations, and it became c lear that
significant commercial demand would n o t mat er ializ e for a
number of years.

Thus, the federal agency sought t o limit

the production of uranium while keeping the industry alive
and heal thy. 65
In 1958 the AEC curtailed exploration by modifying
certain aspects of its program.

While it continue d to h o n o r

previous contracts, the Commission announced that from 1962
to 1966 it would purchase uranium concentrate that
originated only from those ore reserves developed before 24
November 1958, the date of the announ ce ment.

This damp e ned

64Interview #5; Interview #15; "VCA Mill to Shut Down
Jan. 31," Forum, 3 January 1958, p. 1; untitled editorial,
Forum, 3 January 1958, p. 1.
65 0' Rear, "Summary and Chronology," 1 7; June H. Taylor
and Michael D. Yokell, Yellowcake: The International Uranium
Cartel (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 31-32.
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enthusiasm for exploration, because the AEC withdre w its
guaranteed market for new discoveries. 66
Simultaneously, the Commission began to implement an
allocation system for the delivery of uranium ores to the
mills.

AEC geologists assessed 2,500 mining properties on

the Colorado Plateau, and found eight hundred that met
eligibility criteria.

The AEC allocated, from 1962 to 1966,

the delivery of ore from these properties to the mills; the
AEC based each mining company's allotment on ore reserves
developed before 24 November 1958.

For small mining

companies, which usually did not control enormous ore
reserves, the AEC based the allotment on the small
companies' past ore production, as measured from 1 July 1956
to 30 June 1960. 67
These actions had no immediate effect on uranlum
production as a whole.

The delivery of U3 0 8 to the AEC

continued to inc rease yearly until it peaked at thirty-five
million pounds in 1961.

Thereafter it decreased, by about

three to four million pounds per year, until 1971, when the
AEC bought only 2.5 million pounds.

From 1959 to 1961 the

milling companies produced as much as their contracts with
the AEC would allow.

Then , in 1962 the allocation system

took effect, as well as a new, lower price for uranium
concentrate paid by the AEC to milling companies.
66 Taylor and Yokell , Yellowcake, 31-32.
670' Rear,

"Summary and Chronology," 18 -19 .

In 1955

1 64
the AEC paid an average of $12.25 per pound; after 1961 it
paid only eight dollars per pound. 68

Activity in the

uranium industry decreased correspondingly.

Based on

production, then, one may conclude that 1961 marks the end
of the uranium boom.
Indeed, the early 1960s were not lucrative for the West
End, as employment in the mines and mill decreased.

Some

small mining companies found the AEC's new quota system
unprofitable, and gave up the business.

The Golden Cycle

Corporation, a large, diversified mlnlng company, lost its
uranium claims in the West End to another AEC decision.
Golden Cycle had mined AEC controlled land on Atkinson Mesa,
near Uravan, since 1953.

(This was not the same land that

was opened to the public in 1954.)

In 1962 the AEC declined

to renew any leases on the lands it controlled, and Golden
Cycle suddenly had no ore to mine.

The company laid off

fifty miners. 69
The working population at the Uravan mill d ecl ined, a s
well.

In 1960 Union Carbide employed an average o f 224

workers at its mill.

By 1964 the number had dropped to 152.

Other statistics reflect the downturn in the uranlum
industry.

In 1960 Montrose County had 285 mine operations

that produced 509,338 tons of ore.
68Albrethsen and McGinley,

In 1965 the county

"Summary History," B - 6 .

69 "Small Uranium Producers View AEC with Distrust,"
Daily Sentinel, 27 July 1962, p. 5; "Uranium Miners' Ranks
Rapidly Thinning," Daily Sentinel, 25 July 1962, p. 3.
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counted only 135 opera tions that produced 264,584 tons of
ore.

The total worth of Montrose County ore dropped from

nearly eleven million dollars in 1960 to 5.2 million dol lars
In

1965. 70

Had the uranlum market collapsed completely, the West
End may have faced economic rUln.
aware of this dependence.

West Enders were fully

In 1961 VCA returned to Naturita

to operate an ore concentrating plant, which was designed to
treat ore in a preliminary fashion before it was shipped to
VCA's Durango mill.

West End merchants purchased a two-page

ad in the local newspaper, thanking VCA for its return to
Naturita.

Unfortunately, VCA officials closed the

concentrator less than two years later, due to " continued
high cost and unprofitable operations.,, 7l
But the West End's uranium deposits were far from
depleted, and the AEC continue d to provide a market, albeit
a less lucrative one than before.

And, the West End had a

70Monthly Manning Reports, 1960, Industrial Relations
Department file; Monthly Manning Reports, 1964, Uravan
Purchasing 1962 file; both documents from room 126, Umetco
Records;
M. H. Howes, "The Mineral Industry of Colorado, "
in Minerals Yearbook, 1960, volume 3, Area Reports
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961 ) , 225 ;
Carl L. Bieniewski and William C. Henkes, "The Mineral
Industry of Colorado," in Minerals Yearbook, 1965, volume 3 ,
Area Reports: Domestic (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1967), 187.
71 "VCA to Build Ore Concentrator," Forum, 9 February
1961, p. 1; advertisement, Forum, 16 February 1961, pp. 8-9;
"Naturita Concentrator to Close, Some Employees to be
Transferred," Forum, 28 February 1963, p. 1.
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stro ng, r e s o u rce fu l supporter in Union Carb i de, a comp a ny
with the me ans t o e ndure the uranium slump.
Union Carbide Corporation, the parent company, was
heavily involved in the uranium business.

Through diffe rent

subsidiaries the giant corporation mined uranium in
Col o rado, Utah, and Wyoming.

It operated mills in Gas

Hills, Wyoming, and in Maybell, Urava n , and Rif le , Colo r a d o .
Uni o n Carbide als o o perated f o r the AE C the Oak Ridge
Nati o na l Laboratory and three othe r fa c ilities invo l ve d l n
at omic research.
In the 1960s and 1970s Union Carbide continue d t o
produ c e vanadium, from mills in Rifle and Urav an, a nd fr om a
mine and mill near Hot Springs, Arkansas.

The corp ora ti o n

marketed its own vanadium alloying agent, called Ca r v an.
Als o , o the r divisions within Union Ca r bide Co rpora ti o n us e d
va nadi u m in the manufa c ture of all oys .

Fo r t h e Uravan mill ,

and for t h o s e in the mln lng bu s i n ess , the p roducti o n o f
v anad i um b ec ame mo r e impo rtant as the governme nt' s purchases
o f u ran lum d ec reased.

72

Union Carbide remained operational ln the Wes t En d f o r
more than two decades after the bust of the earl y 1 960 s.
Mining at Union Carbide," pamphlet, n. p., n. d.;
Union Carbide Corporation, Annual Report 1965, n. p., n. d.;
Union Carbide Corporation, Annual Report 196 6 , n. p., n. d.;
C. P. Martin to Public Relations Pacific, 28 January 1 9 71;
all documents from Historical Data file, drawer 511 UbZ,
room 119, Umetco Records; "Vanadium Star on Slop e Hor iz o n,"
Daily Sentinel, 12 October 1961, Mines and Mining--Vanadium,
Mesa County Public Library Clippings File, Grand Jun ct i o n,
Colorado.
72 "
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But the events and political decisions of that time served
as a reminder to West Enders that they enjoyed no
guarantees.

They began to realize, or take more seri o usly ,

the possibility of a permanent closure of the mines and
mill.

The end of the boom forced them to realize that

control of the uranium industry lay well beyond their reach.
These unsettling notions spawned a certain restlessness, and
a question difficult to answer.

The editor of the local

newspaper felt obligated to respond:
Many persons have recently asked me, "What's going
to become of this area?" Perhaps the best answer
is simply--"Just what we make of it." Things
aren't going to get much worse even if we do
nothing but if we all roll up our sleeves and go
to work to promote our entire area.
. they
could get to be one heck of a lot better. 73

73Marv Hearnesberger,
1964,

p.

9.

"Coffee Break," Forum, 16 January
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CHAPTER 5
URAVAN:

"A COMPANY TOWN IN THE

TRUE SENSE OF THE WORD" l
To read one side of the story, Uravan had very little
to recommend it during the early 1950s.

Described as a

"camp" during this time, some workers believed "the only
good [thing] about Uravan is the ability to leave once in a
while."

A number of employees stayed on the job for only a

short period of time.

In the booming '50s the competition

for workers was intense, and many left Uravan for the lure
of better jobs. 2

The housing conditions at Uravan probably

added to the discontent.

Some of the houses available were

quite small, and some lacked indoor plumbing and other
modern convenlences.

As noted, people lived wher e they

could, In tents, shacks, and trailers.
to Uravan without their families,

Sometimes men moved

staying in a bunkhouse

until they could arrange housing for their families.
However, this disaffection was not universal; many
people were simply grateful to have a steady job, considered
the best paying job in the region.
Uravan came from small towns,

Those attracted to

farms, and ranches around

southwestern Colorado; having endured the Depressi on and the
lBill Conrad, "Yellow Cake Market Healthier Than Ever, "
Daily Sentinel, 18 July 1979, p. 29.
2Confidential letter, 11 September 1950, Informati on
Confidential 1950-52 file, Uravan Purchasing 1962 drawer,
room 126, Umetco Records.
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war years, they were not accustomed to a grand style o f
living, nor did they expect more than Uravan offered.

For

example, one woman considered it no in c onvenience to heat
the bath water on a stove.
1950s, she said,

Of living in Uravan in the

"If you never had anything, you felt like

you were bettering yourself all the time.,, 3

That statement

pretty well reflects the condition of Uravan at the time.
Perhaps its population grew too fast,

but by the mid-1950s

the company had completed a number of improvements to the
town,

including a street paving project, the addition of

bathrooms to many of the houses, and the construction of
about seventy new houses.
Opinions of the town remained di v ided, howe ve r, a nd
high turnover rates plagued Union Carbide for a number of
years.

In 1954 the company hired 104 mill workers and lost

ninety-six.

Of those who left, fifty - one had work e d l e ss

than eight months.

In 1955 the company hired 181 and l o st

exactly the same number.

Of those, sixty-one work e d their

jobs less than one month. 4

The place seemed impermanent, a

feeling fostered by the knowledge that Union Carbide
operated on an AEC contract--no one knew for sure if the
plant would continue to operate beyond the terms o f that

3Interview #8.
4Irvin W. Graham to
Irvin W. Graham to R. D.
letters from IRD Monthly
Relations 1949-1950-1951

R. D. Van Zante, 10 January 1955;
Van Zante, 16 January 1956; both
Report 1954-55-56 file, Industrial
drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
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agreement.

Also, many of the people comlng to Uravan were

young: men, perhaps just out of military service and
entering the workforce for the first timei women, many newly
married, who were just beginning to plan their futures.
Union Carbide offered such people employment, but they could
not be sure if that would conform to their goals.

One man

came with his wife intent to work only through the winter,
until they decided their future plans.
worked for thirty winters .

They stayed and

A woman whose husband served at

the mill for approximately the same number of years captured
the feeling:

"Uravan was just a stopping place on your way

to the rest of the world. li S
Union Carbide officials always struggled, to a certain
degree, against high turnover rates.

Nevertheless, the

company benefitted from the arrival in the 1950s of a core
of dedicated employees who actually liked the plac e .
1961 the company employed 144 hourly mill wo rkers .

In
Of

those, twenty-nine had been on the job for at least ten
years, and ninety-one had been employed at least five years.
In 1976 the company counted 116 hourly mill employees.
Thirty-eight of them had twenty or more years of service,
and sixty-two of them had served nine or more years. 6
SInterview #16.
6Milling Hourly List, October 1961, Housing Printout
fi le , drawer 308 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Recordsi Milling
Hourly List, 2 January 1976, 1976 Employee Lists file, 1974,
1975, 1976 Employee Relations drawer, room 126, Umetco
Records.
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In the 1960s and 1970s the turnover rates among hourly
employees leveled off and remained constant.

For example,

in 1960 Union Carbide employed, as an average throughout the
year, 157.5 hourly workers at its mill.
left that year,

Twenty-nine men

for a turnover rate of 18.4 percent.

The

company experienced a nearly identical rate In 1964, when it
employed an average of 114 and lost twenty-one for the year.
In 1974 the company employed 107 mill workers and lost
twenty-one, a 19.63 percent turnover rate. 7

These figures

reflect the general trend in the uranium industry, which was
never so vibrant as in the 1950s.
production peaked,

Then, when mlne and mill

jobs were widely available and there was

less risk involved with leaving one job for another.

The

figures also represent a stabilization of the workforce;
over time,

the company managed to find workers who

appreciated the living and working conditions at Uravan.

A

long time Uravan resident explained the trend In a practical
way: turnover rates fell during the 1960s "because people
were starting to work on their pensions." B

(For the number

7Union Carbide Nuclear Company Personnel Report,
December 1960, Monthly Manning Reports file, Industrial
Re l ations Department drawer, room 126, Umetco Records;
Personnel Report, Union Carbide Corporation Nuclear
Division, December 1964, Monthly Man ning Repor t s 1964 file,
Uravan Purchasing 1962 drawer, room 126, Umetco Records;
Personnel Report, Union Carbide Corporation, Mining and
Metals Division , December 1974, 1 975 Monthly Manpower Report
file, 1974, 1975, 1976 Employee Relations drawer, room 126,
Umetco Records.
BIn t e rv i e w # 2 1 .
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of people who worked at the Uravan mill through the ye ars,
see Table 2 on the following page.)
Most new arrivals to Uravan formed their oplnlons
quickly;

"you either loved the place or you hated it.,, 9

Those who hated it usually left within a few months, and
those who stayed at least a year usually remained mu ch
longer.

Those who made the decision o f whether o r n o t t o

stay at Uravan based their decision upon a set of factors
common to most of us.

That is, Uravanites assessed their

housing and working situations, their ways of life, and the
general qualities of their lives to determine whether Uravan
best suited them.

Such basic decisions were not unique t o

Uravan.
But In many ways the town was unusual, even unlque In
southwestern Col o rado.

Uravan functi o ned as an o ld -

fashioned company t o wn: a t own that ex isted for o n e p urpose
o nly, t o mill uranium, and one that was maintaine d b y st r i c t
company c o ntrol.

Like most company t o wns, Uravan was

isolated, and located in a harsh environment.

To li v e

there,

a person had to accept the limitations of a small

town.

On the other hand, because of the company, residents

enjoyed benefits and conveniences not usually found in small
towns.
It was a town of which residents were intensel y pro ud;
yet, v i rtually all of the town ' s working inhabitants came
9Interview #28.
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Table 2.--Number of Employees at the Uravan Mill
Year

Hourly

Nonexempt

Exempt

1957
1960
1961
1962
1963

183
157
144
124
122

NA
33
32
27
24

NA
37
35
30
28

1964
1968
1969
1970
1971

114
112
116
120
115

19
20
15
13
13

23
27
29
27
26

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

100
95
107
114
116

13
13
NA
14
NA

24
NA
28
29
28

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

129
134
140
140
87

16
17
18
20
14

29
30
30
27
25

Figures are not available for all years.
NA means that
reliable figures are not available for that parti c ular year.
Jobs classified as "nonexempt salaried" included
secretaries, typists, clerks, warehouse employees, vari o us
assistants, and others.
Nonexempt employees wer e paid a
salary based on a forty hour week, bu t received ove rtime pay
for any hours worked over forty per wee k.
These e mpl oyees
had no supervisory responsibilities.
The "exempt salaried" group included superintendents,
foremen, engineers, and others with supervisory
responsibilities.
The list includes only mill workers, although some mlners
and others lived in Uravan.
Figures are from various "Manpower Reports," "Personnel
Reports," and "Employee Lists," Umetco Records.
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from somewhere else, and no one could expect to live there
beyond his working years.

Uravan represented home in the

truest sense to an entire generation of people who grew up
there; yet, it no longer exists.

Its thirty-five year post-

war history offers an interesting glimpse of life In a
company town.
The physical shape of Uravan conformed to the canyon
that surrounded it, long and narrow, and through whi ch
meandered the San Miguel River.

Within this elongate

pattern stood 167 houses clustered in nine blocks, each
named after one of the first ten letters of the alphabet,
with the letter I omitted.

Some time during the 1960s the

company attempted to rename the streets, giving each the
name of a gemstone; however, these names never t ook hold,
and former Uravan residents still refer to the st ree ts, or
blocks, by the letter designations.
Blocks A through F,
houses in Uravan.

92 units, constituted the oldest

By modern standards, and perhaps even by

standards of the day, these were small and poorly built.
Sixty-one had two bedrooms, twenty-two had three bedrooms,
two had four bedrooms and seven had one bedroom.

The houses

ranged in Slze from 629 square feet to 1850 square feet, but
most fell into the 650 to 1000 square foot range.

These

older dwellings averaged, approximately , 870 square feet.
Many of the houses had been expanded in one way or another ,
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and the square footage cited above reflects those
enl argemen t s . 1 0
Most of the houses In blocks A through F had been
constructed in Uravan's first,

pre-war life.

By the

company's own standard, these units provided only lIadequate
accommodations," although the houses in blocks Band F were
said to provide,

"in general,

. comfortable facilities.

Some were of frame construction, but many,
E,

and F,

II

in blocks C, D,

had exterior walls of "tar-paper and r ough slab

construction."

Also described as "tar-paper shacks,

houses provided little insulation.

II

these

Another problem with

some of the older houses resulted because they had been
built directly on the ground, without solid foundations.
Thus,

the floors sometimes rotted and had to be replaced. ll
Also counted among the older houses were the flat top

apartments,
war.

those built under government contract during the

By all accounts, these one,

two,

and three-bedroom

units were the most undesirable alternative.

Tenant s lived

lOT. F. Roberts, "Uravan Housing Review," 14 January
1964, Housing 1964 file, Uravan Purchasing drawer, room 126,
Umetco Records (cited hereafter as Roberts, "Uravan Housing
Review"); "Residential Property Appraisal Record, Paradox,
Redvale, Uravan, Olathe, Alamo Heights," Tax Assessor's
Office, Montrose County Court House, Montrose, Colorado
(hereafter cited as Residential Property Appraisal Record)
Many of Uravan's houses, at various times, were enlarged.
One can not know for certain that these tax records were
accurate regarding the dimensions of the houses.
But the
records correspond roughly with descriptions of the houses,
and with some company records relating to the houses.
llRoberts,
Interview #22.

"Uravan Housing Review";

Interview #17;
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with small rooms, small yards, cold and hard concrete
floors,
(60)

and "the general congestion resulting from sixty

families living in so small a physical area."

The

apartments also had thin walls; a former tenant noted that
"any argument in the whole section that you was In, you
heard. "

For all of its drawbacks, there was a time when a

family might have welcomed the chance to move into the
apartment complex.

A man who moved to Uravan in the 1950s

remembered that the flat tops were "swank," compared with
living in a tent. 12
The newest houses In Uravan, built In 1956, were the
twenty-three two-bedroom houses on

J

Block.

In Montrose

County tax records these were all listed at 760 square fe e t

.
In

.

Slze.

The houses were poorly insulated and required

quite a lot of maintenance; the most pressing problem proved
to be "leaking roofs," which the company eventually replaced
entirely. 13
with some exceptions, most people regarded the houses
In G and H Blocks as the best living accommodations.

Of

these fifty houses, built in 1954 and 1955, thirty-eight had
three bedrooms, two had four bedrooms, and ten had two
bedrooms.

The smallest had 720 square feet of living space,

while the largest had 1388; the approximate average square
12Roberts,
Interview #22.

"Uravan Housing Review"; Interview #23;

13Residential Property Appraisal Record; Roberts,
"Uravan Housing Review."
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footage was 908. 14

These houses were attractive and

solidly built, with hardwood floors, utility rooms, and a
reasonable amount of storage space.
As of 1964 Uravan had two trailer courts.

The "old "

court had twenty-three spaces, and a wash house that
included shower and toilet facilities.

At the time, some of

the trailers still in use had no such conveniences.

The

"new" trailer court had thirty spaces, and was "li mited to
modern trailers with bathrooms.

II

For single men, Uravan had

five bunkhouses, each with four rooms. 1S
As the owner of Uravan's houses, Union Carbide took
responsibility for all maintenance to the houses.

In

addition, the company paid the cost for room additions and
enlargements.

The company employed carpenters and a

maintenance crew that performed much of this type of work,
altho ugh at other times house improvements were performed by
independent contractors.

The company provi ded paint and

materials for residents to paint their houses, and t enants
were allo wed to build fences and outdoor storage facilities.
None of Uravan's houses had garages.
If Uravanites found their housing inadequate in any
way, one aspect of those accommodations alleviated their
apprehensions: they paid less rent, probably, than anyone In

14Residential Property Appraisal Record; Roberts,
"Uravan Housing Review.
II

IS Roberts,

"Uravan Housing Review.

II
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southwestern Colorado.

In 1964 Union Carbide rented some of

its houses for as low as $11.50 per month.

This rate

applied to some of the older one-bedroom houses.

Forty-four

dollars represented the highest rent, charged for the fourbedroom houses on Band H Blocks.

On average, the people in

C and D Blocks paid the lowest rent, nearly sixteen dollars.
The residents of G and H Blocks paid the highest average
rates, thirty-seven and thirty-nine dollars, respectively.
The average rent for all Uravan houses stood at about
twenty-nine dollars per month in 1964. 16

In addition,

renters paid for gas and electricity usage.
Union Carbide officials designed the rent policy
specifically to make Uravan more attractive to the company ' s
employees.

The rent collected by the company covered only a

small fraction of the housing maintenance costs and property
taxes.

Even more remarkable was the fact that rents hardly

increased over the years.

In 1983 residents still pa i d

rents ranging from $27.50 to about $50.00 per month. l7
The low rents provided the intended incentive to live
and work in Uravan.

Most people mention the rents as one of

the benefits to living in the town.
16

To one man,

II

the rent

Ibid.

l7 Union Carbide followed a tradition established and
maintained by the owners of other company towns.
"Rental
charges for company houses have always been low and
frequently have served as an added inducement to live in an
isolated area." James B. Allen, The Company Town in the
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966),
89.
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of the houses was probably the best thing about living In
Uravan. ,, 18

Their enthusiasm for the low rents may mask

some of the shortcomings in the housing situation.

Early In

1960 Uravan's plant superintendent solicited from a group of

nlne company men, salaried employees,

"a brief memorandum on

housing and employee facility problems."

He asked his co-

workers to explain the effect of these problems "on the
procurement and holding of personnel," both salaried and
hourly. 19
All of the respondents listed the small Slze of the
houses as Uravan's worst problem.

Not only did families

feel cramped, they had little storage space, both inside and
outside, they had no "hobby area," and the yards were rather
small.

Other problems included the lack of sidewalks, small

spaces in the trailer court, an unusual accumulation o f dust
in the houses, and "sub-standard" housing for single
employees.

The respondents generally agreed that Uravan ' s

housing conditions negatively affected the recruitmen t and
retention of employees.

The potential salaried employee

"will think several times before moving from a more elegant
house [elsewhere]

into a simpler house [in Uravan]."

And,

18 rnterview #15.
19 Company Houses and Land, General file, drawer 7 UaZ,
room 124, Umetco Records.
The contents of this file consi st
of a memo to nine Union Carbide employees, dated 2 February
1960, and the responses to that memo .
Although not listed
as "confidential," the respondents will remain anonymous.
These documents will hereafter be cited as "Memorandum on
Housing and Employee Facility Problems."
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"any hourly man that lS a good conscientious worker and
practices good housekeeping generally by his very nature
would not live in a house like C, D, E, and F blocks or the
flattops. ,, 20
The previous two responses, submitted by different men,
suggest that not only were Uravan's houses small, but that
they may not have been entirely sound.

Another commented

specifically on the quality of the houses, which he termed
"inadequate."

Caustically, he wrote that "moving into a

house in sore need of repair, with a poor paint job,
dripping, encrusted faucets, with green corrosion products
on the bathroom chrome, with a rattling furnace is usually
enough to suggest inadequacy."

He continued at some length

in this vein, calling some of the houses "shabby. ,, 21

This

charge describes less the overall state of the houses than
it reflects the condition of a few of the houses at this
particular point in time.

The company painted the houses on

a regular basis, and there is every indication that the
company repaired plumbing, and other, similar problems.
Apparently in direct response to the comments
contributed by these men, the company enlarged several of
Uravan's older houses between 1960 and 1964, and set aside
land for a new, more spaclous trailer court.

In fact,

the

company improved various aspects of the houses on a regular
20 Ibid .
21 Ibid.

181
basis. 22

By making these improvements, company officials

struck a balance; without spending a tremendous amount on
new houses, they achieved their goal, to their apparent
satisfaction, of reducing employee turnover by offering more
attractive housing.
Some may assume that Uravan residents made sacrifices
to live there.

Some families lived in very small houses for

long periods of time.

The town's water system was not up to

the standards of modern day city dwellers.

For many years

the water occasionally took on a rusty hue, apparently
because of iron water lines.

Some residents remember an

unpleasant taste to the water, probably because of high
salinity.

But those who chose to live in the town were

satisfied with their situation, and most would agree that
the company tried to accommodate a family's needs.

Those

who placed a greater emphasis on a bigger, or "more elegant"
home probably disliked Uravan and chose not to live there.
But it is not the case that Uravan residents accepted sub standard housing in exchange for low rents.

The rural West

End had never been an affluent place, and the quality of
Uravan's housing compared to that available in Nucla and
Naturita.

From Uravan one did not have to travel very far,

only to the nearest mining camps, or to even smaller towns

22 Roberts, "Uravan Housing Review"; Invitation to Bid
on Construction of Additions to Houses, 13 April 1971,
Upgrade Housing file, drawer 935-1429U, 1969-1972, room 126,
Umetco Records .
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In the mlnlng reglo ns of southwestern Colorado, to find
people who lived with fewer convenlences.
The great disadvantage to life in a company town lies
In the fact that residents had no opportunity to own their
houses.

In the 1950s some company town managers began to

sell to their employees the company-owned houses.

The idea

was that workers who could fulfill a part of the American
Dream, that of home ownership, would be happier, more
satisfied with their circumstances , and more interested In
and committed to both the town and the company.

Reportedly,

the idea worked, and the companies also benefitted from
having less money tied up in real estate. 23

But Union

Carbide's managers thought the idea impractical for Uravan.
Selling houses would have further involved the company In
the real estate business; if retired workers continued to
live in Uravan , the company would have had to erect new
houses for new workers.

Also on the minds of company

officials was the possible day that the mill would close.
In that case, home o wners would have been left with
virtually worthless property.

No one anticipated or

predicted a shutdown, but company managers recognized the
possibility. 24

23 "Switch away from Paternalism Pays Off for Company,
Workers, Town," Chemical Week 81 (16 November 1957 ): 86-88;
Joseph P. Blank, "He Turned Company Towns into Home Towns ,"
American Business 28 (September 1958): 12-14.
24 Interview #28.
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Not all who worked in Uravan chose to live there.

In

1964 about seventy-one percent of all mill employees lived
In company houses, and in 1976 the ratio remained virtually
the same. 25

The others lived nearby, usually in Nucla or

Naturita, but sometimes in Paradox or Norwood or other
towns.

Those who lived outside of Uravan sometimes had pre-

established residences elsewhere.

Others chose to buy or

build a house in Nucla, for example, because they wanted to
have their own property.
In assigning houses, Union Carbide always gave
preference to salaried personnel and to those with job
seniority.

In the early 1950s company officials actually

devised a mathematical formula to determine a "house
factor."

The house factor resulted from adding an

employee's monthly salary and his length of service as
numbered in months.

He with the higher house fa ctor

received the first choice .

While this housing formula may

have been abandoned, some form of it remained.

In later

years the company considered these factors when revlewlng
housing applications: the employee's length of service; the
number and sex distribution of his children (the parents of
a boy and a girl might get a three-bedroom house, so that
children of different gender occupied different rooms, while

25Roberts, "Uravan Housing Review"; Milling Hourly
List, 2 January 1976 and Milling Salary [List], 2 January
1976; 1976 Emp l oyee Lists file, 1974, 1975, 1976 Employee
Relations drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
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the parents of two c hildren of the same sex might get a two bedroom house); and job classification. 26

By any formula

the company generally presented the salaried employees with
a choice of houses upon their arrival in Uravan.

Meanwh ile ,

most of the hourly workers experienced some time in the flat
tops before they acquired the length of service to move int o
a house.
Accorded their preference, salaried personnel tended t o
live on blocks B, G, and H.

Some of the A and B Block

houses were desirable because they were bigger, and because
of that street's location in a shady area.

The plant

superintendent always lived in a big house on B Block.

With

the exception of the superintendent's house, and perhaps a
f e w o thers, hourly workers were not excluded fr om the
preferred houses.

Given time and, likely, a certain amount

of persistence, some hourl y workers moved their families
into the preferred hous es .

In 1 959 eleve n hourly mill

workers lived in G and H Blocks.

In 1976 seventeen hourly

mill workers rented h ouses on those streets.

It was not

always the case , however, that Uravanites of any job
category sought housing in these blocks .

A number of

residents lived comfortably in houses in the older blocks

26 Confidential letter with attached memos, 13 August
1951, Information Confidential 1950-52 file, Uravan
Purchasing 1962 drawer, room 126, Umetco Records; Hosokawa,
"It's Uranium," 7 ; "Your Guide to Housing--Uravan, Colo.,"
undated pamphlet for the use of Uravan residents, Umetc o
Records.
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for many years.

In some cases, men with salaried positions

and many years of service chose to live in older houses.
And one might consider the case of a blue collar worker,
with plenty of seniority, who declined opportunities to move
from his older house.

He and his family had grown quite

comfortable with the house; the company had expanded it as
his family grew, and they had arranged everything to their
liking.

Besides, he did not like the idea of living next to

the salaried types. 27
In the early 1960s Union Carbide began to operate its
o wn mlnes.

Previously, the company had hired independent

mining contractors to mine its claims.

As they hired

miners, company officials also sought to house them.

Thus,

as the boom of the 1950s subsided the housing at Uravan
remained full, because miners took up any vacancies that
resulted from a reduced mill crew.

But not all of Union

Carbide's miners chose, or we re able,

to live In Uravan,

primarily because the town was not convenient to some of the
mlnes.

In 1964 the company employed 142 mining personnel In

all job categories

(hourly and salaried workers) .

sixty-five of them lived in Uravan. 28

Only

In addition, Union

27Hourly List, November 1959, Housing 1959-1960 file,
Industrial Relations Department drawer, room 126, Umetco
Records; Milling Hourly List, 2 January 1976, 1976 Employee
Lists file, 1974, 1975, 1976 Employee Relations Files
drawer, room 126, Umetco Records; Interview #11.
28 Roberts,

"Uravan Housing Review."
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Carbide provided housing to employees of Uravan's business
establishments and to school teachers.
Although Uravan's residents had no personal financial
commitment in the matter, and despite the plain appearance
of their houses, most of them took a great deal of pride in
their neighborhoods.

They kept beautiful lawns, cultivated

fruit trees, planted gardens, and,
pleasant atmosphere.
of a "sin

In fact,

In general, maintained a

it was considered something

. not to keep your lawn watered and cut ."

"Neat and well-kept," although "not what you'd call pretty,"
wrote an observer in 1979.

In the 1950s others described

Uravan's "orderly rows of cot tages, cabins,

[and]

houses,"

the appearance of which indicated "a personal pride in the
town as well as a company interest." 29
Indeed, it was a "policy of the company to maintain the
community in an attractive and safe manner for the benefit
of all residents . "

Union Carbide issued explicit

instructions to each renter regarding the upkeep of
virtually every aspect of the houses,
fences,
alleys."

including yards,

sheds, wood piles, alleys, and the I!space behind
The company forbade residents from keeping

unlicensed and inop erative vehicles on the premises.

The

rules extended to the maintenance of the insides of the
houses.

(There were notorious examples of homes In such an

29 Interview #17; Bill Conrad, "Company Town: 'Is Not
What You'd Call Pretty, '" Daily Sentinel, 18 July 1979, p.
29; Maness and Jacobs, Uranium Crazy, 53.
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ill-kept state that the company considered them health
hazards. )

The company "helped and encouraged" residents to

keep the houses and neighborhoods free of trash,

junk, or

other unsightly mess by scheduling a yearly collection date
for the removal of accumulated refuse. 30

Normally, the

encouragement achieved the desired results, but occasionally
the company had to apply more pressure.

For example,

In

1981 the company evicted a family whose house was considered
"a fire,

health and safety hazard."

Previously, the

employee had "not complied with the varlOUS requests to
bring the house into safety compliance." 31
Union Carbide encountered its most serious problems
with non-employee residents--not the school teachers and
employees of Uravan's business establishments, but mlners
and truck drivers who worked for other companies.

The

company rented some of its extra houses and trailer spaces
to these contract employees, although the total number of
such rentals was probably small.

One company official had

much to say about the contract employees, but his comments

30 "Your Guide to Housing- - Uravan, Colo.," undated
pamphlet for the use of Uravan residents, Umetco Records;
Union Carbide Nuclear Company to Uravan Residents, 28 March
1963, Housing 1963 file, IRD Files 1963 drawer, room 126
Umetco Records; "Housing Standards for Uravan Residents," 3
June 1982, Uravan Correspondence file Fll172-Fll197, drawer
32 Ua, room 126, Umetco Records.
31Union Carbide to Uravan resident, 18 March 1981,
Housing Increase Proposals, Uravan Correspondence file,
drawer Fll172-Fll197, room 126, Umetco Records.
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reveal even more about the attitudes of company-employed
residents:
We did have many problems with employees of mlnlng
and trucking contractors in collecting rent as
well as in maintaining the houses, lawns, fences,
etc., up to the standards required.
They seemed
to lack the "community pride" that most UCC [Union
Carbide Corporation] employees living in Company
housing exhibited by maintaining their residences
up to the standards required.
We attributed some
of this to what we felt was a feeling of not
having a "permanent" job and that the Uravan
housing was an interim situation until they moved
on to some other job.
. We did receive many
complaints from UCC employees living in Uravan
regarding the manner in which the above mentioned
non-UCC employees maintained their Uravan
residences. 32
The company's obligation extended to other matters of
community etiquette.

For example, the company held

accountable the parents of children who damaged or
vandalized property.

In rare instances the company evicted

families with uncontrollable, mischievous children .
The company even policed barking dogs.

A man o n F

Block once received from his company a letter informing him
that his dog was a "nuisance."

The company representative

asked him to "please make arrangements to keep the dog
inside so the noise will not disturb others," or to "get rid
of her."

One week later, after "continual complaints about

the dog," the man received a missive that informed him of
three choices.

He might:

"keep the dog inside at all

32 Confidential Letter, 7 June 198 3, Uravan
Correspondence file, drawer Fll172-Fll197, room 126, Umetco
Records.
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times";

"get rid of the dog"; or,

"move out of Uravan and

accept this as your ten day prior written notice that the
rental agreement lS terminated. ,, 33
Despite the company's tone In this particular instance,
no Uravanites characterize the company's methods as
Draconian.

And, one might imagine that the company usually

employed a bit more tact, or acted less abruptly.
Nevertheless, Union Carbide felt obligated to enforce a set
of standards believed to be fair and beneficial to the whole
community.
Grouped together at the southeast end of the town stoo d
a collection of buildings that one might call the business
district.

Union Carbide leased to the United States Post

Office Department a small building for mail serVlce.

Next

to the post office, on Main Street, was the Recreati o n Hall,
a one time Civilian Conservation Corps building that had
been moved to Uravan during the war.

As originally built

the wooden structure was tall and long, with a steeply
pitched roof.

At some point during its history, the company

added two wings t o the sides of the Recreation Hall.

The

building served its purpose as a community center; in it,
Uravanites held meetings for all of its civic and service
organizations.

The Rec Hall also served as a church,

33Union Carbide Nuclear Company to Uravan resident, 13
February 1959 and 20 February 1959 , Housing 1959-1960 file,
Industrial Relations Department drawer , room 126, Umetco
Records.
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theater, and dance hall.

It housed the community library,

the roller skating rink, and in the basement, even a
shooting range.
Next to the Rec Hall was the drugstore.

The serVlces

included fountain drinks and meals, such ·as soup and
sandwiches.

In the late 1950s the company arranged for the

services of a pharmacist.

After the issuance of a license,

also in the late 1950s, the proprietor of the drugstore sold
packaged liquor there.
Originally the drugstore housed a tavern, which served
only beer; later, the tavern was moved next door to the old
service station.

By company preference, the tavern closed

each night at 10:30, and did not open on Saturday or Sunday.
A new gas station was established on the highway at the
southeast entrance to the town.
Directly across the street from the drugstore st ood
Uravan's monument to its history,

the Boarding House.

In

the post-war period, the Boarding House was used primarily
as a dining hall.

The meals were served "family style,"

delivered from the kitchen on big platters to tables full of
diners.

The Boarding House is fondly remembered for its

good food by those who ate there, and stories are told about
the huge meals consumed by the miners, mill workers, and
truck drivers who frequented it.

Workers also bought sack

lunches, to carry to work with them,
House.

from the Boarding
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The Boarding House is also remembered for a small
basement room In which several men gathered regularly to
play poker.

And for many years single men took rooms In the

upstairs portion o f the Boarding House.

Eventually,

however, the company ended that convenience because "there
were things going on up there that shouldn't have been going
on."

In 1960 the Boarding House survived a recommendation

that it, along with the adjacent bunk houses, be demolished
and replaced.

Some considered the buildings "fire

traps. ,, 34
Of course, Uravan also had a store, the San Miguel
Trading Center.

It functioned not as an old-fashioned

company store, but as a small town general store in the
classic sense; the store management offered customers
groceries, dry goods, appliances , furniture,
work clothing.

hardware, and

What the store's proprietor did not keep on

hand, he could usually order, and for the Christmas season
he stocked toys.

The store's owner also allowed customers

to purchase on credit, billing them at the end of each
month.
Pete Peters operated nearly all of Uravan's business
establishments.

Before the Uravan renaissance in 1949,

Peters owned an interest in the Fremont Trading Company, a
partnership that operated a store and hotel in the company
34 Interview #28; J. F. Brenton to J. L. Lake, 18
February 1960, Company Houses and Land, General file,
7 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.

drawer

192

town of Climax, Colorado.

Fremont won the contract to run

Uravan's store, and Peters took responsibility of his
company's interests in Uravan.

Almost immediately, the

Fremont partnership formed the San Miguel Trading Center
(SMTC).

Eventually, Peters owned complete interest in SMTC.

Although Peters spent a considerable amount of his time
tending his businesses in Uravan, he lived in Grand
Junction. 35
Union Carbide negotiated, and through the years
amended, separate contracts with Peters for each of his
enterprises.

Peters rented most of the buildings, the gas

station, general store, drugstore, and tavern,

from the

company for a certain percentage of the sales from each.
The company allowed Peters use of the Rec Hall to show
mOVles, specifying only that he pay for janitorial service.
Peters also maintained the company's swimming pool, under a
contract that repaid him his costs, and paid him a certain
percentage of those costs.
Peters was a shrewd businessman; his training, he said,
came during the Depression, when a person learned to "stay
on his toes."
well,

Then, if a person did not learn his trade

"there was a hundred men behind you that would take

your place." 36

Peters knew how to take advantage of

opportunities, even in a small place like Uravan.
35 Peters interview.
36 Ibid.
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For example,

In the late 1950s Union Carbide's managers

explored the possibility of obtaining a pharmacist for
Uravan.

Naturally, Peters offered to hire one for the

drugstore.

But it was not at all clear that a pharmacy

would pay for itself, given the small population base in
which it would operate.

Therefore, Peters proposed that he

be allowed to sell packaged liquor from the drugstore, as
well.

The increased revenue from selling liquor would

compensate for any loss on the sale of prescription drugs.
The company approved his proposal. 37

(In 1954 the Montrose

County Commissioners denied Peters a liquor license, but
they granted him one In 1958.)
Peters also proved a tough negotiator, and on a number
of occasions he won Union Carbide over to his position.
SMTC began to experience financial troubles in the early
19 60 s, as the downtrend in the uranium industry negatively
affected SMTC's lncome.

Because there were fewer miners and

mill workers in the West End, Peters sold less fr om his
store, boarding house, tavern, gas station, and drugstore.
Union Carbide found itself in a bind, as well; in 1962 the
company denied its employees a wage increase because of
fiscal restraints.

A company official hopefully, if

somewhat naively, suggested to Peters that he should expect

37 Ibid.; A. C. Sada to H. K. Jackson, 10 February 1958,
and Confidential Letter, 28 February 1958; both documents
from San Miguel Trading Center, Store, Boarding House file,
Contracts and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
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and accept "a cycle of reduced profits," just as the company
had.

Peters rejected the suggestion. 38
The first matter the two parties discussed was the

Boarding House.

This operation never made a profit; the

company wanted it run at cost, as a benefit to the people of
Uravan and the West End.
its other operations.

SMTC's margin of profit came from

That arrangement suited Peters fine;

for him, the Boarding House represented the "best
advertising that we had at Uravan."

But In the early 1960s

the Boarding House began to lose money.

Union Carbide

officials reluctantly agreed to allow Peters to raise prices
for rooms and meals at the Boarding House, the first such
increase since the prices were set in 1950. 39
Then Peters experienced "financial difficulties" with
his other enterprises, which were supposed to show a profit.
In 1964 he tried to conVlnce Carbide that he could not
continue to operate under the terms of his contract.

Peters

wanted the company to reduce the percentage of his sales
that he paid in rent.

Initially, Carbide officials refused

to compromise, so Peters informed them that he would have
either to "reduce the scope of our services," in order to
make his operations more efficient, or he would have to
close down his businesses.

Faced with this ultimatum, Union

38 0. J. Malacarne to L. P. Twichell, 13 April 1962, San
Miguel Trading Center, Store, Boarding House file, Contracts
and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
39 Ibid.; Peters interview.
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Carbide officials agreed to rework the contract, and Peters
stayed in business. 40
Finally, in 1966 Peters claimed continued financial
losses on the operation of the Boarding House and the
pharmacy.

His other businesses, he wrote, could "no longer

support" the Boarding House.

The pharmacy was not "self-

supporting," because of "the reduced number of people in the
Uravan area" who used the pharmacy.

Furthermore, Peters had

trouble finding a pharmacist who wanted to live in Uravan;
to attract one, Peters would have to "increase the salary by
two to three thousand dollars a year."
difficulties, Peters asked for,
subsidy from Union Carbide.
paid SMTC $225 per month,

Faced with these

and received, a direct

Beginning in 1966 the company

"so long as a licensed pharmacist

is maintained in the Uravan drugstore."

Union Carbide also

paid the San Miguel Trading Center $500 per month "f o r
ope rating the Uravan boardinghouse. ,, 41
From these examples one should n o t assume that the
relationship was one sided, that Peters took advantage o f
Union Carbide.

When they negotiated the contracts, Carbide

4°H. K. Jackson to P. H. Peters, 28 December 1964, and
Peter H. Peters to H. K. Jackson, 25 January 1965; both
documents from San Miguel Trading Center, Store, Boarding
House file, Contracts and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126,
Umetco Records.
41 Peter H. Peters to H. K. Jackson, 18 February 1966;
C. P. Martin to P. H. Peters, 13 February 1976; both
documents from San Miguel Trading Center, Store, Boarding
House file, Contracts and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126,
Umetco Records.
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officials had at hand SMTC's financial records.

It would

seem unlikely that Union Carbide tolerated cozenage or
duplicity.

The deals agreed upon by Union Carbide reflect,

rather, the cost of business in the West End.

Uravan's slim

population precluded the high volume sales that a grocer or
druggist needs.

Union Carbide officials demonstrated their

desire to provide certain services and conveniences for the
people of Uravan.

Instead of paying to maintain the

pharmacy and Boarding House, the company could just as
easily have allowed those businesses to close.
Carbide opposed "any changes that would increase the
cost of living of our employees."

For twelve years, from

1963 to 1975, meals at the Boarding House cost an average o f
$1.17,

and single rooms at the bunk houses cost $4.33 per

week.

(Bunk house residents could buy meals for $2.50 per

day. )

In 1975 the cost for meals at the Boarding House

increased to an average of $1.47, and single rooms in the
bunk houses increased to seven dollars per week. 42
Union Carbide also monitored the prices for groceries
at the general store.

In 1962, and again in 1964, a company

representative compared the prices for groceries at four
outlets: one in Naturita, one in Nucla, the San Miguel
Trading Center, and a market in Grand Junction.

His survey

42 0. J. Malacarne to L. P. Twichell, 13 April 1962, and
James D. Hainey t o Union Carbide Corporation, 20 June 1975;
both documents from San Miguel Trading Center , Store,
Boarding House file, Contracts and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room
126, Umetco Records.
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showed the cost of eighty-four different grocery items, and
the total cost of those items.

In both years SMTC had the

lowest prices; In 1962 the three other stores in the survey
charged, on average, 1.9 percent more for the same items,
and in 1964 the other stores charged, on average, 2.8
percent more.

It should be noted that this price comparlson

did not include figures from the big chain grocery stores in
Grand Junction.

Those stores generally sold goods for less

than an independent, small town market.

According to

Peters, Union Carbide also surveyed the prices for grocerles
at chain stores and found them only two percent below the
prices charged at the San Miguel Trading Center. 43
Union Carbide's mission to provide for the needs of its
employees extended to medical care.

The company equipped a

clinic, and paid a salary to a doctor and nurse.

For this

salary the doctor conducted yearly physical examinations for
all company employees, and tended to a c cidents in the mines
or the mill.

The company required only these basic duties

of its doctor, and allowed him to establish his own,
independent practice, on which the company placed few
restrictions.
The clinic was well equipped; the company bought
medical devices that many small town clinics do not have.

43 Study of Grocery Costs in Uravan Area, 20 February
1964, San Miguel Trading Center, Store, Boarding House file,
Contracts and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records;
Peters interview.
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The company also kept an ambulance, but reserved it for mill
and mlne accidents.

Uravanites, like other West Enders,

used the Nucla-Naturita ambulance service when they needed
emergency medical attention in Grand Junction or Montrose.
As late as 1969 an "ambulance card" cost West Enders only
five dollars per year.

With the purchase of a card, a

person paid nothing when he or his family member required
the ambulance service.

Without the purchase of a card, the

ambulance service charged a person twenty cents per mile for
the emergency trip. 44
Usually, Union Carbide employed very good doctors; most
of them were well regarded by Uravan residents, and even by
Nuclans and Naturitans, who were welcome to visit Uravan's
doctor.

However, doctors did not always stay l ong at

Uravan, and Carbide officials spent a lot of time recruiting
and persuading physicians to establish a small town
practice.

This proved a difficult task at times, becaus e

good doctors gravitated towards bigger towns that offered
bigger and better medical facilities.

On two occaSlons

Uravan residents found themselves in the care of what one
man called "the outcasts of the medical community."

These

two doctors, one a "drug addict" and the other a

44 Interview #18; "Ambulance Fund Drive Starts," Forum,
21 August 1969, p. 1.
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"psychopath," were as infamous In Uravan as other d o ct o rs
were esteemed.

The company had to fire both of them. 45

The company provided its town with a deputy sheriff,
through an agreement with the Montrose County Sheriff's
Office.

Throughout Uravan's history a deputy lived in t he

town, In a house rented to him by Uni o n Carbide.

A

volunteer fire department, equipped by the company, serv ed
the town.

Uravan's mill operated continuously; at any given

time there were on duty mill workers who were trained and
r e ady to respond to a fire.
The Uravan Community Church was an important part o f
the lives of many residents, and one only minimall y affe c ted
by the company.

In the 1950s a group of Uravanites formed

this non-denominational Christian Church.

In the early

years the group r e lied o n lay minister s , o r past o r s who came
t o Uravan from o ther t o wns.

Eve ntual ly , they cont acte d

Village Missions, an o rganization designe d with the g o al o f
"ministering to the spiritual needs of the rural and
suburban communities o f Nor t h America."

When the Uravan

Community Church needed a pastor, Village Missions sent on e
of its missionaries.

The community was expected to provide

the pastor's salary and to tithe a small amount to Village

45 Interview #18; Interview #30.
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Missions.

However,

if the community had trouble provid ing

for the pastor, Village Missions contributed. 46
Village Missions sent a steady stream of missionaries
to Uravan; from 1957 to 1980 the town was served by ten
different pastors.

Dedicated as these men must have been,

few stayed more than a one to two year period.

The town had

three pastors who stayed for two to three years, and one
particularly steadfast missionary who remained for nearly
four years.

This man still serves Village Missions,

in the

position of chief executive officer. 47
In 1961 the Uravan Community Church membership
consisted of nineteen families, but Sunday attendance
averaged about 150.

Uravan's Catholics went to a Catholic

Church in Nucla, and there was a newly built Mormon Church
in Naturita.

In Uravan in the early 1960s there was a small

number of people who belonged to the Congregational Church,
which was served by a minister from Nucla.

A smaller number

belonged to the Episcopal Church; they met informally, once
a month, and were served by a minister from Grand
Junction. 48

But in Uravan it would have been difficult to

46 Reaching North America, informational pamphlet from
Village Missions, Dallas, Oregon, n.d., n.p.
47 Information provided to the author by Village
Missions, Dallas , Oregon.
48 p. Willis Da l e to O. J. Malacarne, 9 May 1961; O. J.
Malacarne to A . C. Sada, 8 August 1961; both letters from
Uravan Community Church file, Contracts and Leases drawer 4
UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
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maintain a church; because of the town's small population,
the Episcopal Church, for example, simply did not have
enough members to conduct regular services.

Also, there was

a certain amount of turnover in Uravan; a small congregation
might be ruined when some of its members moved from town.
The Uravan Community Church, apparently the most suitable to
the greatest number of people, remained the biggest in
Uravan.
Union Carbide's involvement In the Uravan Community
Church extended only as far as allowing the group to use the
Recreation Hall and providing a house for the pastor.

In

the early 1960s the Community Church asked the company to
donate land on which the congregation would build a church.
The plan was never carried out, however, perhaps because
company officials feared that su ch a move woul d be taken as
a show of support for one group over another.

If the

company granted land for the church, there would be "no end
to the requests for space to build churches."

The company

preferred a building to which all groups had access. 49
Union Carbide's involvement in and control of other
aspects of its community -- concerning housing, town
maintenance, its business establishments, and its medical
services--fit a certain model for company towns.

The

49Unsigned memorandum, Union Carbide Nuclear Company,
28 July 1961; O. J. Malacarne to A. C. Sada, 8 August 1961;
both documents from Uravan Community Church file, Contracts
and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
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historian James B. Allen, In The Company Town in the
American West, discovered that most company town managers
charged low rents for company-owned houses and provided some
type of health care for the community.

Union Carbide's

lease agreements with the San Miguel Trading Center als o fit
the pattern of modern company towns; in the latter half of
the twentieth century company town managers increasingly
removed themselves from mercantile operations, and allowed
independent companies or individuals run the business
establishments. so
Historians coined a convenient term for the type of
management found in company towns: paternalism.

The word

describes a system of management or government whereby those
in charge behave like a father towards his children.

The

father, or the company, provides for, protects, nurtures,
and disciplines his children, or the company's employees.
More useful, perhaps, is a dictionary definition:

"a

relation between the governed and the government, the
employed and the employer, etc.,

involving care and contro l

suggestive of those followed by a father. "Sl

As we have

seen, Union Carbide provided care and exercised control to a
degree that one might call paternalistic.
But the term is distasteful,
implications.

According to Allen,

fraught with negative
"it connotes a type of

SOAllen, Company Town, 89, 95-97, 138-139.
slQuoted in Allen, Company Town, 122.
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company control destructive of personal liberty. ,, 52

Under

a paternalistic system, the thinking goes, the governed lose
their initiative, become dependent on the benevolence of
some authority, and end up working not for themselves, but
for the benefit of those in charge.

The word implies a

relationship in which the governed cannot adequately provide
for themselves.

And, it suggests that something is expected

from the governed: undue loyalty, obedience, and adherence
to a set of rules.

Historians also describe communist

systems of government as paternalistic.
These negative aspects of paternalism would seem an
extreme way to characterize the administration of Uravan, at
least to most of those who lived in the town.

Yet, one man,

a salaried employee, viewed the company-owned town in just
such a light.
Literally Uravan itself lS a dead end for the
salary people. We come because the salary and
work seem interesting.
We work to make more
profit for the company, and at the end our future
lies in a promotion to Valhalla (Grand Junction)
or to the Holy of Holies (New York).
I would
classify Uravan as a relatively normal but not
lavishly constructed company town which has no
visible means of support.
The "company" giveth
and the "company" taketh away blessed be the
profits for U.C.N.C. [sic]
. The company man
and the person who can tolerate being a little bit
socialistic (company socialistic) are the type who
I ike Uravan. 53

52 Ibid.
53Memorandum on Housing and Employee Facility Problems.
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This lament may reflect only the frustration of a
single disappointed man.

It lS true that Uravan existed

only to profit the company, and that everything done by the
company at Uravan was designed,
profits.

in some way, to lncrease the

But all companles operate in a similar manner, and

profits are always the bottom line.
The opinion cited above may also reflect a
philosophical opposition to a situation In which a person
feels more beholden to the company than he thinks
appropriate.

Undoubtedly there were others who resented

having to ask the company for permission to move into a
different house, who disliked calling the company to make
repairs to their houses, who took offense at the many rules
issued by the company, who did not want to rely on the
company to pave the streets and hire a doctor, who objected
to the idea that the company would decide the hours during
which the tavern remained open.

One might imagine that

certain people, those who wanted to involve themselves in
town government for example , would not have appreciated life
In a company town.

It may have been dissatisfaction of an

ideological sort that prompted another man to write, as a
partial explanation of why he left Uravan,

"I'm just not

sold on company towns! ,, 54
54Employee's Termination Survey 1962-63-64 file, Uravan
Purchasing 1962 drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
The
company always had a high rate of turnover in the mining
department; these twenty-four letters, each addressed to a
"Dear Former Employee," represented the company 's attempt to
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It should be noted that Union Carbide refrained from
the more egregious forms of paternalism.

The company never

forbade its mill employees from organizing a workers union,
nor from using company property to hold union meetings.

The

company certainly did not attempt to tell its employees how
to vote, and no one felt pressure to shop for high cost
goods at company-owned business establishments.

In an

earlier day, company town managers often practiced such
coercion. 55
The most obvious, negative consequence to life In
Uravan was that residents had no opportunity to own houses
or property in the town.

It must have been unsettling for

employees who, upon retirement,

found themselves witho ut the

ho me they had occupied for so l o ng.

Many former residents

remember that some people encountered problems when they
left Uravan, because they had not planned adequately, had
not saved enough to invest in a house somewhere else.

One

might reasonably assume that the restriction on home
ownership made Uravan undesirable to a lot of people.
Some residents remembered others who grumbled about
excesslve company control.

The company required that fences

be built in a certain way , although the company als o
provided the materials for the fences.

Also, the company

discover the miners' dissatisfaction. A few of the
respondents mentioned living conditions as unsatisfactory,
but it is not clear that all of them lived in Uravan.
55Allen, Company Town, 121-123, 131-132.
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painted the outside walls of the houses In colors of the
company's choosing. 56

Such control, however, hardly

represents a gross infringement upon individual freedom, and
probably few residents regarded it as such.
Most of those who lived and worked in Uravan for a
number of years embraced what the historian Allen called a
"positive" sort of paternalism, a system that benefits both
the company and the workers.

Allen pointed out that workers

who paid very little rent had the unusual opportunity t o
save money for their retirement.

Union Carbide relied upon

workers who enjoyed small town living; by enhancing the
community, the company was able to attract and retain,
its benefit, those types of workers.

to

The company's efforts

helped to make "isolation not the handicap one might
suppose. ,, 57

After all, not all small communi ties of eight

hundred to one thousand inhabitants can afford an olympic
sized swimming pool, or realize the benef it o f a pharmacy .
Uravan's long-time residents express a deeply felt
appreciation for Union Carbide.
man who said,

Most would agree with the

"The company went out of its way to make

things decent . ,, 58

They speak of the benefits provided by

the company, with no hint of resentment over company
control.

In fact,

they realized that the company's policies

56 Interview #24; Interview #21.
57Allen, Company Town, 123-124.
58 Interview #22.
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were necessary to the system in place.

Where else, one

might ask, would the annoyance of a neighbor's barking dog
be so swiftly eliminated?
The conditions under which Uravan existed distinguished
the town In other ways, as well.

Except for the younger

generation, everyone came to Uravan from somewhere else.

A

person's extended family--grandparents, uncles, aunts,
COUSlns, and even brothers and sisters--usually lived
elsewhere.

Uravan had no retired, respected elders living

within the community, and no cemetery, a sure symbol of a
community's permanence.

Thus, some may have had trouble

thinking of Uravan as "home," or as anything more than
temporary.

The town's dependence upon a single industry,

and the markets that controlled the industry, may have
caused some to question the town's potential longevity, and
to question their own future in that town. 59

It lS

interesting, however, that few former residents mention such
things as signs of Uravan's instability, or as a negative
consequence of living there.

Most, it seems, accepted the

unusual conditions of life In the company town, and made the
best of it.

The threat of a collapse in the uranium

industry must have been considered, but the industry had
established a solid track record in the West End.

Uravan

residents took for granted that the mill would continue to
operate; or, they simply chose to worry about other matters.
59 Interview #21; Interview #24.
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Long-term residents structured their lives around the
premlse that their jobs were permanent.
If Union Carbide controlled Uravan, the company's mill
complex dominated it.

Several buildings, including a

carpentry shop, warehouse, offices, and a laboratory, sat on
the valley floor near the town.

The mill itself was a

collection of gray, metal buildings and structures, some
built at the base of the mesa behind Uravan, others attached
to the inclined surface of the mesa, and still more at the
very top, a few hundred feet above the town.

In the early

years, when the mill was relatively small, most of it could
be seen from town.
the mesa.

Only the ore crushing plant stood atop

Over time the company expanded the mill,

incorporating new technology along the way; eventually, most
of the structures relating to the milling process were
located on top.

Thus, it looked in the 1950s like a "jumbl e

of mill buildings has c limbed out o f the canyon ."

In 1980,

however, the buildings appeared to "cascade down the .
ridge above Uravan. ,, 60
The complex process of extracting uranlum and vanadium
from raw ore involved several steps.

Simply put, the ore

went through a crushing and grinding process, ending up as
fine particles of sand.

It was then leached in big tanks

with a sulfuric acid solution, which removed both the
6° Lavender, One Man's West, 315; Sheri Poe Bernard,
"Uranium Travels Grim-Looking Path into 'Yellowcake ,'" Daily
Sentinel, 9 November 1980, p. 29.
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vanadium and uranlum.

Union Carbide used so much sulfuric

acid, about 5,900 tons each month, that the company produ c ed
its own.

The acid plant, located on top of the mesa, was

constructed in 1961. 61
The resultant "pregnant liquor," the solution from the
leach tanks that contained both uranium and vanadium, was
drained to ion exchange columns, each of which contained 350
cubic feet of anionic exchange reSln.

About one thousand

pounds of uranium collected on the reSln In each column; the
uranium was then "eluted," removed from the reSln by a wash
in an acidified brine solution.

The product from this

process, the "eluate," was then pumped to an area of the
plant called "yellowcake precipitation."

The uranium was

precipitated by heating the solution and adding ammonia.
This precipitate, now called yellowcake, was then "filtered,
washed, dryed,

[sic] calcined, and finally drummed. ,, 62

Meanwhile, the solution containing the vanadium went
through a solvent extraction circuit.

During the early part

of Uravan's history, the mill produced a finished vanadium
product.

In later years the Uravan mill produced a vanadium

"liquor" that was shipped to the company's Rifle mill for
further processing.

61 "Uravan Sulfuric Acid Plant Brings Benefits to Area,
Daily Sentinel, 13 October 1977, p. 25.
62 Supervisor's Notebook, 19 January 1961, drawer 292
UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
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The men who performed the varlOUS mill tasks--and they
were all men for a long period of time--carried job titles
that must have been informative to those intimate with the
mill operation: SX operator,

IX operator, B-Leach operator,

B-Thickener operator , Aerofall operator, sample bucker, and
Yellowcake operator.

Other classifications would be more

understandable to non-initiates: ore receiver, maintenance
mechanic, plumber-pipefitter, maintenance carpenter, acid
operator, machinist, dozer-shovel operator, dockman, and
truck driver.

The company also hired carpenters, painters,

auto mechanics, and, of course,

laborers.

The last job

title on this list was one generally avoided, but, like the
flat top apartments, one that many people occupied for at
least a short period of time.
Because of the tremendous amounts of chemicals used in
the mill, the work was p o tentially hazardous.
of heavy mill machinery, trucks,
to the potential.

forklifts,

The pr e s e n ce

and hoists added

Accident reports from the late 1950s and

early 1960s illustrate the nature of accidents In the mill:
there were several cases of burns,

some caused by acid,

others caused by an overflow of a red cake precipitation
tank and hot yellowcake dropping from a dryer onto a man's
arm.

One man received a dose of steam and ammonla full in

the face when a valve broke.
use of safety glasses.

He saved his vision with the

Another exposed himself to too much

vanadium; that caused "vanadium toxicity," a severe
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congestion of the lungs.

Once, three men tried to empty a

barrel of sodium sulfhydrate into a "green sludge
precipitation tank"; fumes overcame the three, one of whom
fell down a flight of stairs.

In the Aerofall Mill a small

fire erupted, traced to an accumulation of lubricant under a
plece of machinery.

At the ore receiving bin a contractor's

truck rolled, apparently unattended, off the bin and into a
company truck.

On two occasions a forklift overturned

because of operator error.

Twice the operators of crane

hoists experienced mishaps, once when the boom of the crane
hit a power line.

Mill workers suffered cases of back

strain and sometimes hernias caused by exertion, and once a
man broke his ribs in a fall.

63

On three occasions in

Uravan's entire history, dating to 1936, men died in mill
accidents.
Despite these distressing incidents, former mill
workers maintain that theirs was not a dangerous occupation.
They do not discount the hazards, but speak with the
confidence of men who knew their jobs well and knew how t o
avoid accidents.

Most accidents, employees suggested,

resulted from an individual's lack of attention to

63

1958-'59-'60'-61'-62-'63 Accident Reports, Uravan
file, Ura-V033 drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
This file
appeared complete.
If so, there were fifty accident reports
between May of 1958 and July of 1963. Many of them resulted
in no, or only minor, injuries to workers.
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prescribed procedures and safety rules. 64

A reading of the

company's accident reports confirms their oplnlon.
The workers' attitudes also reflect the sincere belief
that Union Carbide's management placed a priority on their
well being.

Said one,

"They put safety first,

got to feeling that they meant it.

and we really

It wasn't just

production first and safety second, but it was safety
first."

Another man remembered that,

"from the top

management clear down," everyone "put a lot of effort into
safety. ,, 65
The company employed a safety englneer who instituted
and coordinated various programs.

For example, there were

frequent and regular safety meetings.

These served not only

to stress the point, but also to provide information
regarding new chemicals or processes in the plant.

The

company also provided first aid training to the mill crews.
The company attempted to "sell safety to employees" through
various types of training and education. 66
Company representatives investigated each mill
accident, and in their reports recommended the means by
which to fix the problem or to avoid the situation that
precipitated the accident.

Union Carbide installed certain

64 Interview #23; Interview #3.
65 Interview #7; Interview #38.
66 T. R. Van Fleet and A. M. Simpson, "USV's All-Out
Safety Drive Pays Off at Uranium Mills,
Engineering and
Mining Journal 154 (April 1953): 98-99.
II
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equipment, like fire extinguishers and emergency shower
heads, in the mill.

The company expected mill work ers to

wear steel-toed boots, as well as other protective clothing
designed for certain jobs or certain areas of the mill:
safety glasses, hard hats, gloves, ear plugs, and
respirators.

In the case of an accident, Uravan's doctor

was never far away; in one instance, he arrived on the scene
within five minutes.

Another time, an injured man was In

the doctor's clinic within nine minutes. 67
That safety measures were paramount at Uravan may been
seen in the company's newsletter, the USV Photo News
called the UCN Photonews) .

(later

The company used this bimonthly

periodical to emphasize the importance of safety, not only
in the work place, but also at home and while driving.

The

newsletter contained articles, tips, reminders, and cartoons
that reinforced the safety message.

As announced in the

pages of the company newsletter three Uravan workers formed
the charter membership of the "Wise Owl Club ," a select
group of men "whose eyesight has been saved by the use of
safety goggles on the job."

Within a few years at l east

three more had joined the club at Uravan. 68

67 1958-'59-'60-'61-'62-'63 Accident Reports, Uravan
file, Ura-V033 drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
68 "Wise Owls," USV Photo News 2 (April-May 1952): 3;
"Blindness Averted , " USV Photo News 15 (June-July 1954)
20;
"New Member of Wise Owls," UCN Photonews 36 (JanuaryFebruary 1958): 2; "Wise Owl Award," UCN Photonews 46
(Second Quarter 1960): 12.
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The company's efforts in this matter paid off.

Some

mill crews took great pride in maintaining a good safety
record.

A man intimat e with Union Carbide's program boasted

that his company established a record far better than those
of other uranlum mills.

He further claimed that "we won

national recognition for our safety from the National Safety
Council several times."

That organization gave its "Award

of Merit" to the Uravan mill In 1961, for 710,000 man hours
of accident free operation.

In 1964 the Uravan mill

celebrated "the best safety record of any mineral industry
In the state of Colorado. ,, 69
One of the distinguishing aspects of mill work in
Uravan was the shift schedules followed by many e mployees .
Because it never shut down, Union Carbide provided for three
shifts of operators to attend the mill.
worked from 8 a. m. until 4 p. m.

The day shift

The swing shift worked

from four o ' clock until midnight; at that time, the
graveyard shift took over and worked eight hours.

For the

sake of fairness , the mill crews rotated shifts; each crew
worked one week on each of the three shifts.
Typically, a mill crew worked seven days on the sWlng
shift, from Tuesday until Monday,
each day.

four o'clock to midnight

There followed two days off, or exactly fifty - si x

69 Interview #3; "Emphasis on Safety," UCN Photonews 50
(Second Quarter 1961): 6-7; F. W. Wyatt to All Mill
Employees, 27 May 1964, Parties, Company, etc. 1964 file,
Uravan Purchasing drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
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hours, because the sWlng shift ended on Monday at 12 p. m.,
and the crew returned to work on Thursday at 8 a. m.

Then,

the crew worked seven day shifts In a row, until the next
Wednesday.

There followed only one day off, a period of

time known as "short change"; thirty-two hours later, at 12
p. m. on Thursday (Friday morning), the crew reported for
graveyard shift.

The crew worked seven straight graveyard

shifts, from Thursday to the following Wednesday, 12 p. m.
to 8 a. m. each day.

At this point, the crew might need a

respite, and the schedule makers allowed for one.

The crew

received four full days off, Friday through Monday.

But

this time period, known as "long change," actually consisted
of 128 hours.

The crew left work at eight o'clock in the

morning on Thursday, and returned to work for the swing
shift at four o'clock in the afternoon on the next Tuesday
(see Table 3, on the following page) . 70
In 1976 thirty-two hourly employees, out of a total of
116 In Uravan,

followed the rotating shift s che dul e outlined

above; eight foremen also worked this shift schedule.
During each twenty-eight-day period, the men on this
particular shift worked twenty-one days and had seven days
off .

During three out of four weeks, mill crews worked

forty hours per week.

During the week of "short change,"

700perations Schedule, Shift Schedules file , drawer 290
UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
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Table 3.--0perations Schedule for Mill Operators, Uravan
Mill, 1975-1976
Shift
Date
10-26
10-27
10-28
10-29
10-30
10-31
11-1
11-2
11-3
11-4
11-5
11-6
11-7
11-8
11-9
11-10
11 -11
11-12
11-13
11-14
11-15
11-16
11-17
11 - 18
11-19
11-20
11-21
11-22

o

11-23
11-24
11-25
11-26
11-27
11-28
11-29
11-30
12-1
12-2
12-3
12-4
12-5
12-6
12-7
12-8
12-9
12-10
12-11
12-12
12-13
12-14
12-15
12 - 16
12 - 17
12-18
12-19
12-20

12-21
12-22
12-23
12-24
12-25
12-26
12-27
12-28
12-29
12-30
12-31
1-1
1-2
1-3
1-4
1 -5
1-6
1-7
1-8
1-9
1-10
1-11
1-12
1-13
1-14
1-15
1-16
1-17

1-18
1-19
1-20
1-21
1-22
1-23
1-24
1-25
1-2 6
1-27
1-28
1-29
1-30
1-31
2-1
2-2
2-3
2-4
2-5
2-6
2-7
2-8
2-9
2-10
2-11
2-12
2-13
2-14

2-15
2-16
2-17
2-18
2-19
2-20
2-21
2-22
2-23
2-24
2 - 25
2 - 26
2-27
2-28
2-29
3-1
3-2
3-3
3-4
3-5
3-6
3-7
3-8
3-9
3-10
3-11
3 - 12
3 - 13

Su
M

Tu
W

Th
F

Sa
Su

A

B

C

D

o
o

D
D
D
D

G
G
G
G
G

S
S

S
S
S
S
S

M

S
S

Tu

o

W

o

Th

D
D
D

F

Sa
Su

W

D
D
D
D

Th

o

F

G
G

M

Tu

Sa
Su
M

Tu
W

Th
F

Sa

G
G
G
G
G

o
o

o
G
G
G
G
G
G
G

o

o
o
o
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

o
o
D
D
D

o

o
D
D
D

o
o

o
o
S
S
S
S
S

s
S

o
o
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

o
G
G

D
D
D
D

o
G
G
G
G
G
G
G

o
o
o
o
S
S
S
S
S

Off
D = Day Shift, 8 a. m. to 4 p. m.
S = Swing Shift, 4 p. m. to 12 p. m.
G = Graveyard Shift, 12 p. m. to 8 a. m.
The Graveyard
Shift actually began at 12 p. m. the prevlous day.
Thus, the Thursday Graveyard shift began at 12 p. m. on
Wednesday, and the workers left at 8 a. m. on Thursday
mornlng.
=

Each of these mill crews, designated here as A, B, C, and D,
consisted of two shift foremen and eight mill operators.
Reproduction of an Operations Schedule from 1975 -19 76, Union
Carbide Corporation, Uravan, Colorado.
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however, each man put In forty --eight hours.

Of course, the

mill workers received overtime pay for hours worked In
excess of forty per week.

They earned holiday pay, two and

one-half times the normal rate " for hours worked on maJor
holidays. 71
Other crews followed different shift schedules.

The

Ore Receivers, Sampler OperatoKs, Sample Buckers, and
Yellowcake Dryer Operators wor}<ed ten days consecutively on
the day shift.

After four days off they returned to the

mill for ten consecutive days on the swing shift.

They got

another four days off before returning to the ten -day period
of day shifts.

These crews, consisting of ten employees in

1976, worked no graveyard shifts.

The three people employed

as "Utilityman" worked a schedule that consisted of
graveyard and swing shifts only. 72

Some employees, the

carpenters, mechanics, electricians, warehouse, and lab
employees, worked stri ctly days.
But those individuals who accepted the jobs wi th
rotating shifts, especially those with graveyard shifts,
faced an unusual burden.

Some adapted to the schedul e;

most, it seems, disliked it, but accepted it as part of
their jobs.

Some hated it, but tolerated it for many years.

71rnterview #30.
72 0re Receivers, Sampler Operators, Sample Buckers,
Yellow Cake Dryer Operators (schedule); Utilityman Shift
Schedule; both documents from Shift Schedules file, drawer
290 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.

21 8

Others hated it and left Uravan.

As a source of discontent,

as a reason many people left Uravan after only a short
period, the rotating shifts and the graveyard shift ranked
high . 73
pnion Carbide recognized the problems associated with
the mill's shift rotations.

Not only were employees

dissatisfied with the peculiar hours, the shift schedules
presented a safety concern.

The managers at the mill

realized that an employee who changes his sleep pattern
every week may not be in the highest state of mental and
physical readiness when he comes to work.

It was once

proposed that crews work for more than one week on each
shift.

For example, a crew might work for a month, or even

two months at a time, on each shift.

This would give a

person the opportunity to adapt to a new schedule.

But the

idea never caught on with the employees themselves.
Apparently, enduring one week of the graveyard shift was
difficult enough.

"When it came down to a vote,

[the

workers] got to thinking about that month on the graveyard,
and they voted it down. ,, 74
The redeeming feature of Uravan's shift schedules was
the four days off known as "long change."

Many of the men

in Uravan indulged their passion for hunting or fishing
during long change.

A family could use the time to go to

73 Interview #30; Interview #24.
74 Interview #3; Interview # 1 0 .
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Grand Junction or Montrose,

for shopping or business.

A

person might schedule his v racation time to coincide with his
four days off, thereby gainling a longer vacation.

Or, the

mill workers simply enjoyedl more time with their families.
Generally speaking, the lonlg change made the graveyard
shifts worth while.
An employee who found himself on a mill crew that
worked rotating shifts had the opportunity to "bid" on other
jobs.

Following the agreem(ents between Union Carbide and

the workers' union, the com}pany posted all hourly job
openlngs.

Any worker who s (o desired submitted his

application for that job to the company, and company
officials decided whom to h .ire based upon the appli can ts'
qualifications.
Uravan's workers

organ ~ized

town and mill reopened.

in 1950, shortly after the

Rewortedly, Union Carbide o pposed

unionization, though not st rrongly enough to dissuade the
workers.

The company succemsfully opposed the unionization

of Uravan's Laboratory
Technicians.

empl ~ yees

and Metallurgical

This was a group of workers, fourteen o f them

in 1960, classified as none )xempt salaried.

The company paid

the nonexempt personnel a salary based on an eight-hour day
and forty-hour week.

But the company paid these employees

overtime for any excess hourrs, and the nonexempt personnel
carried no supervisory responsibility.

Union Carbide's

warehouse employees and offnce personnel, also classified as
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nonexempt salaried, were also not organized.

Even the mlne

workers declined the opportunity to form a bargaining unit.
Thus, only the mill workers belonged to a unlon.

For

many years, membership among those employees was nearly
complete, and union members were well satisfied with their
organization.

The workers,

it seems, appreciated having the

details of their working relationship spelled out in the
For example, the union protected its

labor agreements.

members from arbitrary or unfair management decisions by
negotiating a grievance procedure.

This allowed management

and labor to settle disputes in an orderly manner with both
sides represented.

The labor agreements also assured the

fair distribution of overtime hours, and the opportunity for
mill workers to bid on other jobs. 75

These provisions, and

many others, allowed the workers more control over their
working conditions.
By all accounts the relationship between manag ement and
labor was genial, although one union man qualified this
characterization by adding,
are concerned."

"as far as unions and companies

He claimed a "great deal of respect for the

company officials," and noted that "most of them had
respect, or at least they said they did, for the union. ,, 76
Perhaps company officials were sometimes reticent, but
they did,

indeed, appreciate the union.

75 Interview #7

i

76 Interview #15.

Interview #32.

A supervisor at the
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mill put it this way:

"You'll not get many of them to admit

this, but I think a good share of the immediate supervisors,
from the superintendent on down, were in favor of having the
union there."

Because of the union's influence, he

maintained, the mill ran in a more efficient, orderly, and
safe fashion.

Each employee was trained for and assigned to

a certain job, and the company never pulled a man off one
Likewise, the mill supervisors,

job to put him on another.

except in the case of emergencies, never performed the work
intended for mill operators.

Another salaried employee

agreed that the union promoted the company's goals; because
"management knew exactly what to expect from labor," fewer
misunderstandings arose.

The grlevance procedure benefitted

the company because it helped keep to a mlnlmum the
lingering frustrations caused by unresolved differences . 77
The union also cooperated with company officials on the
safety issues that were so important to them.
Only once in Uravan's post-war history did the
differences between union and management become intractable.
In the early part of 1965 Uravan's unlon members felt they
deserved a raise greater than what Carbide offered during
the negotiation of a new labor agreement.
to strike, and it began on 1 March 1965.

The union voted
The strike idled

110 workers at Uravan, and 105 workers at Union Carbide's

77 Interview #5; Interview #22.
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Rifle mill.

The company negotiated the same agreement with

both groups. 78
For three weeks, the Uravan mill produced no vanadium
or uranlum.

Supervisors maintained certain parts of the

mill -- they kept the pumps runnlng,
clean and free of damage.

for example--to keep it

The union granted the company's

request that a plumber and an electrician remain available
to fix any problems that arose in the town.

A few mill

workers wanted to stay on the job, but the supervisors
forbade it.

The warehouse continued to receive shipments,

because those workers were not on strike. 79
The strikers set up a headquarters at the basement of
the boarding house, and a picket line at the entrance to the
mill.

They allowed miners into the warehouse to pick up

supplies.

However, they refused to let ore haulers into the

mill to stockpile their ore.

If a trucking company had

insisted on crossing the picket line, the strikers would
have allowed it, but the ore haulers respected the strikers'
position. 80

It would have been possible to stockpile the

ore at the Uravan mill, although it is not clear that the
mill supervisors would have attempted to deal with a great
influx of ore.

78 "Uravan and Rifle v\Torkers on Strike," Forum, 4 March
1965, p. 1; "Strike," Forum, 11 March 1965, p. 1.
79 Interview #5; In tervie w #7.
8° Interv iew #15.
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The tone of the strike was decidedly low key; it even
reflected some of the small town pleasantness that
characterized Uravan.

No one made any threats, and some of

the supervisors stopped to chat briefly with strikers as
they cro ssed the picket lines.

One mill worker remembered,

"We didn't carry guns, we didn't carry ball bats.
carried was a deck of cards to play cribbage."

What we

The men

brought in cakes and pies from home and sat around drinking
coffee.

However, some of the strikers began to feel "awful

nervous and wringy before the thing ended. ,, 81
Despite the strike, and the presence of a federal
arbitrator, the company refused to meet the union's demands.
After three weeks, the two sides reached a compromise.
Instead of a ralse of five to seven cents per hour, as
originally proposed, the company gave the workers six to
eight cents per hour.

Union members realized they had

gained virtually nothing.
was not strong enough.

One man complained that the unlon

He believed that, during the strike,

the picketers should have stopped all incoming deliveries,
and that the unlon should have made no conceSSlons.

But,

for the most part, the workers were satisfied with the
outcome.

In the years following the strike, bargaining with

the company was easier, and the workers "got real good
raises without even much negotiation."

81 Interview #7; Interview #15.

Any radical action
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during the strike could have caused irreversible harm to the
relationship between union and management. 82
One cannot easily summarize the entire thirty-five year
relationship between Uravan's workers and management.
During those years the attitudes, goals, and philosophies on
each side varied from year to year.

What may have been

important during one bargaining session may not even have
been at issue during another.

The opinions of one group

toward the other probably evolved over time.

Discussing the

strike, a union member recalled the tension and frustration
that existed among the workers at that specific time:
Carbide was just like any other company.

"Union

They're only going

to give you what it takes to satisfy you, one way or the
other. "

It

lS

worth noting, however, that in a long, candid

interview, the same man made a contradictory statement.
Concerning concessions made by the company to the workers,
he said,

"I always felt that Union Carbide would go one step

further than hal fway. ,, 83

In both cases, one cannot doubt

his sincerity; he enjoyed a long, productive career at Union
Carbide.
Notwithstanding the reason for the strike of 1965-namely, the rates of pay--former Carbide employees felt that
their pay and benefits were good.

That is, they do not

complain about their pay, and they do not mention it as one
82 Interview #43; Interview #15; Interview #7.
83 Interview #7.
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of the reasons that people may have disliked working In the
mill.

Likewise, retired employees appreciate their

pensions; while working, they had the opportunity to invest
in a company savings plan, to which the company contributed.
Employees received two weeks of paid vacation upon the
completion of one year of service, and an extra we ek of paid
vacation after five,

ten, twenty, and thirty years of

employment. 84
The staff personnel at Uravan, classified as "exempt
salaried," consisted of men who worked in both the mining
and milling operations of Union Carbide.

The company

employed a plant superintendent, who coordinated the entire
Uravan operation, including the administration of the town.
Responsibility for the operation of the mill itself fell to
the mill superintendent.

Also at the mill were a plant

englneer, safety engineer, instrument englneer, plant
metallurgist, chief chemist, and personnel manager .

Through

the years,

By the

job descriptions and job titles changed.

1970s Carbide employed an environmental coordinator, a BPlant superintendent, an area superintendent, and,

instead

of a personnel manager, an administrative supervlsor.

The

operation of the mill also required shift foremen, mill
foremen, maintenance foremen, a storeskeeper, and a master

84 "Know Your Vacation Plan," UCN Photonews 45 (First
Quarter 1960): 7; "Your Savings Plan," UCN Photonews 45
(First Quarter 1960): 8; "U.C.N.C. and Mine Workers Agree on
Modifications," Forum, 3 February 1966, p. 1.
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mechanic .

In 1961 thirty-five to thirty - eight exempt

salar ie d personnel worked at Uravan in the mill depar t ment.
In the mid-1970s there were approximately thirty. 85
The salaried positions in the Uravan mining operation
included a mine superintendent, chief engineer, chief
geologist, production englneer, safet y engineer, and
ventilation engineer.

The c ompany als o employed shift

f o remen, a drill foreman, geologists, and surveyors.

In the

early 1960s the mining department at Uravan employed about
forty staff members.

Shortly thereafter the number

decreased to a range of approximately twenty-five to thirty;
by 1980 there were only nineteen. 86
Often the company's salaried personnel transferred to
Uravan from other divisions or companies in the vast
o rganization of Union Carbide Co rp o ration.

Such a t ra nsf e r

involve d a move from as near as Rifle, Colorado, o r f rom a s
far away as New York, California, Kentucky, or West
Virginia.

Union Carbide's Colorado Plateau Operations

offi ce , within the corporation's Metals Division, was

85Uravan Milling Operations, Monthly Manning Reports
1961 file, IRD Correspondence 1-61 to 12-61 drawer, room
126, Umetco Records; Personnel Reports, January 1974 and
January 1975; from 1974, 1975, 1976 Employee Relations Files
drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
86 Personnel Report, Monthly Manning Reports 1 96 1 file,
IRD Correspondence 1-61 to 12-61 drawer, room 126, Ume t co
Records; Personnel Report, Monthly Manning Reports 1 96 3
file, IRD Files 1963 drawer, room 126, Umetco Records;
Manpower Report, Manpower Report 1981 file, drawer 330 UaY,
room 126, Umetco Records.
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located In Grand Junction.

That office administered a

network of mining and milling operations in the western
states.

The company also recruited recent college graduates

and people with experience in companies independent of the
Union Carbide organization.

Consequently, the staff

personnel, unlike the hourly employees, were often
unfamiliar with southwestern Colorado, and unaccustomed to
life in a small town like Uravan.
Uravan acquired the reputation of a "training ground"
for salaried personnel.

Men would come in, absorb a few

years of valuable experience at the Uravan mill, and then
leave, transferred to another position at a different
location.

Sometimes, a person worked a few years at Uravan,

took a transfer to another location, and came back to Uravan
at a later date.

"Assuredly," wrote one man,

we came to Uravan,

"that is why

. to qualify for promotion."

In his

view the town suffered because of the turnover in the
management positions.

It led to a lack of "leadership" In

the communi ty. 87
Despite the perception that Uravan functioned as a
"training ground,

II

there are many examples of men who served

in staff positions for many years.

This held especially

true for the various foremen, who often acquired their

87Memorandum on Housing and Employee Facility Problems.
The man who wrote this was the same who hoped for a
"promotion to Valhalla (Grand Junction) or to the Holy of
Holies (New York)." See page 203.

228
positions after several yearrs of hourly work at Uravan.

In

1976 most of the foremen in the mill had more than twenty
years of experience at Uravan.
that required more

But also in the positions

speciali~ed

training, the various

engineers, metallurgists, cmemists, and administrators,
there are many examples of

~en

who worked for ten years or

more.
In the 1950s Uravan's plant superintendent noted that
"the line of demarcation beLween staff people and Union
people extends beyond the pnant."

It would be difficult, In

Uravan, for the two groups LO avoid one another.
line of demarcation, he

sug~ested,

But this

negatively affected

Uravan's community spirit, stability, and social
relationships.

He was

opti~istic,

ingredients of a good stew,

however, that "like the

relationships and community

spirit improve with time andl association.

,, 88

The superintendent's prediction seems to have been
accurate.

Many people reme®ber that during the 1950s class

lines were more rigidly

dra~n

than in later years.

To one

person it seemed as rigid as; a military base; salaried
employees lived in one part of town, the hourlys lived In
another, and the two groups

stayed separate.

At that time,

it has been said, company of:ficials encouraged the
BB R. D. Van Zante, "The West End of Montrose County has
Grown Up," Uravan History fi .le, drawer 2UaZ, room 126,
Umetco Records.
This appear's to have been a presentation
that, along with a film, was , given at a West End social
gathering.
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supervlsors to dissociate themselves from the mil l
wo rk e rs . 89
Sometimes, the salaried personnel behaved in ways less
than egalitarian.

Reportedl y there existed a "500 Club,"

the membership of which was o pen only to those who made five
hundred dollars or more per month. 90

While this club may

not have lasted long, many Uravanites remember that a few
salaried people carried a condescending attitude toward the
non-salaried workers.

Undoubtedly, some mill workers

harbored resentment that, for example, staff members
received better houses.
Generally speaking, however, the community coalesced
after the 1950s, when the work force began to stabilize.
There were always certain distinctions; each year at
Christmas the company staged a banquet reserved for staff
members.

(Some workers did r e sent that.)

And, every Labor

Day the union sponsored a picnic for its members.

Some

people mention that the "line of demarcation" existed mo re
between the mining and milling departments than betwe e n the
hourly and salaried employees.

Two f o rmer reside nts, o f

different backgrounds and generations, mentioned that
"cliques" formed in Uravan. 91

That the townspeople tended

89 Interview #18; Interview #5.
90 Interview #35.
91 In t e rv i e w # 3 5; In t e rv i e \..v # 2 .
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to associate with those with whom they had the most In
common lS no surprlse.
Uravan's plant superintendent served as a mitigating
influence in the relationship between the different groups.
The townspeople had a good deal of respect for the
superintendents, and they set the example, through their own
attitude and actions, for social relationships in Uravan.
By all indications, the company had very capable men who
filled this position.
played a role.

The superintendent's wives also

They often involved themselves in community

activities, and in the process, worked to bring people
together. 92
Another source of community cohesion came from those
residents least likely to recognize a "line of demarcation":
the children.

Because they tended to associate with

whomever they pleased, the c hildren helped to "break down"
the barriers that might have been erected by adults.

There

was in Uravan a high rate of participation in children's
activities and organizations.

The supervision of these

activities, for the sake of the children, helped people come
together as a communi ty. 93
When talking about the community structure, many former
residents mention the fact that,
unemployed people.

in Uravan, there were no

This gave the town a certain vitality, a

92 Interview #21; Interview #7.
93 Interview #4; Interview #3.
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"busy" atmosphere, and kept t o a mlnlmum the number of
malcontents.

There appears t o have been little anxiety

concerning the continued operation of the mill, and few who
treated Uravan as only a temporary situation.

On two

occasions--once in the early 1960s and once ln the early
1970s--the company reduced its work force.

Whil e these

reductions no doubt caused some concern, they represent
exceptions rather than a rule.

Moreover, the layoffs

affected only the least senlor members of the work force.
Thus, for most Uravan's history, the work force remained
stable, and this gave the community a stable base.
There was no lack of community involvement in Uravan.
Citizens held positions on the local school board and in the
Uravan PTA, served as leaders in various scouting
organizations, and instructed the local youth in such
activities as swimming, archery, and shooting.

People

formed clubs of various kinds, and joined service
organizations like the Lion's Club and the VFW, or served as
officers in the workers' unlon.

The more athleti c minded

joined a bowling league (at Nucla's bowling alley ) , men's
softball and basketball teams, and women's volleyball teams.
For many years Union Carbide sponsored a baseball team that
played against other teams in southwestern Colorado.

At one

time the manager of the team felt obligated to announce that
the Uravan club consisted strictly of amateur players.

It

fielded no one who received "pay for playing baseball," and
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no one "under contract to a seml-pro club or professional
team. ,, 94

It was widely concluded, however, that Carbide

offered summer jobs to men who happened also to play
baseball.
Long-time Union Carbide employees express a deep
appreciation for life in a sIT1all town.

Many of the men In

Uravan pursued the easily accessible outdoor pastimes like
hunting, fishing,

and camping.

Those who liked Uravan

enjoyed their isolation, in which they created their own
entertainment.

They remember, not without some nostalgia,

that for many years no one i n Uravan had television sets;
even after television became more common, in the early
1960s, the programmlng was s o limited that television played
only a minor part of daily life.

They remember most fondly

the friendships created among people with similar int erests
and goals, and f o stered by the intimate nature o f the small
town.
The newcomer or visitor to Uravan sometimes had trouble
understanding the residents'

affinity for their town.

A

Union Carbide employee once told a school teacher that it
was "worth quite a few hundred a month just to live in this
area."

Apparently, the teacher believed just the opposite,

that she should receive "quite a few hundred a month" extra
for enduring life in the West End. 95
94 "To Whom It May Concern," Forum 12 May 1960, p. 5.
95 Interview #23.
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Dissatisfaction may have been more common among the
salaried employees, some of whom felt they deserved better
than Uravan offered.

Addressing the question of how the

town could be improved, one salaried man complained that
Uravanites shared an overly complacent attitude.

He

resented lithe idea that since we live in the sticks we
should act like it.1I

As an example, he referred to the

service station, which was surrounded by lIa sea of mud and
gravel and [that]

seldom if ever is cleaned.

The help

situation is so short and lax that it is usually faster t o
fill your own tank than wait for service. 11 96

One might

imagine the scene: the small town gas station attendant sits
inside, dozing off with a newspaper folded over his lap and
his legs propped on the desk.

Meanwhile,

impatient

customers line up outside, waiting for service.
The inconveniences and slow pace bothered other people,
as well.
New York.
last long.

A· woman recalls a couple that came to Uravan from
III can't even imagine the shock, and they didn't
But I remember that they couldn 't believe that

their daughter couldn't take ballet lessons. II

Some talked

about mlsslng the cultural events,

shopping centers, and

entertainment that Uravan lacked.

They suffered IIcanyon

fever, II which resulted from isolation and monotony.

A short

time away from town palliated the symptoms. 97
96Memorandum on Housing and Employee Facility Problems.
97 Interview #37; Interview #35.
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Sometimes, it took a person a while to accustom to
Uravan's climate.

A woman remembers a neighbor who had

arrived from one of the eastern states.

In Uravan he

inhe rited a nice lawn, but he neglected to water it.
someone asked him why he did not water, he replied,
just wai ting for the rain." 98

When
"I was

In the West End, several

months might pass without significant rainfall.
Those unfortunates who never quite adapted to Uravan
provided a source of amusement for others.

But even among

the salaried personnel there were those who not only lived
in the town for many years, but who also came to appreciate
its rustic charms.
aspects of the town.

Two salari e d men affirmed the positive
"The years that we lived in Uravan and

wat ched our children grow were the happiest years of our
life."

And,

from another,

"We couldn't have found a finer

place to raise our children, because there was nothing down
there to bother or hurt those kids." 99

Both statements

reflect the widel y shared sent i ment that life in Uravan
centered on family activities.
One man who grew up in Uravan called the experlence
"the best thing that ever happened to me." 100

The town's

immediate surroundings offered children endless
opportunities to explore and play.
98 Interview #21 .
99 Interview #35 i Interview #28.
100 Interview #25.

And, their parents
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devis e d an almost endless list of activities to keep the
children occupied.

Children participated in varlOUS team

sports, scouting organizations, and school and churchrelated activities.

Many children learned to shoot in

either the gun club or the archery club.

There were fishing

trips and excursions to nearby ski resorts.

The Recreation

Hall provided the setting for roller skating, sock hops,
school plays, movies, and many other events.

Uravan's

olympic-sized sWlmmlng pool attracted children from all
parts of the West End.

At the pool children received

sWlmmlng lessons and the opportunity to join the swim team.
It is clear, however, that when a man says his young
life In Uravan was "the best thing that ever happened to
me," he refers to more than just fond childhood memories of
swimming and playing in the hills around the town.

The

children, In retrospect, are grateful for their inheritance
of an uncomplicated lifestyle, for the values they learned
as youngsters in a hard-working town.

They value the

"close-knit community" in which they grew, and rememb er In
Uravan a spirit of cooperation, helpfulness, and
friendliness that excluded no one.
for everybody else.
an yw he re e I s e .

"Everybody watched out

That's something I've never found

,, 1 0 1

Uravan's school accommodated children in classes from
kindergarten through eighth grade.
lOl Interview #2.

Union Carbide leased the
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land for the school building to the school district for
thirty dollars per year; under that agreement, the school
district paid for gas, electric, and water service. 102

The

company built a pedestrian underpass beneath the busy road,
the main entrance to the town,

that separated one part of

the Uravan school from the other.

To accommodate the

population boom of the 19508, the school district had
constructed a new classroom building and gymnasium at
Uravan.
Upon graduation from the eighth grade, Uravan's
students went to Nucla for high school.
extraordinary.

The change was not

In addition to a variety of sports teams and

clubs at the high school, those who spent their formative
years In Uravan remember roller skating, bowling, dances,
and the drive -in theater.

The more adventurous attended

"beer parties," which probably occurred more often than the
parents of Uravan's youth realized. 103
Uravan's baby boom generation, those born in the late
1940s and early 1950s, did not experlence the full effect of
the social transformation that occurred in America during
the 1960s.

Apparently, most teenagers in the West End did

l02 Sc hool Lease Agreement, 1 May 1964, School District
RE-2 file, Contracts and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room 126,
Umetco Records.
In a 1953 amendment the company extended
the original lease, dated 1 June 1943, to a period of forty
years.
Amendment to Lease Agreement, 1 May 1953, School
District RE-2 file, Contracts and Leases drawer 4 UaZ, room
126, Umetco Records.
103 I n t e rv i e w # 2 7; In t e rv i e w # 2 .
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not try unduly t o shock their parents, rebel against
established norms, or, in most cases, experiment with
illegal drugs.

One who graduated from high school during

the 1960s said that marlJuana use was uncommon, and that
none of his male classmates wore long hair.

He described

Uravan and the West End as a "red neck," meaning
conservative, society, with a perspective on life that
reflected more the 1950s than the 1960s.

For example, when

a young, unmarried girl got pregnant, her parents sent her
away until the baby was born, presumably to avoid the
embarrassment of the situation.

In other such cases, it was

expected that the boy who fathered the child would take
responsibility by marrying the girl. l04
The youth of Uravan and other towns In the West End
attached no particular stigma to mlnlng, mill wo rk, or life
in the West End.

There does not seem to have been a

widespread desire to escape the lifestyles of their fathers
and mo thers.

Upon graduation many West End boys "put In

down at Carbide."
one,

Many of the young women, according t o

"wanted to get married and start a family." 105

But

the uranium industry never expanded a great deal, and jobs
in the West End were not always there for those who would
otherwise have wanted to stay .

104Interview #17; Interview #27; Interview #25.
105 Interview #27; Interview #2.
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Others left to go to college.

Union Carbide offered

very well-paying summer jobs to young people who attended
college and were the children of company employees.

In

fact, because of the educational background of Union
Carbide's staff employees, Uravan's high school graduates
may have been more inclined or encouraged to attend college
than were those in other parts of the West End. 106
It has been said that "Uravan was wonderful for men,
children, and dogs."

The women of the town,

often experienced "boredom and discontent."

in contrast,
The wife of a

salaried employee related her initial reaction to Uravan,
one that she felt was probably typical for women in her
position.

"My God, so this is Uravan.

We had that Uravan crud from the water.

We had copper water.
They couldn't

believe that this was the place where they would have to
live."

She lived in the town for many years, however, and

said that she, and other women, remember Uravan with great
fondness.

For her, the people and the intimacy were the

redeeming features of the town.

She felt that living in

Uravan demanded some sacrifices,

"but you couldn't find the

happiness and the family unity that you had with your family
and your friends in Uravan . ,, 107
Many others repeat this sentiment.

"It was a close

community; everybody helped one another and if there wasn't
l06 Interview #34.
l07Interview #18; Interview #31.
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anything to do , people got together and did something."

The

women formed numerous clubs; one resident belonged to seven
different groups during her stay in Uravan. 108

As one

might expect, women involved themselves quite often in
organizations designed to benefit their children.

The PTA

meetings were heavily attended, and members staged pot luck
dinners and bazaars to raise money for various projects.
Church-related activities, including Sunday School and
Vacation Bible School, constituted anot her important part of
the lives of many Uravan residents.
For some, however, the activities listed above describe
not the opportunity for things to do, but rather the lack of
such opportunity.

One woman insisted that there "was

nothing to do" in Uravan.

She had "no idea" what other

women did to pass the time, but for her, the routine of life
in Uravan was not terribly exciting.
six months In the town:

She recalled her first

"I had coffee wi th everybody.

. I

took a lot of pills f or the first six weeks, and thought , 'I
can 't live here.'

I just about went crazy, and I d ecided I'd

better stop taking pills and just accept it, so I finally
She easily explained the high turnout for events like

did. "

PTA meetings.
to do."

"Well, like I said, there wasn't an awful lot

For her, the redeeming feature of life In Uravan

was the opportunity to work a full - time job. l09
108 Interview #29; Interview #36.
109 Interview #26.
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Other women worked outside the home, not only for their
own satisfaction, but because they simply needed the extra
lncome.

Sometimes the wives of Union Carbide employees

taught in the school district, and some women found
employment with the school district in other capacities.
Women took jobs in Pete Peters's San Miguel Trading Center,
drugstore, or boarding house.

Peters also hired

housekeepers; they cleaned the bunkhouses and the staff
house, in which visitors to Uravan stayed.

Perhaps twenty

people worked for SMTC in various capacities.

Others worked

for stores and businesses in Nucla and Naturita.

But the

women who worked for local businesses endured a discrepancy
in wages that grew during the years.

One woman recalls that

during the early, post-war years, she earned almost one - half
of what her husband earned at Union Carbide.

Nearly three

decades later, still working, she earned about thirteen
percent of what her husband earned at Carbide. 110
Union Carbide employed some women as typists and
secretaries.

In 1959 nine women worked in Uravan as typists

or secretaries.
capacities.

In 1976 only four women worked in similar

The position of nurse, apparently, was always

filled by a woman.
No women worked In the mill until the early 1970s.
lS not clear what prompted Carbide's managers to begin
hiring women.

It may have been pressure from women who

1l0 Interview #4.

It
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desired the opportunity to work; or, it may have been that
the company felt an obligation to hire women to comply with
guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.

In 1971 the company issued an Affirmative

Action Compliance Program report.

The report indicated that

five women worked in the milling operation; the company
classified four of them as "office and clerical" workers,
and one as a "professional."

In 1972 the mill operation

provided employment to four women: a secretary, a typist, a
clerk, and a nurse.

However,

in 1976,

SlX

women worked In

the mill itself; a "dockman," a sample operator, two
laborers, a "utilityman," and a Yellowcake Dryer operator.
These employees all began working for Carbide between August
of 1973 and December of 1975. 1 11

Thus, it appears that the

first woman hired for mill work began in 1973.
It

lS

impossible to determine whether enough jobs

existed to satisfy the demand.

Some people who commented on

this issue agreed that those women who wanted empl oyment
could find it, though others felt that such was not the
case.

But even as late as the 1970s, many women in Uravan

l11Affirmative Action Compliance Program, Union carbide
Corporation, Mining and Metals Division, Uravan, Colorado,
Milling, page 14. Affirmative Action Compliance Program
file, IRD Files 1970-1971 drawer, room 126, Umetco Records;
Equal Employment Opportunity Program, Affirmative Action
Plan, Milling, 1 April 1973, Union Carbide Corporation,
Mining and Metals Division, pages 24-26.
1973 Affirmative
Action Compliance Program file, IRD Files 1972-1973 drawer,
room 126, Umetco Records; Milling Hourly List, 2 January
1976, 1976 Employee Lists file, 1974, 1975, 1976 Employee
Relations drawer, room 126, Umetco Records.
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did not want to work outside the home.

Also, because of the

low rents in Uravan, and a generally low cost of living,
fewer women felt the financial need to get a job.
Professional women, those who wished to pursue careers,
would have found Uravan impossible.

Union Carbide sometimes

found it difficult to hire men to fill its salaried
positions, because the Wlves of the potential employees
chose not to live in a small town that limited their own
goals. 112
For many women, tending the needs of their families
provided work and challenges enough.

They regarded Uravan

as an ideal place for their families, and specifically for
their children, for several reasons.

Most people considered

Uravan a safe, secure place with very little crime.

The

people of the town trusted most of their neighbors; this
familiarity further supported residents' sense of security.
And, if needed, a person could always find someone to take
care of her children for a while.

It seemed also that

children were exposed less to the negative influences that
one sometimes finds in bigger communities.

The Uravan

school was a point of pride, and the focus of activity
within the community.

The classes were small and the

teachers were well known to the parents, two factors that
many people feel were benefits of life in Uravan.

112 Interview #30.
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Of c ourse, people can ralse happy children i n mo st
pla c es, large or small.

One might wonder why anyone would

choose Uravan, with its hulking, unsightly uranium mill
serving as a backdrop.

Some former residents will admit

that the mill was "ugly.

II

Occasionally, odors from the mill

drifted through the town, but these were not particularly
obnoxious and some residents do not remember any odors .
James B. Allen, In The Company Town in the American West,
wrote that In a company town, the "company business" became
"a regular and accepted part of the community."

The "giant

pile of overburden," the "towering stacks of the smelter,"
and the "dynamite blasts from the pit" that marked a c opper
mining community, for example, would strike the visitor as
peculiar and undesirable.

But for company town residents

such things constitute a way of life, and go all but
unnoticed.

ll3

In Uravan, as in other company towns,

the

mill shifts regulated the lives of families and the
c ommunity.

The mill, with its regularly sounding whistle,

the passing ore trucks, and the big evaporation ponds on the
highway identified both Uravan and a way of life into which
many people settled and found comfortable .

They have to

reflect on the matter, or to be reminded, to realize that
Uravan was unusual in both appearance and community
structure .

ll3Allen, Company Town, 106-107.
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One cannot overestimate the strong affinity that former
residents hold for Uravan.

They are proud of the town they

built, and the work they accomplished.

Former residents

convey a clear sense of this pride, and also the feeling
that they belonged to something special and to something
that can not be duplicated.

Uravanites keep track of one

another, and attend annual reunions, one held at the old
ball park near Uravan and another in Grand Junction.
Union Carbide engendered a loyalty that plays no small
part in the residents' fondness for their town.

Uravanites

appreciated the simple fact that Union Carbide's jobs
allowed them to make good wages, and to remain in an area In
which they preferred to live.

Former residents frequently

mention the company's largesse: the swimming pool, a pass
for which cost a family almost nothing; the company's
sponsorship of athletic teams; the company's donation of
tools or materials for community projects in the West End;
the big Christmas parties the company gave for children; the
summer jobs given to college students.
to one,
there. II

IICarbide, II according

IIcouldn't be any better to the people who worked
A man who had experience working for other

companies said that Union Carbide "can never be matched as
to compassion and fairness.

To me, Union Carbide was

the company, they were my company. II
employees' loyalty.

The company repaid its

When layoffs occurred, the company
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tried to transfer laid off workers to other locations, or to
rehire the laid off workers at a later date. 114
Of course, there must have been throughout Uravan's
long history many people who felt no sense of belonging or
pride, and who found nothing particularly attractive in the
town or the mill.

But the short-term, disaffected residents

left no lasting mark on the place, and contributed little to
the community that others remember so fondly.
Visitors may have found the town singularly
unattractive and unappealing.

In 1970 a writer for McCall's

magazine passed through and, obviously unimpressed,
described Uravan as a "dismal .

. dusty mill town. ,, 115

A

resident without the benefit of a national audience issued a
rhymed response that reflects the pride felt by many others.
Uravan
"A dusty, dismal mining town"
And c e r tainl y not very p r ett y
Closed in between two canyon walls
Ninety miles to the nearest city
We don't have much in Uravan
And not much to be thankful for
A post office, drug store, garage
And, oh yes, there's the friendly store
But there are some things I would like
To name--and here's a few
Our kids are home in bed by nlne
There's nothing else to do

114 Interview #32; Interview #35;

Interview #30.

115Nancy Wood, "America's Most Radioactive City,"
Mc Call ' s 9 7 ( S e pte mbe r 1 9 7 0): 4 6 - 5 0, 12 2 . Grand J un c t i on ,
not Uravan, received this novel distinction.
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The town's unemployment rate
Has hit an all time low
Because if you don't work here mister
Then you pack your duds and blow
There is no crime in Uravan
No robberies, rapes or drugs
Our kids COULD walk the street at night
And worry not of getting slugged
Our loyalty runs pretty high
In this "dirty dismal mlnlng town"
We sorta take offense to it
When someone tries to put us down
Oh yes we're proud of Uravan
The town that never sleeps
For Carbide's mill runs day and night
And seven days a week
And so in passing, may I say
Before I put my pen to bed
What other ONE WHOLE TOWN can say
We thank you for our daily bread
So if by chance the AEC or Willard Wurtz 116
Would close us down
Then everyone in Uravan
Would leave this dismal mlnlng town
I wonder how our cause wou ld go
If to Montrose we fled
And sent this note to Welfare
"Thank you for our dail y bread,, 117

116Willard Wirtz (the name is misspelled in this copy of
the poem) was the Secretary of Labor in the late 1960s. He
proposed federal regulations concerning the level of radon
gas in uranium mines.
The level he advocated, some said,
would force the closure of most uranium mines.
117 "Uravan," unpublished poem, Estalee Silver
Collection, Museum of Western Colorado, Grand Junction,
Colorado.
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CHAPTER 6
"THOUGH OTHERS COIV1E AND GO,

. THEY

HAVE ALWAYS HAD CARBIDE" l
The uranlum industry that sustained Uravan provided a
great deal of support to the rest of the West End, as well .
Developments in the industry in Colorado followed those in
other states, and in the industry as a whole.

Throughout

the 1960s the uranium market was relatively stable, although
not robust.

The total domestic output of uranlum was far

less in the 1960s than it had been during the uranium boom
of the 1950s.

Whereas In 1961 twenty-seven uranium mills

operated in the western states, by 1968 only sixteen mi l ls
produced uranium; by the end of that year the number
decreased to thirteen. 2
The Atomic Energy Commission provided most of the
market for uranium during the 1960s.

In 1962 the Commission

devised a "stretch-out" program, designed to sustain the
uranlum industry from 1967 through 1970.

"The milling

companies could voluntarily defer delivery of a portion of
their 1963-1966 contract commitments until 1967 and 1968 in
return for an AEC commitment to purchase,

in 1969 and 1970,

lRocky Mountain Consulting Associates, Inc., and Greg
Trainor, Crises in the West End: Social and Economic Impacts
of the Uranium Market Bust (Glenwood Springs, CO: Rocky
Mountain Consulting Associates, Inc., 1981), 6.
2Richard F. Stevens, Jr., "Uranium," in Minerals
Yearbook, 1968, volumes 1-2, Metals, Minerals, and Fuels
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 1119.
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an additional amount of U30 a equal to the quantity so
deferred."

Eleven companies,

including Union Carbide,

negotiated stretch-out contracts with the AEC. 3

The

contracts ensured prices and demand through 1970, and
prevented a collapse of the market.
In the later half of the 1960s uranlum industry
observers began to anticipate increased demand for uranium
from utility companies, then in the process of planning and
constructing nuclear power plants.

In 1966 utility

companies began to order uranium in large quantities for the
first time; Westinghouse Electric Corporation negotiated one
contract for concentrate worth seventy million dollars.

In

a separate deal, Union Carbide also sold concentrate to
Westinghouse, four million pounds of uranium oxide to be
delivered from 1970 to 1973.

This may have been Union

Carbide's first commercial sale of uranlum.

The trends

indicated "that this country will be hardpressed by 1980 t o
provide enough uranium for its nuclear power industry.

,, 4

That prediction was not far off the mark, but the
industry had another slump to endure.
uranium until the very end of 1970.

The AEC purchased
Thereafter, all sales

3Albrethsen and McGinley, Summary History,S.
4Glynn Mapes, "Off the Deathbed: Nuclear Power Plant
Needs Begin to Revive Sick Uranium Industry," Wall Street
Journal, 1 August 1966, p. 1; "Mineral Production
Increases," Forum, 30 January 1969, p. 1; "Don't Junk Your
Geiger Counter--Yet," Daily Sentinel, 18 February 1966, p.
11.
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involved private concerns.

By 1971, the first year of

strictly pr i vate sales, the uranlum market had grown IIsoft
under conditions of excess supply. II

During the first few

years of private sales, utility companies bought far less
uranium than had been anticipated .

The AEC, which

controlled a huge stockpile of uranlum,

IIproposed a schedule

for disposal of this stockpile over a period of several
years."

To say that the uranium industry's reaction to this

proposal was IInegative ll probably understates the case.
According to one observer, the possibility that the
government's lI u ranium stockpile will be dumped on the
market II represented a IIspecter that haunts private uranium
companies. II

The AEC later decided not to burden the market

with its own excess uranium. 5
In 1972, amid a market of IIcontinuing oversupply,
excessive stocks, and soft prices, II Union Carbide officials
reduced work schedules at the Uravan mill to a five-day
week.

The company also reduced its work force at the mill

to 125, an all-time low.

(This figure represents the total

number of employees at the mill.)

Simply put, the company

5Walter C. Woodmansee, "Uranium, II in Minerals Yearbook,
1971, volume 1, Metals, Minerals, and Fuels (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1973), 1197; "Government No
Longer Purchasing Uranium, II Forum, 31 December 1970, p. 1
(reprinted from the Mining Record); IIAEC Not Going to Sell
$600 Million of Uranium,lI San Miguel Basin Forum, 22 March
1972, p. 1.
The Forum became the San Miguel Basin Forum
with the 18 February 1971 issue.
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sought "to reduce the production rate to match product
sales.,, 6
Union Carbide also sold vanadium, and that product
helped the company galn a better return on its mining and
milling activities.

In 1966, for example, Colorado produced

seventy-two percent of the nation's vanadium, and Montrose
County had Colorado's highest production.

However, by the

early 1970s the market for vanadium, like that for uranium,
atrophied.

Thus,

in the early 1970s the production and sale

of vanadium did not compensate for the reduced output of
uranlum.

In fact,

in 1972 Union Carbide suspended

operations at its vanadium and uranium mill in Rifle.

In

1973 the Rifle mill reopened, but the mill produced only
vanadium and operated with a much smaller work force than
before. 7

6Walter C. Woodmansee, "Uranium," Minerals Yearbook,
1972, volume 1, Metals, Minerals, and Fuels, (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 1261; Uravan Mill:
Employee Turnover 1968-1979, Turnover 1968-1979 file, drawer
34 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records; "Carbide Plans Five day
Week," San Miguel Basin Forum, 22 March 1972, p. 1; Andrew
Kuklis, "The Mineral Industry of Colorado," in Minerals
Yearbook, 1972, volume 2, Area Reports: Domestic
(Washington, DC; Government Printing Office, 1974), 154.
7Carl L. Bieniewski and William C. Henkes, "The Mineral
Industry of Colorado," in Minerals Yearbook, 1966, volume 3,
Area Reports: Domestic (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1967), 180; Kuklis, "The Mineral Industry of
Colorado," 154-155; "Carbide Announces Rifle Shutdown," San
Miguel Basin Forum , 3 May 1972, p. 1; "Spending for Union
Carbide Tri-State Plateau Operation Was $14.5 Million in
1973," San Miguel Basin Forum, 20 February 1974, p. 8.
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Union Carbide's reduced production schedule at the
Uravan mill forced the closure of more than one half of the
mlnlng operations in the West End and adjacent mlnlng areas.
Many of the mines had been operated by smaller companles,
the owners of which could not remain competitive in the slim
market.

But even Union Carbide, the West End's largest

uranlum industry employer, had to close one of its more
productive mlnes, the Eula Belle, and terminate the
employment of thirty miners there.

At one time, the Eula

Belle provided employment to forty or fifty miners.

Foote

Mineral Company, formally the Vanadium Corporation of
America, had thirty mines In Montrose County in 1967.

But

those mines fell inactive In 1968 when the mill in Shiprock,
New Mexico closed.

Climax Uranium Company, which also mined

ore In Montrose County, closed its Grand Junction mill In
1970. 8

These developments left the West End in a receSSlon.
Expressed metaphorically, the West End had "been riding the
uranlum gravy train for a long time.

Now it looks as if we

are coming to a very rough sect ion of track.

II

From 1969 to

1972 the assessed valuation of West End properties f e ll

8Kuklis, "Mineral Industry of Colorado," 154;
"Government No Longer Purchasing Uranium," Forum, 31
December 1970, p. 1 (reprinted from the Mining Record)
"Eula Belle to Close," San Miguel Basin Forum, 10 January
1973, p. 1; "Carbide to Lease Foote's Slope Uranium
Properties," Forum, 20 August 1970, p. 1; William C. Henkes,
"The Mineral Industry of Colorado," in Minerals Yearbook,
1969, volume 3, Area Reports: Domestic (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1971): 178.
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about $1 million, mostly due to the decrease In mlnlng
activity .

A "gloom" settled In, caused by "little payroll

. a lag In the uranium demand, high costs of living .
rising interest rates and costs of being in business and
staying in business. ,, 9

West End residents began to explore

more earnestly the possibility of developing alternative
sources of income.
Economically, as well as geographically, West Enders
had always seen themselves as a region separate from the
east end of Montrose County.

Most developments in Montrose

hardly affected the West End; in fact, West End residents
felt more closely allied with neighboring San Miguel County.
They shared more interests with the people of Norwood , a
farming,

ranching, and sometime logging town in San Miguel

County, than they did with the people of the east e nd of
t heir own county.

Similarly, developments in the uranlum

industry determined the economic fortunes of both the West
End and the far western portion of San Miguel County,
although very few people lived in that part of San Miguel
County.

And, West Enders felt more closely allied with

Telluride, the seat of San Miguel County, than the y did wit h
Montrose.

The editor of Nucla's newspaper expressed these

sympathies in 1954: "We are convinced that the West End of

9Marv Hearnesberger, "As I See It," Forum, 5 March
1970, p. 1; "We're Worth Less," San Miguel Basin Forum, 23
August 1972, p. 1; "Editorial Views," San Miguel Basin
Forum, 5 September 1973, p. 2.
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Montrose County and San
and socially, if not

Migue~

Co. are one unit economically

politica~ly."

Accordingly, he changed

the name of his paper from the Nucla Forum to the Forum,
"serving the West End and San Miguel Co." 10
No doubt, the West End's isolation provided the grounds
for some alienation.

One res n dent pointed out that she

lived closer to the seats of three different counties-Dolores, San Miguel, and Ouray--than to her own county seat,
Montrose.

But she, and apparently a few others, had also

grown indignant over the perceived lack of support the West
End received from its county seat.
West End," she wrote,
slope.

"Montrose treats the

"just l iL ke Denver treats the western

,, 11

In 1968 the editor of Nucla's newspaper explained this
feeling of neglect.

In a

ser~es

of opinion pieces he

enumerated the grievances suffered by his part of the
county.

In essence he felt truat the West End, because of a

small population and lack of p)olitical representation,
received less funding for roadls and other public projects.
The West End contributed more to the county in tax revenues
than it received In support.

Moreover, West Enders had to

pay for projects In Montrose that did not benefit them, and
most of the county employees lived in Montrose.

"The powers

l°"They Say the 1st Year's; the Hardest," Forum, 25 June
1954, p. 1.
11Letter to the Editor, Forum, 18 January 1968, p. 4.
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that be in Montros e," wrote the editor, treated the West End
like a "poor relative . ,, 12
The perceived i nequities In the county political system
so incensed the editor that he advocated secession for the
West End; he even held a "straw vote ballot," to determine
the strength of public sentiment for his proposal.

Only

sixty-five people vot ed; twenty-two wanted to form a new
county, and another forty-one felt the West End should join
San Miguel County.

The lack of response must have been

disheartening, and the effort to place the secession
question on the general election ballot apparently
failed. 13
The West End seceSSlon movement of 1968 serves only as
a footnote to the area's history.

One long-time resident

and observer remarked that the effort "wasn't to o powerful,
but it was noisy. ,, 14

Nevertheless, the secession moveme nt

demonstrates the West End's economic isolation.

Building

projects that boosted the economy of Montrose--expanded
airport, hospital, or junior college facilities,

for

example--had no direct impact on the economy of the West
End.

They realized the need to attract or develop some sort

12Marv Hearnesberger, "As I See It," Forum, 4 January
1968, 11 January 1968, 18 January 1968, 25 January 1968, 1
February 1968, and 22 February 1968, p. 1.
13Marv Hearnesberger, "As I See It," Forum, 25 January
1968 and 1 February 1968, p. 1.
14 The phrase is Betty Zatterstrom's, communicated
informally to the author.
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of industry unlque to their situation and independent of the
rest of the county.

The people of the West End also knew

that they would benefit from cooperating with other
communities in the San Miguel Basin.

Strictly speaking, the

San Miguel Basin is that geographic area drained by the San
Miguel Riveri but, as generally used, the term designates
the West End and all of San Miguel County.
Tourism represents a common alternative for communities
In the western United States that face hard times because of
a slump or bust in an extractive industry.

As early as 1962

members of Naturita's chamber of commerce joined
representatives from the towns of Norwood, Telluride, Ouray,
and Ridgway (the latter two communities lie within the
boundaries of Ouray County) to promote tourism in the area.
Initially, the boosters' plans were not extraordinarily
ambitious:

liThe group will erect signs in the vicinity of La

Sal, Utah In an effort to route tourists through this
area.

11 15

In succeeding years there were similar efforts to
IIstress tourism, II and lIattract the tourist dollar. II

In 1970

residents of the San Miguel Basin formed an area-wide
chamber of commerce, a group that worked toward the goal of
attracting not only tourists, but also new businesses.

The

group's promotional efforts succeeded, at least for one
community in the San Miguel Basin.
15 11

The West End watched as

Joint Effort,lI Forum, 28 June 1962, p. 1.
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"opportunity knocked"--in Telluride.

By the early 1970s

Telluride, conveniently located in the mountains, had
developed into a popular ski resort, complete with new chair
lifts, condos, and "an accompanying real estate boom. ,,16
The West End could not compete with Telluride for the
tourist dollar.

It is rarely a destination for travelers,

except those who happen to live there.

It lacks the

spectacular mountains to which tourists traditionally flock
in both winter and summer, and also the cozy alpine charm
that resort developers, event organizers, restauranteurs,
hoteliers, and store owners easily exploit.

The West End's

assets--the stark, serene, high desert landscape, pleasant
weather during much of the year, and its location near the
Uncompahgre National Forest--are less appreciated by
tourists and more difficult to capitalize on.
isolation presents a problem.

As ever,

Moab, Utah, once an unknown

town with a history, climate, and geographical setting
similar to the West End's, has grown into a tourist mecca.
But Moab benefitted from its proximity to two major
attractions, Arches National Park and Canyonlands National
Park.

Moab is also only thirty miles from an Interstate

Highway.

It is true that many would consider the landscape

16"Tourist Dollar Importance Stressed," Forum, 22 April
1965, p. 3; "Opportunity Knocked in Aspen 20 Years Ago.
It
Knocked Again in Vail 8 Years Ago.
It Knocketh Now in
Telluride" (advertisement ) , San Miguel Basin Forum, 30
August 1972, p. 10; Grace Herndon, "Progress Catching up
with SM Basin," San Miguel Basin Forum, 27 December 1972, p.
5.
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surrounding Mo a b to b e much more spectacular, and better
suited and more a cces sible t o bicyclists, hikers, four - wheel
drive vehicle en t husi asts, and those who recreate on the
rlvers.
The West End's rlvers have not attracted rafters or
outfitters, perhaps because the rivers run too shallow
during the summer.

The area's mining legacy, though

interesting to the history buff, lacks the romantic quality
associated with Colorado's silver and gold mlnlng
communities, many of which use that mining history as a
tourist attraction.

A West End resident once asked,

"Do you

think people would like to tour a uranium mine?
think they would pay for it?,, 17

Do you

Somehow, the prospect

seems unlikely.
The people of the San Miguel Basin investigated other
ways to augment their economy.

In 1970 the San Miguel Basin

Development Association promoted the area as the possible
site for a paper mill, probably to have been located in
Norwood.

The efforts drew the interest of a firm that

requested information about the area's resources.

Then, In

1972 a group of farmers in the area investigated the

possibility of establishing a "cooperative cheese factory"

17Stephen Singular, "Two Western Colorado Towns Want
This Opportunity to Go to Waste--Nuclear Waste," Empire
(Sunday supplement to the Denver Post), 23 October 1983, 30.
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and da iry operation . 18

Both of these ideas had promlse ,

given the resour ces o f the area; however, the plans never
materialized.
In 1970 the Four Corners Regional Commission funded a
study entitled Alternative Economic Development Programs for
the San Miguel Basin, published in 1971. 19

The authors

designed the study "to provide an economic inventory of the
San Miguel Basin," and "to develop a set of alternative
growth approaches based upon an analysis of the Basin's
strengths, weaknesses and potentials."

As part of the

"economic inventory," the authors found a population of
5,500 in the San Miguel Basin,

people per square mile.

a population density of 2.1

(The average number of people per

square mile in the entire state was 21.2.)

In 1970 Uravan

had a population of 850; Nuc la , 949; Naturita, 820; Norwood,
408; and the population of Telluride stood at 553. 20

18 "New Lake and Possibility of a Paper Millon Agenda, "
Forum, 16 April 1970, p. 1; "Cheese Factory Idea Discussed,"
San Mi~uel Basin Forum, 1 March 1972, p. 1.
19The Four Corners Regional Commission was created as
part of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of
1965.
Members of the commission made funds available "for
planning, investigations, studies, demonstration projects,
and training programs" that would help "to reverse rural
unemployment and economic decline" in Arizona, Utah,
Colorado, and New Mexico.
Four Corners Regional Commission,
informational pamphlet from the Four Corners Regional
Commission, n.d., n.p.
2° John P. Byrden and others, Alternative Economic
Development Programs for the San Miguel Basin (n.p., Denver
Research Institute, University of Denver, 1971), 1, 3, 9.
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The authors o f t he study found, not surprisingly, that
the mining indus try p rovided the primary source of jobs and
income in the area.

This held especially true for the West

End; but there were ura nium mines in western San Miguel
County, and in the eastern part of that county there was
occasional gold and silver mining activity.

According to

the study, mining sustained 661 jobs, or forty-two percent
of the total,

in the San Miguel Basin.

The income from

those jobs totaled $5.8 million, about forty - six percent of
the basin's total lncome.

Those involved in the extraction

and processlng of ore earned, on average, substantially more
than others in the San Miguel Basin.

Jobs in the mining

industry paid an average of $8,800 annually; government
employees, second on this list, earned an average of $7,500
per year.

The authors of the study further concluded that

the mlnlng industry accounted for seventy - five percent of
the basin's "basic support."

They defined the term as

"a c tivity [that] brings money fr o m 'outside' into the l oca l
economy. ,, 21
The San Miguel Basin's agricultural enterprises
represented the second most important part of the economy.
Ranching and farming contributed fifteen percent of the
area's "basic support."
1970,

There were 180 agricultural jobs In

each of which paid an average of $6,000 per year.

Agriculture provided the "stabilizer that offset the 'boom
21 Ibid., 11, 10.
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the 'boom or bust' cycles associated with mlnlng activities
In the area." 22
Farmers In t he West End and the San Miguel Basin grew
mostly grains and hay , which they sold to local ranchers.
Coors Brewing Company provided the market for the only
export crop, moravian barley.

Although farmers experienced

some difficulties raising the barley, it was said that Coors
paid "premium" prices.

The lack of rainfall and irrigation

water prevented larger, more diverse farms in the West End
and the rest of the San Miguel Basin. 23
Livestock operations produced the most lucrative
agricultural export in the region.

In 1969 there were

52,700 head of cattle in all of Montrose County.

(Those who

kept such statistics did not estimate the number of cattle
raised in the West End alone.)

San Miguel County ranchers

owned eight thousand cattle In 1969.

But because ranchers

depended on outside markets and other factors that varied
from year to year,

their business was not always profitable.

In the late 1970s, for example, the owner of a ranch near
Naturita claimed that "all cattle producers have been losing
money on their operations. ,, 24
22 Ibid., 3, II,

Agricul ture in the West End

75.

23 I b l' d ., 75-76; "Water Shortages and Soil Conditions
Limit Farming Here , " San Miguel Basin Forum, 17 August 1978,
p. 28.
24 Byrden and others, Alternative Economic Development
Programs, 75, 90; "Water Shortages and Soil Conditions Limit
Farming Here," San Miguel Basin Forum, 17 August 19 7 8, p.
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and the San Mi g u el Ba sin remained stable, but could n o t be
described as vigorous or growlng.
Thus, the autho r s of Alternative Economic Development
Programs for the San Miguel Basin encountered a situation in
which "prosperity has always depended on decisions made far
away."

During lean times, this situation led to a "feeling

of helplessness and frustration."

However, although they

found "no strikingly identifiable, broad-based body of
leadership to lift the economy," they did find individuals
determined to solve the area's economic problems.

The

authors proposed seven "themes of development" for the
basin, and stressed the need for cooperation between the
various communities of the basin, area-wide planning, and
political action.

The study included the advantages and

disadvantages that would result from each theme of
development, and also the efforts that would be required to
implement each of the themes. 25
The proposed themes of development stand as a testament
to the difficulties encountered by those who would diversify
the economy.

To implement the "alternative economlC

development programs," residents of the San Miguel Basin
would have needed a considerable investment from outside
sources.

Each theme of development depended upon the type

28.

25Byrden and others, Alternative Economic Development
Programs,S, 13, 14-36.
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of int e r e st and suppo rt, mostly from government agencles,
that the We st End and the San Miguel Basin had always found
so difficult to a ttra ct.

This irony was lost, apparently,

even t o the authors o f the study.
For example, the authors proposed that residents
promote "traditional" tourist activities, like camplng,
hunting, fishing,

hiking, and off-road vehicle recreation.

The owners of "woode d, scenic mountain land"

(in San Miguel

County) might establish resorts, or rent access to the land.
However, this type of development necessitated "public
investments" by the Forest Service and the state government
to improve the area's highways, campgrounds, and game and
fish areas.

A second tourism related development pro posal

had to do with Telluride's potential as a ski resort . 26

As

noted, In the early 1970s this theme of development came to
pass.
The potential f o r mineral extraction constituted a
third economic developme nt program.

At vari o us locations In

the San Miguel Basin there were deposits of gold, silver,
copper, tungsten, bog iron, potash, gypsum, salt, and
natural gas.

But it seemed unlikely that, with the

exception of some gold and silver extraction at a mlne near
Telluride, any of these deposits would stimulate commercial
interest.

The authors of the study did forecast a favorable

market for uranlum, seemingly five to ten years in the
26 Ibid., 15-16, 19-20.
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future, and sugges ted a possible resurgence in the uranlum
i ndustry.

But r eside nts could do very little to promote

uranium; the autho rs of the study could suggest only to
"demonstrate interest, use political influence,

[and]

facilitate housing" to encourage this type of development.
Any economic growth tied to uranium would come as a result
of the nation's need for nuclear energy, and from the
investments of big companies.

The uranium industry, as

those in the West End knew all to well, depended upon
factors beyond their control.
the study pointed out,

Besides, as the authors of

"mineral development alone cannot

sustain a region's long term economic growth." 27
A fourth theme of development, admittedly "theoretical
In concept," called for "'new city' type of urban
development."

The authors of Alternative Economic

Development Programs for the San Miguel Basin saw a
possibility for the "experimental development of new towns
in rural areas which are prepared to plan and cooperate."
New cities would develop because of an increase in the
nation's population, and because of "public policy" efforts
that would encourage people to settle in underpopulated
areas.

The idea would necessitate "government funding for

rural renewal," government subsidies for "basic employment,"
and the "private development of lands now owned by the
government."

One envisions a massive, government-sponsored

27 Ibid., 29-30, 39-45, 50-56, 48.
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and government-di rect ed relocation program; to some , such an
effort seemed "enti re ly possible" and appeared "worthwhile
to consider." 28

While there has been, in recent years,

some migration from urban centers to rural areas, it has not
been directl y subsidized by the federal government and it
has not tremendousl y affected the population or economic
fortune of the West End.
The remaining themes of development correlated to
massive federal spending of another sort: the construction
of a big new dam and reservoir in San Miguel County.
project would stimulate the economy in three ways.

Such a
First of

all, the actual construction of the reservoir would last
approximately ten years, create two hundred construction
jobs, increase the area's population, and generate
additional retail sales and taxes.

Secondly, the dam

p roje ct would facilitate a broad new range of tourist
activities in the San Miguel Basin.

Finally, the reservoir

would allow for the irrigation of more arable land,
attracting as many as "125 new family size farm units" to
the San Miguel Basin.

The types of development spurred by

the San Miguel Reclamation Project would be of a reliable,
a l though not spectacular, sort, and it could well have
proved a "major attracting force for

[other]

economlc development over the years to come."

sorts of
Also, it

entailed few drawbacks that could not be mitigated with land
28

I b'l d

.,

32-33.
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use plans and control s.

The residents of Placerville, In

San Miguel Count y , fa ced the most dire consequence; the
reservoir would "inundate" that community. 29
The idea for some sort of irrigation project In this
part of Colorado originated In the 1930s.

Most of the

"investigative work" on the project began In 1957, with the
creation of the San Miguel Water Conservancy District.

The

board of the conservancy district worked with the Bureau of
Reclamation to develop a feasibility report, which the
Bureau of Reclamation produced in 1966.

By that time,

almost one million dollars of "state, local, and federal
funds" had been spent on the study.

As of 1966 the plan

called for a dam on a creek between Norwood and Placerville;
this would create a reservoir with seventy-two thousand acre
feet of water.

(Apparently, in this first version of the

plan, the water in the reservoir would not inundate
Placerville.)

Tunnels constructed from the dam site would

create the smaller Naturita Reservoir and Radium Reservoir,
both of which would be in San Miguel County, near the
Montrose County line.

Tunnels from these smaller reserVOlrs

would lead to varlOUS parts of the West End and San Miguel
County for irrigation purposes. 30

29Ibid., 21-28.
30"Long Awaited Feasibility Report lS Now Complete,
Forum, 10 March 1966, p. 1.

11
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The San Miguel Project, estimated to cost about $68
million in 1966, seeme d to have enough support In the late
1960s to insure comple tion.

However, the federal

legislature never gave final approval for the bill that
would authorize the construction of the San Migu el Project
and four other Colorado reclamation programs.

In 1971

supporters of the project received more federal funding for
more studies, but the project continued to languish,
ultimately because of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of
Congress.

Also, by 1973 those who opposed the project for

reasons related to its environmental impacts had made their
vie ws known; such opposition further delayed the project.
Nearly ten years later, In 1982, the "dream of many"
continued "to Slmmer on the back burners of the f e deral
government as future food for thought."

By then, the latest

version of the plan called for the rerouting of a nearby
highway; this added an enormous sum t o the overall co st
projections, and the available federal money was beginning
to get scarce .

The di rec tor of the Co l orado Wat er

Conservation Board noted that "before, it was one hundred
percent federal money .

Now,

if we want these projects, we

are going to have to negotiate with the federal gove rnment
and provide some of the funding." 31

Not surprisingl y , the

Aspinall Report s on Local Proj ect Hearings," Forum,
19 May 1966, p. 1; "Basin Bill Dies," Forum, 1 September
1966, p. 1; "Board Predicts Project Completion by '78,"
Forum, 17 July 1969, p. 1; "San Miguel Project to Get
$150,000," San Miguel Basin Forum, 12 August 1971, p. 1;
31 "
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dream of the San Migu el Reclamation Project never
mat erialized.
Like the e ff ort to build the San Miguel Project,
attempts t o diversify and expand the economy of the San
Miguel Basin , and especial ly of the West End, ended
unhappily.

Of course, it might be assumed that the West

End's lack of growth did not disappoint all residents.

One

woman who has spent most of her life there remarked that "a
lot of people feel like we're letting the world pass us by,
but I would just as soon [let it] . ,, 32

So much the better,

perhaps, that tourists do not flock to the West End.

It

leaves the roads uncongested, the countryside less litt ered .
Re sidents of the West End appreciate their small town
lifestyles and the area's rural atmosphere; otherwise, they
would not live there.

Fast food re staurants and big

discount stores are signs of economic growth --or , the prl ce
a town pays for growth, some might say.
But for its isolation the West End has paid a prlce, as
well.

Funding for schools and public services sometimes

falls short.

High school graduates often cannot stay In the

area, and college graduates cannot return, because of the
lack of jobs.

The area's small economy hinders efforts t o

"San Miguel Dam Project Discussed at Redvale," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 24 October 1973, p. 5; "San Miguel Project on
State's List Again," San Miguel Basin Forum, 13 May 1982, p.
1.

32 Interview #4.
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maintain healt h care servlces

l

or facilities for older

These type s of needs prompted West End community

citizens.

leaders constantly to look for new ways to lure money into
the local economy.
revenue

1

Lacking new jobs, new sources of

most in the West End had no qualms with the uranlum

industrYI

if only it would revive itself and remain steady.

In the early 1970s a West End resident addressed the
general topic of growth and the future of "Colorado West."
In a wide-ranging jeremiad
California

l

l

a newcomer

l

recently moved from

accused West Enders of taking for granted the

beauty and solitude in which they lived.

She reminded them

that in some places--namelYI California--people had no
chance to breathe fresh air, or "to walk alone on a mountain
top or valley without rude interruption from planes, cars,
and motorcycles."

She urged western Coloradans to prepare

for the inevitable "onslaught" from the "disillusi oned and
desperate" throngs of pe op le seeking refuge from overcrowded
California.

She warned that without "planning and zoning / "

words that "elicit expressions of horror / " western Colorado
would "become another disaster area akin to metropolitan Los
Angeles where the magnificent orange groves were chewed up
and spat out into masses of concrete and people. ,, 33
Lest her words be taken for hyperbole, the writer
pointed out that the "destruction" of western Colorado had

33Virginia Rasmussen "What/s Ahead for Colorado West / "
Forum 7 January 1971 p. 1.
1

l

1
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alre ady b egun .

She l amented the neglect that allowed old

buildings t o cru mbl e , and the apparent indifference t o the
e stablishment o f junkyards in plain view.

She disparaged

those who left "dere lict cars to rust and attract rats,"
unloaded refuse "in a remote cedar grove," or planted "trash
around their homes instead of flowers and trees."

And she

attacked the uranium industry and its supporters:
I resent--for the pioneers who sought the beauty
of this country--the disgorging of the bowels of
the mountains by man and the effluent from his
purging left in the open for all to see.
I
resent--for the residents--the carelessness of the
mills.
The blackmail so evident- - "Accept our
pollution of water and air or go jobless." The
terror of making waves lest the millowner pack up
and leave. 34
The environmental aspects of mlnlng and milling were
not the primary concern of West End residents at the time,
and these comments probably endeared the writer to few of
her new neighbors.

Answering the criticism that resulted

from the letter cited above, another resident enjoined,
"Give her a break!

It takes a while for newcomers to

understand us and we don't always welcome newcomers,
especially newcomers with new ideas. ,, 35
The uranium industry did revive, and the economl C slump
that hit the West End in the early 1970s began to abate in
the mid-1970s.

The purchase of uranium by power companies

34 Ibid.
35Letters to the Editor, San Miguel Basin Forum, 18
February 1971, p. 7.
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caused the rebo u nd.

In 1975 and 1976 ten nuclear

powerplants opene d , a nd the nation's use of nuclear
generated electricity jumped to 9.4 percent of the total In
1976, up from SlX percent In 1974.

Long range forecasts

called for an even greater demand for uranium from utility
companles, In part because it cost much less than coal.

In

response to the new demand, uranium companies opened new
mlnes, built new mills, expanded the production capabilities
of old mills, and accelerated the exploration for new ore
reserves.

In 1976 the sixteen uranium mills in the United

States "operated at the highest average rate per mill ever
attained (1,500 tons of ore per day) . "

(The production of

uranium did not lncrease as dramatically because the ores
were generally of a lower grade.)
yellowcake,

The mills' product,

fetched forty-three dollars per pound in 1978.

This represents a tremendous increase from the eight dollar
per pound rate in 1968; but, by 1978 the costs of
exploration , mining, and processing had also risen
dramatically. 36
The favorable market spurred a boom in the West End,
and several companies competed for uranium.

General

36James H. Jolly, "Uranium," In Minerals Yearbook,
1975, volume 1, Metals, Minerals, and Fuels (Washington, DC :
Government Printing Office, 1977), 1425; James H. Jolly,
"Uranium," in Minerals Yearbook, 1976, volume 1, Metals,
Minerals, and Fuels (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1978), 1373-1374, 1379; Alan Gersten, "Uranium: A
State Force Since Marie Curie," Rocky Mountain News, 9 Jul y
1978, p.

6.

2 71
Electric Corporation constructed an ore buying station near
Naturita, where the old VCA mill once stood.
Electric,

General

"the world's largest manufacturer of nuclear

boiling water reactors, nuclear cores and complete power
plahts," bought ore to ensure a constant supply of uranlum
for its own needs.

The company shipped its ore to a mill

owned by Energy Fuels Nuclear in Blanding, Utah.

Cotter

Corporation, a subsidiary of the power company Commonwealth
Edison, entered the West End uranium industry.

Cotter mined

ore on land in the Uravan Mineral Belt and shipped it to a
crushing plant at Whitewater, near Grand Junction; from
there, the ore was sent to the company 's mill in Canon City,
Colorado.

That arrangement proved impractical, however, and

after only several weeks Cotter closed the facilities at
Whitewater and shipped its ore to the Uravan mill.

Ranchers

Exploration and Development Corporation extracted uranium
from mill tailings left by VCA near Naturita.

The company

moved 630,000 tons of tailings to the southeast end of the
Paradox Valley; in less than two years, Ranchers Exploration
had removed from the tailings 380,443 pounds of uranium
oxide in concentrate, and 1,835,280 pounds of vanadium. 37
Union Carbide continued its steadfast mining and
milling activities in the West End.

In the late 1970s the

Uravan mill provided employment to 184, the highest total
37 Paul Hathaway, "Uranium: Boom is the Word for Mineral
Belt," Daily Sentinel, 14 September 1976 Mining Edition, p.
34; Chenoweth, "Historical Review," 25, 27.
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slnce the lat e 1950s.
its mining depart ment .

Carbide also employed 471 people In
About one-half of the company's

mining employees live d in the West End; the remainder of the
mine employees, because of the location of the various
mines, lived In Dolores County, San Miguel County, and In
southeastern Utah. 38
The West End once agaln bustled with activity; ore
trucks and drilling rigs appeared with greater frequency,
and the roadways filled with vehicles carrying mlners,
engineers, and geologists to work.

Wages rose as companles

competed for mining, drilling, or trucking services.
Business flourished at gas stations, grocery stores,
restaurants, bars, and hotels, the rooms of which rarely
went unoccupied.

A businessman established a mobile home

sales lot in Nucla, and a new trailer park opened in
Naturita.

New homes were built, but still there was not

enough housing to meet the demand.

The influx of new

families and businesses strained the capacity of Nucla's
water system. 39

It must have seemed like old times.

38Uravan Mill: Employee Turnover 1968-1979 , Turnover
1968-1979 file, drawer 34 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records; Ted
G. Early to Terry N. Washburn, 4 September 1980, Uravan
Correspondence file, drawer Fll172-Fll197, room 126, Umetco
Records.
39 Paul Hathaway, "Uranium: Boom is the Word for Mineral
Belt," Daily Sentinel, 14 September 1976 Mining Edition, p.
34; "Mining Belt's Growth Seen in Economy," Daily Sentinel,
14 September 1976 Mining Edition, p. 38; Vivian Blue, "Boom
Town Dilemma Discussed," Daily Sentinel, 25 October 1977, p.
5; Bill Conrad, "Imp act--Nucla," Daily Sentinel, 11 June
1978, p. 1.
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Boom town rowd iness also revisited the West End.

In

Naturita alone there were seven "liquor outlets," and bar
fights broke out ofte n.

In Nucla,

the town board voted to

suspend a bar owner's license because of the fighting that
occurred every week in his establishment.

And in 1978 a

counselor employed by the Midwestern Colorado Mental Health
Clinic in Norwood moved to the West End in response to an
increased "alcohol treatment caseload. ,, 40
Reporters covering the West End during the late 1970s
discovered among the residents a feeling of cautious
optimism about the latest boom.

Because of the nation's

growing need for energy, many counted on a continued demand
for uranium.

Nevertheless, no one discounted the

possibility of another bust.

There also seems to have been

some ambivalence about the state of affairs.
Nucla's newspaper described

II

The editor of

a sense of awkwardness and

hesitancy among the local people."

The real profits from

uranium went to "outsiders," those with "the means and the
money to extract what is largely inaccessible to local
residents."

Meanwhile, West Enders wat ched, feeling

beguiled and exploited as "the fruits of their land" were
taken away.

"The outward galn of economics," according to

4°"Friday the 13th Date of Bar Brawls In Naturita," San
Miguel Basin Forum, 19 October 1978, p. 9; "Bar Vows Fight
Against Board," San Miguel Basin Forum, 20 July 1977, p. 1;
"Full Time Alcohol Counselor Now In West End," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 12 January 1978, p. 1.
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this writer,

"is some how lessened by the inward loss of

ownership. ,, 41
Even among the "outsiders," the leaders of the uranlum
industry that determined the economlC fortunes of the West
End, there existed some ambivalence concerning the health of
the industry.

"The current status of the nuclear power and

uranlum industries in the U. S. lS a paradoxical contrast
between optimistic activity in exploration and mlnlng
and continuing uncertainties at utilities."

The optimism

stemmed from the realization that nuclear power was
"necessary, clean, safe, and cheap."

However, the

industry's future remained uncertain because of "a confusing
array of government regulations, a small but vocal antinuclear block, a reassessment by utilities of future
electrical growth rates, and crippling inflation. ,, 42
As if on cue, the problems inherent in the nuclear
power industry began to reveal themselves; the industry
experienced setbacks from which, some say, it will never
recover.

The phrase "uncertain future," and the word

"uncertainties" appeared often in descriptions of the

41"Mining Bel t' s Growth Seen in Economy," Daily
Sentinel, 14 September 1976 Mining Edition, p. 38; Vivian
Blue, "Boom Town Dilemma Discussed," Daily Sentinel, 25
October 1977, p. 5; "Which is More Blessed?" San Miguel
Basin Forum, 10 November 1976, p. 2.
42 James F. Davis, "Uranium Industry Develops Despi te
Nuclear Uncertainties," San Miguel Basin Forum, 17 August
1977, p. 14.
Davis was the General Manager, Uranium
Exploration, of the Rocky Mountain Energy Company.
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nuclea r p o we r indu stry.

If perception is reality, then the

b e ginning o f the indu stry's pro blems began in March of 1 9 79,
with t he i nfamo u s a c cident at the Three Mile Island nuclear
power station.

The accident focused unprecedented public

attention on the industry.

It transferred "the burden of

proof from those who claim nuclear power is not safe to
those who claim it is."

The much more serious accident at

the Chernobyl plant, in April of 1986,

"may have marked the

final breach of trust between nuclear leaders and their
increasingly skeptical constituents. ,, 43
But many observers have pointed out that the nuclear
power industry suffered problems that predated Three Mile
Island.

In the 1970s industry leaders vastly overestimated

the nation's future need for energy.

They planned the

construction of nuclear power plants to meet a need that
would not exist.

They also erred tremendously in estimating

the cost of constructi o n, which s o ared above the original
projections.

Worse, the builders of nuclear reactors

overestimated their own capabilities.

They built react o rs

with serious flaws, design and safety liabilities that
either caused costly delays, or later proved extremely
expensive to correct.

The accident at Three Mile Island

provided justification for even more stringent safety

43Victor Gilinsky, "The Impact of Three Mile Island,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 36 (January 1980): 18;
Christopher Flavin, "Nuclear Power's Burdened Future,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43 (July - August 1987): 26.
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measures, mandat e d by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
adding more to the c ost of nuclear power plants. 44
The nuclear industry never resolved a method by which
to dispose of its waste, highly radioactive spent fuel rods
and other, less radioactive materials.

This "most

intractable problem" has added to the costs of nuclear
power, and lessened any remaining public enthusiasm for it.
The industry suffers from one final difficulty, that of
decommissioning plants that either developed problems too
expenslve to repair, or that near the end of serviceability.
Estimates for the cost of decommissioning are enormous;
given the industry's previous record, those estimates may be
too low.

In a 1990 study researchers concluded that nearly

five hundred billion dollars, at the dollar's 1990 value,
had been spent in the nation's nuclear energy program Slnce
1950.

Through subsidies and grants the government had

supplied approximately one-fifth of that amount.

In the

view of industry observers, the return never matched the
investment.

America's nuclear power program has been called

"the largest managerial disaster in business history, a
disaster on a monumental scale. ,,4 5
44 Flavin, "Nuclear Power's Burdened Future," 27;
Gilinsky, "Impact of Three Mile Island," 19; Phillip A.
Greenberg, "Dreams Die Hard," Sierra 78 (November-December
1993): 82 - 83; "Nuclear Woes," National Review, 14 June 1985,
16-17.
45Greenberg, "Dreams Die Hard," 85; the oplnlon at the
end of the paragraph comes from the February 1985 issue of
Forbes magazine, quoted by Greenberg on page 102.
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Beginn i n g in 197 5 orders for new reactors began to be
canceled and withdrawn; in fact,

between 1974 and 1 9 87 all

new orders for nu c lear power plants were eventually
canceled.

As of 1987, the plans for 108 reactors had been

scrapped.

During that time the nation's output of

electricity from nuclear reactors actually increased,
because the power plants started before 1975 became operable
In the 1980s. 46
The arrest of the growth of the nuclear power industry
directly impacted the nation's uranium industry, and the
impact is seemingly traceable to 1979.

In that year

yellowcake sold for forty-three to forty-five dollars per
pound.

However, the uranium companies had been producing

enormous amounts of yellowcake,
utilities could use.
drop.

far more uranium than the

This excess supply caused the prlce t o

By the early part of 1980 many companies had scaled

back uranium exploration activities in anticipation of a
reduced demand for uranlum.

By the end of 1980 the prlce

for yellowcake had fallen to twenty-eight dollars, and by
1985 the price stood at fifteen dollars per pound.

The

production of one pound of yellowcake, from mine to mill,
cost an average of thirty dollars.

Employment figures

corresponded to the price of uranium concentrate.

In 1979

the uranium industry employed twenty-two thousand people.
By 1981 only fourteen thousand people worked in the
46 Flavin,

"Nuclear Power's Burdened Future," 26-27.
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indust r y , and by 1985 the number had been pared to two
thousand. 47
The bust In the uranlum industry precipitated a crlSlS
In the maJor uranlum producing portion of Colorado: the West
End of Montrose County, and the far western parts of San
Miguel and Dolores Counties.

Before the bust that area's

population was estimated at 7,000, and the uranium industry
provided jobs to 1,080 people.

By March of 1981 sixty-four

percent, or 695 people, had lost their jobs in the three
counties combined.

In the West End of Montrose County alone

there were 3,963 residents in 1980, and approximately
thirty-six percent of the paid workforce, or 690 people,
worked in the uranium industry before the bust. 48

Within a

few years virtually no one worked in the mines, and Union
Carbide employed fewer than one hundred at its mill.
Union Carbide's employment figures,

(For

see Table 4 on the

following page.)
The number of unemployed grew as the uranlum
companies--General Electric, Cotter Corporation, Atlas
Minerals, and various others--scaled back their operations,
47 "Townsfolk in Dumps over Industry Slump," Rocky
Mountain News, 31 May 1981, p. 61; "The Glow Has Faded from
Uranium Mining," Business Week, 18 February 1980, 64; Mark
Crawford, "Mill Tailings: A $4-Billion Problem," Science 229
(9 August 1985): 537; Don Snow, "Uranium Tomorrow," High
Country News 13 (11 December 1981): 10; "The NUEXCO price of
Uranium Remains $15 per lb for April," San Miguel Basin
Forum, 4 April 1985, p. 1.
48 Rocky Mountain Consulting Associates, Crises In the
West End, 12-13, 18.

279

Table 4. -- Uni o n Carbi de Employee Residences, Uravan Area,
September 1980
Mine Employees

Total

49

164

131

131

63

98

Moab, UT

58

58

La Sal, UT

36

36

16

17

33

5

27

32

Monticello, UT

19

19

Cortez, CO

17

17

4

11

Slick Rock, CO

10

10

Cahone, CO

10

10

8

8

5

7

6

6

2

4

3

3

Location

Mi ll Employees

Uravan

115

Dove Creek, CO
Nucla

Naturita
Norwood, CO

Redvale, CO

35

7

Egnar, CO
Paradox

2

Grand Junction
Bedrock, CO

2

Dolores, CO
Gateway, CO

2

2

Shiprock, NM

2

2

Pleasant View, CO

2

2

Montrose

1

1

Delta, CO

1

1

471

655

Total

184

The category "mine employees" includes support personnel,
mlne office and shop employees, and exploration personnel,
as well as mlners.
Source: Jack Frost, Umetco Minerals
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and then eventually q uit the uranlum business altogether.
The independent mi ne rs and small companies lost their
livelihood be cau se t hey could not sell their ore.

The

incomes lost fr om the uranium bust multiplied, because
retail business in the West End fell, perhaps as much as
fifty to sixty percent.

Many of the unemployed left,

reducing the population of the West End by about twenty-five
percent; as the 1980s progressed, the population would
dwindle even further.

Many of those who stayed applied for

food stamps, unemployment lnsurance, or other types of
government assistance. 49
The social c o nsequences of the uranlum bust were
documented In a study entitled Crises in the West End:
Social and Economic Impacts of the Uranium Market Bust.

The

researchers compiled information from the West End of
Montrose County, and the uranium dependent western parts o f
San Miguel and Dolores Counties.

Doctors and nurses

reported that, because of financial difficulties, many
delayed or forsook medical and dental care for themselves
and their children.

At the same time, however, mental

health officials reported an increase in their alcohol abuse
caseload, a development "directly associated with the
anxiety and insecurity connected with loss of jobs."

A

counselor with the Midwestern Colorado Mental Health Clinic
49 Ibid., 3, 8, 41-42, 47-48; "Naturita's World Hasn't
Much Joy This Christmas," Denver Post, 21 December 1981, p.
SB.
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noted that the facility's caseload increased even as the
area's population decreased.

But there was an even more

dramatic indication of anxiety,

insecurity, worry , and

depression; in a ten-month period of 1980 and 1981 ten men
in the three uranium-producing counties committed
suicide. 50
More than one person pointed out that the West End had
been through hard times before.

But the situation in 1981

induced an unusual feeling of hopelessness.
one woman,

According to

it was "the worst I've seen things in the 27

years I've been here."

The reason for the "hysteria," as

another resident termed it, was that even Union Carbide, the
West End's largest employer, found itself enervated by the
uranium bust.

As the locals recalled,

"even when other

operations around here shut down, we always had Carbide."
And,

"we've seen some bad times before, but Carbide never

shu t down." 51
Indeed, it must have seemed impossible; In nearly fifty
years of operation Uni on Carbide was a West End institution,
it represented a way of life.

Yet,

inexorably, as the

uranium market vanished the company reduced the scope of its
50Rocky Mountain Consulting Associates, Crises in the
West End, 35-40; Bob Silbernagel, "Unemployment, Alcohol
Breed West End Suicide," Daily Sentinel, 3 May 1981, p. 7.
51"Naturita's World Hasn't Much Joy This Christmas,"
Denver Post, 21 December 1981, 5B; Bob Silbernagel, "Mill
Closing Leaves West End in Dilemma," Daily Sentinel, 8 March
1981, p. 1; Rocky Mountain Consulting Associates, Crises in
the West End, 6.
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operations, and then shut down completely.
1980 Carbide laid off seventy-three miners.

Near the end of
In March of

1981 the company reduced the workforce at the Uravan mill
from 180 to 90.

Carbide actually closed the mill for SlX

months in 1981, but still kept about ninety employees to
maintain the mill.

From 1982 to 1984 Union Carbide

continued to produce yellowcake from stockpiled ore to meet
its long term contract commitments.

However, the mill

operated only about six months each year, and with a greatly
reduced workforce.

Meanwhile, the company let go more and

more of its miners; by 1983 all of the company's mines had
been closed. 52
Union Carbide never intended to abandon Uravan and its
interest in uranium.

Not only did company spokesmen say

that, they also indicated through their actions that they
intended to hold out until it became profitable once agaln
to process uranium.

For several years, until the mid-1980s,

the company kept a small crew employed to maintain the mill
in standby condition.

Company officials predicted that the

price of uranium would rise after the existing stockpiles of
yellowcake were depleted.

In the early 1980s, however, no

one expected the price of uranlum to rebound for a long

52 Bob Silbernagel, "Carbide Layoffs to Begin," Daily
Sentinel, 2 March 1981, p. 18; "Carbide Reduces Mining
Employees," San Miguel Basin Forum, 4 November 1982, p. 1;
"UMETCO to Suspend Milling Operations at Uravan," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 4 October 1984, p. 3.
The name of the company
changed from Union Carbide to Umetco Minerals in 1983.
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time, at least five years.

Eventually , toward the end of

1984, Union Carbide closed the Uravan mill for the last

Even then, the company maintained the belief "that

time.

market conditions will eventually improve and allow a return
to normal operations. ,, 53

But the market never returned to

"normal" and the Uravan mill never started up agaln.
With the West End in a depression there may have been a
few people who resented Union Carbide.

"It eats at me that

I had loyalty to Carbide--took a lot--and now they don't
care about me.

I feel betrayed and angry, like I've been

used until I'm not of any use to anybody."
more sympathetic to the company's situation:

Another man was
"You can't

punch Union Carbide for closing down, but a lot of us would
like to."

Probably most residents of the West End withheld

blame from the company.

A Uravan man whom the company laid

off felt no bitterness.

"It isn't Union Carbide's fault.

They warned us about the layoff and helped out. ,, 54
Company officials assisted when they could.

Some

workers transferred to Union Carbide operations in other
states.

To others, those closer to the retirement age

specified in the company pension plan, the company granted a
53 Deborah Frazier / "Mining Towns Face Long-Term
Economic Woes/" Rocky Mountain News 31 May 1981/ p. 14;
Umetco Minerals Corporation/ News Release/ 27 September
1984/ Seniority List and Manpower List file/ drawer 292 Ua/
room 126, Umetco Records.
54Rocky Mountain Consulting Associates/ Crises In the
West End/ 64; Deborah Frazier/ "Mining Towns Face Long-Term
Economic Woes/" Rocky Mountain News/ 31 May 1981, p. 14.
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few years credit, allowing them to retire early.

In some

cases Union Carbide waived the rent for unemployed former
workers.

Company officials filed a petition with the

Department of Labor to obtain "trade adjustment assistance"
for their former employees.

This assistance helped

unemployed workers obtain relocation allowances,

job

training, placement services, counseling, and other such
servlces.

And, the company helped the newly formed West End

Economic Adjustment Committee secure a $25,000 federal
grant, to be used "for a study on the effects of the
recesslon and ways to combat them." 55
In 1985, just after the Uravan mill closed, the people
of the West End staged an appreciation to honor the company
that had employed West Enders for nearly fifty years.

The

towns of Nucla and Naturita proclaimed 30 March 1985 "Umetco
Day"

(Union Carbide became Umetco Minerals in 1983) .

Approximately one hundred people turned out, and ClVlC
leaders presented Umetco officials with a plaque
commemorating "49 years of social and economic support of
the West End."

As various participants explained, the

company had contributed not only jobs to the area, but also
considerable good will in the form of financial and material
donations for community projects.

Independent miners,

55 "375 Umetco Minerals Workers in Colorado,

Utah and
Wyoming Approved for Trade Adjustment Assistance," San
Miguel Basin Forum, 1 November 1984, p. 2; Bob Silbernagel,
"Community Leaders Seek to Offset Woes of Uranium Industry,"
Daily Sentinel, 3 May 1981, p. 14.
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contra ct mlners, and others who worked in the West End
uranium industry appreciated the company for its fair,
honorable, and generous business practices.
resident,

II

If Carbide hadn't come in here,

Said one
I suppose some

other company would have; but whether they would have been
as generous as Carbide,

I don't know." 56

56"Nucla and Naturita Proclaim UMETCO Day," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 21 March 1985, p. 9; Bob Silbernagel, "Carbide
Has Been Towns' Best Friend, Celebration Shows," Daily
Sentinel, 1 April 1985, p. 1A.
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CHAPTER 7
"URANIUM: A STATE FORCE SINCE MARIE CURIE" l
On 30 September 1997 a truck laden with twenty-five
tons of uranium ore keeled over on Interstate 25 near
Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The accident scattered several

tons of ore across the highway, causing a traffic jam as
workers removed the debris.

The driver of the truck escaped

with only mlnor injuries and the incident was, as accidents
involving big trucks go, not exceptional.

However, the

reac ti on of local residents and passing motorists was
extraordinary; many of them checked into a local hospital
for treatment for radiation exposure.

In fact,

room nurse used the expression "mass hysteria";

an emergency
"we had

people come in for basically just panic," she reported.

A

spokesman for the Colorado Springs Fire Department advised
that "anyone who may have come into contact with the dust
should be checked by their [sic] medical provider as a
precaution."
explained,

Exposure to the dust from the ore, he

lS hazardous:

"uranium miners all ended up

get t ing cancer. " 2

lAlan Gersten, "Uranium: A State Force Since Marie
Curie," Rocky Mountain Nev-Js, 9 July 1978, p. 6.
2"Truck Hauling Uranium Crashes in Colo. Springs,"
Daily Sentinel, 1 October 1997, p. 2B; Jim Mallory,
"Radioactive Cargo Spill Closes 1-25," Denver Post, 1
October 1997, p. lB.
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The panicked reaction

lS

understandable; few words are

as capable of causing hysteria as "radiation," which itself
lS

inextricably linked with cancer in the public perception.

But it is noteworthy that in the late twentieth century
uranium ore might be perceived as such a threat.

In the

early part of this century many people eagerly used various
remedies made with radioactive elements.

They drank or

bathed in radioactive water, applied or ingested various
radioactive ointments and potions, and sought cures in all
manner of devices manufactured with radioactive elements.
Thus, within the span of less than a century the popular
understanding of radiation has changed dramatically.

This

irony was not lost to the people of the West End, where so
much uranium had been mined and milled.

A woman who had

lived in the West End "through boom and bust" remembered the
days when people paid "for the privilege of sitting In a
uranium mine to expose themselves to radio-activity to cure
their ailments."

"Now," she observed,

"they think it would

wreck you." 3
Generally speaking, West Enders do not share the
popular anxiety over radiation.

They grew up with

radiation, some would say, or worked in the uranium industry

3Landa, "Bur i ed Treasure," 3 4 - 3 7; "Uranium and
Katherine Kadie.
. She Was Here Through Boom and Bust,"
San Miguel Basin Forum, 27 July 1978, p. 9.
Interestingly,
some people continue to visit uranium mines to cure their
ailments.
See Michael Finkel, "A Radioactive Lourdes," New
York Times Magazine, 24 December 1995, 34.
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all of their lives.

Indeed,

In the ear l y 1980s the

residents o f Naturita cour ted a company that sought to
establish a low-level radioactive waste dump.

They wanted

the company to build the facility in the West End as a way
to replace some of the jobs lost to the bust of the uranium
market. 4

The people of most communities would shudder at

the thought of living close to a nuclear waste dump.
Many in the West End discern an insidious element In
the public distrust of radiation.

The fear of nuc lear power

plants, they maintain, led to the rUln of the uranium
industry.

And the fear of radioactive contamination, many

believe, caused the end of Uravan and brought upheaval to
the communities of the West End.

Yet, because of the wide -

spread concern about radiation, a new industry arose in the
West End.

One might call it the remediation industry, and

it has helped the West End come through the collapse of the
uranium industry.
Although Union Carbide shut down its We st End mlnes and
mill in the mid-1980s, the company would maintain its
presence In the area for years to come.

Through nearly

fifty years of operation the company had accumulated a
liability that it could not abandon.

By 1984 Union Carbide

had amassed approximately ten million tons of mill tailings
and contaminates that resulted from decades of uranium and
4Eric Morgenthaler, "To Keep Their Town Alive, the
Residents of Naturita, Colo. Want a Nuclear Dump," Wall
Street Journal, 1 July 1982, p. lB.
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vanadium production.

This waste material, a source of low-

level radiation, had attracted considerable attention from
the state government, the federal government, environmental
groups, scientists, lawyers, and the general public.

For

Union Carbide and other uranium companies the tailings and
other waste have proven to be the scourge of the industry,
at best a nuisance and at worst a considerable threat to
human health.
A mill operation creates enormous amounts of the sandlike waste material; virtually all of the ore processed at a
mill comes out as waste, because uranium constitutes only a
tiny fraction of the original ore.

Some mills also removed

vanadium from the ore; still, removing the vanadium hardly
reduced the total amount of leftover tailings.
of ore that passed through the Uravan mill,
least 1,950 pounds of tailings remained.

For each ton

for example, at

Thus, ln any place

that a mill operated, there will be found tailings, ln
amounts that correspond to the Slze of the mill and the
length of time it functioned.

At various locations in the

western United States there were in 1985 perhaps 191 million
tons of uranium mill tailings. 5
Uranium mill tailings contain about eighty-five percent
of the ore's original radioactivity.

The milling process

removed virtually all of the uranium, ninety-two to ninetyeight percent.
5Crawford,

But the waste contains all of the uranium
"Mill Tailings," 537.

290
decay products , elements that occur with the decay of
uranlum.

One of these elements is thorium-230, which has a

half life of 77,000 years.

Thorium decays through alpha

particle emission to radium, an element with a sixteen
hundred year half life.

Radium is the parent of radon, a

radioactive gas with a half life of about four days.

Due to

the long half life of thorium, uranium mill tailings
constitute an all but inexhaustible source of low-level
radiation. 6

The tailings also contain a number of non-

radioactive elements leached from the ore, and the reagents
used in the milling process.
Mill tailings are remarkably transient.

The owners of

many mills deposited their waste near rivers, and it was
thus "very susceptible to soil erosion processes and
downstream transport in the watershed."

It has been shown

that mill tailings are the source for dissolved radium in
rlvers, and this raises the concern that drinking water
sources have been, or may be contaminated.

Further,

"the

uptake by algae of radium-226 entering surface waters can
eventually also lead to incorporation into the human food
chain.,, 7

The most serious water pollution occurred when

6Edward Landa, Isolation of Uran i um Mill Tailings and
Their Component Radionuclides from the Biosphere--Some Earth
Science Perspectives, United States Department of the
Interior, Geological Survey Circular 814 (Washington, DC:
Government Printi n g Office, 1980), 5-6.
7Ibid., 7-8; "Uranium Tailings Taint Upper Colorado
River," High Country News 12 (7 March 1980): 13.
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there were relatively few controls on the discharge of mill
effluent and tailings.

Over time, state and federal

agencles began to regulate the discharges more strictly.
Tailings may also be blown about by the wind;
scientific investigation has revealed increased levels of
radiation, due to the wind transport of tailings, as far as
one mile from some tailings piles.

At a mill site in New

Mexico, nearby residents reported that winds carried
tailings in visible clouds up to six miles away.

Tailings

deposited in such a manner lncreases the risk for human
exposure to radiation.

It also raises the concern that

plants might become contaminated "as a result of either root
uptake and translocation or surficial contamination of
foliage by airborne particulates."

The cattle and wildlif e

that eat such plants represent a theoretical pathway through
which humans ingest radiation. 8
Mill waste may contaminate the soil and groundwater
that lies beneath it.

In some cases, radium leached into

the soil beneath tailings piles to depths of two to nine
feet.

The groundwater beneath tailings piles may contain

uranium, which is more readily transported to the
groundwater than is thorium or radium.

Although the mills

were designed to remove as much uranium as possible, some
8Quotation from Landa, Isolation of Uranium Mill
Tailings, 8; Steve Hinchman, "Rebottling the Nuclear Genie,"
High Country News 19 (19 January 1987): 1; Justas Bavarskis,
"Uranium: The West Mines, Mills, and Worships Radioactive
Fuel," High Country News 10 (10 March 1978): 7.

2 92
uranlum remained in the waste.

Tailings also contaminate

soils and groundwater with selenium and other nonradioactive elements that originated in the uranium ore.

9

When deposited, uranlum mill tailings have the
consistency of thin mud; the tailings emerge in a "slurry,"
mixed with the liquid effluent from the mill.

The liquid

drains rapidly from the surface of the pile, but the inner
portions of the pile remain wet for long periods of time.
And, if new tailings are constantly added, at least some
portion of the pile remains wet.

The waste in the "tailings

ponds" must be retained with a dam, generally constructed of
tailings materials.

At Church Rock, New Mexico, in 1979 a

dam retaining mill wastes broke.

The break released ninety-

four million gallons of liquid waste and 1,100 tons of
tailings.

This accident has been called "the largest

release of radioactive waste" in American history. 10
However, there occurred in Grand Junction an even
greater release of radioactive waste.

Between 1952 and 1966

mill tailings were used in that city for construction
purposes.

Very little thought was given to the control of

tailings at this time; in fact,

there were no federal

regulations concernlng tailings until the 1970s.

The use of

tailings as fill material was considered an efficient way to
9Landa, Isolation of Uranium Mill Tailings, 6, 9-19;
Hinchman, "Rebottling the Nuclear Genie," 6; Bavarskis,
"Uranium," 6.
I°Hinchman,

"Rebottling the Nuclear Genie," 1.
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dispose of accumulated waste.

Building contractors and home

owners hauled off approximately 300,000 tons of it.

About

fifty thousand tons were used under and around homes,
businesses, and schools as fill material for foundations and
for water and sewer lines.

(Apparently, the remainder was

used in the construction of highways, streets, and
sidewalks.)

The presence of tailings beneath an enclosed,

occupied structure presents a health risk, because radon gas
permeates concrete slabs and accumulates in the confined
space of the building.
As noted, thorium decays to radium, and radium is the
"parent" element of radon gas.

Radon emits alpha particles,

and thus is radioactive; but the odorless, colorless, inert
gas presents little concern, because a person exhales the
gas before the alpha radiation causes significant harm.

But

as the radon itself decays, it forms the radioactive
isotopes of bismuth, polonium, and lead.

These decay

products, sometimes called "radon daughters," are highly
charged, atomic sized, solid particles with half lives
ranging from less than a second to about twenty years.

The

radon decay products attach easily to lung tissue when
inhaled.

The alpha radiation emitted by these particles may

cause cellular damage that may result, after a latent period
of five to twenty years, In a cancerous growth.

If uranium

mill tailings are deposited beneath houses and other
buildings, as occurred in Grand Junction, the occupants will
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inhale extraordinarily high levels of radon decay
products. 11
This problem received widespread attention in the late
1960s and early 1970s .

In 1972 Congress appropriated money

to help the state of Colorado , which was to pay one quarter
of the cost, remove the tailings that had been installed
under and around buildings in Grand Junction.

The most

widespread use of tailings for construction purposes
occurred in Grand Junction, but it became evident that
buildings in many other towns and cities had been similarly
contaminated.

It also became clear that millions of tons of

tailings at various mill sites warranted attention. 12
In 1978 Congress passed the Uranium Mill Tailings
Radiation Control Act.

The legislation authorized the

Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Project, or UMTRA
Project.
project,

The Department o f Energy

(DOE) administers the

"designed to provide f or the stabilization,

disposal and control of uranium mill tailings located at
designated inactive uranium mill sites in a safe and
environmentally sound manner."

Legislators defined inactive

sites as those mills that produced uranium for the AEC

11Landa, Isolation of Uranium Mill Tailings, 10; H.
Peter Metzger, " 'Dear Sir: Your House is Built on
Radioactive Uranium Waste, '" New York Times Magazine, 31
October 1971, 59.
12Luther J. Carter, "Uranium Mill Tailings: Congress
Addresses a Long-Neglected Problem," Science 202 (13 October
1978): 194.
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before 1971; legislators appropriated no funding for active
mills, those that continued to produce uranium after the AEC
discontinued its purchases.

Under the UMTRA Project the DOE

also directs the removal of radioactive fill material under
"vicinity properties," those buildings constructed with mill
tailings as fill.

As of 1995, the DOE had completed much of

the "remedial action" at fifteen of the original twenty-four
designated tailings piles.

The DOE had identified 5,275

vicinity properties, 5,121 of which had been "cleaned up."
Of the total number of vicinity properties, 4,266 were
located in Grand Junction. l3
Grand Junction received a high dose of pUblicity for a
time; one writer dubbed it "America's Most Radioactive
City."

Another reported that Grand Junction suffered an

abnormally high rate of cancer and birth defects, and
suggested that future cancer rates would be higher in Grand
Junction than elsewhere.

But the concern about radon gas In

buildings gradually escalated to include the entire nation.
Because radioactive elements are ubiquitous in the earth's
surface, buildings in any state may be found to have
accumulations of radon gas that some consider a threat to
human health.

In fact,

the Environmental Protection Agency

l3 U. S. Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations
Office, Public Affairs Division, DOE News: UMTRA Questions
and Answers, December 1982; U. S. Department of Energy,
Office of Environmental Management, Uranium Mill Tailings
Remedial Action Project: Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Report to
Stakeholders, 30 September 1995, 2, 23-24.
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(EPA) has placed radon very high on its list of health
risks; the agency figures that radon causes five thousand to
thirty thousand lung cancer deaths per year. 14

The concern

about radon has been well publicized, and has resulted In a
vast number of scientific and medical studies.
It has been well established that radon daughters are
carclnogens.

The risk occurs with long-term, continuous

exposure to high levels of the decay products.

But there

exist differences of opinion concerning the level at which
radon constitutes a health risk.
the unit "picoCurie per liter"

Radon is often measured In

(pCi/l) of air.

The EPA

established the "action level" for radon at four pCi/l.
Homes and buildings that exceed the "action level" should be
"mitigated," often a very expenslve process.

But many

critics contend that the EPA's level is much too low.

One

of them, Doctor Geno Saccomanno, lS a well known research
pathologist from Grand Junction who has spent much of his
career studying the consequences of long term exposure to
radon decay products.

Since the early 1970s he has assured

Grand Junction residents that the levels of radon gas in
their homes pose no extraordinary health risk.

Saccomanno

maintains that there is no increased risk in buildings that
have radon levels as high one hundred pCi/l.

However, he

14Wood, "America's Most Radioactive City," 46; Metzger,
"'Dear Sir,'" 59; Cassandra Chrones Moore, Haunted Housing:
How Toxic Scare Stories are Spooking the Public out of House
and Home (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1997), 27.
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would settle for the twenty pCi / 1 level that other
countries, including Canada, have adopted as a standard.
Saccomanno is certain that indoor radon, even in Grand
Junction, is not a health hazard.

Of the widespread concern

about mill tailings installed under houses, Saccomanno said,
"I think the public

lS

being misled

. there isn't a

single documented case of a non-smoker exposed to [indoor]
radon who developed cancer."

Moreover, cancer rates In

Grand Junction are no higher than anywhere else. 15
There are other critics of the EPA's radon policy.

For

a variety of reasons, according to their viewpoint, the
evidence upon which the EPA bases its policy is faulty.
Researchers in the United States and other countries have
conducted studies that fail to establish a link between
indoor radon and cancer.

In fact,

some studies have shown

that the states with the highest levels of indoor radon have
fewer cases of lung cancer than those states with the lowest
levels of indoor radon.
commented,

Such findings, one author sharply

"would give pause to anyone but an EPA

15 "Extremely Low Radiation Levels Emphasized at Radon
Study Meet," Daily Sentinel, 21 January 1971, p. 7; "Doctor
Disputes Cancer, Mill Tailings Connection," Denver Post, 7
September 1987, p. 2Ci Bob Silbernagel, "Saccomanno Stance
on Radon Supported," Daily Sentinel, 21 December 1994, p.
1Ai Kit Miniclier, "Uranium Cleanup Grows into West Slope
Boom," Denver Post, 16 April 1989, p. 1Bi "Researcher
Questions Tailings-Cancer Link," Rocky Mountain News , 6
September 1987, p. 31.
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administrator. ,,16

In the critics' oplnlon, the EPA's

adherence to an unrealistic "action level" causes undue
worry and unnecessary expense on radon testing and
mitigation.
As with indoor radon, outdoor radon, specifically that
which emanates from tailings piles, has been the subject of
considerable attention and debate.

Many scientists, some

with the EPA and other government agencies, hold the Vlew
that the exposure to any amount of radiation causes negative
health effects: there is no safe level of radiation.

The

radon decay products released from tailings piles around the
western United States contribute to the doses received by
everyone In the nation.

Scientists have devised formulas

designed to estimate the number of cancers caused by radon
decay products that come from tailings piles.

As explained

by the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

"the

health effects of the radon production [from uranium mill
tailings] are tiny as applied to anyone generation, but the
sum of these exposures can be made large by counting far
into the future , large enough in fact to be the dominant
radia t ion exposure from the nuclear fuel cycle." 17
16Moore, Ha unted Housing, 21-26, 34-35; see also
Leonard A. Cole, Element of Risk: The Politics of Radon
(Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of
Science Press, 1 993), 65-79.
l7U. S. Congress , House, Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs , Uranium Mill Tailings Control: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, 95th
Congress, 2nd session, 26-27 June, 10 July, and 17 July
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If it

lS

true that "the radon released by a pile In New

Mexico may eventually harm a stockbroker In New York," then
the effects to local populations must be some degree
One must also consider the localized radioactive

greater.

contamination resulting from wind and water erosion, and
from the misuse of tailings.

Many have authored articles

and books that explain the assumed and potential tragic
health effects caused by the exposure to the radiation from
mill tailings. 18
Contrarily, other scientists discount the health risks
beget by mill tailings.

The amount of radon exhaled by

tailings constitutes but a tiny fraction -- far less than one
percent--of the total amount of radon that comes from the
entire earth's surface.

The atmosphere so dilutes the radon

from tailings piles that it cannot be measured beyond the
distance of one-half mile, and one-quarter mile in some
cases.

For these and other reasons, many experts maintain

that uranium mill tailings cause no adverse health effects,
not only to distant populations, but also to local
populations.

Some would say that the "perceived effects,"

1978,76.

18Bavarskis, "Uranium," 5; see also Hinchman,
"Rebottling the Nuclear Genie"; H. Peter Metzger, The Atomic
Establishment (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 161-198;
Harvey Wasserman and others, Killing Our Own: The Disaster
of America's Experience with Atomic Radiation (New York:
Dell Publishing, 1982), 177-189.
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an individual's concern about r adiation from mill tailings,
warrants more attention than the actual radiation. 19
A study panel convened by the National Research Council
trod the middle ground.

That group concluded that most

people will suffer no adverse health effects from the
release of radiation from uncontrolled tailings piles.
Those living in very close proximity to such a pile, less
than a kilometer away, could have an increased level of
risk.

The panel also believed that while "tailings may pose

health risks through a variety of secondary pathways--such
as Vla the food chain--in gene r al, it does not appear that
such risks are significant. ,, 20
While there are various r i sk assessments, no one
questions the need to contain and stabilize uranium mill
tailings.

(Although the e xperts do argue the methods by

which and the extent t o which the tailings should be
controlled. )

It suffices to consider the fact that the

wastes will be radioactive for many thousands of years, and
no one can predict the future migration of people or
tailings.

Even a person with the most sanguine view of the

19U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Management of Commingled Uranium Mill Tailings: Hearings
before the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems
Subcommittee, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 17-18 August 1982,
176-194, 221, 270-271, 451, 352-353, 503-504.
2°National Research Council, Uranium Mill Tailings
Study Panel, Scientific Basis for Risk Assessment and
Management of Uranium Mill Tailings (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1986), 109-110.
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threat posed by uranlum mill t ailings will admit that
"there's a hell of a lot we don't know about radiation at
low levels."

For that reason most people are uneasy with

the idea of tailings "just blowing around New Mexico," as
one politician put it . 21
The elements found In uranlum mill tailings also emit
gamma radiation.

The gamma radiation from mill tailings is

considered less a threat to human health than the internally
deposited alpha radiation.

However, when tailings are

spread about the environment, the gamma radiation
contributes to the overall level of potentially harmful
radioactivity.
The history of mill tailings disposal In the West End
extends to the 1910s, when the Standard Chemical Company
built a concentrating mill at the future site of Uravan.
That operation left only a small amount of tailings, as
measured against the amount left in the 1950s and later.
Standard Chemical processed about thirty thousand tons of
ore from 1914 to 1922, although the estimates vary.

It is

also possible that as much as "100,000 tons of sands could
have resul ted from this earliest operation. ,, 22
21Geno Saccomanno, quoted in Gary Harmon and Ginger
Rice, "Early '70s Tales Spurred Removal of Uranium Waste,"
Daily Sentinel, 10 March 1991, p. lAi Melanie Kenderdine,
legislative director for Representative Bill Richardson,
quoted in Crawford , "Mill Tailings," 537.
22 Landa, "Buried Treasure," 18 i U. S. Department of
Energy, Grand Junction Area Office, and Bendix Field
Engineering Corporation, Commingled Uranium Tailings Study,
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In 1936 the United States Vanadium Corporation built
Uravan and a mill at the same site.

From 1936 to 1944 the

company produced vanadium; the amount of tailings left by
this operation is not known, but one might guess that there
were several hundred thousand tons.

The West End's other

mill, belonging to the Vanadium Corporation of America,
produced vanadium from 1939 to 1944 and left an
indeterminate amount of tailings at the site.

The

accumulated tailings from these two operations were then
milled for their uranium content for the Manhattan Project.
Beginning in the late 1940s both VCA and USVC (the
company later became Union Carbide) processed ore for the
AEC uranium procurement program.

The VCA mill near Naturita

remained in operation for about ten years; then,

from 1961

to 1963 the company operated an upgrader on the site.

The

waste from these activities remained until the late 1970s,
when Ranchers Exploration acquired it.

That company moved

630,000 tons of waste to a site near the old coke ovens In
the Paradox Valley.

Ranchers Exploration leached the

tailings to remove the remaining uranium and vanadium; the
company then "covered and stabilized the reprocessed
tailings in accordance with Colorado Department of Health
regulations. ,, 23

volume 2, Technical Report, DOE/DP-OOll, 30 June 1982, A-18.
23Albrethsen and McGinley, Summary History, A-27.
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Union Carbide's Uravan mill operated continuously for
about thirty-five years.

Until 1956 the tailings were

deposited on the valley floor near the town and along the
banks of the San Miguel River.

In 1956 the company expanded

the mill and changed the milling process; thereafter, the
company stored the tailings on the top of Club Mesa, about
four hundred feet above Uravan.
In the West End, like in many other cities and towns In
the American West,
other buildings.

tailings ended up beneath houses and
The use of tailings as fill material was

not widespread and systematic, as in Grand Junction.

The

communities were much smaller, and construction occurred on
a much smaller scale in the West End.

Nevertheless, the

waste was generally available to anyone determined to get
it.

As of 1997 the DOE had identified forty-eight vicinity

properties in the Naturita area (including Nucla).

The list

consisted of three vacant lots, a school, eight commercial
structures, twenty-eight homes, and eight other properties,
including churches and car washes.
had been remediated.

Twenty - five of the sites

Many other properties have been

examined and excluded from the DOE's UMTRA Project,
presumably because the levels of radiation at those
structures did not warrant the excavation of soil from
around the structures.

As of 1997 the DOE had yet to
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determine the status of fifty-two additional properties In
the Naturita area . 24
The remediation of vicinity properties is sometimes
costly because it involves the removal of tailings from
beneath the structures.

Such was the case at some West End

buildings, including a school in Nucla.

In other cases,

however, remediation means the simple removal of soil from a
driveway or parking lot; this radioactive dirt from the mine
sites had been transported through the years via the miners'
vehicles.

A shop in Naturita, to which miners took their

vehicles for repair and maintenance, required this type of
remediation.

In other cases, the DOE found tailings beneath

the room additions of houses in Nucla or Naturita.

Some

people salvaged bricks, found to be radioactive, from the
old VCA mill.
Uravan encountered similar problems.

Late In 1969

Union Carbide officials detected high levels of radon gas In
a house on D Block; this prompted the company to move the
family into another house.

Eventually all of the houses and

bunk houses on D Block were demolished, and other houses In
Uravan required remediation.

Uravan received its own small

measure of attention in the early 1970s.

A correspondent

for McCall's magazine publicized the evacuation of the

24Wal t Migdal, Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.,
Albuquerque, NM, to author, no date.
Jacobs Engineering
one of the government contractors in the UMTRA Project.

lS
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family from the house on D Block, and the situation was
mentioned on a nationwide evening news telecast. 25
No one can say for certain how tailings ended up
beneath some of Uravan's houses and other buildings.
Officially, Union Carbide allowed no use of its tailings for
any purpose, and that policy existed at least since the
1950s.

However, the company's official concern may not have

extended throughout the workforce.

There probably were

individuals who allowed tailings to be carried off;
eventually, it was discovered that sewer, water, and gas
lines in Uravan had been buried in mill tailings.

There

were tailings used in a septic system leach field.

And,

some residents used the sandy waste material in gardens, to
soften and improve the drainage of the hard soil. 26

Former

Uravan residents claim that gardens laced with tailings
produced more beautiful plants; the ammonlum salts found In
the waste makes an excellent fertilizer.
But the origin of mill tailings scattered about Uravan
lS

"unknowable."

No one knows what happened to the waste

left from the Standard Chemical operations of the 1910s.
The exact disposition of tailings left from the 1930s and
1940s has not been established, although one pile left from
25Metzger, '" Dear Sir,'" 62; Wood,
Radioactive City," 50.

"America's Most

26 Jack Frost, former manager of plateau operations,
Union Carbide Corporation, interview by author, 20 February
1995, Grand Junction, Colorado, tape recording, private
collection.
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the 1940s remained near Uravan throughout its history.
company stabilized this old pile with a dirt cover.

The

When

Union Carbide demolished the house on D Block, the one that
had attracted so much attention,

it is said that workers

found not tailings beneath the house, but high grade ore.
That ore was probably left from the Standard Chemical
operations of the 1910s.

In the 1930s the houses were built

in Uravan "without any real concern with what was under
them."

Through the years the tailings from earlier

operations were buried, covered up, or scattered in varlOUS
ways throughout Uravan. 27
Mill tailings were deposited In Uravan by natural
means, as well.

During the 1940s the wind blew across the

tailings with enough velocity to create "sand storms" that
circulated about Uravan.

At the time, no one thought of the

dust as a radiation hazard, although it was clearly a
nUlsance.

In the early 1950s the tailings were still

deposited near the town.

However, an active tailings pile

contains more moisture than the dry tailings piles that
stood in Uravan during the 1940s.

The piles that

accumulated during the early 1950s were probably less
susceptible to wind erosion.
In 1956 Union Carbide began pumplng its waste to the
top of Club Mesa, about four hundred feet above Uravan.
This new location further reduced the amount of windborne
27 Ibid.
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radionuclides that accumulated in and around the population
center of Uravan; Union Carbide's managers apparently
believed they had no problem, because they did little to
further control the wastes.

A thorough study of the Uravan

area by the consulting firm of Dames and Moore found that
"windborne particulates from tailing and ore stockpiles
contribute little to the ambient environment at Uravan."

At

any given time, thirty to forty percent of the tailings were
wet, because the sands emerged from the mill In a slurry.
The moisture mitigated against the dispersal of tailings in
The remaining dry portions of the pile developed

the wind.

a "dry ha r d crust-like" surface that held firm. 28
Another firm, ERI Logan,

Inc., prepared a report that

summarized the many past studies of the Uravan area.

The

authors of this particular report reached a different
conclusion:

"Inhalation of direct and resuspended

radioactive particulates is c onsidered t o b e a princ ipal
exposure pathway for humans in the vicinity of the Uravan
mill."

The authors concluded that windborne particulates

from the tailings, and from certain areas of the mill itself
contributed to elevated levels of radiation in and around
Uravan.

Even the "haul traffic," the trucks bearing loads

of ore, provided a source for "fugitive dust."

Surveys of

28Dames and Moore, Consultants in the Environmental and
Applied Earth Sciences, Environmental Report: Uravan Uranium
Project, Montrose CountYt Colorado, 31 August 1978, 5-22, 345.
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vegetation In and around Uravan showed that plants had
absorbed radionuclides from the mill site.

Garden

vegetables grown in Uravan contained levels of radiation
that exceeded standards,

set by the EPA, that took effect on

1 De c e mb e r 1 9 8 0 . 29
The new EPA regulations applied to doses of radiation
from exposures to materials produced In the uranium fuel
industry; however,

the EPA specifically omitted radon decay

products from its new regulations.
the new regulations,

When the EPA announced

in the late 1970s, several sites

measured in Uravan exceeded the new EPA standards.
of Uravan had met the previous EPA standards,
before 1 December 1980.

The town

in effect

And Union Carbide officials

believed they could meet the revised standard through
remediation work in the town, and by installing a new, two
million dollar system to the mill. 30

Presumably, this

would have reduced the release of radioactive particulates
from the mill.

29ERI Logan, Inc., Final Report: Winter Baseline
Investigation of Surface Media in the Vicinity of the Uravan
Uranium Mill, Uravan, Colorado, volume 2, Summary of
Historical Information, 11 August 1986, 3-15, 2-18, 3-16 3-20, 4-16 - 4-19.
30Roger Jones to Robert G. Beverly and others, Internal
Correspondence, Union Carbide, 28 February 1978, Housing
Radiation file, drawer 22 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records;
J. F. Frost, Union Carbide Corporation to [Union Carbide
Employees], 20 November 1980, Uravan Correspondence file,
drawer F-11172-F-11197, room 126, Umetco Records; Sheri Poe
Bernard, "Expected EPA Rules Could Rub Out Uravan," Daily
Sentinel, 9 November 1980, p. 29.
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Setting a standard for levels of radon gas fell to the
state of Colorado, which granted Union Carbide's operating
license.

The company may have been able to meet the state's

standard, set at three pCi/l, through remediation work at
various sites.

According to the company, four of ten sites

measured in Uravan met the standard, although at least one
site measured seven pCi/l.

However, the Colorado Department

of Health (CDH) and varlOUS environmental groups wanted to
lower the standard to one pCi/l.

Some claimed that the

lower level was necessary to prevent lung cancer caused by
radon daughter products.

Union Carbide officials believed

the proposed standard was "unrealistic," and would "impose
unnecessary hardship" on both the company and the residents
of Uravan.

They considered the three pCi/l standard

safe. 31
Had Union Carbide been unable to meet the radon
standards set by the state, the company probably would have
closed the town, and arranged for housing in Nucla or
Naturita.

Ultimately, however, the bust in the uranium

market rendered the point irrelevant; the population of
Uravan dwindled through the early 1980s, and by the middle
of the decade no one lived there.

At any rate, the CDH

31 Jeff Marti, "A Western Colorado Uranium Town Is Beset
by Radioactivity and the Economy," High Country News 17 (4
February 1985): 11; Deborah Frazier, "Uranium Town faces
Closure in '88," Rocky Mountain News, 20 September 1984, p.
16; J. F. Frost, Union Carbide Corporation, to [Union
Carbide Employees] , 20 November 1980, Uravan Correspondence
file, drawer F-11172-F-l1197, room 126, Umetco Records.
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never enforced its standard for radon gas by forcing Union
Carbide to close Uravan .
In fact,

the state of Colorado allowed Union Carbide to

operate its Uravan mill with an outdated license for ten
years,

from 1975 to 1984.

Through that period the old

license was amended several times.

This unusual situation

was blamed on "uncertainty over changing regulations,
understaffing at the health department, events at other
mills and company delays in supplying adequate information."
Colorado Department of Health personnel had concerns about
Union Carbide's waste disposal practices and radiation
levels in Uravan.

Carbide's managers worked to satisfy

those concerns, but found themselves unable to meet a set of
constantly changing state and federal regulations.
Meanwhile, the representatives of various environmental
groups weighed In on the matter, and demanded that Union
Carbide meet certain criteria for wast e disposal in order to
continue operating.

The result was a maSSlve pile of

documents--estimated to have grown to a stack eleven feet
tall by 1984--produced by Union Carbide and various
consulting firms.

The documents contained the plans through

which the company intended to comply with state and federal
regulations.

One of Union Carbide's managers remembers that

the company spent nearly six million dollars on various
studies and reclamation plans.

But the state of Colorado
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did not lssue a new license until 1987, well after the
company had closed the mill. 32
Of great and ever growlng concern to the CDH was the
mountain of waste amassed on the mesa behind Uravan.
Representatives from the state of Colorado, the EPA, and
environmental groups viewed the tailings as a perpetual
source of contamination to the surrounding environment.

But

the tailings posed another threat: some feared a break in
the tailings dam, caused by flooding,
human error.

A failure in the dam,

would overwhelm the town of Uravan.

an earthquake, or

it was generally agreed,
Union Carbide deemed

the tailings retention structure safe.

The consulting firm

of Dames and Moore elaborated on the likelihood of a
catastrophe.

The consultants believed it "unlikely" that

the dam would fail because of a flood.

A dam break because

of an earthquake they believed "highly improbable."

And,

the release of waste material because of structural failure
was "cons i de red remot e . ,, 33
But others were not so sure.

An inspection by a

representative of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, late In
1979,

"revealed significant retention dam instability."

The

director of the Radiation Control Division of the Colorado
32Timothy Lange, "Tailings, Pollution Haunt Uranium
Company Town," High Country News 12 (22 February 1980): 1;
Deborah Frazier, "Uranium Wasteland Awaits Rebirth," Rocky
Mountain News, 19 February 1984, p. 20; Frost interview.
33 Lange, "Tailings, Pollution," 4-5; Dames and Moore,
Environmental Report, 7-2, 7-3.
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Department of Health believed that "shallow sloughing
failures could occur which could lead to a major overall
failure" of the dam.
the mill.

The CDH forced Union Carbide to close

It remained closed only four days, during which

time the company stabilized the dam and arranged to have new
tailings pumped to a location further from the edge of the
mesa. 34
Other waste disposal practices caused problems for
Union Carbide.

Since the early 1960s the company had used

the Club Ranch ponds to dispose of raffinate, liquid mill
effluent containing reagents and elements dissolved from the
ore.

Straight from the mill the liquid contained radium;

but company engineers devised a treatment system by which
most of the radium was removed.

The effluent was then

pumped to the six unlined ponds on the banks of the San
Miguel River just downstream of Uravan.

The water

evaporated and the solids remained in the form of crystals;
periodically, the solids were removed to a different
location.

The ponds were designed without a lining, to take

advantage of both evaporation and percolation.

The small

amount of radium and uranium remaining in the effluent

34 Lange, "Tailings, Pollution," 4; Ellen Wheeler,
"Radioactive Tailings Focus of Debate," Rocky Mountain News,
23 March 1980, p. 4.
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collected on the solids in the bottom of the ponds, and the
soil beneath the ponds neutralized the acidic wastes. 35
To dispose of liquids Union Carbide also used an area
on top of Club Mesa, because the Club Ranch ponds were not
big enough to accomplish the goal.

At the mesa site the

liquid was sprayed into the air, to promote more rapid
evaporation.

As the water from the effluent evaporated,

mounds of raffinate crystals formed.

The company used the

Atkinson Creek disposal area, located near the river and
downstream of the Club Ranch ponds, to store raffinate
crystals from Club Mesa and the Club Ranch ponds.

To treat

additional mill effluent, the company designed a
neutralization plant.

The effluent was neutralized with

limestone and treated for radium removal; after the solids
settled the liquid was discharged to the river.

The

neutralized sludge from this operation was removed to a
disposal site on Club Mesa.

The company also had in place a

system that recirculated a portion of the tailings pond
1 iquids . 36

35Robert G. Beverly, former director of environmental
control, Union Carbide Corporation, interview by author, 17
February 1995, Grand Junction, Colorado, tape recording,
private collection; Robert G. Beverly, "Radioactive Wastes,"
paper presented to the National Technical Task Committee on
Industrial Wastes, Denver, Colorado, 30 November 1961.
36 Beverly interview; Robert G. Beverly, "Waste
Management in Mining and Milling of Uranium," in Radiation
Protection in Mininq and Milling of Uranium and Thorium
(Ge neva: International Labour Office, 1974), 312-315.
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At one time, Union Carbide's waste disposal facilities
represented significant progress in the reduction of
pollution.

Just a few years previous to the construction of

the Club Ranch ponds, for example, mill owners commonly
discharged waste directly to the rlvers.

Union Carbide was

the first mill to begin removing radium from the liquid
effluent,

In 1958, and that process was regarded as "state

of the art."

In those years, the primary concern was the

radium contained in the waste, but the Club Ranch ponds also
reduced the amount of salts and other contaminants released
to the river.

In an earlier day,

"the general philosophy of

the people running things was that they stayed one step
ahead of the regulators."

Union Carbide's "technical

people" took pride in not only meeting the regulations, but
also in working to formulate new regulations .

For example,

during the 1960s the company cooperated with the state of
Colorado to set new standards for the disposal of uranium
mill wastes. 37
By the late 19708, however, the company's waste
disposal practices were deemed ineffective.

Inevitably, the

tailings pile and other waste disposal sites bled
contaminates to surrounding areas.

The groundwater beneath

37Beverly interview; Frost interview; Robert G.
Beverly, "Statement by R. G. Beverly, Union Carbide
Corporation, for Panel on Past, Present, and Future Controls
of Water Pollution by the Colorado Uranium Industry," paper
presented at the National Western Mining Conference, Denver,
4 February 1966, 3-4.
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the Club Ranch ponds and the tailings piles contained salts,
such as aluminum sulfate, calcium sulfate, and sodium
chloride that resulted from the acid used in the mill.

The

groundwater also contained some uranium, that five percent
or so that had not been extracted from the ore.
years various metals,

Through the

including aluminum, arsenic, barium,

cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, mercury, nickel, selenium,
silver, vanadium, and zinc, also leached into the soil and
groundwater beneath the tailings and the Club Ranch ponds.
Runoff from the ponds, crystal disposal area, and the
tailings pile polluted the adjacent soils; runoff from these
areas and subsurface seepage from the groundwater charged
the San Miguel River with contaminants.

In addition,

windborne pollutants from the tailings pile and from the
mill operation contaminated the soils in the vicinity of
Uravan.

Soil tests revealed "significant inverse

relationships between distance from the Uravan mill site and
soil contaminant concentrations" of several metals. 38
Most of these metals, however, were not considered a
threat to the human population.

The authors of a health

risk assessment of Uravan regarded only cadmium and lead,
present in relatively high concentrations only in the Club
Ranch ponds, to be health threats.

Several other metals,

38 ERI Logan, Inc., Final Report: Winter Baseline
Investigation of Surface Media in the Vicinity of the Uravan
Uranium Mill, Uravan, Colorado, volume I, Results of January
1986 Field Investigation, 11 August 1986, 2-2 - 2-5, 4-1 4-10,

5-1 - 5-3,

7-2 - 7-9.
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including mercury, posed "no serlOUS health threat because
of low concentrations or no known health effects."

Other

metals were discounted as health threats "due to either
minimal toxic effects, lack of accumulation within the body,
or the lack of specific conditions required for toxicity."
And, though Union Carbide's operation resulted in the
contamination of groundwater in the vicinity, it did not
affect the either the residents' drinking water, which
originated from another source, or any irrigation water. 39
Union Carbide came under heavy pressure in the late
1970s and early 1980s to clean up its site and to halt the
further release of pollution.

State and federal agencies

applied this pressure, as did environmental groups like the
National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund,
Friends of the Earth, and local groups.
took a beating.

The company's image

An EPA agent was quoted as saying that the

company could not "invest enough money in that site to make
it acceptable by today's standards."

Representatives of

Colorado's Department of Health termed Uravan a "bad
operation," and a "disaster area."

A spokesman for the

Environmental Defense Fund asserted that "if you live In
Uravan and don't smoke, you have double the risk of a smoker
of getting lung cancer."

A wag suggested that, should the

tailings dam at Uravan give way, the town and its residents
39R. A. Consultants, "Qualitative Health Risk
Assessment: Uravan Uranium Mill, Uravan, Colorado," July
1986, 8-9; Frost interview.
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would become "a nuclear Pompeii," buried beneath "tons of
hot effluent. ,, 40
Accidents at the Uravan mill contributed to the
perception of Union Carbide as corporate polluter.

In

October of 1980 a worker broke a pipe that carried
raffinate; the resulting spill released nine thousand
gallons of raffinate to the San Miguel River, and
constituted the third such spill in a six - week period.
Logan,

ERI

Inc. counted forty-one spills and discharge

violations at the Uravan mill from 1968 to 1983 . 41
The pressure on Union Carbide culminated in 1983, when
the state of Colorado sued Union Carbide for damages the
company had done to the environment.

The lawsuit was filed

under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, the so-called
Superfund legislation.

The state of Co lorado filed seven

such claims against varlOUS manufacturing, mining, and
milling companies. 42
The claim against Union Carbide proceeded slowly.

A

company representative who participated in the proceedings
4°Quoted in Lange, "Tailings, Pollution," I, and
Deborah Frazier, "Uranium Town Faces Closure in '88," Rocky
Mountain News, 20 September 1984, p. 16; Tom Clark, "A
Nuclear Pompeii?" Westword, 25 January 1980, p. 3.
41 Peggy Strain, "U-Waste Spills 3rd Time in 6 Weeks,
Denver Post, 31 October 1980, p. 2; ERI Logan, Inc., Summary
of Historical Information, 2-37 - 2-38.
II

42John Toohey, "State Pursues 23 Claims for Toxic
Cleanup,
Denver Post, 10 December 1983, p. IF.
II
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described the situation:

"We would have technical meetings

with fifty people in the room,
technical people.

ten lawyers, and forty

You try to get something done, and it

would turn to chaos.

Nothing was happening."

The company

proposed a review committee, composed of three people from
each side, responsible for reaching some sort of resolution.
The state agreed, and the committee "met essentially fulltime for a year in Denver."

By February of 1987 the

committee had formulated a consent decree, a sort of
agreement that, by court order, was legally binding on both
parties.

A remedial action plan for the Uravan site

constituted part of the consent decree. 43
The Colorado Attorney General's office held tremendous
power In this situation.

The state required Union Carbide

to produce its own document s in the case against the
company.

It seemed as though the company was being held

liable for practices that, in the past, had been licensed by
the state's regulatory agencies .

The state required the

company to pay for studies that were commissioned by the
state.

And, as part of the settlement Union Carbide paid

2.75 million dollars to the state for the cost of pursuing
the case and as a payment for damages to the environment. 44

43 Frost interview.
44 Ibid.; Don Thompson, "Sta te to Get Money for Uravan
Cleanup," Daily Sentinel 16 March 1987, p. 1.
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Union Carbide's managers believed the legal action more
of a political gimmick and a money grab than an attempt to
rectify any harm to the environment.

The state had ample

power without the superfund law to compel the company to
remediate its site.

More importantly, Union Carbide had

fully intended to clean the Uravan site, and to implement
new waste disposal facilities for its anticipated future
operations.

The company had commissioned numerous studies

of the site and had presented the state a remediation plan
similar to the one detailed in the consent decree of 1987.
The company had even established a surety of nearly twentyeight million dollars that guaranteed its good
intentions. 45
It seems certain that Union Carbide would have had to
close Uravan, primarily because of the radiation levels In
the town.

Before signing the consent decree with the state

of Colorado, Union Carbide had agreed to evacuate the town
In 1988 if the town did not meet the applicable standards.
As part of the consent decree, however, the state insisted
that the town be closed by 31 December 1986. 46

Had uranium

prices remained high enough, Union Carbide would have

45Mary Louise Gibiln, "Carbide Calls Cleanup Suits 111Conceived," Daily Sentinel, 21 February 1985, p. 1; Frost
interview.
46 Deborah Frazier, "Uranium Wasteland Awaits Rebirth,"
Rocky Mountain News, 19 February 1984, p. 20; Albert J.
Hazle, "Colorado: The Legacy of Uranium Mining," Environment
29 (January-February 1987): 37.
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remained in the business; the company had bought interest In
a mill in Blanding, Utah to continue its operations.

But

even with high uranium prices, Uravan likely would have
closed.
Under the remedial action plan that resulted from the
state's lawsuit, the cleanup of Uravan was predicted to cost
some forty-four million dollars.

At the completion of the

project, no sooner than 2003, the cost will probably be at
least twice that amount.

The mill tailings will be covered,

in place, on top of Club Mesa.

From the town site the

company has excavated contaminated soil, as in a strip
mining operation, and moved it to the top of Club Mesa.

The

Club Ranch ponds still exist; now, however, they are lined,
and the company pumps the polluted groundwater into the
ponds.

As the water evaporates the solids remain, and these

contaminates will eventually be moved to the waste
repositories atop Club Mesa.

Likewise, raffinate crystals

and neutralized sludge that had been stored in various
locations have been moved to a waste disposal facility on
the mesa.
The mill and other buildings have been dismantled, and
disposed of according to predetermined regulations.

Union

Carbide sold many of Uravan's houses in the mid-1980s; the
buyers moved the houses to various towns in southwestern
Colorado, where they are still in use.

The company measured

the radioactivity of each house before it left Uravan, and
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certified each as safe according to radiation standards.
Gradually, the remaining structures in Uravan were
dismantled or demolished.

When the company completes the

reclamation , no trace of the town or the mill will be left.
In its reclamation work at Uravan, Umetco Minerals has
employed an average of forty people since the mid-1980s. 47
Meanwhile, at the former VCA mill site located about
two miles from Naturita, the DOE has conducted an on - going
reclamation project.

Although the tailings had been moved

from the site in the late 1970s, radioactive and nonradioactive contaminants remained as a result of seepage,
run-off, and erosion.

There is also groundwater

contamination, but the DOE will allow natural processes to
flush the groundwater clean.

It does not provide local

consumption water.
The Naturita UMTRA Project was started only In 1994;
the site was low on the DOE's list of priorities because of
its location In a sparsely populated area.

Initially,

project engineers planned to remove 400,000 cubic yards of
soil, but they eventually removed nearly twice that much.
The DOE bought from Umetco Minerals a disposal pit that
Umetco had excavated on Club Mesa; DOE contractors have used
that site to dump the contaminated soil from the VCA site.

47 Frost interview; Nancy Lofholm, "Uravan Wastes to be
Buried," Daily Sentinel, 1 November 1986, p. 1; Bob
Silbernagel, "Mover Makes Tiny Uravan Even Smaller," Daily
Sentinel, 23 November 1985, p. 1.
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The remedial action has proceeded intermittently, and lS
scheduled to be c ompleted in 1998. 48
The DOE's contractors provided some economlC activity
and local employment.

In 1996 those contractors employed

about forty West Enders, with more hiring anticipated; more
workers participated in the project, but many of them lived
out of the area. 49
The West End reclamation projects have provided jobs
and economic activity to the area.

Local residents

appreciate that, but the environmental cause did not play
very well.

For the most part, former and current r e sidents

believed that the reports of Uravan's contamination we re
overstated.

They describe the state-mandated cleanup of

Uravan as "hogwash," "a crock , " "a joke," and "overkill."
Some West Enders c onsider environmentalists to b e
overzealous, seeking to fix problems, with other p eople's
money, that did not exist .

In 1980 a Montrose County

c ommissioner noted that "nobody on this current board of
commissioners is inclined to go along with some o f the
extreme attitudes of the environmental type."

Othe rs vi e w

the remediation of Uravan as an example of outsiders getting
involved in local affairs, of which they had little
48 "Mill Site Cleanup Nears Completion," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 23 October 1997, p. 1; "Tailings Site Cleanup
Here Nears Final Stages, Mid 1998 Deadline," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 25 December 1997, p. 6.
49 "Naturita UMTRA Site Impact Expected," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 20 June 1996, p. 6.
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understanding and about which they reached false
conclusions.

According to this view, the order to clean up

Uravan had more to do with Uravan town's closure than the
fall of uranlum prlces.

Said a former mill worker,

"We felt

more or less the government's the one that put us out of the
jobs."

A Naturita resident summarized the local attitude

during Uravan's final days:

"I suspect that if you were an

environmentalist, it would not be wise to walk into the
Naturita bar on Saturday night and say 'Uravan has to be
closed. ' ,, 50
Few of Uravan's residents, apparently, worried about a
collapse of the tailings retention dam above the town.

In

some cases, perhaps, familiarity bred a sense of security.
"I don't see what the holler is about on that tailings pile.
I saw that pile grow.

I was there when there was nothing up

there on that mesa but pinyons and juniper."

This mill

worker also felt reassured by Union Carbide's health and
safety policies.

Another Uravan resident recalled reports

that theorized only an earthquake of magnitude 6.0 could
damage the tailings dam.

Incredulous, she wondered "when

are we going to have a 6.0 earthquake?" 51

50The opinions and quotes in this paragraph come from
several interviews by the author.
See also Lange,
"Tailings, Pollution Haunt Uranium Company Town," 4, and
Marti, "Western Colorado Uranium Town," 11.
51 Lange,

"Tailings, Pollution," 4; Interview #2.
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The notoriety that Uravan achieved during the late
1970s and early 1980s annoyed the residents of the town.
"The tailings don't bother people here," reported one.

"The

stories about how dangerous the radioactivity is makes
people here pretty mad.

,, 52

Residents grew weary of

visitors asking them whether the radiation scared them, and
they heard the popular fable, about Uravanites "glowing In
the dark," too many times.
about radiation.

They take a nonchalant attitude

Some still maintain that the company tore

down the house on D Block not because of high levels of
radon gas, but because the company wanted to process In the
mill the valuable ore located beneath the house.
The calm reaction might be seen as a defense of their
town, company, and way of life, but it is also true that
some Uravan residents were well informed about radiation.
For example, one former resident cited a lack of certainty
among experts regarding "what is a high level of radiation."
He acknowledged a "breaking point" at which the radiation
levels become a health risk, but doubted that levels in
Uravan had reached that point.

Another pointed out that

everybody is exposed to naturally occurrlng radiation from a
variety of sources; she doubted that living In Uravan
contributed significantly to a person's overall exposure
level.

One woman looked at the matter pragmatically; the

Deborah Frazier, "Uranium Wasteland Awaits Rebirth,"
Rocky Mountain News, 19 February 1984, p. 20.
52
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pollution in a big city like Denver seemed much more harmful
to a person's health than anything found in Uravan. 53
Often, thos e who lived and worked in Uravan allude to
their own health, and that of their neighbors, as evidence
that their exposures to radiation were inconsequential.

If

the radiation exposure levels in Uravan were so high, they
ask, why have there not been more cases of cancer of the
type caused by alpha or gamma radiation?

While such

anecdotal evidence is not conclusive, an epidemiological
study provided additional confirmation.

The study was

commissioned by Union Carbide and completed in 1987.

The

author of the study compiled data on 812 families consisting
of 3,202 people who either lived and worked in Uravan, or
who only lived in Uravan for at least one year between 1935
to 1984.

The author found no evidence "to suggest that

Uravan residents experienced significantly higher rates of
cancer than either the U. S. population or the population of
the State of Colorado."

In fact, Uravan residents, both

male and female, have enjoyed "significantly lower mortality
rates" than the national population, principally because
they suffer far less from circulatory diseases than the
general population. 54

53 Interview #34; Interview #17; Interview #2.
54Susan G. Austin, Final Report: A Study of the Health
Experience of Residents of Uravan, Colorado, Austin Health
Consultants, Inc., April 1986, 11-21.
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Nevertheless, one might assume that those who worked in
the Uravan mill--some for thirty years or more--faced health
hazards that went beyond the call of duty.

After all, those

employees handled uranium, in various stages of refinement,
every working day.

While their family members express

little or no concern about the health hazards of living In
Uravan, one might expect that the mill workers themselves
harbor some doubt.

Perhaps some do harbor doubt, but there

are many former mill workers who display a confident
attitude toward the supposed radiation threat.

Likely, many

would agree with the long-time mill worker and Uravan
resident who said,
endangered,

"If I thought my health was really

I wouldn't have worked there."

the statement of another former mill worker:

Also typical

lS

"I have no

concern about the uranium industry being a health hazard
here."

A few mill workers took extreme measures to express

their attitude towards the supposed radiation threat; they
actually ate yellowcake, not only to demonstrate their own
fearlessness, but also to declare their belief that the
widespread concern about radiation was exaggerated. 55
However, various health threats existed in the mill
environments, especially in the late 1940s and the 1950s.
Inspections of uranium mills at that time revealed high
55 Interview #23; "WSMA Elects Bunker President,
Association Talks over Senate Bill," San Miguel Basin Forum,
17 February 1983, n. p.; Interview #24; Steve McMillan,
"Reaction to Exposure Different," Daily Sentinel, 2 December
1986, p. 5A.
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levels of silica dust In some areas, and high concentrations
of airborne vanadium at some mills that processed vanadium
as well as uranium.

Surveys also showed that mill workers

were exposed to radon gas , radioactive dust from the ore,
and airborne uranium concentrate (yellowcake ).

Some mills

achieved special notoriety because of the lack of dust
control measures and other problems.
mill near Naturita,

An observer of the VCA

for example, reported that "an estimated

20 tons of yellowcake had been lost via air emissions ,
imparting a yellow hue to the countryside for 'a half a mile
or so.'"

In 1949, just two years after the VCA mill opened,

health inspectors found high levels of silica, carbon
monoxide gas, and hydrochloric acid fumes so noxious that
the inspectors became ill.

A former employee at the VCA

plant, confirming the inspectors' report, remembered
"terrible" fumes and dust in the mill. 56
Some former uranlum mill workers have complained of
odd, debilitating health problems.

And, studies of mill

workers have shown "small excesses of deaths" from certain
types of cancer , kidney disease, and respiratory disease not
caused by smoking.

These diseases may be the result of

exposure to various forms of radiation and dust in the
mills.

However, the "health risks to uranium mill workers,"

56 Ken Silver, "The Yellowed Archives of Yellowcake,"
Public Health Reports 111 (March -April 1996 ) : 119-122, 124;
Robert Stapp, "A-Plant Fumes Lethal in Hour, Say Officials, "
Denver Post, 8 July 1949, p. 1; Interview #14.
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according to an author who looked into the matter,
rece i ved relatively litt l e attention."

"have

He has called f o r

more thorough examinations of uranium mill workers and the ir
environments. 57
The unhealthy conditions at uranlum mills were easily
eliminated.

One group of inspectors believed that Iithere

are no health hazards in the mills which cannot be
controlled by accepted industrial hygiene methods. ,, 58

The

Uravan mill serves as an example of the industry's response.
Built in the late 1940s, its design was probably similar to
other mills that operated in the 1950s.

The control of

health hazards, or lack thereof, was likely similar to that
of other mills.

Moreover, within the entire uranium

industry during the 1950s there was little concern about
worker exposure to radiati o n .

By the end of that decade

there existed a more heightened awareness about the possible
dangers.

It seems that Union Carbide, as well as other mill

operators, began to implement most of its "industrial
hygiene methods" In the latter part of the 1950s.

In 1960

Union Carbide's director of environmental control spoke on
the subject of radiation In the uranium mills.

His

57Marj ane Ambler, "Ailing Uranium Millworkers Seek
Recognition, Aid, II High Country News 12 (5 September 1980)
I, 4-5; Silver, "Yellowed Archives," 119.
58 S. E. Miller, D. A. Holaday, and H. N. Doyle, "Health
Protection of Uranium Miners and Millers," A. M. A. Archives
of Industrial Health 14 (1956): 53; Silver, "Yellowed
Archives, II 123-124.
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presentation reflected the "progress" made not only by Union
Carbide, but by other mills, as well:

"The measurement and

control of airborne uranium dust and airborne [uranium]
concentrate has been the biggest problem and the one In
which we have seen the greatest advancement over the past
two years." 59
Some former Uravan mill employees acknowledge the
hazards that existed in that particular mill, but it does
not seem to bother them.

One man mentioned the dust in the

mill and the presence of varlOUS chemicals.

Despite any

concerns, he spent a long career at Uravan.

Another long-

time mill worker also remembered dusty conditions: "It got
to where you had to wear respirators in certain areas,
especially in areas where there was radioactive dust."

He

also recalled that workers inhaled vanadium fume on the job:
"Most everybody got a dose of it sometime."

The exposure to

vanadium caused severe congestion--"that vanadium would plug
you up something terrible"--and it caused a person's tongue
to turn black, although some describe it as more of a green
color. 60

It has generally been believed that the

afflictions caused by vanadium were temporary.

59Robert G. Beverly, "Progress In Radiation Control in
Uranium Mines and Mills," paper presented at the National
Western Mining and Energy Conference, Denver, Colorado, 22
April 1960, 3.
6° Interview #24; Interview #7; Interview #15.
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Eventually, Union Carbide mandated the use of
respirators in certain ar e as of the mill.

While some former

mill workers remember a time when respirators were optional,
others, who started at a later date, remember that a
respirator was required equipment.

But health experts

emphasized that respirators represented only a secondary
precaution, not designed to supplant "permanent and adequate
preventative and control measures required for successful
suppression of radioactive dust."

Toward this end, Union

Carbide installed sprayers, scrubbers, collectors, and other
dust control devices.

In fact,

as early as 1953 some dust

collectors had been installed at the Uravan mill.

Company

managers deemed dust control not only a matter of health and
safety, but also one of simple economics.

They wanted to

save as much product as possible. 61
To assure the effectiveness of these controls, the
company periodically sampled the plant for dust, silica, and
radiation levels.

The company provided film badges, which

measured the amount of radioactivity in the work place .
Employees also received a regular health screening; a
urinalysis,

for example, would detect the presence of some

radioactive substances in the body.

The company provided

employees with information about radiation and taught

61Robert G. Beverly and C. K. MacArthur, quoted in
Silver, "Yellowed Archives," 124; Van Fleet and Simpson,
"USV's All-Out Safety Drive," 98-99; Beverly interview.
Beverly began working for Union Carbide in 1959.

331

employees industrial hygiene methods.

For example, to keep

dust from accumulating, mill workers were instructed to use
water or vacuum pressure and to avoid sweeping or using
compressed air.

Mill workers were also advised to wash

their hands before eating, smoking, and at the end of their
shift; to "change clothes and bathe regularly"; and to eat
their lunches "in an area which is as dust free as
possible. 11 62
Two areas of the mill caused concern for dust and
airborne radioactivity.

The initial stages of the process,

the ore handling and crushing, promoted potentially high
levels of dust and radon decay products.

In this area Union

Carbide installed its dust control systems.

In well

ventilated areas, it was assumed, radon decay products
present no hazard, and most of the work areas in the mill
were ventilated.

After the crushing, the ore was put into

solution, and it remained in liquid f orm until the end of
the process.

The wet solution not only eliminated the dust,

but also suppressed the emission of radon decay products.
In the final stage of the process Union Carbide's safety
engineers again took precautions to minimize the workers'
exposure to the end product, yellowcake.

Fresh yellowcake

62 Beverly interview; Ralph Thul, former safety
engineer, Union Carbide Corporation, interview by author, 26
July 1993, Grand Junction, Colorado, tape recording, private
collection; Supervisor's Notebook, 19 January 1961, drawer
292 UaZ, room 126, Umetco Records.
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glves off no radon gas, because it contains no radium, the
parent element of radon. 63
The awareness of potential radiation hazards grew
simultaneous with the development of the uranium milling
industry.

At the beginning of the 1950s only a few people

recognized the various health threats that existed in the
mills.

Doctors and industrial hygienists from federal

agencies like the AEC and the United States Public Health
Service (PHS) warned of the problems in the late 1940s and
early 1950s.

However, it took several years for mill owners

to see the need for the control of radiation in the work
environment.

An inspector from the PHS remembered that,

once the hazard had been recognized,

"most of the mills did

a beautiful job" of implementing radiation and dust control
systems.

Regulations issued in 1957 by the AEC also guided

the uranlum milling companies in this direction. 64
Within the uranium industry there existed a far larger
group of workers who were exposed to radiation: uranium
mlners.

While the mills employed, at most, three thousand

workers during the peak of uranlum production, from five to
six thousand miners worked during the same period.

And,

while the conditions in some of the mills were decidedly
63 Beverly interview.
64 Duncan A. Holaday, quoted in Ambler, "Ailing Uranium
Mill Workers," 4; Beverly, "Progress in Radiation Control,"
3;
Robert G. Beverly, "Radon Daughters and Their Control,"
paper presented at the Mining Environmental Conference,
University of Missouri at Rolla, 17 April 1969, 8.
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unhealthy, the atmosphere in the mlnes might be considered
primitive.

As it turns out , the radiation exposures to

uranium miners probably constituted the dominant
occupational radiation hazard in the uranium fuel cycle.
Many of the mines on the Colorado Plateau were small
operations in which two to four men dug and hauled out ore.
However, there were a few larger mines, in which as many as
twenty, thirty, or up to fifty miners might have worked.
The mines were often dusty, due simply to the nature of the
work and the enclosed atmosphere of the work place.

The

dust in those mines has caused pulmonary fibrosis and other
lung problems.

Miners also received exposure to a certain

amount of external gamma radiation, usually not in dangerous
amounts, and airborne radium and uranium.

Other hazards

came from the gases created by blasting and the fumes from
diesel powered mining equipment; such equipment was rare
during the 1950s, but became more common during the
1960s. 65
The greatest radiation hazard resu lted from the radon
gas that escaped from the ore bodies and accumulated in the
enclosed space of the mlnes.

The amount of radon gas and

its decay products in uranlum mines reached levels far
greater than normally found in houses, even in houses built
upon tailings.

To measure radon decay products the health

65Duncan A. Holaday, "Radiation Hazards in Uranium
Mining," Mining Congress Journal 45 (April 1959): 104-106.

334
experts of the 1950s devised a measurement called the
working level

(WL).

Simply stated, the working level

represents a measurement of the amount of radon decay
products in the air, and when the unit was formulated, one
working level was assumed to be safe. 66

Health experts

also created a measurement known as the working level month
(WLM) , used to calculate a miner's cumulative exposure.

A

miner exposed to one working level for 170 hours, the hours
worked in a month, would have accumulated one working level
month.

If he worked for a year In a mlne in which the level

of radon decay products measured one WL, he would have
accumulated twelve working level months of exposure.

If the

mine in which he worked measured ten working levels, through
the course of a year he would have accumulated 120 working
level months.
Through the 1950s mlners labored in atmospheres In
which the level of radon decay products measured several
hundred or more working levels.

Consequently, many miners

accumulated hundreds, and often thousands, of working level
months of exposure.

The exposures to which American uranium

66 The definition of a working level is "any combination
of radon daughters in one liter of air that will result in
the ultimate emission of 1.3 x 10 5 million electron volts
of alpha particle energy." This is the same amount of
energy released by the decay of radon daughters at
radioactive equilibrium with one hundred picoCuries of radon
per liter of air.
Bernard L. Cohen, "Radon:
Characteristics, Natural Occurrence, Technological
Enhancement, and Health Effects," Progress in Nuclear Energy
4 (1979): 5.
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mlners were subjected provided the evidence of the harmful
Years after their exposure

effects of radon decay products.

to this form of radiation in the mlnes, many who mined
during the 1950s and 1960s died of lung cancer, at a rate
that some would call epidemic.

The evidence showed a

correlation between the amount and length of exposure and
the incidence of lung cancer.
Unfortunately, the possible risks associated with the
exposure to radon decay products did not receive widespread
attention until about 1960, after which year the industry
took steps to correct the problem.

The uranium miners'

calamity lS all the more troubling in light of the simple
solution to the problem: forced ventilation.

By pushing

fresh air through the mines, engineers greatly reduced the
concentration of radon decay products in that envi r onment;
ventilation also removed the dust from the mines.

However,

the uranium industry adopted mlne ventilation practices only
gradual l y and reluctantly.
At the inception of the AEC uranlum procurement
program, In the late 1940s, sanitary engineers and radiation
experts suspected a health threat from radon decay products

.
.
.
In uranlum mlnes.

In general, the effects of radiation on

human tissue had been well established by that time .
Moreover, studies of European miners who worked in mines
with high levels of radon gas corroborated a link between
the exposure to radon decay products and lung cancer.

As
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early as 1948 doctors from the AEC's Medical Division
visited the Colorado Plateau uranlum operations.

Those

doctors recommended improved dust control systems In the
mines, and they recommended that levels of radon gas In
mlnes should not exceed one hundred picoCuries of radon per
liter of air. 67
Because of a "dearth of available information on the
health hazards associated with this industry," the PHS
initiated a health study of uranium miners and millers In
1950.

These examinations revealed "no clear-cut etiologic

or pathologic patterns," a finding that came as no surprise
In light of short work history of most of the miners in the
study.

But field investigations conducted at the same time

revealed high levels of radon and its decay products in the
mlnes on the Colorado Plateau.

In a 1952 "Interim Report,"

the PHS warned that "sufficient information has been derived
to conclude that certain acute conditions are present in the
industry which,

if not rectified, may seriously affect the

health of the worker."

The PHS investigators issued

recommendations designed to improve the health conditions In
uranlum mlnes.

They recommended a maximum level of one

hundred picoCuries of radon decay products per liter of alr

67B. S. Wolf, "Medical Survey of Colorado Raw Materials
Area," memo to P. C. Leahy, Manager, Colorado Area Office,
Atomic Energy Commission, 19 July 1948, 4.
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In the mlnes, a concentration equal to what would eventually
be called one working level. 68
Throughout the 1950s health experts from the PHS
continued their field investigations and health surveys of
uranlum mlners .

By 1960 the PHS had collected extensive

medical data on 3,415 underground uranium miners.

In 1951

the PHS initiated "training courses" designed to disseminate
information concerning radon to mining companies, federal
and state mining agencies, and government health agencies.
By 1955, it was later reported,

"most of the personnel

concerned with the problem had attended one or more of these
sessions. ,, 69

If this statement accurately reflects the

attendance to the PHS training sessions, most of the
initiates remained unconvinced.

Although some mines were

ventilated in the middle to late 1950s , such attempts were
few and not thorough eno ugh.

By one estimate, mines in

southwestern Colorado averaged from fifty to seventy-five
working levels from 1950 to 1957, thirty to fifty WL in

68Duncan A. Holaday, Wilfred D. David, and Henry N.
Doyle, "An Interim Report o f a Health Study of the Uranium
Mines and Mills," Public Heal t h Service Division of
Occupational Health and the Colorado State Department of
Public Health, May 1952, i, 2, 6, 16.
69 Statement of Surgeon General Leo J. Gehrig, in U. S.
Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Radiation
Exposure of Uranium Miners: Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Research, Development , and Radiation, 90th Congress, 1st
session , 9-10, 23 May , 6-9 June, 26-27 July, and 8, 10
August 1967, 140, 142.
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1958, and twenty to thirty WL in 1959. 70

are lower than these.)

(Other estimates

Naturally, the concentration of

radon daughters in some mines was much higher.
It took approximately ten years for most mining
companies to implement ventilation systems, and for state
agencles to establish and enforce regulations concerning the
level of radon gas in the mlnes.

In that decade, 1950 to

1960, uranium miners absorbed the heaviest doses of

radiation.

The delay between the recognition of the radon

problem and the implementation of effective ventilation
systems In the mines has been investigated by several
authors.
The AEC set radiation limits In all nuclear fuel
facilities except the uranium mines.

Even for uranium mills

the AEC adopted radiation standards.

But the agency never

took the steps necessary to assume regulatory control over
the mines.

Howard Ball, a public policy expert and the

author of Cancer Factories: America's Tragic Quest for
Uranium Self-Sufficiency, harshly criticizes the AEC.

In

the name of "national security," he writes, the AEC pursued
an "undemocratic" and irresponsible uranlum procurement

7° "Estimated Radiation Levels in Uranium Mines, in the
Salt Wash Sandstone, Uravan Area, Southwestern Colorado."
According to a footnote to the document, "these estimates
were made by knowledgeable individuals in Grand Junction who
are very familiar with the mining and ventilation practices
in the mines in the Uravan area.
The range of our estimates
reflects the differences in company operated mines and the
small mines operated by independent miners."
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policy by means of "deception and falsehood."

AEC

bureaucrats, with full knowledge of the consequences, chose
to allow miners to work in unhealthy conditions in order to
ensure the supply of uranium, and to keep the price of
uranlum as low as possible.

No one told the miners during

the 1950s of the possible risks, and AEC officials, despite
sufficient evidence to the contrary,

"argued that little was

known about the relationship between cancer and exposure to
radon daughters."

Had the miners been informed, the

thinking goes, they would have chosen not to work in the
mlnes.

And, had mining companies been forced to install

ventilation systems, the cost of such systems would have
infringed too greatly on the profits (or, presumably, forced
the AEC to pay more for the uranium.)

Thus, the AEC

consciously developed a "strategy" that involved deception
and the deliberate use of the miners as "guinea pigs" in
order to establish a sure supply of American uranium.

71

The journalist Peter H. Eichstaedt, in If You Poison
Us: Uranium and Native Americans, describes a negligent
attitude held by AEC officials.
dangers faced by mlners,

They ignored the known

fearing that any negative publicity

"might slow or, worse yet, derail the AEC's plans to develop
U

. S . uranlum.
'"

Eichstaedt points out that other federal

agencies, the Bureau of Mines and the Labor Department, for
71Howard Ball, Cancer Factories: America's Tragic Quest
for Uranium Self-Sufficiency (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1993), 10-11, 13-14, 36-37, 109-112.

340

example, could have established radiation standards for the
mlnes.

That the officials of these agencies chose not to

regulate the mlnes lS "one of the greatest examples of
bureaucratic buck-passing in American history."

Those In

the AEC and other agencies believed the matter should be
left to the states. 72
The AEC, according to Eichstaedt, knew very well that
the miners were at risk, but sought to suppress any
information concerning the levels of radioactivity in the
mlnes.

He documents "misinformation" and "misleading"

statements the AEC used to indicate that the problem of
radon in the mines was either not serious, or that, contrary
to the facts,

the solutions to the problem "were being

implemented. ,, 73
The activities of the PHS investigators during the
1950s have been well documented.

Howard Ball, in Cancer

Factories, reserves a measure of blame for these health
professionals who, In complicity with the AEC, entered "a
pact with the devil."

He questions the doctors' ethics,

because they agreed to keep the miners ignorant of the
radiation hazard in the mines.

PHS investigators were

allowed to continue their mine inspections and miner health
surveys, Ball writes, only on the condition that they not
72 Peter H. Eichstaedt, If You Poison Us: Uranium and
Native Americans (Santa Fe, NM: Red Crane Books, 1994), 5458, 69, 75.
73 Ibid., 54, 69.
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tell the mlners of the danger.

This condition was placed

upon them by the AEC and by mining companles, again because
of the fear that miners would quit their jobs if they knew
of the dangers.

Ball further questions the principles of

those in the PHS who, he believes! did not do enough to make
themselves heard.

They should have sounded an alarm that

could not have been ignored. 74
Others take a more sympathetic Vlew of the PHS.

Peter

Eichstaedt, in If You Poison Us, writes that the PHS
investigators were "tenacious," doing "their best" to alert
government officials and mining company officials to the
problem of radon in the mines.

Raye C. Ringholz,

In Uranium

Frenzy: Boom and Bust on the Colorado Plateau, quotes the
PHS approach:

"implore, exhort and attempt to educate,"

techniques that had been sufficient to achieve other goals.
She portrays the Occupational Health Field Station, the
division within the PHS that conducted the uranium miner
health surveys, as an underfunded agency without the clout
to persuade or regulate.

Ringholz points out that the PHS

went to great lengths to obtain its information through mlne
inspections and medical surveys.

In the early 1950s no one

could prove that the radon decay products in American

74 Ball, Cancer Factories, 46, 53-54, 110. A journalist
who investigated the uranium miners' story draws the same
conclusion: "public health researchers struck a Faustian
bargain with mining companies." Tony Davis, "Experts Knew
Miners Were at Great Risk," High Country News 22 (18 June
1990): 11-12.
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uranlum mlnes would eventually cause cancer , because the
disease would not appear until many years after the
exposure.

(The conclusion that European miners had

developed lung cancer due to the exposure to radon daughters
was not universally accepted.

Skeptics pointed out that the

European miners were exposed to other suspected carclnogens ,
including arsenic , and that social, ethnic, or other
environmental factors may have contributed to the disease In
the European miners.)

The PHS accepted certain restrictions

in order to compile a substantial database, and without that
data, it would have been all the more difficult to convince
everyone that the mines needed ventilation. 75
The state agency most involved with the PHS mlner
studies was the Colorado Department of Health.

In 1949 the

director of that state agency convened an advisory board t o
examine the possible hazards in the newly activated uranlum
industry.

At the request of this committee the PHS

initiated what was to become a series of uranium miner
studies and mine surveys .

In fact,

the CDH worked closely

with the PHS in developing the uranium miner studies during
the early 1950s, and CDH officials demonstrated a great deal
of concern. 76

Why then did not the Colorado Department of

Health, or perhaps the Colorado Bureau of Mines, implement
75Eichstaedt, If You Poison Us, 63, 65; Ringholz,
Uranium Frenzy, 47, 85, 166-178, 205, 284.
76Holaday, David, and Doyle, "Interim Report," 1-2·,
Ringholz, Uranium Frenzy, 37-51, 166-171.
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and enforce radiation standards in the mines?

Colorado's

Governor Stephen McNichols and the governors of other
uranium mining states passed the buck back to the federal
government.

The states claimed no authority over uranlum

mining, which they viewed as a federally controlled
enterprise.

McNichols also protested that the states could

not afford to staff the necessary mine inspectors; he
thought the AEC should give money to the states for such
purposes.

The governor further declared that had the AEC

not been so "miserly," that had the AEC paid more for
uranlum, then the mining companles, especially the smaller
ones, would have had the money needed to install and operate
ventilation systems. 77
The uranium mining states did very little before 1960
to enforce radiation standards.

The cha irman of the Utah

State Industrial Commission noted that the states had
adopted radiation standards, or at least had recommended
limits for radon in the mines, set at one working level.
However, he passed the buck In the opposite direction,
indicating that "the burden of these measures falls to the
mine operators."

The chairman also realized the importance

of the uranium industry to Utah, saying that his commlSSlon
"will strongly oppose arbitrary or unreasonable safety

77 Eichstaedt, If You Poison Us, 77; flU-Miner Clinics
Suggested for Junction, Durango Areas," Daily Sentinel, 17
December 1960, p. 1.
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regulations. ,, 78

The state mlnlng agencles had to balance

the mlSSlon to promote uranium mining with the obligation to
regulate the industry.

The enforcement of strict radiation

standards entailed the installation of ventilation systems
in the mines.

Most people at the time agreed that

ventilation was an expensive proposition, one that could
potentially have slowed the uranium industry.
The big uranium mining companles have been accused of a
callous, single-minded pursuit of the bottom line.
According to Eichstaedt, in If You Poison Us,

"by 1955

mining companies were well aware of the radon problems In
the mines and the fact that ventilation could be used to
reduce those and other dangers."

Mining company officials

also believed that miners would quit their jobs if they knew
of the dangers.

"Profits were at stake,"

writes

Eichstaedt, implying that mlnlng companles did not want to
spend the money on ventilation.

The mlnlng companies went

to great lengths "to keep from being forced to spend the
money needed to make the mlnes safe for humans."
Cancer Factories, echoes that opinion:

Ball, In

"Mining companies,

almost without exception, were reluctant to spend any funds
on mine safety unless demanded by the federal government,
their only customer." 79
78 " Report on Convention Sessions," Mining Congress
Journal 41 (November 1955): 66.
79 Eichstaedt,
Factories, 38.

If You Poison Us, 64,

91;

Ball, Cancer
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The evidence colle cte d by the authors named in the
foregoing paragraphs is persuasive.

Nevertheless, one might

hesitate to accept the idea that a confederation of
government officials and mining company managers, a fairly
large group of people, deliberately and with full knowledge
of the consequences, put miners in harm's way.

Of course,

many would have no troub le accepting that idea.

But it is

possible to see In this large group of people an inability
to take seriously and to comprehend the gravity of the
problem.

One might imagine that during the 1950s the word

"radiation" simply did not carry the psychological impact
that it does today.

In an era that lacked the massive

government regulations that we have today, mlne owners and
government administrat ors failed to protect the mlners.
That fa il ure was tragi c in its conseque nces, but resulted
perhaps more from the opera tion of "a bungling bureaucracy"
than from malice. 8o

A statement by Willard Wirtz,

Secretary of Labor during the 1960s, describes the
inefficiency and ineptitude with which the bureaucracy
functioned in this case:
The record reflects continuing attention by a
variety of State and Federal agencies (including
the Department of Labor) to both the standards and
the inspection problems in connection with uranium
mining.
It is a record, nevertheless, of
literally hundreds of efforts, studies, meetings,
conferences, and telephone calls--each of them
8°Milton Viorst and J. V. Reistrup, "Radon Daughters
and the Federal Government," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 23 (October 1967): 26.
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leading only to ano ther -- most of them containing a
sufficient reason f or not doing anything then - -but
adding up over a peri o d of years to [a] totally
unjustifiable "lack of needed consummative
action. ,, 81
Although he issued the statement In 1967, the words apply
equally well to the situation as it existed at the end of
the 1950s.

The record at the end of the 1950s is also

fraught with ambiguities , inconsistencies, and oddities.
Perhaps the biggest barrier to implementing ventilation
In the uranium mlnes was the firm belief, held by many in
government and industry, that radon decay products posed no
threat.

The director of the Colorado Mining Association

wrote that, during the 1950s and early 1960s,

"the minority

view was that radiation e x posure was not at all harmful .

II

His belief that only a mino rity held that view may be
understating the case.

A PHS medical doctor noted that "the

concept that radiation exposure in uranium mines can cause
lung cancer .
and early 1960s. 82

would ha ve been challenged" in the 1950s
An AE C representative testified that

within the agency there was littl e awa reness of the problem:
"I don't think anyone felt the urgency in protection against

radiation [and] radon gas."

An official with the AEC

81Statement of Willard Wirtz, in U. S. Congress, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Radiation Exposure of Uranium
Miners: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Research,
Development, and Radiation, 90th Congress, 1st session, 910, 23 May, 6-9 June, 26-27 July, 8, 10, August 1967, 90.
82 Statements by George Vranesh and Victor E. Archer, in
U. S. Congress, Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners, 1136,
1208.
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Division of Biology and Medicine believed that the
concentration of radon daughte r s In American uranium mlnes
would be insignificant, because the ore in American uranlum
mlnes contained relatively small amounts of radium.
late as 1961 two Union Carbide engineers wrote:

And as

"Recent

pUblicity has focused attention on the hazard of lung cancer
among uranlum mlners.
has been exaggerated.

Many mining people feel the danger
,, 83

These statements were not

necessarily attempts to minimize or obfuscate the problem;
it may be that well-intentioned people were simply wrong.
Those who doubted the connection between radon
daughters and lung cancer may have formed their belief
because of a lack of "positive evidence at that time that
radon gas was or could be harmful."

This attitude may have

been more prevalent in the min i ng industry, but at least
some doctors were also ske ptical.

In 1961 a Grand Junction

do c tor disputed the pre di c tion that uranium miners would
develop lung cancer at rates higher than the rest of the
population.

He believed a certain amount of "hysteria" had

begun to surround the issue.

An editorialist for Grand

Junction's Daily Sentinel summed up the skeptics' attitude.
He wrote on behalf of the small miner, who, many claimed,
Spencer Hutchinson, quoted in Ball, Cancer
Factories, 37; L. Joe Deal, quoted in Ringholz, Uranium
Frenzy, 46; Robert G. Beverly and Vernon J. Bishop, "Air
Sampling Limits Radiation Exposure in Colorado Uranium
Mines," Mining Engineering 13 (August 1961): 962.
By 1961
Union Carbide had implemented a fairly thorough ventilation
program.
83 W.
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could not afford to ventilate the mlnes.

He asserted that

those who wished to compel mine owners to install
ventilation based their efforts on "scare-head contentions,

II

"sketchy information," and "unproven, inconclusive reports
which do not represent actual heal th problems." 84

The

editorialist was probably no health or radiation expert; but
his viewpoint may well reflect the majority opinion of the
time.
Mining company managers may have been mollified by
reports from health professionals.

At an industrial health

conference in 1955, Colorado Department of Health
representatives announced:

"We do not anticipate a

duplication of the European experience because we have a
more complete understanding of the problems and of the steps
that are necessary to reduce the exposure."

They

undoubtedly referred to the efforts to inform the mlnlng
industry, and to the early, though inadequate, efforts to
ventilate the mlnes.

A sanitary engineer for the Public

Health Service gave the impression in 1954 that "research
thus far indicates hazards are not excessive, with less
danger apparent from radon (radioactive gases)

than from

84Statement of G. A. Franz, Deputy Commissioner of
Mines, Colorado Bureau of Mines, in U. S. Congress,
Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners, 318; Stuart C. Black,
quoted in Gordon G. Gauss, "Radiation Danger Figures in Work
Disease Hearings," Daily Sentinel, 26 January 1961, p. 1;
"Killing Off Small Mines," Daily Sentinel, 24 January 1961,
p. 4.
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dust inhalation. ,, 85

One might Vlew such statements as

calculated attempts to mislead the mining industry, to leave
the miners unprotected; conversely, such pronouncements may
simply indicate that even health professionals
underestimated the dangers.
It took many years t o convince many different people
that the mines needed ventilation, and miners needed as much
persuaslon as anyone else.

Some miners will say that, if

they had been told of the health hazards, they would never
have worked in the mlnes; but many other miners continued to
work underground after they had been told.

The record is

replete with stories of miners who , like mine owners and
government officials, lacked the wisdom, foresight, and
prudence to take the threat seriously.
It proved difficult to convince them of a threat from
an invisible, tasteless, odorless gas.

Colorado Bureau of

Mines personnel experienced "no end of difficulty in trying
to convince the operators and miners that an excessive
amount of ventilation at no small cost was needed to correct
this intangible hazard."

In addition to the cost, there

were other reasons for this resistance .

One mlner commented

"that he did not believe radiation and radon can cause harm
as he knows plenty of old-time Uravan miners

. who are

85 "U. S. Uranium Miners Escaping Lung Cancer," Science
News Letter 67 (30 April 1955): 277 i "Federal Physicians
Studying Health Hazards Faced by Uranium Miners on Colorado
Plateau," Engineering and Mining Journal 155 (September
1954):

14.
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hale and hardy after spending many years In uranlum mines."
The notion that radiation held curative powers proved
persistent; some miners could not believe that the opposite
was true.

And many miners possessed that odd, irrational ,

and common human characteristic that allows many of us to
continue risky habits or destructive behaviors, despite the
sound advice of others.

When told that "you have a good

possibility of getting lung cancer

the mlner said,

'oh, that won't happen for fifteen years or so.'"

The

mlners, too, were in it for the money, and they made good
wages.

As Ringholz points out, mlners already knew their

occupation was physically demanding and inherently
hazardous.

This new threat from radiation seemed

insignificant to many of them.
make,

With the money they could

"they were willing to take the risks. ,, 86
There seems to have been a point during the mid-1950s

at which miners, at least some of them, became aware of the
concept of radiation.

In 1955 meetings were convened in

Salt Lake City and Grand Junction, both of them called the
Seven State Uranium Mining Conference on Health Hazards.
The conferences were attended by PHS officials,
representatives from state mining bureaus, mlnlng companles,
and mlne operators.

The representative of one mlnlng

86 Statement of G. A. Franz, in U. S. Congress,
Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners, 318; William L.
Chenoweth, "Joint Examination of the Enos Johnson Mine,
Chuska District, San Juan County, New Mexico," memorandum,
28 September 1961; Ringholz, Uranium Frenzy, 86-87.
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company reported that "it lS difficult to get a mlner on the
Plateau to realize that ventilation helps him."

He

indicated that while most miners were "unaware of the
dangers," there were attempts to educate them as early as
1955. 87

Earlier, In 1952, the AEC established the position of
"Mining Engineer, Ventilation" at the Grand Junction
Operations Office.

That office conducted "safety,

ventilation, and radiation surveys as a public service for
uranium mines being operated on Government lease ground."
However, an engineer with the AEC described a "lack of
conviction" among mlners and mine operators "that constant
attention to ventilation practice is important."

He found

improperly installed equipment, unused equipment, and fuelpowered fans that remained idle simply because they had run
out of fuel.

He also found that miners left the fans idle

in the winter time because the introduction of fresh,

cold

outside air made the mines frigid. 88
This theme repeats itself often; mlners worried not
about the possibility of developing cancer at some point In

87Arthur J. Rice, "Radiation Concentrations in Uranium
Mines and Methods of Control on the Colorado Plateau," Mines
Magazine 4 7 (September 1957): 45.
Rice presented this
article as a paper to the Colorado Plateau Section, AIME
[American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers],
Grand Junction, Colorado, 3 March 1956; Alan Pritchard,
"Radiation Danger to Miners Warned," Daily Sentinel, 18
August 1955, p. 1.
88Rice,

"Radiation Concentrations," 45, 47-48.
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the distant future,

but rathe ; r

In fa i ct, ventilating the mines in

of catching pneumonla.
the winter caused "all

about the immediate prospect

manner ~

of the mines were wet to

of freezing problems."

with, because of water that

begi~n

naturally seeped from the roc : k .
wet drilling technique.

Many

In addition, miners used a

In p oarticularly cold weather the

water from these sources froz ee, on the floors and walls of
the mine and on the miner.

T ~ he

c o ld air also froze the

lines that fed water to the d i rills.

Eventually, some

ventilation systems included Ipropane burners to heat the
fresh air. 89
The costs of ventilation L ran from fifty cents to $1.50
per ton of ore produced in 1g e6 9.
percent to fifteen percent of
one ton of ore.

This equates to 2.5

t he total cost of producing

These were Uffru ion Carbide's c o stsi the cost

of ventilation, as a per c entasge o f the total mining costs,
may have been greater for the

small producers.

The small

mine operators always argued tt-hat they could not aff o rd t o
install effective ventilation

systems.

This may have been

true for some of them, and thlrough the years the varlOUS
costs of mining did increase.

At the same time, however,

many small miners continued t eo> operate their businesses,
even after investing in the n Ee 'cessary ventilation
equipment. 90
89Beverly,
90 Ibid ., 8

"Radon Daughte ;rs and Their Control," 6.
i

Interview #12 .
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Respirators represented another effective method of
mitigating the radon problem.

However, many miners did not

like to wear them, because the respirators were cumbersome
and inhibited breathing.

Even a big mining company like

Union Carbide did not expect the miners to wear such
devices.

According to a company manager, it seemed

impractical "to require a physically active miner to wear a
respirator eight hours a day. ,, 91
In the late 1950s and early 1960s mlners began to die
of lung cancer in significant numbers (fifteen from 1956 to
1959 and fifteen from 1961 to 1962).

This represented the

evidence that correlated the exposure to radon decay
products and lung cancer.

A heightened sense of urgency

became manifest in the effort to persuade everyone of the
need for ventilation.

In December of 1960 the Secretary of

Health, Education, and Welfare convened in Denver a
conference attended by the governors and other
representatives of several western states.

A doctor with

the PHS told the conferees that mlners were suffering very
high rates of lung cancer.

The ongoing PHS medical surveys

indicated, through the use of an early diagnostic technique
called a "sputum cytology," that many more mlners showed
indications of developing lung cancer.

And, in sixty-seven

percent of the mines sampled by the PHS, the concentration
91Gaylord Kirkham, "Views of Slope Miners Vary on
Uranium Dangers," Daily Sentinel 18 May 1967, p. 1; Beverly,
"Radon Daughters and Their Control," 7.
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of radon decay products measured more than the recommended
one work ing level. 92
Soon after this "Governors' Conference" the Deputy
Commissioner of the Colorado Bureau of Mines called a
meeting for mine operators that was held in Grand Junction.
He announced that the state agency would implement a "Radon
Daughter Control Program," effective 1 June 1961.

The state

agency hired and trained six new employees to implement the
program,

increased its mine inspections, and established a

field office in Naturita.

At this field office the Bureau

of Mines kept records of mine inspections, and kept the
exposure records of individual miners.
apply pressure on the mining companles.

The state began to
According to a mlne

safety engineer who attended the Grand Junction meeting,
"they came down here and they ripped us mining people over
the coals." 93
Other states made commitments similar to Colorado's,
and as a result,

the efforts to ventilate the mlnes

increased and the concentrations of radon daughters In the
mines began to fall.

Most of the states already had

standards in effect.

For example, Colorado had adopted the

92 Ringholz, Uranium Frenzy, 203-204.
93 110perators Called to Junction in U-Mine Cancer Peril
Study," Daily Sentinel, 5 January 1961, p. 1; State of
Colorado, Bureau of Mines, 1961 Annual Report, in U. S.
Congress, Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners, 79-80;
Vernon Bishop, former mine safety engineer, Union Carbide
Corporation, interview by author, 5 November 1997, Grand
Junction, Colorado, tape recording, private collection.
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one working level standard in 1954, but had simply never
enforced it.

In 1961, however, the state began to look at

that level as a long or intermediate-term goal.

The

Colorado Bureau of Mines focused immediately on mlnes with
the highest concentrations.

Mine inspectors threatened to

shut down those mines with more than ten working levels.

If

the radon daughters measured three to ten working levels,
the Bureau required corrective action to reduce the
concentrations.

Gradually, the Colorado Bureau of Mines

lowered the shut down level and the level at which
corrective action was needed.

By 1967 the state closed down

mines that measured more than thr e e working levels, and
required corrective acti o n in mlne s with one to three
working levels, and by 1 9 69 the Colorado Bureau of Mines
issued "closure orders" for mines with two or more working
l e vels. 94
In addition and in response to these state efforts,
mining c ompanies worked more aggressively at solving the
problem.
response.

Union Carbide serves as an example of the industry
"In the early days of uranium mining," a plece of

company literature reads,

"little was known about the

possible adverse health effects from exposure to mine
94 Statement of G. A . Franz, in U. S. Congress,
Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners, 322-323; G. A. Franz
to Melvin Price, 12 March 1969, in U. S. Congress, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Radiation Standards for Uranium
Mining: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Research,
Development, and Radiation, 91st Congress, 1st session, 1718 March 1969, 25-26.
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radiation."

However, once it became known, Union Carbide

addressed the hazard in its usual thorough fashion.

Union

Carbide was proud of its mine safety record, and has pointed
out that certain safety requirements "were often built into
federal and state regulations after adoption by Union
Carbide. ,, 95

In light of its record, few people would

question Carbide's commitment to the health and safety of
its miners, or its reluctance to spend money on mine safety.
Union Carbide hired Vernon Bishop In 1956.

He began as

a mlne safety inspector, then assumed the titles of mlne
safety engineer, mine safety director, and safety
coordinator for all of Union Carbide's uranium mining
operations.

Under his guidance Union Carbide achieved a

remarkable mine safety record.

Through the years both

Bishop and his company earned an impressive number and wide
variety of mlne safety awards.

Union Carbide, according to

Bishop, allowed him to do whatever was needed to improve
mine safety.

He and his immediate superVlsor refused to

accept "second best" in health and safety. 96
In 1956 Bishop knew virtually nothing about radiation.
However, he immediately began to implement ventilation to
clear the mines of blasting gasses and dust, and to

95 "The Uranium Miner at Union Carbide," undated
manuscript, and "Mining at Union Carbide," undated pamphlet
(both documents probably from the late 1970s) ; Historical
Data file, drawer 511 UbZ, room 119, Umetco Records.
96 Bishop interview.

357
eliminate "dead air," stagnant pockets of alr with very
little oxygen.

It was not long, however, before doctors

from the PHS contacted Union Carbide to request its
cooperation with the ongoing radiation studies.

Bishop

received instructions to "cooperate to the fullest extent."
The PHS investigators taught Bishop how to conduct radon
tests, and Bishop arranged for Union Carbide miners and the
company's contract miners to take part in the PHS medical
surveys.

The company paid the miners for the time they

spent at the Uravan clinic for medical examinations.

As

part of the medical studies, Union Carbide agreed to put
four dogs in the mines on two different occasions; after
about six months of continuous exposure to the radiation,
the dogs were sent back to the PHS.

Subsequent examinations

of the dogs yielded little information about the effects of
the mine radiation on dogs or, presumably, humans. 97
During this time, the late 1950s, Vern Bishop still
knew virtually nothing about the effects of radiation,
because the PHS health officials were not telling him
specifically of the dangers.

When asked whether his

superiors at Union Carbide knew of the health risks, Bishop
asked,

"why should they" have known?

He believes that the

PHS personnel operated "under orders" from the AEC not to

97 Ibid.; Vernon J. Bishop, "Control of Radon Daughters
In the Colorado Plateau Mines," paper presented at the
Mining Environmental Conference, University of Missouri at
Rolla, October 1971, 3.
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ralse too much alarm.

However, Bishop began to have

"suspicions" and "concerns," especially when miners he knew
began to develop lung cancer in the late 1950s.

His

recollections may seem disingenuous, but others who worked
in the field also knew nothing about radiation during the
late 1950s.

William L. Chenoweth spent a lot of time In the

mlnes as an AEC geologist, and he remembers exactly when he
learned of the possible hazards from radiation; it was 1961,
when he received a reply to a memorandum he wrote to his
superiors in the AEC. 98
During the late 1950s Union Carbide owned about three
hundred mines, and most of the mining was done by
contractors.

Under this arrangement the contractor paid for

his mining equipment and labor, but Union Carbide paid for
everything of a permanent nature installed in the mlnes,
including ventilation equipment when it became more widely
used.

Vern Bishop became well known for his strict safety

rules, and the company acquired a reputation for
thoroughness in the upkeep of its mlnes.

One contractor who

worked in Union Carbide mines during the 1960s said that
"everything they did, they did first class."

In fact, he

compared the company to a government operation, because the
company seemingly spent too much money in its zeal. 99
98Bishop interview; William L. Chenoweth, personal
communication with the author; R. A. Laverty, memorandum to
William L. Chenoweth, 28 November 1961.
99Bishop interview; Interview #33.
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Other mlners agree that Union Carbide maintained strict
safety policies, and they remember Vern Bishop's rlgorous
enforcement of the rules.
By 1959 Union Carbide had hired a full-time ventilation
englneer, and the company continued to improve ventilation
and radon sampling techniques, which were not exact
sClences.

Bishop and his staff also began keeping records

of exposure levels for the company and contract mlners.

In

1959 inspectors took 225 radon samples, and the radon
daughter concentrations averaged 24.2 working levels.

In

1960 the company achieved a dramatic reduction, lowering the
radon decay product concentrations in its mines to an
average of 8.4 WL.

In that year the company had "imposed

upon itself" a policy under which a mine was shut down if it
exceeded ten working levels.

In 1964 the company reduced

the "shutdown level" to 7.5 WL, then to five WL in 1966,
then to three WL in 1967.

The average working level In

those mines fell from 4.1 In 1961 to .85 in 1967. 100
Other mines In Colorado had higher radon daughter
concentrations than Union Carbide's mines.

A survey of 124

lOOStatement of Burton R. Buck, President, Mining and
Metals Division, Union Carbide Corporation, in U. S.
Congress, Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners, 533; Annual
Summary of All Radon Daughter Samples Taken in Union Carbide
Uranium Mines (1980), Umetco Records.
Vernon Bishop wrote
that the company established a shutdown level of 7.5 WL in
1960, five WL in 1964, three WL in 1965, and two WL in 1967.
He pointed out that Union Carbide took these actions
independent of and prior to the state's regulations.
Bishop, "Control of Radon Daughters," 4.
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mlnes In 1965 revealed that thir ty -nine percent of the mlnes
measured less than one working level; forty-two percent
measured 1.0 to 2.9 WL; twelve percent had 3.0 to 4.9 WL;
SlX percent had five to ten WL, and one percent of the mines
had more than ten WL.

A 1966 survey of 148 Colorado mines

showed slightly improved figures.

According to another

source, Colorado uranium mines averaged ten to twenty WL In
1960, 7.5 WL from 1961 to 1963, and five WL from 1964 to
1966. 101
The gradual lowering of radon decay product levels in
the mines came too late for the miners of the 1950s, many of
whom had accumulated many thousands of working level months
of exposure.

As working levels in the mlnes fell during the

1960s, the number of miners who died of lung cancer
increased.

From 1960 to 1966 no f e wer than six and as many

as sixteen miners died each year; by the latter year the
total stood at ninety-eight, according to the PHS studies.
These alarming statistics resulted in the first widespread
coverage of the miners' story.

The statistics also resulted

In the first decisive federal action.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy called hearings In
June of 1967 to evaluate the problem of uranium miners'
exposure to radiation.

Shortly before the hearings

convened, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz decreed, under
101U. S. Congress, Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners,
1305; "Estimated Radiation Levels in Uranium Mines, in the
Salt Wash Sandstone, Uravan Area, Southwestern Colorado."
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the authority of the Walsh - Healy Publi c Contracts Act pass e d
in 1936, a strict three-tenths working level standard for
o

uranlum mlnes.
0

his mandate.

Various studies and expert opinion justified
According to the Surgeon General,

if the

concentration of radon daughters averaged 2.1 working
levels , 11287 lung cancer deaths could be expected as a
result of exposure incurred during the next 20 years."
Among the same number of non-miners, he would expect only 41
lung cancer deaths during that time period.

Even if the

level were set at one WL, significant excess deaths would
occur. 102

The three-tenths level was deemed safe for

miners, putting them at a risk no greater than the general
population.
Other experts, including members of the Federal
Radiation Council, believed a one working level standard
safe.

Mining companies ag re ed that one WL presented no

excess risks; the consensus opini o n held that Wirtz's three tenths WL standard was lI u nwarranted,

lIarbitrary,

II

lido n o thing but close up the industry.

II

II

and would

In the fa c e of what

observers called an lIonslaught,lI Wirtz retreated to a one
working level standard.

That standard took effect, enforced

by the U. S. Bureau of Mines.

By 1971 the government no

longer purchased uranium, so the standard could not be
enforced under the Walsh - Healy Act.

In that year, with the

102Statement of Surgeon General Leo J. Gehrig, in U. S.
Congress, Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners, 143.
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eventual recommendation of the Federal Radiation Council,
the standard was set at .3 WL; this translates to an
exposure of 3.6 working level months over the course of a
year.

During a twenty-year career at such an exposure, a

mlner would accumulate less than eighty WLM.

The standards

set in 1971 remain in effect, and the Mine Safety and Health
Administration enforces them. 103
The heaviest occupational exposures occurred during the
1950s, and In some cases, the 1960s.

Many would maintain

that until 1971, when the three-tenths WL standard took
effect, all miners received doses of radiation that could
lead to lung cancer.

One of the pioneers of the PHS's

uranlum miner studies contended that, even with a threetenths WL radon daughter concentration, miners encounter
"some increased risk."

He estimated that risk to be

"somewhat less than the excess risk" of smoking cigarettes.
An industrial hygienist for the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic
Workers Union claimed that even with mine levels at threetenths WL, there would be "a continuous epidemic of lung
cancer among uranium miners."

Uranium miners, he wrote, are

exposed to higher doses of radiation than "any other worker
103 Statements of Paul C. Tompkins , Executive Director,
Federal Radiation Council, Robley Evans, Professor of
Physics, and George Vranesh, Director of the Colorado Mining
Association in U. S. Congress, Radiation Exposure of Uranium
Miners, 16, 359, 1138; Viorst and Reistrup, "Radon
Daughters," 29; Robert G. Beverly, "Development and
Legislation of Environmental Regulations for Mining," paper
presented at the 15th Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute, Vail, Colorado, 11 July 1969, 14-17.
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In the nuclear fuel cycle."

He advocated standards much

lower than the current three -tenths WL. 104
By 1974 a reported 144 uranium mlners had died of lung
cancer; by the 1980s the number had increased to
approximately four hundred.

In 1990 the United States

Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act.
The act provides for monetary compensation to be paid to an
underground uranium miner or his relatives if the miner
developed lung cancer, worked in the mines between 1947 and
1971, and accumulated a certain level of exposure as
measured in working l eve l months.

The amount of the

compensation may be as much as $100,000.

The act also

provides for compensation for miners who develop certain
noncancerous lung diseases,

such as pulmonary fibrosis,

silicosis, and pneumoconiosis, which stem from the exposure
to dust in the mlnes.

The Department of Justice administers

the compensation program.

As of 1998 1,341 claims had been

approved, 1,287 claims had been denied, and $130 million had
been paid. 105
104Victor Archer, quoted in Jack Cox, "Casualties
Mounting from U-Rush of '49," Denver Post, 2 September 1979,
p. 1; Rafael Moure, "The Scientific Rationale for a Lower
Radon Daughter Exposure," in Radiation Hazards in Mining:
Control, Measurement, and Medical Aspects, ed. Manuel Gomez
(New York: American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and
Petroleum Engineers, 1981), 25-27.
105Gerard W. Fischer, Uni ted States Department of
Justice, to author, 3 February 1998.
For details concerning
the efforts to obtain compensation, see Eichstaedt, If You
Poison Us, 95-126; Ringholz, Uranium Frenzy, 223-253; Ball,
Cancer Factories, 65-93.
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Of the 1,341 claims thus far approved, 550 were for
cases of lung cancer.

Seven hundred forty-seven claims had

been approved for miners with pulmonary fibrosis.

The

remaining 44 approved claims had been filed by miners with
silicosis, fibrosis of the lung, cor pulmonale relative to
fibrosis,

and pneumoconiosis.

The Justice Department has

sent compensation to 474 miners (or their families)

In

Colorado, 328 to New Mexico, 199 to Arizona, and 184 to
Utah.

It may well be that more miners who worked In

Colorado fell victim to lung cancer and fibrosis.

But

miners moved often, so it is not clear that a miner's
current place of residence (or his family's)
state in which he mined.

is in the same

The Justice Department has sent

compensation to twenty-eight states, most of which were not
uranium mining states. 106
Pulmonary fibrosis results from the inhalation of dust,
which injures the lung tissue; the scars left from the
healing of these injuries define the disease.

It has often

been assumed that dust in the mines was not a major problem
because many of the mlnes were wet; that lS, water seeped
into the mines from underground sources, and the miners used
a wet drilling technique.
levels down.

The water helped to keep dust

However, it is clear from the statistics

compiled by the Justice Department that many mlners worked
in dusty conditions that led to pulmonary fibrosis.
l06 Fischer to author, 3 February 1998.

As
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noted, ventilation solved the problem of radiation and dust,
although in some cases, at least, the ventilation actually
stirred up the dust.

At any rate, observers and

commentators, from health experts to historians, have
concentrated only on the radiation in the mlnes.

This lS

probably due to the fact that lung cancer among uranlum
miners became apparent much earlier than the incidence of
pulmonary fibrosis; moreover, lung cancer is far more
lethal.
In assesslng the human cost of uranlum mlnlng, one
factor clouds the picture: cigarette smoking.

While the

uranium miners' experlence has demonstrated the carcinogenic
effect of radon decay products, there is debate concernlng
the role of cigarette smoke in the development of the
uranium miners' cancer.

Grand Junction's Doctor Geno

Saccomanno has been at the forefront of the debate.
In the late 1950s Saccomanno began developing the
"sputum cytology," a procedure used by pathologists to
detect lung cancer in an early stage, before it appears on
an x-ray.

He did so at the request of the Public Health

Service doctors, and the AEC and the PHS funded his
research.

He first published his methods in 1963; since

then, the so-called "Saccomanno Technique" has become widely
used.

Many people in the Grand Junction area, including

miners, have benefitted from the early diagnostic technique.
Saccomanno has not counted the number of miners in which he
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spotted a lung tumor in i ts early stages, but he says t hat
there have been many.

For example , in 1966 a thirty-si x-

year-old miner found out through a sputum cytology that he
had lung cancer.

Doctors removed part of his lung, and he

was still living ten years later.

Lung cancer lS among the

most deadly forms of the disease.

Only about fifteen

percent of those patients whose cancer first appears on an
x-ray survive five years or more.

Saccomanno's technique

can greatly improve the survival rate.

Saccomanno's work on

the sputum cytology, his interest in diseases of the lung,
and the fact that he lived in Grand Junction led him to
collect extensive medical data on uranium miners.

His

database is reported to be "the world's largest accumulation
of data for this high-risk population. ,, 107
In the early 1960s Saccomanno became concerned about
the smoking habits of uranium miners.

Along with Vern

Bisho p of Union Carbide , the d oc t o r toured the mines; he
advised the miners to qui t smoking, and gave them graphi c
demonstrations of the effects of smoking on the human lungs.
According to Union Carbide, as many as seventy percent of
the mlners smoked in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

By the

end of the 1960s, through education and encouragement, the
figure had dropped to thirty percent.

As Saccomanno

l07 John D. Zoidis , "Sputum Cytology's Pioneer," Journal
for Respiratory Care Practitioners 9 (December-January
1996): 73; Alice Wright, "He Had Lung Cancer: But Now He
Leads a Normal Life," Westworld (Sunday supplement to the
Daily Sentinel) 7 November 1976, 4-5.
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remembers it, half of the mlners quit smoking upon hearing
his lectures, but all of them eventually returned to the
habi t . 108
By 1967 Saccomanno was convinced that the miners' lung
cancer was caused primarily by smoking.

In that year the

PHS studies indicated that seventy-four percent of all
uranium miners smoked cigarettes.

Ninety-four of the

ninety-eight miners who had died by 1967 were smokers.
Saccomanno asserted that the miners he had been following
were "heavy smokers, not 10 cigarettes a day,
some of them up to three packs a day."

20 or 30, but

He believed this

factor "has to get some accounting somewhere." 109

That is

one of Saccomanno's least provocative statements.
To Saccomanno the evidence showed a "synergistic
effect," which resulted from the exposure to both radon
decay products and cigarette smoke.

That is, the two

carcinogens combined to assault the lung tissue to a degree
greater than the simple addition of one with the other.

The

cigarette smoke greatly exacerbated the damage caused by the
radiation; or, to look at it another way, the damage caused
by radiation accelerated the assault on the lungs from the

108 "Radiation and Uranium Mining," undated manuscript,
Historical Data file, drawer 511 UbZ, room 119, Umetco
Records; Geno Saccomanno, interview by author, 3 November
1997, Grand Junction, Colorado, tape recording, private
collection.
109U. S. Congress, Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners,
210,

655.
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cigarette smoke.
culprit.

But Saccomanno has never doubted the maln

"In the absence of cigarette smoke," wrote the

pathologist in 1968,

"I do believe that cancer of the lung

would be nearly non-existent on the Colorado Plateau."
Eleven years later Saccomanno insisted that "if there is an
epidemic of lung cancer among uranium miners,

'it's an

epidemic from smoking. , " llO
By 1988 Saccomanno had collected medical information
and had analyzed the sputum cytologies of 16,720 uranium
mlners.

At any given time there were, at most, five to SlX

thousand mlners.

But Saccomanno's list includes anyone who

mined uranium underground, some who mined only a short time
and some who mined for many years.

His database lS far from

a complete list of Colorado Plateau uranium miners.
Seventy-six percent of the miners in Saccomanno's 1988
database smoked cigarettes.

Of all the miners,

the non-smokers, 383 had died of lung cancer.

including
Three hundred

fifty-six of the victims were smokers, twenty-five were not,
and two had unknown smoking histories.

Radiation was

assumed to be responsible for virtually all of the lung
cancers In the non-smokers.

The average age at which the

cancers were diagnosed in the non-smokers was about fifty-

llOGeno Sacc omanno, "Radiati on Exposure of Uranium
Miners, Labor Department Hearings, 20 November 1968," in U.
S. Congress, Radiation Standards for Uranium Mining, 305 ;
Geno Saccomanno , quoted in Jack Cox, "Radiation Specter
Haunted Early U-Miners, " Denver Post, 3 September 1979, p.
1.
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SlX.

The non - smoking mlners all had accumulated at least

three hundred working level months of exposure, and most had
one thousand or more WLM. 111
Among the smokers Saccomanno found a correlation
between the amount of exposure and the incidence of lung
cancer.

Most of the individuals in this group had exposures

of three hundred or more WLM, and more than half had one
thousand or more WLM.

Saccomanno believed that smoking

caused the cancer for all victims with less than three
hundred WLM,

35 out of the total of 383.

To him,

the

evidence is a clear indication of the synergistic effects of
smoking and exposure to radon decay products.

But he is

firm in his belief that, although radon daughters in high,
prolonged doses contributed to the lung tumors,
caused most of the cancers."

"smoking

(He does acknowledge that the

very high levels of radiation absorbed by some miners during
the 1950s were capable of causing a tumor.)

Since 1988

Saccomanno's database has grown to a total of 17,792 miners.
Five hundred thirty-seven of them devel op ed lung cancer,
forty-four of whom were non-smokers, and his conclusions
about the data remain the same. 112

111Geno Saccomanno and others, "Relationship of
Radioactive Radon Daughters and Cigarette Smoking in the
Genesis of Lung Cancer in Uranium Miners," Cancer 62
(October 1988): 1404-1407.
112 Ibid.; Saccomanno interview.
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Saccomanno is widely respected but his findings are not
universally accepted.

In epidemiological studies there are

many different variables, statistics, models, and methods by
which to evaluate the data.

One doctor pointed out that

Saccomanno had not studied the full caseload, had not seen
evidence from miners who had left.

Other experts simply do

not interpret the data the way Saccomanno does.

Most would

agree that smoking and radiation produce a synergistic,
multiplicative, or additive effect.

But most believe that

the role of radiation in the development of cancer lS much
greater.

Those who study the problem often point out,

for

example, that a only a small percentage of Navajo mlners
smoked cigarettes; yet, the Navajo uranium mlnlng population
has suffered greatly increased rates of lung cancer .

Two

doctors who studied the incidence of cancer among Navajos
reached a conclusion far different than Saccomanno's:

"Our

data indicate that cigarettes act as a promoting agent, and
that radiation is the major cancer initiating agent.

,, 113

The small mlnlng communities on the Colorado Plateau
have been hit hard by the deaths of miners.

It has been

reported that In Marysville, Utah, where nearby mines had
notoriously high concentrations of radon decay products,
fifty percent of the miners had died of lung cancer by 1981.

113Jack Cox, "Radiation Spector Haunted Early U-Miners, "
Denver Post, 3 September 1979, p. 1; Leon S. Gottlieb and
Luverne A. Husen, "Lung Cancer among Navajo Uranium Miners, "
Chest 81 (April 1982 ): 51.
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Similar devastation has been reported from communities on
the Navajo Reservation, and from the survivors of two small
m1n1ng camps 1n Colorado. 114

The people in the small towns

of the West End of Montrose County have seen their share of
cancer and other lung ailments among uran1um m1ners.
It is difficult to estimate the number of m1ners from
the West End who have developed lung diseases.

A high

percentage of West End miners came to the area only for the
work; most of them eventually left.

Others, who may have

called the West End home, moved after the mining activity
ceased.

William L. Chenoweth helps the Justice Department

determine the work histories of miners, or those miners'
relatives, who have filed for compensation through the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act.

As of 1994, 854 claims

had been approved by the Justice Department.

Chenoweth

figures that eighty percent of those miners had spent some
time 1n the Uravan area.

An estimated 102 of those miners

"had spent their entire mining employment in the Uravan
area . ,, 115
In researching the history of the West End,

it 1S odd

to find very little mention in the area's newspaper of the

114 Ball, Cancer Factories, 51; Molly Ivins, "Death by
Radon Daughter, " Westworld (Sunday supplement to the Daily
Sentinel, 10 June 1979, 6-7; Godfrey, "Mining the Colorado
Plateau," 94.
115 Information provided to the author by William L.
Chenoweth, consultan t to the Radiation Unit, Department of
Justice.
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suspected or confirmed hazard of radiation in the mlnes.

In

1958 one of the first West End miners to develop lung cancer
died.

Nucla's Forum cited his death as due to "s ilicosis

and lung cancer ."

Shortly thereafter the director of the

Colorado Department of Health wrote to point out that the
man had died of lung cancer, not silicosis.

The director

urged for a "concerted effort in assisting mine operators In
reducing radiation exposure levels."

In response the editor

of the Nucla newspaper called for better performance from
"Colorado's undermanned and far-from-harsh mine inspection
program."

During this time the paper also carried a story

and some letters concerning the inadequacy of Colorado's
workman's compensation coverage.

(In 1961 the widow of the

miner who died in 1958 did receive compensation from the
Colorado Industrial Commission.) 1l6
Thereafter, there was, apparently, no mention of the
radiation problem until the late 1960s, when Willard Wirtz
threatened to impose a three-tenths working level standard
for uranium mines.

Nucla's newspaper carried two stories

concernlng the financial impact to mlnlng of Wirtz's
standard.

West End mine operators agreed that the financial

burden of installing more effective ventilation systems
116 Editorial (no title), Forum, 21 November 1958, p. 20;
"Forum's Forum," Forum, 2 January 1959, p. 14; Another
Voice Speaks Out on Silicosis Problem," Forum, 28 November
1958, p. 3; "Miners Ask 'Why Can't Something Be Done about
Occupational Coverage for Silicosis?'" Forum, 26 December
1958, p. 4; "First Settlement Made in Mine Radiation
Deaths," Forum, 16 November 1961.
II
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would be too great.

According to the local reporter,

"if

the .3 ruling goes into effect, it could seriously curtail
local uranium mlnlng and sound the death knell to our local
economy as far as it is based on mining."

The newspaper

editor wrote a column in 1969 about Geno Saccomanno's
efforts to encourage miners to give up smoking. 117
Certainly, there must have been much discussion of radiation
in the West End during the 1960s.

But it is interesting and

perhaps noteworthy that very little of it appeared in the
newspapers.
A reporter with the Wall Street Journal visited the
West End in 1967.

He found that, despite the warnings of

health experts, West End miners had "withdrawn into an
Alice-in-Wonderland existence."

None of the miners he

interviewed took seriously the threat posed by radiation In
the mines.
cancer,

Some were fatalistic:

"If I'm gOlng to get

I'm going to get it, and that's all there is to it."

Others simply believed the threat was overstated.

The

reporter framed his article on the premise that miners
"gambled" their lives "for a good salary, low taxes and
cheap housing. ,, 118
117 "Uranium Mining's Importance Stressed at Colorado
Meeting," Forum, 22 February 1968, p. 1; "Hearing Results
Extremely Important to Local Economy," Forum, 14 November
1968, p. 1; Marv Hearnesberger, "As I See It," 16 January
1969, p. 1.
118Guy Hal verson, "Uranium Miners Defy Warning That
Death Lurks in Form of Cancer-Causing Particles," Wall
Street Journal, 6 October 1967, p. 7.
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Another reporter coverlng the West End found a more
cautious attitude among some miners.

About the radiation

two miners claimed never to "give it a thought."

One of

them explained: "If a guy's gOlng to have it, he's going to
have it.

This is not the only thing that causes cancer."

However , a nineteen-year-old miner expressed concern,
saylng,

"I don't like it."

He declined to elaborate, except

to say that his wife" [didn't]

like it either."

Other

mlners voiced concern about the radiation, but seemed to
believe that conditions had improved to safe levels.

One

man pointed out that ventilation techniques were improving
constantly .

However, too much ventilation caused other

problems; it made the mlnes too cold, and the swiftly movlng
air tended to stir up dust.

He also noted that Union

Carbide's "safety rules are always a little bit stricter
than the state's."

None of these mlners wore respirators,

but all agreed that they would if a more comfortable
respirator were available. 119
Thirty years later the people of the West End do not
doubt that the radiation in the mines contributed to the
deaths of miners.

Even those who never feared working at

the Uravan mill, or living near the mill tailings in Uravan,
wi ll acknowledge that uranium miners were subjected to
excessive levels of radiation.

"Now people that worked In

119Gaylord Kirkham, "Views of Slope Miners Vary on
Uranium Dangers," Daily Sentinel, 18 May 1967, p. 1.
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the mlnes, and especially those that smoked cigarettes,
there's no argument about how the uranium and the smoking
cigarettes together caused a lot of cancer.

Those that

worked in the early days, most of them are gone, so you
can't argue about it." 120
Indeed, the people of the West End know Geno Saccomanno
and his research very well, and many of them agree that, In
most cases, smoking played a significant role in miners'
lung cancers and other respiratory problems.

One long-time

uranium miner claimed that he knew of only two miners who
developed lung cancer without ever having smoked.

Another

guessed that maybe "three or four" non - smoking miners whom
he knew had died of lung cancer. 121

They realize that when

a man who smoked and mined uranium for several decades dies
of lung cancer, there is some reasonable doubt as to the
genesls of his disease.

There is even less doubt for those

who smo ked cigarettes but mined only a relativel y short
period of time.

Cigarette smoking also compounds the

effects of the pulmonary fibrosis that miners developed from
the exposure to dust in the mines.
Nevertheless, many miners who smoked died prematurely
because the additional damage done by radiation reduced the
average age of death.

Moreover, at least five percent of

all lung cancer cases among miners were non-smokers who died
12° Interview #15.
121 Interview #12; Interview #33.
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at relatively young ages
research ) .

(according to Saccomanno's

Many others, regardless of their smoking habits,

developed pulmonary fibrosis from work in the mines.

One

can imagine the pain and frustration caused by the disease
or early deaths of these mlners.
There also seems to be a widespread belief In the West
End that the government knew all along that the mlners were
being exposed to dangerous levels of radiation.

One man

likened the AEC's uranium program to the nuclear testing
program of the 1950s; in both cases the government knew that
people would be exposed to harmful doses of radiation from
ei t her radon daughters or the fallout from the testing.

He

added that, when he mined, he simply thought it was safe;
otherwise, he believed, the government would have done
something to protect the miners.

There also is anger that

the AEC would encourage the miners to dig out the ore, but
refuse to set standards for the regulations.

Concerning the

AEC's role in the uranium procurement program, a West End
reSl'd en\...t- sal'd , "The government knew they were killing all
these guys." 122
One might assume that mlners and their families are
angry or bitter, and perhaps many are.

But from those who

have thus far survived one gets a sense of a certain
stoicism among the miners.

They knew that theirs was a

122 Interview #39; Interview #33; Interview #6; Interview
#12.
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hazardous occupation, even without the radiation.

Some

believe that the exhaust from underground diesel equipment
was the worst health hazard of all.

The physically

demanding nature of the work has exacted a toll on the
miners' health, and some suffer from pulmonary fibrosis
developed over years of working underground.

But those who

stayed in the mines for many years clearly liked their
occupation; they accepted these hazards and demands to work
underground.

And there is among them a rugged philosophy

they developed through the years of mining.
elaborated on this philosophy.

One mlner

Most blue collar professions

have risks, and when he was mining he did not think the
risks,

including radiation, were much greater than those of

other jobs.

He worried more about driving back and forth to

work than he did about mining or radiation.

In any case,

"people do what they have to do" to make their living. 123
One former miner asserted that the mining c o mmun i ty
abides little "resentment."

"Uranium mining for so many

years was their livelihood, which profited them very well.
Their children had opportunities that they never would have
had if they had stayed on the ranch or the farm.
Uranium mining was very good to these people, and they don't
outright resent" what has happened to them. 124
Nevertheless, this opinion might seem blithe.
123 Interview #33.
124Intervie w #13.

Relatively
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few of us know what it lS like to learn that we have lung
cancer or pulmonary fibrosis, especially when the stricken
knows that the cause could have been eliminated, or knows
that he was put deliberately in harm's way.

If those people

and their families harbor resentment, it is understandable.
"There's a lot of widows around here." 125

That simple

and direct statement from a uranium miner's widow glves as
much interpretation to uranium mining's legacy in the West
End as any story can.

At the town park in Nucla stands a

small monument, erected to the memory of the area's mlners.
The stone has seventy -four names inscribed upon it, although
the list includes miners who died of causes unrelated to
mlnlng.

The monument reads, also simply and directly,

Memory of These Miners and the Lives They Gave for the
Families They Loved."

125 Interview #6.

"In
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CHAPTER 8
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ECONOMY HERE? l
The West End of Montrose County does not glve up its
history easily.

For many years eight or ten houses sat on a

grassy bluff overlooking the Dolores River on the highway
about ten miles north of Uravan.

The houses had been moved

from Uravan in the mid-1980s, but the mover abandoned his
project and left the houses to the vicissitudes of nature,
passersby, and vandals.
forsaken,

There the houses sat, broken and

resembling only vaguely the houses in which Uravan

residents once lived.

The houses might have remained there,

slowly deteriorating for many decades to come, but early in
1998 arsonists set them ablaze.
A few miles further down the road toward Uravan, one
can stop and look at the remnants of the hanging flume,
attached to the high walls o f the Dolores River canyon.

It

seems amazing that any part of the flume remains, and more
amazing that it was built in the first place.

The hanging

flume survives as a tribute to the perseverance, optimism,
and ingenuity of those who seek precious metals.
Closer to Uravan, at the site of the old Club Ranch,
lie several huge ponds lined in black.

The water in the

ponds is a deep emerald green, and one knows immediately
that he is upon a reclamation site of some kind.

Near the

l "Letter: Whose [sic] Responsible for Economy Here?"
San Miguel Basin Forum, 23 January 1997, p. 6.
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ponds is a collection of office buildings marked "Umetco
Minerals Corporation."

The entire Uravan site is fenced,

and on the fence hang signs warning of radioactivity.

By

the side of the road a historical marker tells a short
history of Uravan.

A stranger could not imagine a town

situated by the San Miguel River in the narrow canyon.

Even

a former resident of Uravan would hardly recognize the
place, because everything, the buildings, houses, plants,
and the earth upon which the town stood has been scrapped
The goals for this remediation are high,

away.

"a cleanup

standard so stringent that a preschool child could eat an
aspirin-sized dirt clod of Uravan soil 350 days a year for
six years--without getting cancer. ,, 2

It is difficult to

imagine a person formulating such a standard.

Exactly what

it means is anybody's guess.
Nothing from the Uravan mill remalns except some
concrete supports on the side of the mesa.

At the far end

of town, two buildings remain: the Boarding House, built in
the early 1910s, and the Recreation Hall, dating from the
1930s.

The buildings stand incongruently on a barren site

and amidst big trucks and other heavy equipment.

West End

residents hope someday to save those buildings, but no one
quite knows what to do with them.

2Mark Obmascik, "Cleaning Up After Mines No Easy Task , "
Denver Post, 12 November 1995, p. 1A.
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Just southeast of Uravan next to the highway is the old
baseball field.

It lS covered with weeds and vegetation,

but the light posts still exist.

The place must hold

memories for many people, and former residents still meet
here once a year for a picnic.
About thirteen miles past Uravan on the road to
Naturita looms the old VCA mill site.
sight.

It, too,

lS a strange

Over a year-long period workers removed nearly

800,000 cubic yards of dirt from eighty-five acres of land.
Truckers hauled the dirt in 45,848 trips to the disposal
site at Uravan.

Then, DOE officials encountered financial

trouble and found themselves without the funds to refill the
site.

The late spring ralns formed large ponds on the site,

which the locals named "Lake DOE."

DOE officials never said

they would not finish the project; the agency simply had no
money with which to do it.

Entreaties from state

legislators and congressional representatives, howeve r, will
likely result In the eventual completion of the reclamation.
The site will be filled with clean soil and restored to its
original condition. 3

Many local residents would like to

convert the site into a golf course.
Naturita sits just a mile or two beyond the VCA site.
The residents of this village have suffered slights through

3"Tailings Site Cleanup Here Nears Final Stages, Mid
1998 Deadline," San Miguel Basin Forum, 25 December 1997, p.
6; "DOE Commits to Promises Here," San Miguel Basin Forum,
12 June 1997, p. 1.
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In the 1930s it was dubbed "Gnats-will-eat you,"

the years.

a pun on the local pronunciation of the name, and a
reference to the pesky nature of the prolific insects of the
area.

By the 1970s it was said that "if it wasn't for bars

and gas stations, there wouldn't be a town of Naturita."

A

visitor once called it a "remote, unkempt little town,"
although rustic might be a more appropriate word. 4

In the

San Miguel Canyon, on the banks of the river, Naturita can
be quite picturesque.

In the residential section one finds

tidy houses with pleasant lawns, gardens, and shade trees.
Vestiges of uranium mining are everywhere.

People

decorate their yards with old mining equipment, and the
names of business establishments reflect the former
influence of mining: Yellowrock Cafe, Miner's Inn, and
Incline Lounge.

Just outside of Naturita, on the road to

Nucla, stands the most poignant reminder of the uranium
industry: the forlorn sign for the "Uranium Drive-In"
theater.

The theater closed long ago, and the sign is

decorated with rea l estate advertisements, political
endorsements, stickers, and spray paint.
Nucla sits about five hundred feet and five miles north
of Naturita.

Here, above the San Miguel Canyon, the view

4Lillian Rice Brigham, Colorado Travelore: Romance of
its Trai l s , Railroads , Highways, and Airways (Denver:
Peerless Printing, 1938), 137; "Friday 1 3th Date of Bar
Brawls in Naturita , " San Miguel Basin Forum, 19 October
1978 , p. 9; Eric Morgenthaler, "To Keep Their Town Alive,
the Residents of Naturita, Colo., Want a Nuclear Dump," Wal l
Street Journal, 1 J uly 1982, p. lB.
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broadens in every direction so that one can see the San Juan
Mountains to the southeast.

The buildings and houses in

Nucla resemble those in Naturita, but the town lS more
expanslve.

In Nucla, especially driving along the country

roads outside of town, one gets more of a sense of the
agricultural side of the West End.
The grandeur of the West End becomes apparent on the
road from Naturita to Paradox, through the spectacular
There are no signs of life in the first

Paradox Valley.

twenty miles of this immense broad valley.

Bedrock, in the

middle of the Paradox Valley, is but an old store at which
food, drinks, and gasoline are available to the traveler on
lonely Highway 90.

Paradox, at the northeast end of the

valley, surVlves, the home to a collection of ranching and
farming families.

A drive to the rim of the Paradox Valley

reveals the extent of the agriculture In the northeast end
of the valley.

Paradox has no businesses; the once busy

Paradox Merc (mercantile) is boarded shut.
The West End survived the fall of the uranlum industry
of the early 1980s.

Many people had to move and many

businesses closed, but the area has rebounded.

In 1980

Naturita had 810 residents, Nucla 1,026, and Uravan 510.
After the fall of the uranium market Naturita mav have lost
~

as much as one-half of its population, and Nucla's
population decreased about forty percent.

Now, Naturita lS

home to as many as five hundred, and Nucla has a population
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of about nlne hundred.

Of course, Uravan ceased to exist as

a town, though it still appears on maps.

Although no single

industry supports the West End, there are a number of
smaller employers that prevented a collapse.

(The

population of the West End is difficult to estimate on a
year-to-year basis.

One indication of the area's popUlation

is the enrollment in local schools, presented in Table 5 on
the following page.)
Nucla's power station has been an important part of the
economy since it was built In 1959.

It was operated as a

rural electric cooperative by Colorado-Ute Electric
Association until 1984.

In that year it was shut down, at

the same time, coincidentally, that the uranium industry
came to a halt.

The power plant was recommissioned in 1987

with a new technology: "circulating fluidized-bed
combustion."

This new method of coal burning reduces

pollution and leaves as a by-product gypsum, which may be
used for construction and agricultural purposes.

The Nucla

power station is said to have been the first to incorporate
this technology in the United States.

The power plant,

owned by Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association,
employs about fifty-six West Enders.

The nearby New Horizon

mine supplies coal to the power plant; it is also owned by
Tri-State, and employs about twenty-five.

Tri-State is also

important because of the local taxes it pays, and because it
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Table 5.--West End School Enrollment,

Year

Nucla
High

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

238
269
277
272
283
272
189
202
225
211
227
222
224
214
227
235
238
244
221
222
175
163
148
179
150
125
117
102
94
101
98
100
113
121
149
150
152

1960-1996

Nucla
Paradox
Uravan
Naturita
Middle Elementary Elementary Elementary Total
380
329

348
345

77
79

298
292

NA

NA

NA

NA

330
297
275
263
294
280
290
280
297
276
253
241
242
258
235
218
208
204
193
177
113

349
337
354
498
479
490
453
436
374
303
310
298
297
285
289
299
300
286
232
223
227
159
170
194
190
190
223
230
240
312
333
356
331
252

58
50
47
46
31
37
33
38
38
26
27
26
33
46
35
32
33
38
29
35
32
32
22
27
23
17

281
236
210
198
188
185
167
147
124
102
72
76
92
96
82
81
72
64
51
49

87

80
87
81
78
79
83
99

75
89
93
93
164

7

9

16
12
13

1341
1314
1311
1290
1203
1158
1194
1194
1217
1154
1128
1055
931
876
868
899
923
885
851
835
767
668
632
558
428
397
425
396
379
412
411
439
500
543
614
586
581

Naturita's middle school consisted of grades one through
. h+-L..
elg
The Paradox Elementary School was closed from 1990 until
1993, and again in 1997, because of a lack of students.
Children from Paradox ride a school bus to other West End
schools.
The Uravan school closed in 1984.
Source: West End Public Schools, District RE -2
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"stimulates significant amounts of local purchases to
support the operations of the plant.,, 5
Umetco Minerals, formally Union Carbide, has also
provided jobs and economic stimulation.

In its on-going

reclamation project the company has employed about forty
since the mid-1980s, and that employment will continue for
at least several more years.

Umetco has occasionally hired

locals to reclaim old mlnes, filling the entrances to the
mines with the waste left from long ago.

Umetco has also

made a significant gift to the West End.

The company sold

to the DOE a waste repository on Club Mesa, which the DOE
has used to deposit contaminated soil from the old VCA mill
site.

Umetco gave five percent (slightly more than

$100,000) of the sale of the pit to the West End.

The West

End Advisory Committee has used the money for various
projects and to address various needs in the area. 6
The DOE's reclamation project at the old Naturita mill
site has also provided some jobs to the West End.
jobs have not been steady and long term.

But those

Moreover, when the

reclamation projects at Uravan and Naturita are finally
finished,

a significant job source will end, as well.

5"Nucla Station: From Demonstration Project to
Commercial Success--It Was Quite a Trip," Update (Winter
1995): 1-9. Update is "a newsletter for customers and
friends about advanced energy technology from Ahlstrom
Pyropower."
6"West End Benefits from Surcharge Money," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 4 December 1997, p. 1.
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The school district lS one of the larger employers In
the West End.

In addition, the public serVlce companles

that serve the area provide employment, and some employees
of Montrose County live and work in the West End.

There are

also many privately owned businesses of the type that serve
most communities, restaurants, gas stations, a variety of
stores, repair shops, and other service-oriented
enterprises.

There are businesses common to rural and

agricultural areas, such as feed and supply stores.

And,

there are some construction companies, a small concrete
plant, a trucking company, and a gravel pit, businesses that
serve the West End and San Miguel County.
One of the more successful entrepreneurs In the West
End is the owner of Reams Construction.

This company

performs heavy construction projects around western Colorado
and in nearby states.

The owner of the company is the son

of a former Uravan mill worker; he could have located his
business anywhere, but he chose to stay in Naturita, and his
business employs about twenty-five people.

Another

successful West End businessman operates Nucla's pharmacy
and drug store.

He, too,

is the son of a former Uravan mill

worker, and he wanted to stay in the West End and raise his
family there.

This is typical of those who live there.

Many will admit that they could find better business
opportunities elsewhere, or simply choose to live and pursue
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their livelihoods elsewhere; but they prefer to live In the
West End .
Ranching and associated agriculture play an important
role in the West End economy.

There are several big ranches

in the area, but, as ever, there are many families who
simply ralse a few cattle to supplement their income.
Others use family land to raise hay and gralns.

Thus,

agriculture in the West End remalns what it always has been:
a solid and stable, but not spectacular, part of the
economy.
The towns of the West End have also become what are
known as "bedroom communities."

These are towns in which

people live because the cost of living remains relatively
low; but workers from these towns find employment in the
resort communities that have high costs of living.

Thus,

some people living in Nucla and Naturita commute to
Telluride to work in the service industry and in other
capacities there.

It is not easy, because the drive takes

an hour to an hour and a half.

But people of modest means

simply cannot afford to live in Telluride.

Employers in

Telluride have arranged for shuttle busses to transport some
of these workers.
In the West End also live many retired uranlum industry
employees.

When the mill and the mines shut down, many

people close to retirement age moved to bigger towns, such
as Grand Junction, Montrose, and other communities in

389

southwestern Colorado.

But others chose to retire in the

West End, where they had spent their careers and raised
their children.

They wanted to stay in the place they had

always called home, or had adopted as their home.
It is often said that the West End is home to many
recipients of government aid.

They live in the area because

of a generally low cost of li ving, and receive their lncome
from varlOUS government sources.
In 1996 the price of uranium rebounded slightly.

Early

In 1997 a uranium mine opened in the eastern part of
Colorado; later in the year a mine operated by the
International Uranium Corporation o pened in San Miguel
County.

The mine runs two shifts and employs about forty

people.

The company ships its ore to a mill in Blanding,

Utah.

Many people are skeptical that the operation will

succeed, because the price of uranium simply is not that
high.

The carnotite ores of southwestern Colorado also

contain vanadium, and it is from that product that the
International Uranium Corporation hopes to make its profit.
But the price of vanadium fluctuates a great deal, and there
would seem to be no guarant ee for a continued lucrative
market. 7
The openlng of the "Sunday Mine," as it is known,
created a few jobs for the people of the West End.

And, the

7"Experts Predicting Mining Comeback," San Miguel Basin
Forum, 18 April 1996, p. 1; "More Uranium Miners Needed at
the Sunday," San Miguel Basin Forum, 6 November 1997, p. 3.
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company has announced that it will buy uranlum ore.

But

regardless of the success of this particular operation, most
people there think the uranium industry will never approach
its former intensity.

The demand from utility companies

simply is not great enough, and the supply from foreign
countries is cheaper.

The old-time mlners say that it takes

too much capital to get started; government regulations have
"driven mining costs to unnecessarily high levels.,, 8

Also,

they say that the ore most easily mined is gone; it would
take a much bigger investment to extract the uranium that lS
left.

No one in the West End expects to see mlnlng ever

approach its one-time influence .
The West End economy is relatively stable, but its lack
of vitality and growth has sometimes made it difficult for
local leaders to provide and maintain certain services.
example,

For

in 1997 the West End School Board found a budget

shortfall of $38,000.

The superintendent pointed out that

the district's slim budget made it difficult to give raises,
hire new staff, and institute new school programs.

Later In

the year the school board decided to close the Paradox
Elementary School, because enrollment there had dropped
below ten students.

Funding for the area's health clinic

has also fallen short; moreover, the small West End towns
sometimes find it difficult to find good doctors who want to

8"New Regulations Slow Future of Mining Activities,"
San Miguel Basin Forum, 8 May 1997, p. 10.
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live In the area.

9

Many would say that the West End la c ks

facilities for its youth; for example, the area has had no
swimming pool since Uravan closed.

And, without a strong

i ndustrial base, many young people must leave the West End
for employment opportunities .
At the same time, however, local leaders have been
resourceful in their use of tax revenues, and in securing
government grants and other types of financial assistance.
These funds have helped the towns provide the health clinic,
emergency medical service, law enforcement, water systems,
and city equipment, and to improve town parks and buildings.
Nevertheless, virtually everyone would agree that the
West End needs more economic diversity.

Since the early

1980s community leaders in the West End have searched for
ways to replace the then faltering uranium industry.

They

looked into several options, which included the construction
of a women's prlson in the West End, the establishment of a
horse track, and the building of a retirement community.
There were also some more controversial suggestions.

In

1980 community leaders negotiated with Chem - Nuclear Systems,
a company that intended to establish a low-level nuclear
dump near Naturita.

The vast majority of West Enders were

9"West End Schools Making Budget Cuts," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 24 April 1997, p. 1; "Board Decides to Close
Paradox Elementary School for the 97-98 Year," San Miguel
Basin Forum, 7 August 1997, p. 1; "Southwest Health
Committed to Clinic Here," San Miguel Basin Forum, 1 January
1998, p. 1; "Towns Call Foul on BCI Investment Efforts," San
Miguel Basin Forum, 13 March 1997, p. 1.

3 92
In favor of the waste disposal facility, which would have
created about one hundred new jobs.

Eventually, however ,

Chern-Nuclear decided the Naturita site did not fit its
purposes.

Another controversial plan involved the

establishment of casino gambling in the West End.

However ,

the plan hinged on the passage of an amendment to the state
constitution that would allow residents of any town to vote
for legalized gambling.

The resolution to amend the

constitution failed in the Colorado House of
Representatives. 10
The debate on how best to diversify the West End
economy continues.

Some still believe that the area can

attract more tourists.

A member of the Nucla-Naturita

Chamber of Commerce hopes to take advantage of the "small
town safety, security and c oziness in a location that is
between crowded and expensi v e vacation lands."

He would

build hiking, bicycling, and horse trails, and more access
to the area's rlvers.

He talked of creating a "tourist

friendly" atmosphere by beautifying the towns and by
building bike shops, horse stables, and four-wheel drive
vehicle and snowmobile shops. ll

However, until there are

10Singular, "Two Western Co lorado Towns," 32; Laura
Bishop, "Naturita Group Places Bet on Gambling," Daily
Sentinel, 1 December 1990, p. 1; Laura Bishop "Small-Town
Gambling Bill Killed," Daily Sentinel, 24 April 1991, p. 1.
ll "The Future of the West End May Lie in Tourism," San
Miguel Basin Forum, 27 February 1997, p. 10.
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government."

He urged locals to write to politicians for

federal help in finding a replacement to the uranium
industry.

"Let's be the communities who demanded assistance

to replace what government took away." l3
The editor echoed the words of a Naturita man who wrote
that the uranium industry collapsed not only because of the
withdrawal of the government's market for uranium, but also
because of "New Federal Environmental Protection Policies"
under which the Uravan mill could no longer operate.
this writer,

To

"it seems only right that a community of towns

that have played such a vital role in supplying the nation
with a valuable national security commodity during World War
II and beyond, now be given Federal assistance to help them
rebuild their local economies." 14
Of the West End's future,

no one seems sure.

Although

it has increased somewhat in size since the mid-1980s, some
still are not optimistic that the area has a secure future.
David Lavender once wrote that "there had been a day when
the town of Nucla had been content to sit on its hands
waiting.

Why

bother?

i

What would tomorrow bring that was

worth going out to meet?"

That attitude changed with the

coming of the uranium industry, which created, according to

l3 "What Government Required Here, Government Should
Keep Here," San Miguel Basin Forum, 23 January 1997, p. 6.
14 "Letter: Whose [sic] Responsible For Economy Here?"
San Miguel Basin Forum, 23 January 1997, p. 6.
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Lavender,

"a new stir. ,, 15

Now that the "stir" generated by

uranium has ceased, would Lavender regard Nucla and the West
End as an area "content to sit on its hands?"
Lavender's observations, usually so keen, seem
unfitting as applied to the West End.

The area never would

have survived had people simply sat on their hands.

Those

who pioneered the West End worked hard to fulfill the dream
of settling a harsh and beautiful land.

In retrospect it

seems not that they sat on their hands, but

~truggled

succeeded in building a life in a place they loved.

and
When

new opportunities came, such as , the uranium industry, West
Enders took advantage of them .

However, few people made an

easy dollar, whether from agriculture or from uranium.
Those who now live in the area approach life the same way
that the early pioneers did.

They find ways to succeed in a

place they prefer to live, but a place that can be
demanding, as well.

And, they take advantage of any

opportunities afforded them.

15Lavender,

"One Man's West," 3 01.
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